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ABSTRACT
The relationship between ethics and foreign policy is 
increasingly important given the current trend toward 
globalization. However, both of the leading international 
relations theories, liberalism and realism, suffer from an 
inability to integrate the ethical and pragmatic dimensions 
of foreign policy. This is because of the break between the 
transcendent ethics espoused by these theories and the 
uncertainty of their epistemic foundations. This dissertation 
examines the implications of the covenantal paradigm for 
meeting the theoretical challenges within international 
ethics. The covenantal paradigm, as described by Daniel 
Elazar's work on the covenant tradition in politics, provides 
a means of overcoming the problems of liberal and realist 
theories. Covenant's three essential principles are that 
power must be shared and limited, that liberty must be 
federal, or directed toward covenantal goals, and that 
policy-makers must have a sense of realism about the 
existence of evil and its political consequences.
Liberalism's origins in covenantal political culture and 
thought make its premises similar in many ways to the 
covenantal paradigm. But the Enlightenment separation between 
ethics and epistemology, as well as the ever-increasing 
liberal attraction to hierarchical methods of problem­
solving, led to liberal imperialism and ethical confusion. As 
a result, liberal policy-makers often suffer from moral 
blindness and a tendency toward coercion in the international
vii
arena. Realises, on the other hand, often fall into a pattern 
of exercising an existential, private morality, indiscernible 
by those not directly involved in statecraft. This approach 
is unacceptable in an open society.
Covenantal thought integrates ethics and interests in a 
manner similar to that found in social capital theories 
discussed by Robert Putnam, Francis Fukuyama, and James 
Coleman. This paradigm retains all the benefits of liberal 
theory, such as a means of discerning progress in history, a 
focus on human rights, and an empirical grounding, without 
falling into the trap of either impotent isolationism or 
liberal imperialism. Ultimately, the goal of a covenantal 
foreign policy is similar to Kant's vision of a foedus 
pacificum (a peaceful covenanted federation of nations) . 
Nations will also be subject to the norms of international 
law, the foundational premise of which is pacta sunt 
servanda, nations ought to keep their covenants.
Vlll
INTRODUCTION
For three hundred years, liberalism served as a 
comprehensive theoretical framework for understanding issues 
of politics and ethics. Since the time of Thomas Hobbes and 
John Locke, both of whom documented and interpreted the 
events of the English Civil War, liberalism has been 
clarified and reshaped in radical ways, making it distinctive 
from its earlier incarnation in the seventeenth century. 
Despite these changes, the language used to describe our 
hopes and aspirations for the world continues to be broadly 
liberal in nature. No statesman can plausibly speak like a 
nineteenth century practitioner of realpolicik; even the most 
oppressive of late twentieth century regimes feel the need to 
make ethical justifications for their behavior that often 
sound vaguely liberal.
Early in the nineteenth century, the epistemological 
assumptions that gave birth to liberalism were discarded, a 
fact which has had profound ethical implications. But liberal 
international theorists today espouse normative beliefs with 
global implications without taking these changes into 
account. Late-modem liberalism asserts a variety of public 
goods for morally autonomous individuals. Liberalism is 
heralded as the end of history while claiming to be
ateleological. There is much that is beneficial in liberal 
practice, much to be preserved. This paper argues that, in 
order to do that, liberal theory must be revisited and 
revised, not destroyed. While realism has done much to bring 
to light the flaws of liberal international theory and 
practice, it cannot, by itself, serve as an alternative. For 
realism in its contemporary form cannot overcome its own 
ethical limitations. In many ways, it suffers from the same 
afflictions as liberalism. As such, both theories must be 
transcended rather than simply denied or synthesized.
This work deals primarily with the ethical dimensions of 
liberal statecraft. Joel H. Rosenthal states, "the essential 
task of ethics and international affairs. . . [is] to show 
how policy decisions can be firmly rooted in ethics while 
avoiding the perils of moralism and absolutism on the one 
hand and empty relativism on the other. Liberalism is often 
given as the ethical alternative to an ostensibly amoral 
realism. Yet this dichotony obscures the fact that 
contemporary liberalism itself is rife with internal conflict 
over matters of ethics. If liberalism is able to provide an 
answer as to what an ethical statecraft ought to look like, 
it must do so on a broadly reconstructed basis. To rephrase 
Rosenthal's insightful statement, it must account for the 
contextual nature of rule-application (without falling into 
relativism) as well as meeting the moral obligations of
 ^ Joel Rosenthal, "Introduction! Ethics through the Cold War and 
After," in Ethics and International Affairs: A Reader, ed. Joel 
Rosenthal (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 1995), 2.
covenant:-making without becoming rigid absolutism. One way to 
accomplish the task of integrating ethics and policy is by 
returning to the Aristotelian understanding of phronesis or 
practical reason. Some postmodernist thinkers have done just 
that while eschewing Aristotle's metaphysics and his 
teleology. More importantly, they discard the attachment to 
the polis, which in Hellenic thought educated one into the 
virtues that phronesis assumes to be present. - This is a 
promising beginning but it is just that, a beginning.
Phronesis, as it appears in Aristotelian theory, is 
attached to an understanding of the good. This attachment 
distinguishes it from mere cleverness. Phronesis, as 
prudence, is attached to the substantive humanistic good of 
covenant. Covenantal thought places the need for power to be 
shared and limited at the forefront of its concerns. Power 
ought to be used to achieve public goods; covenant seeks 
after the commonwealth ideal, something described further 
below. Prudence weaves its way through both domestic and 
international politics as the recognition of this need to 
limit power in its application. Liberals recognize this need 
at the domestic level while realists focus upon its 
international implications. Yet power-limitation is the 
unitary thread that runs through the comprehensive political 
ethic of covenantal theory.
The theoretical focus of this paper raises a very
2 On this point, postmodernists follow Aquinas and other neo- 
Aristotelizms for whom the polis was an outmoded form of political 
orgemization. Unlike Aquinas, however, postmodernists do not replace the 
polis with some conception of natural law.
important question: Why the need for more theory or any 
theory for that matter? A theory provides a rational 
reordering of concepts into a meaningful whole that may serve 
as a more effective guide for praxis. One might object that 
such a definition does not fit science, particularly the 
natural sciences in which abstract truth is sought apart from 
practical applications. This ignores two very important 
developments in the physical sciences. First, the concept of 
purely abstract truth has been pressed to the margins of 
science for the last thirty years, especially in such areas 
as quantum physics and the search for a unified field theory. 
Second, scientists themselves recognize that theory ought to 
lead to more discovery which, in turn, ought to facilitate 
better theory. This movement from theory to praxis, labeled 
•abduction* by Charles Peirce, belies the notion that theory 
is somehow autonomous in the natural sciences. The same is 
true of international relations. Just as Kant stated that 
percepts without concepts are meaningless, so for statesmen, 
praxis without theory is meaningless at best and dangerous at 
worst.
In the case of international affairs, there is no better 
place to look for theoretical possibilities than in the 
language and practice of those who have come before us. But 
just as in the sciences, when theory fails to match what is 
observed in the world, the theory must be revised or 
scrapped. As Kant and, more recently, Thomas Kuhn attempted 
to show, there are times when anomalies ought to alert us to
the failures of current theories and send us looking for a 
new perspective that better explains what we are observing.^ 
Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Locke all looked to 
contemporary practice in order to derive rational bases for 
understanding politics. They were theorizing about events 
which had already taken place in order to better understand 
them and apply that understanding to the future. In short, 
they sought to make the future more rationally comprehensible 
than the past.
If realist and liberal international theories have both 
fallen short, the covenantal paradigm provides a sounder 
theoretical basis for integrating ethics and policy. The 
covenantal paradigm provides a means of fulfilling our 
aspirations to achieve public goods recognized by liberal 
thinkers. In addition, the historical circumstances that gave 
rise to covenantal thought highlight the concerns of many 
international realists about the human propensity toward the 
domination of others. Covenant as paradigm asserts three 
primary points. First, power must be limited and shared. 
Second, covenantal liberty is the liberty to achieve the 
objectives of the covenant within a multiplicity of spheres 
of activity; public goods are the responsibility of civil 
society as well as the state. Covenantal, or federal, liberty 
is not to be confused with natural liberty, which can be
 ^Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970). Kuhn's own epistemology 
suffers from many of the same neo-Kantian flaws discussed in this paper. 
As a sociology of science, however, his work is a valuable commentary on 
scientific practice.
equated with absolute autonoiry. Finally, policies ought to 
take into account the human propensity to err, to commit 
selfish or even evil acts. This requires a kind of realism in 
policy-making that goes beyond the cultural pessimism found 
in much contemporary realist thought. These elements of 
covenantal thought serve as a foundation for overcoming the 
limitations of other international theories, while preserving 
their insights.
Limitations of the Studv 
This study takes a paradigmatic approach. It attempts 
to construct a "grammar" of political ethics rather than 
dealing with specific policy issues in detail.'* In Kuhn's 
terms, the former is a function of paradigmatic theory while 
the latter falls under what he terms 'normal s c i e n c e . L i k e  a 
grammatical model, paradigms describe a pattern of practice 
to which specific cases can be applied. Kuhn describes the 
process of normal science as being done within largely 
assumed presuppositions. Only when the process of normal 
science fails, when inexplicable anomalies occur again and 
again, do those presuppositions come under question.® While
 ^ This use of paradigm is in accordance with its Greek root, 
peuradeigma, meaning an example. Kuhn gives two examples of 
paradigmatic practice: grammar and common law jurisprudence. See Kuhn, 
23.
5 Ibid., 24.
® Ibid., 67f. Kuhn states, "Because it denumds large-scale 
paradigm destruction and major shifts in the problems and techniques of 
normal science, the emergence of new theories is generally preceded by a 
period of pronounced professional insecurity. As one might expect, that 
insecurity is generated by the persistent failure of the puzzles of
Kuhn's model overemphasizes discontinuities in the progress 
of science, and has limited applicability in the social 
sciences, it is useful as an inquiry into the means by which 
major theoretical change in a given field occurs.
This work asserts that liberalism, the predominant 
political paradigm in the West for two centuries, is subject 
to contradictions that constitute failures at both 
theoretical and empirical levels of analysis. Neither 
contemporary liberal theory nor liberal policy (domestic and 
foreign) can account for itself in its own terms. Second, a 
political ethic that seeks to secure the humanistic ethics 
treasured by liberals must be covenantal, not contractual.
The covenantal paradigm, described in greater detail below, 
more effectively deals with what Daniel Elazar calls the "two 
faces of politics': power and justice.'' All political 
paradigms must account for these two poles of human endeavor. 
Liberalism and international realism both suffer from an 
inability to take these poles into account because of a chasm 
separating their epistemologies and their ethics. Covenantal 
thought, however, does not share this affliction and can 
better serve as a framework within which rational policy 
decisions can be made. Because of the paradigmatic emphasis 
of the paper, it shares much more in common stylistically
normal science to come out as they should. Failure of existing rules is 
a prelude to a search for new ones."
 ^ Daniel Elazar, Covenant and Commonwealth: From Christian 
Separation through the Protestant Reformation, The Covenant Tradition in 
Politics Series, Volume II (Brunswick NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1996),
4.
with Morgenthau's Scientific Man, Reinhold Niebuhr's Moral 
Man: Immoral Society, or, to a lesser degree, Fukuyama's The 
End of History and the Last Man than with a work espousing a 
host of specific policy recommendations. The problems raised 
in those works, the relationship of power to justice, and the 
role of justice in a world plagued by evil, will be 
reexamined in the chapters that follow.
The Libgral Rgvival 
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, liberalism as a 
theory of international relations has experienced a revival 
both as an empirical explanation of world order and as a 
normative basis for foreign policy. Michael Doyle, for 
example, states that liberalism is "emerging as a powerful 
paradigm in the social scientific sense. Unusually— for 
international relations— it is a tested causal theory.*®
Books like Francis Fukuyama's The End of History and the Last 
Man, Joshua Muravchik's more policy-oriented Exporting 
Democracy, and a recurrent interest in Immanuel Kant's 
Perpetual Peace reveal a renewed sense of hope that peace can 
be achieved through liberal means. The underlying theme of 
these works is that peace will be brought about through an 
alteration in the structural relationships of states that 
reflect changes in the domestic conditions of those states.
As states become democratic, they will cease to be a threat 
to one another. There is some evidence for this being the
® Michael Doyle, Ways of War and Peace (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Co., 1997), 285.
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case. Indeed, it appears that, as Kant predicted, liberal 
democratic states do not fight one another.®
What are the primary tenets of liberal international 
relations theory? There are a number of variations of 
liberal theory; but they do have some core elements in 
common. Liberal international relations theory is defined in 
this study as being comprised of four fundamental elements.^® 
First, liberal theory is progressive. Mark Zacher and 
Richard Matthew state: “International relations are gradually 
being transformed such that they promote greater human 
freedom by establishing conditions of peace, prosperity, and 
j u s t i c e . T h e  authors quote John Gray, who asserts that 
liberalism is individualist, egalitarian, universalist and 
“meliorist in its affirmation of the corrigibility and 
improvabi1ity of all social institutions and political 
a r r a n g e m e n t s . "^2 inherent in liberal theory is a belief in the 
power of human reason and its ability to alter conditions of
® Michael Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,* in International 
Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, eds. Paul Viotti and 
Mark V. Kauppi, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1993), 279. See also R.J. 
Rummel, “Libertarianism and International Violence,“ Journal of Conflict 
Resolution (March 1983), 27-71; Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa, 
“Polities and Peace,“ International Security, 2(Pall 1995), 108-32;
John Oneal, Zeev Maoz, and Bruce Russett, *The Liberal Peace: 
Interdependence, Democracy and International Conflict: 1950-1985,“ 
Journal of Peace Research (February 1996), 11-28.
2° This list is derived from Mark Zacher and Richard Matthew, 
“Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands,* in 
Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the 
Neoliberal Challenge, ed. Charles Kegley Jr. (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1995), 107-150.
Ibid., 109.
12 John Gray Liberalism (Minneapolis : University of Minnesota 
Press, 1986), x; quoted in Zacher and Matthew, 109.
life for the better.
Second, liberal theory is ateleological. *[I]t does not
project the emergence of a particular historical end state in
which humankind will realize perfect f r e e d o m . T h i s  quality
of liberal theory, if taken at face value, is one of its
weakest points. Fukuyama in The End of History, reveals why
liberalism stands or falls based on its ability to deal with
this issue. Fukuyama asserts that not only will liberal
states be the final form of polity, but that liberal theory
will be the final movement of intellectual history as well.
Liberalism makes us free to choose our version of the good, a
choice that cannot be predetermined under liberal theory.
Yet even he recognizes that liberal theory alone cannot
maintain itself without a discernible vision of an ideal,
though not perfect, society.
The third element of liberal theory is the belief that
international cooperation is central to the project of global
transformation.^** This work takes this argument one step
further, asserting that solving collective action problems is
the central challenge liberal international actors face.
Robert Keohane's distinction between cooperation and harmony
is instructive on this point.
Cooperation, as compared to harmony, requires active 
attempts to adjust policies to meet the demands of others.
That is, not only does it depend on shared interests, but it 
emerges from a pattern of discord or potential discord.
Without discord, there would be no cooperation, only
Ibid.
14 Ibid., 110.
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harmony.
It is Important to define cooperation as mutual 
adjustment rather than to view it simply as reflecting a 
situation in which common interests outweigh conflicting 
ones. . . .  We require this distinction because discord 
sometimes prevails even when cowman interests exist.
The liberal approach to solving collective action dilemmas
has been varied. At times, liberals appeal to interests
alone, appearing cynical. As Keohane suggests, interests
alone are not enough to explain how cooperation has occurred
in the past or how it might be enhanced in the future. On
other occasions, liberals have appealed to moral principle
alone, appearing foolish. A good part of the reconstructive
project in this work involves examining how such problems may
be solved successfully by redefining political rationality,
or rather, returning to a previous concept of what
constitutes the rational as incorporating interests and
ethics as well. Both liberals and realists rely upon
constricted, narrow views of interests. For liberals,
interests can be defined in terms of economics; for realists,
interests are defined in terms of the balance of power as a
means to peace. A covenantal view of interests is very
similar to the view proposed by Tocqueville, what he termed
•self-interest rightly understood. • As I show in chapter 5,
this concept integrates economic interests with moral
concerns much better than contemporary liberalism can.
The final element of liberalism is the focus on science
Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the 
World Political Economy (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1984), 12. Emphasis added.
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and technology and the way they have led to increasing global 
integration.^® Since the Enlightenment, science has served as 
a touchstone for what modernity at work looks like. The need 
for nations to develop scientifically means that they will be 
on a constant path of convergence. Nations that refuse to 
promote a culture of science, liberals argue, will find 
themselves in a hopelessly backwards position.
In defining the premises of liberalism, Charles Kegley 
cites some similar points to those found in Zacher and 
Matthew.
1. Human nature is essentially 'good* or altruistic and 
people are therefore capable of mutual aid and 
collaboration.
2. The fundamental human concern for the welfare of others 
makes progress possible (that is, the Enlightenment's 
faith in the possibility of improving civilization was 
reaffirmed).
3. Bad human behavior is the product not of evil people 
but of evil institutions and structural arrangements that 
motivate people to act selfishly and to harm others—  
including making war.
4. War is not inevitable and its frequency can be reduced 
by eradicating the anarchical conditions that encourage 
it.
5. War and injustice are international problems that 
require collective or multilateral rather than national 
efforts to eliminate them.
6. International society must reorganize itself 
institutionally to eliminate the anarchy that makes 
problems such as war likely.
7. This goal is realistic because history suggests that 
global change and cooperation are not only possible but 
empirically pervasive.
Zacher and Matthew, 110.
Charles Kegley, 'The Neoliberal Challenge to Realist Theories of 
World Politics: An Introduction,' in Controversies in International 
Relations Theory, 4.
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The normative language found in the above descriptions cannot 
be overlooked. Indeed, it is central to the liberal 
perspective. Ironically, this language constitutes both what 
is best and most problematic about liberal theory in politics 
and diplomacy.
Critiques of Liberal Thought 
While liberalism has had some great successes both as 
theory and in practice, criticisms of its central tenets 
abound. At the domestic level, liberalism has been attacked 
by Marxists, communitarians, and postmodern and critical 
scholars. Unlike realism, liberal international thought is 
primarily guided by principles of domestic politics.^® The 
pacific relations between liberal states--the concern with 
rights, due process, commerce-- are rooted in the internal 
characteristics of those states rather than in the 
characteristics of the global system, what sets liberalism 
apart from realism is the argument that transforming domestic 
politics in liberal states affects how they interact with one 
another and with illiberal states. As Hans Morgenthau stated, 
there are two streams of thought that gave rise to modern 
liberal international relations theory. One is the 
rationalism of the Enlightenment; the other is "the political 
experience of domestic l i b e r a l i s m . B o t h  streams, however.
Kenneth Waltz, "Explaining War," in Viotti and Kauppi, 
International Relations Theory, 126f.
Hans. J. Morgenthau, Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics, Midway 
Reprint Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1974), 41f.
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are closely intertwined. Liberalism is the consummately 
rational theory. Should its rationality fail, this would 
prove devastating for those trying to make sense of liberal 
practice and ethical prescriptions.
Debate between Marxists and liberals has been ongoing 
for more than a century. To revisit this debate here would 
be of little b e n e f i t H o w e v e r ,  the communitarian and 
postmodern critiques of liberal international thought have 
not been so extensively dealt with.
The communitarian critique of liberalism asserts that, 
with the rationalization of democratic politics during the 
Enlightenment, liberalism was placed upon a rational 
foundation of interests that could counteract the irrational 
passions. "Interests," in this work, are defined in accord 
with the meaning used by A.O. Hirschman in his book The 
Passions and Che Interests. 'Interests' of persons and groups 
eventually came to be centered on economic advantage as its 
core meaning not only in ordinary language but also in 
social-science terms as "class interests" and "interest 
groups."2^  As Hirschman points out, this involved a narrowing 
of the term which earlier had included pursuits like honor 
and ambition in the pursuit of glory, the "totality of human 
aspirations." This broader definition sounds much like
20 See, for example. Part Three of Doyle's Ways of War and Peace.
Albert 0. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political 
Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1977), 32f. Though Hirschman is not a communitarian, 
his understanding of the trcuisition in the perception of what interests 
entailed leads directly to the communitarian critique.
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Madison's "ambitions countering ambitions' in the extended 
republic.22 interests, Hirschman states, contain "an element 
of reflection and calculation with respect to the manner in 
which these aspirations were to be pursued.'22
However broadly defined, the pursuit of interests during 
liberalism's nascence was circumscribed by normative 
assumptions, most of which were rooted in natural law theory. 
Over time, these assumptions became less and less visible, 
leaving only the morally autonomous rights-bearing individual 
of modern liberal theory. International liberalism requires a 
moral transcendence of interests to solve collective action 
problems; yet the emergence of this autonomous creature, who 
looks suspiciously like the "last man" abhorred by Nietzsche 
and Weber, presents serious problems. Nietzsche describes 
this man as one guided solely by appetites, concupiscence, 
and a desire for security. He is soulless and utterly devoid 
of spiritual sensibilities.24 For Weber, he was the cog in the 
bureaucratic machine of the iron cage of modernity. The 
distance between this last man and the morally autonomous 
liberal individual appears entirely too short to many critics 
of liberalism.
Postmodernism presents a different set of problems for
22 James Madison, "Federalist 51," in Alexander Hamilton, James 
Madison, John Jay, The Federalist Papers, Ed. Clinton Rossiter (New 
York: New American Library, 1961), 322.
22 Hirschman, 32.
24 Friedrich Nietzsche, 'Thus Spoke Zeirathustra, " First Part, 
Section 5, in The Portable Nietzsche, Walter Kaufman ed. (New York: 
Viking Press, 1954), 128-131.
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liberalism. However frivolous this movement may appear in 
contemporary practice, it is rooted in a serious critique of 
modernism and liberalism that cannot be ignored.
Postmodernism is a powerful response to modernism precisely 
because it is a child of modernity. It has sought out the 
contradictions of modernism in general, and those of the 
Enlightenment in particular, in order to show that liberalism 
is, theoretically, a hollow shell. But postmodernist 
influences on international relations are just beginning to 
be felt, and their implications for these fields need further 
explanation and analysis.
While liberal and realist approaches rely upon concepts 
of human nature to explain international phenomena, 
postmodern scholars have questioned the very existence of 
human nature. For this reason, postmodernism has enormous 
ethical implications, something that might seem obvious given 
that the first postmodern theorist was Nietzsche, whose 
lifelong project was to engage in a "transvaluation of 
values." He hoped to create a new table of values to replace 
those dying principles handed down by tradition or by the 
rationality of the Enlightenment. This work contributes to 
the postmodern corpus by taking seriously the challenge 
postmodernism brings to the question of how statesmen ought 
to think about ethics within the sphere of international 
relations. The postmodern critique of liberalism reveals the 
way liberal intentions to do good often mask assertions of 
raw power. The dangers of coercion that is not grounded in
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shared values and at least a modicum of consensus is a 
recurrent theme in postmodern literature. These are points 
that covenantal paradigm considers of supreme importance as 
well.
Realist critics of liberal theory, such as Samuel 
Huntington, Robert Gilpin and John Mearsheimer, point to the 
fragility of peaceful relationships among nations and reveal 
the rising possibility of a newly fragmented world based on 
regional power blocs with incommensurable interests.zs But 
what is apparent in both liberal and realist theories is a 
certain "givenness" to assumptions about the moral objectives 
of liberalism. Liberals assume the desirability of a global 
liberal order reached through the development of a workable 
system of international law that constrains state behavior. 
Realists criticize the means by which liberals want to 
achieve this order through collective security measures. They 
also criticize attempts to expand the jurisdiction of 
international juridical bodies and the realignment of 
domestic political structures in favor of democracy, which 
may involve entangling forms of intervention.
The binary oppositions scholars use to conceptualize 
arguments reveal the way theories give rise to each other. 
Liberalism is defined in opposition to realism. Both rely on 
distinctive interpretations of data to make conclusions about
25 Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" in The Clash of 
Civilizations : A For&ian Affairs Reader (New York: Council on Foreign 
Relations, 1993), 22-49.
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human nature. Several scholars such as George Modelski^^ or 
Robert Keohane^"^ have attempted theoretical syntheses that 
incorporate aspects of both approaches. But the arguments of 
realists against liberalism are usually empirical, focusing 
on how liberalism does not account for the role of power in 
international relations.
Normatively, liberalism and realism are united by a 
commitment to a type of practical humanism. This humanism 
generally entails assumptions about the dignity of man and 
beliefs about rights found in the American Declaration of 
Independence, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, 
the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the deontic 
principles of Kantian ethics. Humanism serves as the ethical 
foundation for liberalism and as a laudable, but complex and 
distant, goal for realists.-® Liberals see the way to 
accomplish this objective through the establishment of
2^  George Modelski and Kenneth Thompson, Leading Sectors and World 
Powers: The Coevolution of Global Economics and Politics (Columbia,
South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press: 1995).
See Keohane, After Hegemony.
28 Modelski is a good example of the wistfulness of some realists.
In his book Leading Sectors and World Powers, he makes predictions about 
global order leading to beneficent world government over the next three
hundred years. In this and many of his other works, Modelski also uses a
punctuated equilibrium model of neo-Darwinism to describe the evolution 
of global politics. Historically, he asserts, those punctuations have 
been defined by global wars. When, in 1995, this writer asked him 
whether the future would be different, his response was very unDarwinian 
and teleological. He posited that peace was normatively desirable and 
absolutely necessary given the existence of nuclear weapons. While his 
point is well-taken, it represents a slide into non-Darwinian theory and
appears to be the IR equivalent of the Lamarckians ' argument that
giraffes' necks grew longer because their parents had to reach higher 
for leaves to survive. See also George Modelski eind Kazimierz Poznanski, 
*Evolutionary Paradigms in the Social Sciences,* International Studies 
Quarterly 40 (September 1996), 315-18.
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international law and increasing the power of international 
institutions. Realists believe the surest way to preserve 
peace and achieve humanist objectives is through the wise 
application of the balance of power. Morgenthau made an 
attempt, in Scientific Man, to define the substance of 
wisdom, grounded in an Aristotelian conception of man as a 
political animal.29 This comes close to an answer, but 
Morgenthau remains elusive on this point. He merely notes, in 
Hellenic terms, that statecraft involves an ongoing heroic 
struggle rather than a final victory over the evil inherent 
in human life and politics.
Because realism is defined in opposition to liberalism, 
while relying upon the same core element of interest (though 
it is differently defined), realism is subject to some of the 
Scime critiques. For this reason, the viability of realism as 
an alternative to liberalism bears some examination. Where 
liberals have historically seen interests in economic terms, 
realists have concentrated on interests as the maintenance of 
power. Like liberalism, realist theory suffers from a breach 
between its epistemology and its ethics. In order to see how 
this breach is manifested in realist theory, this work 
examines the realist theories of Weber, Morgenthau, E.H. Carr 
and Henry Kissinger.
Covenant as International Paradigm
Thinkers as diverse as Hegel, Nietzsche, Leo Strauss and
29 Morgenthau, Scientific Man, 220.
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Hcinnah Arendt, believed that the way out of the theoretical 
dilemma presented by modernism, the problem of the "last 
man, ' is found in a return to the Hellenic world. But it is 
not enough to stay there. The "discovery* of the individual, 
and thus of individual dignity, is a modem one. Nothing like 
it is found in the classical world. This unique emphasis on 
the individual merits a rescue attempt rather than a wrecking 
job. The covenantal paradigm provides a means of doing that. 
Covenant supplies the missing elements in contemporary 
liberal thought. Because it sees obligations and rights as 
inextricably linked, covenants secure a place for the 
individual while protecting the integrity of community. More 
importantly, covenantal thought sees the limiting of power as 
a profoundly moral enterprise. The power to do good is also 
the power to do evil. This is no less true for individuals 
than for states.
Covenant is the element of social theory that tied 
together the scholastic age and the early period of 
liberalism. Spiritually, the covenant was the key component 
of medieval soteriology, albeit administered through the 
Church. Jerome's Latin Vulgate translation of the 
Septuagint's Greek diatheke (covenant) was foedus, itself a 
translation of the Hebrew fa'rith.^° From this word, we derive 
the English words faith and (not coincidentally) federal.
Here the transition from feudal times to liberal modernity is 
best seen. As both Nietzsche and Hegel argued, this
Blazar, Covenant and Coaunonwealth. 28,
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transition involved the secularization of Christian 
assumptions about politics and, most importantly for this 
paper, about ethics. As time passed, the spiritual element of 
covenant diminished while the political element increased in 
importcince. But this transition has tremendous implications 
for the ethical meaning of liberalism, including liberalism 
as a body of international thought. The foundational maxim of 
international law, the keystone of international liberalism, 
is pacta sunc servanda, nations ought to keep their 
covenants. What is best of liberalism, this paper argues, is 
not that which is found in Hellenic Greece but rather that 
which is found in this transitional period when the very 
meaning of liberalism was established. In doing so, we may 
find that what we are left with is no longer liberal per se. 
We may find ourselves struggling for a new way of expressing 
the synthesis that emerges from this archaeological 
expedition. But that will be less a problem of definition 
than a problem of nomenclature.
Chapter 1 provides a more detailed description of the 
covenantal paradigm and how it is distinguished from 
contract. It also describes the entrance of covenant into the 
modern period, first as theology, and then as social theory. 
Chapter 2 describes the secularization of covenant and its 
devolution into contract. The role of Newton and Locke as 
progenitors of the Enlightenment is central to this story and 
communicates important points about the epistemic 
similarities behind the rise of science, the rise of
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classical liberal theory, and the misunderstandings of both 
by later theorists.
Chapter 3 describes the serious anomalies that plague 
contemporary liberal political ethics at both domestic and 
international levels. The chapter examines communitarian, 
postmodern and realist critiques of liberalism that lay bare 
some of its most serious flaws. It also reveals why neither 
communitarianism nor postmodernism can provide foundations 
for a viable political ethic. Chapter 4 applies the same 
argument to realism, showing the links between neo-Kantianism 
and realism that undermine realist ethics.
Chapter 5 turns to the reestablishment of covenant as a 
paradigmatic solution to the problems of liberal theory. 
Dormant since the demise of natural law theory in the early 
nineteenth century, covenantal theory is making a comeback. 
This revival is motivated both by the recent failures of 
statism^i and by the attractiveness of federalist solutions to 
thorny dilemmas at all levels of political organization. 
Liberal international theory asserts that the liberal 
domestic model is applicable at the international level.
This chapter shows why that argument is correct. Covenantal 
politics harmonizes power and justice through its emphasis on 
limiting power, its requirement of federal liberty, and its 
political realism. In this chapter, all these elements are 
more specifically detailed and applied.
These not only include the failures of communist and fascist 
regimes but also the statism inherent in post-World War II liberal 
regimes.
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Chapter 6 elaborates on the philosophical underpinnings 
of covenantal theory to show how its epistemology and ethics 
are connected and how it can be applied at the international 
level. The epistemic realism of covenantal thought provides a 
more compelling basis for humanistic ethics than modem 
liberalism can. In this way, science, as the study of 
consistently interacting phenomena, and political ethics are 
intimately connected. I argue that a theory of natural law, 
the policy implications of which are subject to empirical 
investigation, is possible. I also address the international 
implications and characteristics of a covenantal world order. 
This order, to be properly covenantal, must look much like 
the foedus pacificum (peaceful covenant) Kant described in 
his Perpetual Peace.
In conclusion, I look at the possibility of this order 
arising in the future. Many indicators lead one to believe 
that the future will be characterized by bureaucracy rather 
than liberty. As Tocqueville stated, the egalitarianism that 
seemed to him to be inevitably victorious, provided both a 
possibility for improvement of conditions or a recipe for 
despotism, depending upon the moral conditions of civil 
society and the structure of institutions. The covenantal 
society, depicted in Democracy in America, is not the result 
of the inevitable unfolding of "history, " the econony, or any 
other deterministic force. It is the result of a choice, a 
"hearkening" to the terms of covenantal relationships and an 
elevated, moral view of liberty as the liberty to do good.
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The future of global politics remains to be constructed by 
choices for or against that vision.
24
CHAPTER 1
FROM COVENANTS TO INTERESTS; THE EVOLUTION OF LIBERALISM
Liberal international thought has heralded the rising 
force of economic globalization that has, particularly since 
the end of the Cold War, made the world a smaller and smaller 
place. Despite an increased emphasis by intellectuals on 
diversity and multiculturalism, the fact is that a 
cosmopolitan world culture has arisen in which differences 
are greatly outweighed by similarities. The upper and middle 
classes, even in many developing nations, look more like 
their counterparts in other nations than they do the members 
of the lower socioeconomic classes in their own country.
Despite the ameliorative aspects of exchanging economic 
for military competition, questions about this change remain. 
One of the primary problems of contemporary liberal theory, I 
shall argue, is its inability to connect interests with 
collective goods. This was not always the case, however. 
Liberalism arose from an intellectual milieu— the horizons of 
covenantal theory— that secured both interests and ethics. In 
this chapter, I look first at the problem interests present 
for liberalism as an international ideal. Second, I examine 
how those problems are addressed by covenant as a 
paradigmatic replacement of the contractualism of
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contemporary liberalism. Finally, I look at how covenant 
became an internationally-influential mode of thought in the 
modem period. Additionally, covenant as a mode of
organizational structure and behavior enabled some states to
succeed in achieving and maintaining global leadership.
Weber and the Problem of the Last Man
In his work The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism, Max Weber outlined the monumental transition that 
occurred four hundred years ago at the beginnings of 
modernity--a period he characterized as being more and more 
dominated by the rationalization of every aspect of life. Far 
from leading to a beneficent Hegelian end of history, Weber 
saw this process moving inexorably towards two monstrous 
outcomes. First he depicted the inescapable iron cage that 
modem rationalism entailed; and second, he pointed to the 
rise of the Nietzschean last man, the bourgeois for whom this
cage would seem a haven rather than a curse.
Weber's work is remarkable not only as a social history 
of capitalism but also as a history of rationality. For what 
leads to the iron cage is the transition from 
Wertrationalitât to Zweckratioanlitàt, or from value 
rationality to instmmental rationality.^ As modemity 
progressed, the instrumental, the economically rational, or 
as economists put it, the microrational was emphasized more
 ^ Max Weber, Economy and Society, eds. Guenther Roth and Claus 
Wittich, trans. Ephraim Pischoff et al. Volume I (Berkeley: University 
of California Press), 24f.
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and more. The pursuit of interest becomes all consuming 
while, by these standards, the non-rational and the moral 
become less and less compelling as sources of action.
Weber's chronicle of this transition is salient to this 
paper because of the way that liberalism in general adhered 
to the same pattern. Liberal theorists originally wrote with 
certain moral assumptions in mind, assumptions that served to 
circumscribe and define proper social behavior and social 
obligations. Evolving as it did out of the political 
applications of covenant theology, liberalism originally 
entailed beliefs about moral obligations and duties between 
government and governed. Classical liberal theorists, 
however, relied upon the concept of interest to make their 
theory rational. This would have profound consequences for 
the ethical underpinnings of the theory in later centuries.
Depicting the rational pursuit of interest as the 
characteristic feature of modernity, Weber remarked:
The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced 
to do so. For when asceticism was carried out of monastic 
cells and into everyday life and began to dominate worldly 
morality it did its part in building the tremendous cosmos 
of the modern economic order. This order is now bound to the 
technical and economic conditions of machine-production 
which today determine the lives of all the individuals who 
are born into this mechanism, not only those directly 
concerned with economic acquisition, with irresistible 
force. . . . Today the spirit of religious asceticism—  
whether finally, who knows?— has escaped from the cage. But 
victorious capitalism, since it rests on mechanical 
foundations needs its support no longer. The rosy blush of 
its laughing heir, the Enlightenment, seems also to be 
irretrievably fading, and the idea of duty in one's calling 
prowls about in our lives like the ghost of dead religious 
beliefs.2
2 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 
introduction by Anthony Giddens, trans. Talcott Parsons (London: 
Routledge, 1992), 181f.
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Weber's pessimism about the future, expecting as he did the 
emergence of the last man, is reflected in his dictum about 
what these men would look like. "Specialists without spirit, 
sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it has 
attained a level of civilization never before achieved.
There is a subtle but important relationship found in 
these passages between the ethics of modernity and the 
epistemology upon which they rest. As rationality became more 
and more synonymous with instrumental rationality alone, the 
proper realm of rational and ethical decision-making became 
more and more circumscribed as well.
In Weber's own work, we see the consequences of the loss 
of the ability to believe in a rational basis for anything 
beyond instrumentalism or interest-based calculations. Thus 
he remarks upon the fading of the Enlightenment progressivism 
as modernity unfolds. In the post-Nietzschean era, means and 
ends are held to be autonomous and divorced from each other. 
Good social science reveals the implications of means chosen 
to accomplish certain predetermined ends. However, social 
science can never address the value of those ends; for values 
are inaccessible to reason.
Allan Bloom examined the impact of Weberian theory on 
American intellectual life following World War II. He states 
that American professors "were literally inebriated by the 
unconscious and values.Weber's assertions about the
3 Ibid., 182.
 ^ Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1987), 149.
28
complete relativity of values did not raise suspicions with 
this generation of intellectuals who thought the lessons of 
Weimar were simply that "the bad guys won. "  ^But, as Bloom 
points out, there is no reason to assume that there are any 
bad guys in a system of value relativity. If the meaning of 
life is ultimately rooted in an existential act of aesthetic 
self-creation, then there is no inherent reason one ought not 
to suppose that the "bad guys' have not expressed a valid 
lifestyle choice. Similarly, sociologist Alan Wolfe reflects 
upon the aporia of modern liberal democratic life, an aporia 
defined by our need to maintain a belief in our way of life 
as a good and our inability to articulate any public good.
The citizens of capitalist liberal democracies understand 
the freedom they possess, appreciate its value, defend its 
prerogatives. But they are confused when it comes to 
recognizing the social obligations that make their freedom 
possible in the first place. They are, in a word, unclear 
about the moral codes by which they ought to live. A moral 
code is a set of rules that define people's obligations to 
one another. Neither the liberal market nor the democratic 
state is comfortable with the explicit discussion of the 
obligations such codes ought to impose. Both view social 
obligation as a by-product of individual action. . . . When 
capitalism and liberal democracy combine, people are given 
the potential to determine for themselves what their 
obligations to others ought to be, but are then given few 
satisfactory guidelines on how to fulfill them.®
Liberal democracy— championed by various thinkers as the end
of history, and the only reasonable choice of regimes left—
cannot justify itself as an ethical and, therefore, as a
political project.
Alexis de Tocqueville was also acutely aware of the
5 Ibid.
® Alan Wolfe, Whose Keeper: Social Science and Moral Obligation 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 2. Emphasis added.
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problem individualism entailed for liberal democracy. 
Individualism, as defined by Tocqueville, was a way of life 
in which persons became concerned only for the needs and 
interests of themselves, their immediate family and 
acquaintances.’ This way of life, he felt, would lead not to a 
happy, sustainable democratic polity but, rather, would lay 
the foundations for the kind of despotic centralization and 
the withering of civil society he had witnessed in France.® 
Tocqueville saw a direct link between the erosion of non- 
familial associations and the erosion of freedom. These 
associations drew individuals out of their homes and schooled 
them for self-governance. In his commentary on Tocqueville, 
Pierre Manent sums up the problem democratic man poses for 
democratic society.
Tocqueville underscores the fact that democratic man is 
governed by the dogma of the sovereignty of the people over 
his individual actions. This dogma is silent on the content 
or the ends of these actions. The rights of man are 
deliberately silent on the ends of man. The more that man 
considers himself as a being who possesses rights, the more 
the guarantee of these rights progresses, the more the 
question of ends is put back, and the silence becomes 
deafening.®
Herein lies the problem for contemporary liberal 
international thought. Perhaps its greatest dilemma is how to 
go about solving collective action problems. This dilemma is 
a profoundly moral one. Nations, and their leaders, must be
 ^ Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. J.P, Mayer, 
trans. George Lawrence, Perennial Library Edition (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1988), 506-508.
® Ibid., 509-513.
® Pierre Manent, Tocqueville and the Nature of Democracy, trans. 
John Waggoner (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996), xiiif.
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persuaded that participating in solutions to economic, 
environmental, and security problems, is necessary and proper 
even at the expense of their own short-term interests. But on 
this point, liberal ethics can have little to say. Liberal 
ethics cannot be defended using liberal epistemology. Its 
epistemology has the rather bizarre characteristic of fitting 
well with either postmodern value relativity of the sort 
outlined by Weber, or to rational choice microeconomic 
rationality, in which preferences are exogenous. Yet liberal 
theorists go on making assertions about what sounds 
suspiciously like a public or common good, not just for a 
community or a nation but for the entire globe. Theory and 
praxis do not form a coherent whole and need to be 
reexamined. What Herbert Marcuse said of Greek philosophy-- 
"Epistemology is in itself ethics, and ethics is 
epistemology"--is no longer true for liberalism, though that 
was its original intent,The disjunction has become severe 
and debilitating.
Robert H. Cox, discussing the continuing relevance of 
the nation-state in the new world order, reflects on how 
Jürgen Habermas and Claus Offe define a contradiction within 
a system. Cox states: "For them, a contradiction is the 
tendency of a system to undermine i t s e l f . I n  addition, he
Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1966), 125.
Robert H. Cox, "Demystifying the Nation-State: Its Relevemce to 
the New World Order." Chapter in Nation or Integration: Perspectives on 
Europe in the 90's, ed. Ulf Hedetoft (Aalborg Denmark: Aalborg 
University, 1993), 28.
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quotes Offe's statement that "a contradiction is the tendency 
inherent within a specific mode of production to destroy 
those very pre-conditions on which its survival d e p e n d s .  
Habermas asserts that, as this process continues, there will 
arise a crisis of legitimacy in which the system may 
collapse. This is precisely the problem that liberalism 
faces. As the gulf between ethics and epistemology grows, 
liberalism's assertions about the good appear to be little 
more than what critical theorists have long asserted--i.e., 
rhetoric masking power. Though some liberal theorists are 
acutely aware of this problem, the vast majority appear to 
be terribly un-self-conscious about its implications.
To understand the transition from liberal rationality 
imbued with the ability to address moral questions to one 
that is primarily instrumental, it is necessary to look at 
the context within which liberal founders were writing. The 
moral assumptions of these writers are of great importance. 
Liberal history can be separated into three periods that 
apply to both domestic and international levels of analysis: 
covenantal thinkers who prepared the way for liberalism by 
revolutionizing thinking about state-society relationships; 
classical liberal thinkers who articulated a rational 
interest-based understanding of political thought ; and 
contemporary or late modem liberals who present us with a
12 Ibid., 3 2 .
12 Francis Fukuyama's work is the best example of this recognition. 
See his The End of History and the Last Man (New York: The Free Press, 
1992, Avon Books, 1993).
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liberalism in which the morally autonomous individual plays 
the central role and for whom there can be no public 
articulation of a communal good. While it can be argued that 
it is the modern incarnation of liberal thought alone that is 
subject to deconstruction, this ignores the unitary narrative 
thread uniting classical liberal rationality with modem 
rationality.
Covenant as Paradigm
Daniel Elazar is known best for his work on American 
federalism and Israeli politics. Both subjects led him to 
examine more closely the concept of covenant. Elazar has 
written five volumes on the relationship between covenants in 
history and politics. This scholar, who wrote so eloquently 
on the subject of contemporary liberal practice in America, 
has much to say about liberalism's philosophical origins and 
historical development as well.
At the beginning of Covenant and Coimonwealth, Elazar 
discusses the differences between covenantal governance and 
the two other forms found in political history. Taking his 
cue from The Federalist #1, he states that regimes may be 
organic (accidental/traditional), hierarchic, or 
covencintal/federal (implemented by d e s i g n ) . R e g i m e s  of the 
first type arise through tradition and are rooted in the non- 
rational. The same may be said, to some degree, of 
hierarchical regimes whose legitimacy rests in some
Elazar, Covenant and Commonwealth, 2.
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combination of coercion and tradition. Only the final form-- 
the covenantal or commonwealth regime— is a product of 
rationality, the result of a voluntary cession of sovereignty 
to some authority with specifically enumerated, limited 
powers. While this description sounds much like the social 
contract of classical liberal theory, there is an important 
difference. The covenantal relationship is profoundly and 
primarily ethical, involving mutual obligations that may, in 
a short-term or individual sense, be contrary to one's 
economic interests. Covenantal regimes order public/market 
relationships in particular ways that are not always purely 
consistent with these interests.
Elazar makes important distinctions between covenants, 
compacts, and contracts. While covenants, compacts, and 
contracts are to be distinguished from hierarchical and 
organic forms of governance, they must also be distinguished 
from one another. For purposes of this discussion, the 
differences between covenant and compact are relatively 
unimportant. But contract is another matter entirely.
Both covenants and compacts differ from contracts in that 
the first two are constitutional or public, and the last 
private in character. As such, covenantal or compactual 
obligation is broadly reciprocal. Those bound by one or the 
other are obligated to respond to each other beyond the 
letter of the law rather than to limit their obligations to 
the narrowest contractual requirements. . . .  As expressions 
of private law, contracts tend to be interpreted as narrowly 
as possible so as to limit the obligation of the contracting 
parties to what is explicitly mandated by the contract 
itself. Contracts normally contain provisions for unilateral 
abrogation by one party or another under certain conditions.
. . compacts and covenants generally require mutual consent 
to be abrogated, designed as they are to be perpetual or of 
unlimited duration.
A covenant differs from a compact in that its morally 
binding dimension takes precedence over its legal dimension.
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In its heart of hearts, a covenant is an agreement in which 
a higher moral force, traditionally God, is either a direct 
party to, or a guarantor of, the particular relationship.
A compact, based as it is on mutual pledges rather than 
guarantees by or before a higher authority, rests more 
heavily on a legal though still ethical grounding for its 
politics. In other words compact is a secular phenomenon.
Each form of association carries its own ethical assumptions.
As Elazar notes, contract has a very limited understanding of
obligations. The same is true, Fukuyama contends, for the
contractual society of Anglo-Saxon liberal thought. As
chapter 4 shows, German theorists, in particular, found the
contractual society repulsive. Searching for ethical moorings
not provided by Anglo-Saxon thought, they turned to a notion
of ethics that was transcendent but unreachable. Much of
modern realism owes its own ethical conceptions to German
thought and, as a result, its ethics suffers from a
disharmony between the actual and the possible in political
life. Covenantal thought, however, provides a real-world
ethic in which obligations are primary while interests are
understood in the broadest terms. Neither absolute autonomy
nor non-consequentialist goods make any sense in the
covenantal perspective; for the covenantal ethic unites
consequential interests with transcendent humanistic goods.
Jewish thought never had difficulty in reconciling the
two realms of interests and public goods. The Tanach is rife
with the Jewish deity placing transcendent ethical commands
in consequentialist terminology, explaining the relationship
between "hearkening" and blessing. As Elazar points out,
15 ibid.r If.
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there is no word in ancient Hebrew for " o b e d i e n c e . "is The 
duty to obey can only be rooted in the agreement to covenant; 
the agreement itself is made rational by the expectation of 
blessing. Both human and deity agree to limit, and share, 
power in order to achieve a higher good. The Torah contains a 
multitude of laws that do not appear to be in one's short­
term economic interests: redistribution of property, limited 
sovereignty over one's land, the prohibition of usury, among 
others. Yet, the promise of the Torah is that by giving up a 
limited level of autonomy, one's long-term interests will be 
served.
As historical proponents of this Jewish model of 
covenant, the Puritans, and John Winthrop in particular, 
believed in the need to balance interests with moral 
obligations in their newly designed communities. Elazar 
explains how the problem of reconciling the needs of the 
marketplace with the commonwealth concept was solved in 
Puritan communities.
John Winthrop, the first governor of Massachusetts Bay 
Colony addressed [the problem] aboard the Arabella on the 
voyage over and suggested the reconciliation of the two 
through the Puritan's covenant with God. He specified the 
articles of that covenant as a practical guide to that 
reconciliation. In true covenantal style, Winthrop's 
discussion emphasized the obligations on the rich to help 
the poor, not the virtues of the poor or any rights of 
theirs to that help. A proper Christian thus was obligated 
to reconcile charity and commerce and to provide his share 
of Christian charity for those less fortunate than he, no 
matter whether the recipients were deserving or not.
Covenant, then, was designed to mediate between self- 
interest and conscience, material means and transcendental
Daniel Elazar, Covenant & Polity in Biblical Israel: Biblical 
Foundations & Jewish Expression (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers, 1995), 70f.
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ends, and personal and collective destinies in the 
commonwealth.
In this pre-liberal period, interests and moral obligations 
are mediated by the covenantal form in which community, and 
all that it entails, is based upon original consent. In the 
American instance, this took place in what looked very much 
like the state of nature, decades before John Locke's 
attempts to justify theoretically the Glorious Revolution in 
his Second Treatise of Government. As one historian of the 
American founding has stated, "In temporal terms, it makes 
more sense to call Locke an American than it does to call 
America Lockean."i® This was because of the previous 
existence in the colonies of the principles of popular 
sovereignty and limited and enumerated powers of government. 
But even more important was the existence of a political 
culture that could support these principles and mediate 
between interests and obligations. This culture was rooted in 
the idea of what Winthrop called "federal liberty" as opposed 
to "natural liberty." The former concerned "the proper end 
and object of authority and cannot subsist without it; and it 
is a liberty to that [sic] only which is good, just and 
honest. This liberty you are to stand for, with the hazard 
not only of your goods, but of your lives if need be.
Ibid., 22.
Donald Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), 11.
19 Quoted in Daniel Elazar, Covenant and Constitutionalism, The 
Covenant Tradition in Politics Series, Volume III (Brunswick NJ: 
Tremsaction Publishers, 1998), 26. Emphasis added.
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Natural liberty, in contrast, resembles freedom in the 
post-Mill period of liberal theory. "By this, man, as he 
stands in relation to man simply, hath liberty to do what he 
lists; it is a liberty to evil as well as to g o o d .  *20 m  other 
words, one has the freedom to do what one will so long as no 
one else is harmed. The morally autonomous individual should 
not be impeded in pursuing her interests as she sees them.
But one can genuinely raise the question as to how 
obligations are justified from within natural liberty, a 
question that has plagued modem liberal theory. Fukuyama, 
proclaiming liberalism to be the end of history, states that 
liberal democracies "are not self-sufficient,and that 
"liberalism must reach beyond its own principles to 
succeed.
The essence, then, of the commonwealth concept is the 
presence of all of these elements: limited and enumerated 
powers of government based on a sense of realism concerning 
the uses of power, in concert with a commitment to a type of 
liberty that is focused upon the freedom to live up to one's 
moral obligations. Without all of these elements, the federal 
or covenantal commonwealth devolves into some other type of 
order. Without federal liberty, one might have a libertarian 
polity in which market principles reign supreme and 
obligations are purely voluntary. Without limited and
20 Ibid., 27.
21 Fukuyama, The End of History, 326.
22 Ibid., 222.
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enumerated powers, one might have a society in which social 
obligations outweigh market principles and property rights 
but in which government is unrestrained in its pursuit of the 
public good. This last scenario could well describe the 
problem with the regime envisioned by Rousseau that, in some 
ways, came into being during the French Revolution.
Certainly the regime of the Contrat Social entailed a pursuit 
of the public good; but it lacked the ordered restraint of 
American practice. For this reason, Tocqueville felt that the 
American experiment in liberty, rooted as it was in the 
federal approach, was superior to that of the French, whose 
new order led to an oppressive centralization of power.
The Covenant Paradigm as Replacement for Contract
Elazar is certainly not the only contemporary political 
theorist to discuss the covenantal paradigm. Michael Walzer 
portrays covenantal thought as the root of egalitarian 
revolutionary and Reformational ideology.In addition, Aaron 
Wildavsky has written on the implications of covenant for 
political regime type and leadership.24 Covenant's 
attractiveness as a replacement for contract is evident in a 
number of other fields as well, lending credence to 
covenant's paradigmatic claims. As the contractual paradigm 
underlying late liberalism has fallen into greater disfavor.
22 See especially Michael Walzer, Exodus and Revolution (New York: 
Harper Collins, 1985}.
24 Aauron Wildavsl^, The Nursing Father: Moses as a Political 
Leader (Tuscaloosa, Aleibama: University of Alabama Press, 1984).
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the covenantal paradigm is increasingly taking its place.
Many physicians and bioethicists have turned to 
covenant to replace the contractual model in medicine. In an 
article in the Journal of the American Medical Association 
iJAMA), a group of physicians published a covenantal 
manifesto admonishing physicians to eschew materialistic 
self-interest and to “act as advocates for the sick wherever 
their welfare is threatened and for their health at all 
times.“25 John J, Ring, a former president of the American 
Medical Association, believes it was the most important 
article ever printed in JAMA. Ring writes: “It strikes to the 
very heart of our professional being and to the core of our 
relationship with those we serve."25
In the field of social work and sociology, contractual 
theory has been woefully inadequate in describing social 
relations either empirically or normatively. Fukuyama alludes 
to this when he states, “[F]amilies don't really work if they
25 Ralph Crawshaw et al, “Patient-Physician Covenant,* JAMA 273 
(1995), 1553. With regards to other medical and public health uses of 
covenantal theory, see also W.B. May, “The Physician's Covenant: Images 
of the Healer in Medical Ethics (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1983), 
and “Code and Covenant or Philanthropy and Contract,* in S.J. Reiser 
ed.. Ethics in Medicine: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary 
Concerns (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977); D.A Landis, “Physician 
Distinguish Thyself: Conflict and Covenant in a Physician's Moral 
Development,“ Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 36(1993), 628-641; 
C.K. Cassell, “The Patient-Physician Covenant: An Affirmation of 
Asklepios,“ Annals of Internal Medicine 124(1996), 604-606; Joseph J. 
Pin, “Commentary: From Contract to Covenant in Advance Care Planning,* 
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 27(1999), 46-56; and P. Ramsey, The 
Patient as Person (New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, 1970). Reunsey 
specifically relies upon theological language to ground the ethic of his 
theory citing the New Testament Greek equivalent of the Hebrew hesed or 
“covenant lovingkindness*: agape (xiii).
25 John J. Ring, “Letter to the Editor,“ JAMA 274(1995), 1265.
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are based on liberal principles, chat is if their members 
regard them as they would a joint-stock company, formed for 
utility rather than being based on ties of duty and love. 
John O'Neill has written an attack on liberal social policy 
entitled The Missing Child in Liberal Theory: Towards a 
Covenant Theory of Family, Community, Welfare and the Civic 
S t a t e . O'Neill argues that liberal policy is atomistic and 
cannot account for the moral requirements of a society to 
provide for its most vulnerable citizens. Pamela Miller, a 
professor of social work, proposes a covenantal model for 
professional relationships in that field, specifically 
opposing it to the contract m o d e l . S h e  argues that 
contractual models promote minimal efforts by professionals 
in treatment relationships as well as the legalization of 
those relationships. Covenants, she states, focus on the 
centrality of obligations, trust, and long-term commitment.
Walter Brueggemann outlines the possibilities for a new 
normative sociology that relies on covenantal premises. He 
foresees a time when it might be possible to construct a 
world "transformed to covenanting, by the dismantling of 
imperial reality. . . . In the field of jurisprudence.
Fukuyama, The End of History, 324.
John O'Neill, The Missing Child in Liberal Theory: Towards a 
Covenant Theory of Family, Community, Welfare and the Civic State 
(Toronto: University of Toronto, 1994).
2® Pamela Miller, "Covenant Model for Professional Relationships: 
An Alternative to the Contract Model," Social Work 35(1990), 121-125.
30 Ibid., 123.
33 Walter Brueggemann, "Covenant as a Subversive Paradigm. " The
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Janet Moore has attempted something similar. Moore constructs
a social theory on covenantal (and feminist) grounds, clearly
distinguished from the contractual model.
I contend that a carefully constructed, covenant-based 
political ethic will demand respect for universal human 
dignity. . . . Thus, a covenant-based theory of justice will 
require that liberalism surrender not only the myth of the 
atomistic individual, but, simultaneously, her untrammeled 
freedom to pursue her subjectively chosen ends. This will be 
particularly true when such "choices" maintain or exacerbate 
conditions of domination and exclusion, or the spiritual and 
political malaise that reciprocally feeds, and feeds upon, 
those conditions.32
Moore, like Elazar, distinguishes between the absolute
autonomy of moral choice in liberal theory and substantive
ethical requirements of the covenantal perspective.
Responding to the charge that membership in the Ku Klux Klan
could be covenantal, Moore points to the limited realm of
ethical choices available within the paradigm.
I present coveneuit within the context of a specific, 
feminist critique, committed to a vision of justice as 
universal dignity that reveals, and seeks to revolutionize, 
patterns of exclusion and domination. Within this context, I 
claim the U.S. Constitution retains paradigmatic covenantal- 
-and emancipatory— potential, and call for renewed 
dedication to its realization. And, within this context, KKK 
members would bear an insurmountable burden in defining 
their commitments as covenantal .33
Moore'S connection of covenant and feminism is telling given 
the relationship between covenant as paradigm and ontological 
egalitarianism in general, a point to be discussed in more 
detail below. Covenant appeals to the capabilities of
Christian Century 97(1980), 1099.
32 Janet Moore, 'Covenant And Feminist Reconstructions Of 
Subjectivity Within Theories Of Justice, ' Law and Contemporeiry Problems 
55(Summer 1992), 160f.
33 Ibid., 181.
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individuals to make and keep moral commitments. It requires a 
belief in the capabilities of all social actors to hearken to 
the terms of the covenant. Exclusion from that act, based 
solely on ontological qualities like gender or race, violates 
the very nature of covenanting altogether.
Finally, there is covenant as a form of political 
justification for particular forms of regime or policy.
Elazar is probably the most prolific spokesman for the 
former. Elazar himself has called the movement from statism 
to federalism in the postmodern period a "paradigm shift." 
Along with many liberals in the field of international 
relations, Elazar notes the transition from the hard-shelled 
nation state to the confederal network. He also notes how, in 
accordance with covenantal theory, this transition involves 
both interests and public goods, the shift from Common Market 
to European Union being a prime example.
At the domestic level, both President Bill Clinton and 
Prime Minister Tony Blair discussed their agendas in 
covenantal terms. Blair has followed words with covenantal 
action, with power devolving from London to Wales and 
Scotland. In a striking example of Elazar's paradigm shift, 
Blair has reversed the centuries-long accretion of 
administrative power to the center. This devolution does not 
allow complete autonomy in these regions, but the freedom to 
accomplish public tasks in ways other than those dictated by 
London. His government also committed itself to a federal
Daniel Elazar, "From Statism to Federalism— A Paradigm Shift, " 
Publius 17 (October 1996), 422.
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solution to the Northern Ireland conflict. The structure of 
the Irish solution is covenantal, involving power-sharing 
tied to a sense of realism about the claims of each side. 
Whether it also meets the covenantal requirement of being 
substantively ethical remains to be seen.
In the Clinton Administration, Bruce Babbitt, the 
Secretary of the Interior, has used covenantal language to 
describe his own policy agenda. Speaking in defense of the 
1973 Endangered Species Act, Babbitt appealed to the covenant 
spoken of in the book of Genesis, interpreting its message in 
terras of stewardship or dominion rather than exploitation and 
domination. The latter terms Babbitt associates with the 
interest-orientation of contract.Al Gore has used similar 
language to describe his own environmental policy agenda.3* 
Many agreements in international law are termed covenants, 
stressing moral qualities more than legal ones. 37 Many of 
these treaties do not have the force of domestically 
applicable law, yet they provide goals which signatory states 
have committed to achieve. Liberals like Woodrow Wilson also 
relied on covenantal language to describe a normative vision
35 Bruce Babbitt, "Between the Flood and the Rainbow: Our Covenant 
to Protect the Whole of Creation,* Vital Speeches 62 (February 15, 
1996), 281-283.
35 Albert Gore, Earth in the Balance: ecology and the human spirit 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1992).
3^  See, for example. International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, both of which can be found at University of Minnesota's Human 
Rights Library. University of Minnesota. 26 February 1999.
<ht tp : / /wwwl. umn. edu/humanrt s / instree/auob. htm>.
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for international relations.3*
These examples point to the emergence of covenant as a 
paradigmatic replacement for contract. Covenant revives a way 
of thinking about human relationships that has been in 
existence for millennia. Despite its theopolitical origins, 
it is not parochially confined to one religious group or 
geographic region. As Elazar points out, covenantal theory as 
it appeared in Jewish, and then Christian, social theory was 
particularly successful in regions where a pre-Christian oath 
culture already existed. Examples of this phenomenon were 
found predominantly in parts of Germany, Holland,
Switzerland, the Scandinavian countries, and East Anglia and 
Scotland in Britain.3* Because of a political culture amenable 
to covenant as a means of social organization, these nations 
were all affected by the social consequences of the 
Reformation. As Elazar argues, the Reformation was the
3® Wilson's Scottish Presbyterian background, with its heavy 
emphasis on covenant, remained one o£ the great influences on his 
political beliefs throughout his life. It was no accident that the 
League of Nations agreement was termed a "covenant." In 1918, in a 
speech in Britain, he stated, " I wish we could, not only for for Great 
Britain and the United States, but for France and Italy and the world, 
enter into a great league and covenant, declaring ourselves, first of 
all, friends of mankind and uniting ourselves together for the 
maintenance and the triumph of right." Woodrow Wilson, "Speech in 
Manchester England. 30 Dec. 1918, Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: War 
and Peace, eds. Arthur S. Link, David W. Hirst, John E. Little, John 
Wells Davidson et al (Princeton, NJ: 1966-1977), 355f; qouted in John M. 
Mulder, Woodrow Wilson: The Years of Preparation (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1978), 274. Mulder's book is an excellent 
source for those seeking to understand the relationship between Wilson's 
theological background and his policy decisions and view of political 
ethics.
3® Elazar, Covenant and Commonwealth. Elazar discusses these oath 
societies in some detail. On Germany, see 73-79. On Holland, see 102- 
105. On Switzerland, see 100-102. On Scandinavia, see 107-123. On East 
Anglia emd Scotland, see 113. On other areas of Britain, see 125-131.
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primary vehicle for transporting covenantal theory into the 
modern period. The implications of this movement were 
enormous, representing not just a theological perspective, 
but a whole new ontological perspective. During this period, 
the "individual" emerged, a necessary step on the path to 
individual rights. Major steps toward creating the modern 
federal covenantal commonwealth were taken during this period 
as well. The question of how such an order arose out of the 
hierarchy of the medieval period may shed light on what is 
necessary to preserve what is best in liberalism.
Covenant and the Social Origins of Liberal Practice
The characteristics of the covenantal social order are 
found in the complex social arrangements that arose out of 
the late Renaissance and the Reformation. Contemporary 
liberal international thinkers rightly believe that the 
increasing ease with which ideas can be transferred from 
nation to nation is a means of undermining hierarchical and 
oppressive regimes and practices. This was no less true in 
the fifteenth century, while the Renaissance is noted for its 
renewed attentions to classical Greco-Roman texts, there was 
another current of scholarly activity that would prove just 
as important: the beginnings of textual critical methods by 
Renaissance scholars and the study of the Tanach in its 
original Hebrew. The primary element uniting the late 
Renaissance with the Reformation is this commitment to 
scholarly study of Hebrew thought. Thinkers like Machiavelli
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are known for their love of republican virtue and their 
desire to revive the glory and communal spirit of the Roman 
Republic. Contemporary scholars, such as J.G.A. Pocock and 
Robert Putnam, stress the importance of the Renaissance and 
the civic virtue implicit in the classical republican mode of 
thought. But the scope of their work can be misleading if not 
examined carefully. One can plausibly argue that modern 
Western law (including international law) and liberal 
political regimes are the result of a mixture of Jewish and 
classical republican thought into a remarkable synthesis. 
Rather than emphasizing the conflict between Athens (or Rome) 
and Jerusalem, the ways in which these disparate traditions 
were united deserves more attention than it has received.
While the Renaissance brought about a number of 
remarkable achievements, few were as important as the rise of 
textual criticism. The return to ancient and biblical texts 
was to have great import for the development of a new way of 
ordering religious practice that itself would profoundly 
affect political practice. As one historian states;
[J]ust as now, in their own age, good letters were being 
raised as from the grave, painting and music and sculpture 
reborn, so also religion was sharing in the same renovatio 
or renewal, the same reformatio or reformation (a usage that 
was to form one link between the revival of letters and the 
Protestant Reformation), as a reviving knowledge of the 
early church showed how Christianity could be stripped of 
the vain accretions of centuries and restored to its ancient 
purity and simplicity."*^
For an excellent account of the formation of this synthesis in 
law, see Harold Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western 
Legal Tradition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983).
John A. Garraty emd Peter Gay eds.. The Columbia History of the 
World (Mew York; Harper & Row: 1972; Dorset, 1981), 483.
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Many of these accretions, of course, involved the
hierarchical power of the Catholic Church and the form of
worship it e n t a i l e d . '*2 Robert Putnam points out, however.
Church power was not absent in northern Italy; it was
fundamentally altered. Power was dispersed among the laity
and the priest who, far from being a religious potentate, was
seen as a servant called to meet the spiritual needs of the
parishioners.43 It was not the absence of piety that led to
such a rearrangement of ecclesiastical structure. This was,
in fact, a very pious period in nortnern Italy. To some
degree, the fact that political life in the North emphasized
the communal naturally led to a deemphasis on ecclesiastical
power. In addition, an increasing desire to uncover the
original meanings of texts led just as naturally to a
dissemination of scholarship not controlled by Church
authority. One scholar of the Renaissance-Reformation
transition, Bard Thompson, writes :
[W]hat was the early Protestant view of history? It was no 
more and no less the historiography of the Renaissance. The 
ancient world, while remote in time, was near in sentiment; 
the medieval world, while near in time, was remote in 
sentiment. The intellectual problem of the Reformation was 
exactly that of the Renaissance: to return to the sources, 
the roots. When Luther, however, said "sources," he meant 
the Bible; when he said "the golden age," he meant 
Christianity before there were popes : when he said "dark
Elazar argues that the shift from covenant to organic 
ecclesiastical and then political governance is synonymous with the 
medieval period. "[F]or more than a millennium in Europe, the covenantal 
or federal model of civil society was largely supplanted by an organic- 
pyramidal model embodied in the Corpus Christianum and representing a 
mix of imperial, paternal, ecclesiastical, and feudal govememce." 
Quoted in Elazar, Covenant and Commonwealtb, 40f.
43 Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modem 
Italy (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 127.
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ages,' he meant a medieval world irreparably spoiled by 
superstition. Scholastic theology, barbarous Latin, and so 
on.44
Elazar believes the link between the Renaissance and 
Reformation lies in the attention that scholars of both 
periods gave to Hebrew and Aramaic texts in particular. The 
effects of this renewal of interest were seen in the 
similarity of "form and language of Jewish congregational 
compacts and those of Reformed Protestant congregations."45 
Many Christian scholars, animated by the new spirit of 
textual criticism, studied the Tanach, the Talmud, the 
Midrash, and other texts with Jewish rabbinical authorities. 
They noted that when the writer of the New Testament book of 
Hebrews exhorts the pious not to forsake meeting together, he 
uses the Greek episunagogenJ^ The form of church governance 
implied by the practice of those engaged in "synagoguing" 
looked nothing like the authoritarian structure of the 
medieval church. It implied rather "a separation from the 
organic and hierarchical dimensions of medieval Catholic 
Christendom emd a return to the covenantal thinking of
biblical Israel."4?
The Renaissance gave birth to these Christian Hebraists 
who revived the Jewish approach to church governance and
44 Bard Thompson, Humanists & Reformers: A History of the 
Renaissance and Reformation (Cambridge, OK: Whi. B. Eerdman's, 1996), 
373.
45 Elazar, Covenant and Commonwealth, 44.
45 Pros Ebraious 10:25 (Textus Receptus). The full passage reads,
*...me egkataleipontes ten episunagogen euaton kathos ethos tisin, alia 
pcurakalountes kai tosouto mallon oso blepete eggizousan ten emeran. '
4"^ Elazaur, Covenant and Commonwealth, 44.
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turned the attention of Christendom to the Jewish texts.
These texts were widely available in Northern Italy. The 
Talmud and the Hebrew Bible were published in great numbers 
both in Mantua and Venice by the 1480s. In 1506, Johannes 
Reuchlin, perhaps the major figure of the German Renaissance 
and avid student of the Jewish kabbalah, published Concerning 
the Rudiments of Hebrew. This "turning" provided the 
intellectual basis for justifying, in the long run, what 
Luther began in 1517 at Wittenberg. The effects on church 
governance, however, were felt more profoundly by those 
churches influenced later by Ulrich Zwingli, Heinrich 
Bullinger, John Calvin, and Philip Melancthon, the latter of 
which had been Reuchlin's pupil. In the minds of the 
reformers, current ecclesiastical practice could not be 
justified by the early texts of Christendom. A complete 
transformation of governance, they believed, was needed to 
secure the spiritual well-being of the Christian church. But 
this reform was not to remain solely ecclesiastical for long. 
In a striking twist on, and repudiation of, Augustinian 
logic, reformers reasoned that if a (comparatively) 
horizontal and consensual structure of governance was 
appropriate for the city of God, how much more so should it 
be for the city of Man? In practice, these reforms had 
revolutionary consequences.
The Sanctification of Politics
In contrast to the monastic ideal of Catholicism,
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reformers gave a new value to the mundane. Weber notes that 
the idea of the calling, once preserved for those who took 
orders in the Church, now was applied to all who did God's 
will, regardless of profession. A common critique of 
liberalism made by realists, from Weber to Morgenthau, is 
that liberal thought misunderstands the nature of politics. 
Politics, say realists, is the realm of man, not of God. It 
involves choices that may divide conscience and prudence on 
occasions. But Swiss Reformers, taking their cues from 
Deuteronomy rather than the Beatitudes, saw politics very 
differently. Just as in Biblical Israel, they believed 
leaders were ordained by God to promote a godly civil order. 
The same was true of contemporary political figures. Far from 
being the most profane of occupations, politics was a holy 
enterprise through which the dominion mandate could be 
carried out. Calvin saw it as the most holy of professions, 
noting that unless there were godly leaders, the gospel could 
not be preached. This belief would translate easily into the 
social reform movements in later centuries in both their 
secular and religious incarnations.
By baptizing the political, reformers created the basis 
for what was to become the best and the worst of liberal 
politics. The optimism of reform produced higher expectations 
of political actors, but it also created the potential for 
blindness concerning what was actually possible. Connected as 
it was to a pessimistic view of human nature, covenantal 
theory in its origins was suspicious of the idea of unitary
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power. That is why the concept of federal, divided, and 
limited power is inherent in covenantal politics. Once the 
pessimism and mistrust of human power was removed, the 
potential for succumbing to unrealistic political 
expectations became reality.
In the beginning, however, hopes for reform were 
relatively restrained. One strives in vain to find 
justification in Calvin's works for the sort of rebellions 
that would take place in his name in Scotland or in France. 
Ever wary of the antinomianism of the Anabaptists and the 
horrible results of the peasant revolt in Germany, he was 
very circumspect about political applications of the reform 
he advocated. Indeed, in the four volumes of the Institutes, 
there is but one short paragraph in Book IV on the subject, 
known now as the "doctrine of lesser magistrates." Calvin 
allows that if a ruler becomes tyrannical and acts 
unlawfully, a lesser magistrate elected or appointed to 
legitimate political power has the duty to resist these acts. 
Tyranny by itself is not enough; even acts that are patently 
immoral and ungodly do not justify removal.
For when popular magistrates have been appointed to curb the 
tyranny of kings (as the Ephori, who were opposed to kings 
among the Spartans, or Tribunes of the people to consuls 
among the Romans, or Demarchs to the senate among the 
Athenians. . .) [s]o far am I from forbidding these 
officially to check the undue license of kings, that if they 
connive at kings when they tyrannize and insult over the 
humbler of the people, I affirm that their dissimulation is 
not free from nefarious perfidy, because they fraudulently 
betray the liberty of the people, while knowing that, by the 
ordinance of God, they are its appointed guardians.
John Calvin, The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Volume 
IV, trans. Henry Beveridge (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Htn. B. Eerdmans, 
1966), 675.
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This statement gives, at most, tepid support to any form of 
revolutionary fervor. Yet, one can find here the notion of 
divided power so crucial to liberalism. In fact, just a few 
pages before this passage, Calvin's discusses different 
regime types, and does so in a way similar to Aristotle's 
comparative survey of political regimes in the Politics. This 
is not surprising as theologians had been synthesizing 
classical and biblical literature for centuries, seeing 
certain classical writers as falling within the traditions of 
righteous precursors to Christianity. For example, Calvin's 
first work was a commentary on Seneca, and one can see from 
the passage above that his example of lesser magistrates is 
drawn from Ancient Sparta. Additionally, Melanchton wrote a 
commentary on Aristotle's Politics. But the Reformers' views 
of human behavior is much darker than that of Aristotle.
Human reason is infected with sin and vice. It cannot be 
wholly trusted. Nor can any one person be trusted with 
absolute power, even in an ideally constructed regime.
Owing, therefore, to the vices or defects of men, it is 
safer and more tolerable when several bear rule, that they 
may thus mutually assist, instruct, and admonish each other, 
and anyone be disposed to go too far, the others are censors 
and masters to curb his excess. This has already been proven 
by experience, and confirmed also by the authority of the 
Lord himself, when he established an aristocracy bordering 
on popular government among the Israelites, keeping them 
under that as the best form, until he exhibited an image of 
the Messiah in David.
It was left to those who studied with Calvin in Geneva, John
Knox, Theodore Beza, and others, to apply these doctrines to
49 Ibid., 656f.
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politics more directly. And it would be their disciples—  
those whom Michael Walzer considers the originators and 
agents of revolutionary change— paving the way for 
modemi ty - -who would dramatically alter the political 
landscape of Europe.
Calvinism as Revolutionary International Ideology
Calvin expressly admonished the Huguenots against 
rebellion, but by the 1570s the Vindicia Contra Tyrannos, 
penned by "Junius Brutus," disseminated the concept of lawful 
resistance in France. As Quentin Skinner points out, this was 
the first articulation of a modern theory of resistance.si 
John Knox, who wrote in 1556 that Geneva was "the maist 
perfyt schoole of Chryst that ever was in the erth since the 
day is of the Apostillis," carried these doctrines to Scotland 
where he demanded power be shared between Queen and 
nobility. S2
In France and the southern region of the Netherlands, 
Calvinism clearly took on political and military 
characteristics in the form of active resistance. Horizontal
so See Michael Walzer's The Revolution of the Saints; A Study in 
the Origins of Radical Politics (London: 1966). Walter's position on the 
relationship between Calvin and modernity is complex to say the least. 
Essentially, he asserts that there is little relationship between 
Calvin's theology and modernity. But he distinguishes between theology 
and Calvinist "ideology," a term which seems to describe a state of mind 
rather than a particular theoretical perspective. Thus the Calvinist 
saint, under the influence of an ideology of change, is an agent of 
revolution and modern radicalism.
51 Quentin Skinner, The Age of Reformation, Volume II in 
Foundations of Modem Political Thought Series (Cambridge: 1978), 240.
52 Garraty and Gay, 529.
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ecclesiastical structures were easily converted into 
effective political organizations that targeted Catholic 
monarchs of both nations. In the Netherlands, Calvinists met 
with success in ridding themselves of Charles V and assisting 
the revolution of William of Orange. One of the most widely 
distributed pamphlets justifying resistance to the Spanish 
was written by "Eusebius Montanus," who argued William of 
Orange was just the sort of "lesser magistrate" anticipated 
by Calvin's t h e o r y . i n  France, they met with defeat. They 
were killed or expelled, fleeing to England or the 
Netherlands.
The English Puritans relied heavily upon Reformed 
doctrines to oppose any notion of absolute divine right of 
the king to rule and to justify their revolution against 
Charles I. Because government must be based on some 
consensual element, the divine right theory of government was 
unacceptable to Puritans. Parliament was viewed as the 
legitimate source of political authority. This development 
led to one of the internal contradictions of the Puritan 
Revolution that Locke himself, much later, had to deal with 
in his own political theory. Given the covenantal emphasis on 
consent and the ontological equality of covenant-makers, how 
could suffrage (and, more generally, political rights) be 
limited in a covenantal state? These limitations made little 
sense covenantally and they highlight the conflict between 
the organic-traditional form of politics and the covenantal.
cited in Skinner, 215.
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Covenant as Ontological Egalitarianism
Limitations on individual liberty could only be 
justified by an appeal to organic tradition, as could a whole 
host of other limitations on political participation or 
equality. But these limitations could not withstand a 
revolution justified on covenaintal grounds. In England, 
egalitarian groups like the Levellers and the Diggers 
demanded an expansion of suffrage. Revolutionary demands 
arose from the ranks of the New Model Army during the Putney 
debates in 1647. Jacqueline Stevens points out that Locke's 
later work makes much more sense if we understand him less 
"as a more polite Robert Nozick" and more as the "colleague 
of Leveller John wildman, which he was. "^ 4 Men like Wildman, 
who wrote up the army's demands for manhood suffrage, sought 
other policies that flew in the face of organic privilege. 
John Lillburne demanded that electoral apportionment be 
commensurate with taxation, a policy that would vastly 
undermine aristocratic power. In addition. Levellers demanded 
a government based on consent rather than on privilege. 
Political theorist George Kateb, looking affirmatively at the 
rise of individualism, sees groups like the Levellers playing 
the central role in developing the modem conception of 
rights. Indeed, he refers to them as "the spiritual founders 
of the American founding."
To say it again: the theory of equal emd individual rights
Jacqueline Stevens, "The ReasoneUaleness of John Locke's 
Majority: Property Rights, Consent, and Resisteuice in the Second 
Treatise, ' Political Theory 24(August 1996), 424.
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(personal emd political) is now almost universally 
professed. We should remember, however, that it did not 
crystallize until the seventeenth century. Though fed from 
many earlier sources, the theory together with the 
heightened sentiments that had to inspire and accompany it 
may be said to have got its start in Bnglemd among radical 
Protestants. Within the Independents (also nauned 
Congregationalists) a certain group, derisively called 
Levellers, practically originated the modem theory of 
rights in almost its entirety.55
At the same time, a phenomenon historian Lawrence Stone 
calls "affective individualism" began to spread both in 
England and in the colonies.5® Once again, the logic of the 
Reformation worked itself out over time to produce unintended 
consequences. If the beginnings of the movement were focused 
upon the right of congregations to worship as they chose, by 
the mid-seventeenth century, it was just as much about the 
rights of individuals to follow the dictates of conscience 
alone. In 1646, we find a leader of the Levellers stating,
•To every individual in nature is given an individual 
property by nature, not to be invaded or usurped by any. . .
. For by natural birth all men are equally and alike b o m  to 
like propriety, liberty and f r e e d o m . I n  1689, Locke uses 
strikingly similar language to explain the state of nature 
and the place of the individual in it: "All men are naturally 
in . . .  a state of perfect freedom to order their actions 
and dispose of their possessions and persons as they see fit, 
within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave
55 George Kateb, The loner Ocean: Individualism and Democratic 
Culture (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 9.
5® Lawrence Stone, The Family, Sex and Marriage In England: 1500- 
1800, Abridged Edition (New York: Heurper & Row, 1979), 149-152.
5^  Ibid., 149. Emphasis added.
57
or depending upon the will of any other man.
As Weber points out, there was always a strong spirit of 
introspection among Calvinists who searched their souls in 
order to determine their eternal state. The same was true of 
seventeenth century English and American Puritans. It was at 
this time, for example, that the diary became such an 
important literary genre. As Stone puts it, "Puritanism, 
introspection, literacy and privacy form a single affinity 
group of characteristics."59
The men of the army were not the only ones affected by 
the implications of the revolutionary philosophy. The first 
hints of English feminism, encouraged by the appeal to 
ontological equality of covenantal theory, appear in the 
mid-seventeenth century as well. The new role for women was 
already being seen before the military conflict with the 
Crown had begun. By the early 1640's, in some independent 
churches, women participated in church debates, voted, spoke 
prophetically, and preached.®^ As was the case with Puritanism 
as a whole, what began as church reform quickly made its way 
into politics. In 1642, a group of several hundred women 
petitioned Parliament for economic relief from the hardships 
resulting from a loss of trade. When they were rebuffed by
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid., 152.
58 These proto-feminists were inspired by such passages as 
Galatiams 3: 28 (NIV) in which the jostle Paul writes : "There is 
neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male nor female, for you are all 
one in Christ Jesus."
5i Stone, 225.
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the Duke of Richmond, they physically attacked him, breaking
his staff of o f f i c e . in 1649, a large crowd of women
demanded that Leveller leaders, who had been imprisoned by
Parliament, be released, what is interesting about this
scenario is that the reply of Parliament-- that the government
had already dealt with their husbands and that should prove
sufficient— was unacceptable to these women on a class basis.
The beginnings of gender consciousness, arising out of the
implications of ontic equality, had begun to show itself.
John Lillburne stated in 1646:
All and every particular man emd woman, that ever breathed 
in the world, are nature all equal and alike in their 
power, dignity, authority emd majesty, none of them having 
(by nature) any authority, dominion or magisterial power one 
over or eüxjve emother.®^
Further evidence for this connection is found in the way
women relied upon biblical literature emd historical examples
in order to outline the political implications of this new
ontology. They cited the role of Esther as savior of the
Jewish people and claimed that, in the conflict of Saxon
against Dane and the overthrow of the Episcopal tyranny in
Scotland, women had taken the initiative against oppression.®®
This nascent women's movement was not to succeed in the
seventeenth century. Whatever their status in theory, women
®2 Ibid.
®3 Ibid., 226.
®^  John Lillburne, "The Free Man's Freedom Vindicated*, in T.C. 
Pease, The Leveller MovemBnt (Washington D.C.: 1916), Ilf; quoted in 
Peter Laslett's The World We Heve Lost: Eaçrland Before the Industrial 
Age, Third Edition (New York: Ctuurles Scribner's Sons, 1984), 219.
®® Stone, 226.
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qua women were given no separate political consideration by 
the exclusively male revolutionary leadership, a phenomenon 
that prefigured the complicated relationship between women's 
movements and Marxist movements in the twentieth century. 
After the restoration of the Stuarts, tradition began to 
encroach upon the ground gained by these radical ideas. Over 
time, liberal thinkers were also less inclusive in the 
immediate extension of political rights to women. In their 
responses to Filmer's Pacriarcha, both Locke and his 
contemporary James Tyrell, were much more careful about such 
extensions. Tyrell, in fact, precludes such an extension 
outright.
Two more centuries would pass before the movement gained 
serious momentum again. But this period is important for 
several reasons. First, the rise of radical populist 
movements during the revolutionary period highlight the 
relationship between the ontic implications of covenant 
doctrines as they appear in politics and modern liberal 
theory as it would eventually emerge. What is more important 
than the individual accomplishments of any class during this 
period is that the terms of the political debate were 
radically shifted in a way that would have enormous 
consequences for the future. The Puritan period was most 
decidedly not a comprehensive moment of liberation for women
Laslett, 222. These two examples are chosen because of the 
title of the treatise to which they were both responding. Given the fact 
that they were both influenced by Puritan revolutionary writings, one 
must assume that their liberal theories were deliberately less 
inclusive.
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or, for that matter, poor men. But as one historian of 
feminism states:
[Women] drew their power to challenge established religion 
and the sexual hierarchies it instituted from Puritanism 
itself. . . . The radical potential of the individual and 
its corollary— the spiritual equality of each individual 
regardless of sex— caused tension in a society based on 
female subordination and finally created an avenue for women 
to question that subordination. . . .  In subsequent 
centuries it was this 'wayward' and radically 
individualistic Puritan woman who would becomes an icon of 
the feminist individual, challenging a culture that on the 
one hand celebrates individualism and on the other hand 
limits, by gender and race, its realization.®^
This last statement is particularly important. Once the
ideal of ontic equality began to penetrate the intellectual
milieu, its implications were to be far reaching--touching on
issues of gender, class, race, nationality, even recently,
sexual orientation. During this early period, the individual
was part of a vast network of social institutions which
entailed obligations and duties. There still existed a belief
in natural law as a basis of obligations and rights. Once the
bonds of this network were loosened, and natural law became
an oppressive anachronism, it was a short distance
intellectually to the modem possessive individual and the
self-interested bourgeois.
The Moral Necessity of Limiting Power
Another reason this historical overview is important is 
that the demise of these political movements illustrates the 
problem of integrating covenantal politics with organic or
Dawn Keetley and John Pettegrew, Public Women, Public Words: A 
Documentary History of American Feminism, Volume I: Beginnings To 1900 
(Madison WX: Madison House Publishers, 1997), 3f. Emphasis in the 
original.
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traditional politics. But this problem presented American 
covenanters with an incredible opportunity. Against the 
background of organic privilege, the colonists of New England 
believed that rationality itself, as far as politics was 
concerned, was commensurate with consent. The original 
American Puritan colonies were founded during the reign of 
Charles I, and these colonies continued to grow rapidly after 
the end of his reign. As the limitations of what was possible 
in England became clearer, Puritans sought an environment 
where the accretions of tradition would not prove to be an 
obstacle to the establishment of a rational "godly civil 
order." At the same time, the patterns of associations 
inherent in the creation of this order mitigated against the 
isolation of the individual and the hypertrophy of the state 
that are always possible outcomes of radical egalitarianism. 
This was certainly one of the primary points Tocqueville 
wished to communicate to his fellow Frenchmen through his 
emphasis on the Puritan origins of American social theory.
Because Puritans were a minority in English society, and 
certainly because the English did not wish to be "reformed, " 
the Puritan revolution was a failure as a political 
revolution. But its influence was felt in the way Puritans 
dealt with the problem of governance. Their political 
organization was based upon a larger social theory that was, 
as Tocqueville stated, the result of a paradox. The order 
found in the social and religious lives of Puritans allowed 
for political experimentation and innovation.
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Thus, in the moral world everything is classified, 
coordinated, foreseen, and decided in advance. In the world 
of politics everything is in turmoil, contested, emd 
uncertain. In the one case obedience is passive, though 
voluntary; in the other there is independence, contempt of 
experience, and jealousy of all authority.*®®
As a result of both intellectual belief and practical
circumstances of persecution, American Puritans developed a
belief in federal or covenantal authority. Political
authority had to involve consensual agreement and divided
powers for, as Calvin insisted, unitary power was too great a
temptation for any ruler with corrupted reason. Both of these
characteristics, noted by Tocqueville, contributed to the
happiness, comparatively speaking, of New England. The
reasoning behind the arrangement was outlined by John Cotton
in his tract 'Limitation of Government.*
Let all the world learn to give mortal 1 men no greater power 
than they are content they shall use, for use it they will: 
and unless they be better taught of God, they will use it 
ever and anon. . . .  It is necessary therefore, that all 
power that is on earth be limited, Church-power or other. .
. . It is counted a matter of danger to the State to limit 
Prerogatives; but it is a further danger not to have them 
limited. . . .  It is therefore fit for every man to be 
studious of the bounds which the Lord hath set: and for the 
People, in whom fundeuaentally all power lyes, to give as 
much power as God in his word gives to men.®®
Unlike Hobbes, Cotton believes the solution to man's
propensity to do evil is not to create a Leviathan. Instead,
because rulers are subject to corruption, their power must be
limited and checked. One can assume, as did Kant, that such
remedies apply at the international as well as at the
68 Tocqueville, 47.
®® John Cotton, "Limitation Of Government, * in An Exposition upon 
the 13tb Chapter of the Revelation (London 1656), 71-73; quoted in Perry 
Miller and Thomas Johnson, The Puritans (New York: American Book 
Company, 1938), 212f. Emphasis added.
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domestic levels. The idea of the world-state, an all-powerful 
global hegemonic power would be as abhorrent to Cotton as it 
was to Kant.
What is remarkable about Cotton's statement is that it 
was written half a century before Locke's work on civil 
government, dispelling the familiar historical dictum; 
praetera Locke nihil. But as numerous scholars of Puritanism 
show, American Puritans were not afraid to use power. What 
separated them from other political practitioners was their 
insistence on the exercise of power within predetermined 
boundaries. This emphasis flew in the face of historical 
perceptions of power from Plato to Hobbes— that rational 
politics meant unitary rule. Within the framework of 
covenantal politics, power was to be divided and based upon 
consent. In ecclesiastical terms, this entailed presbyterian 
or congregational governance; in politics, it entailed 
covenants or compacts in which participants subordinated 
their interests to the higher moral purpose of developing the 
godly civil order.
The exact specifications of such an order were, of 
course, more difficult to work out in practice, a fact that 
at first appeared troublesome but actually over time became 
something of a blessing for New Englanders. Much has been 
written about the various approaches used to limit suffrage 
in these colonies to the pious, as well as the difficulty of 
determining such a qualification. Different visions of the 
good led to different understandings of piety. These
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distinctions, in turn, led to the establishment of other 
communities. The migrations of Anne Hutchinson and Roger 
Williams are but two examples of this pattern. As these 
distinct visions began to emerge, a new level of tolerance 
began to spread among them as a matter of necessity.
The rise of the individual formed one pole in the 
dialectical development of the autonomous liberal conscience. 
The other was the ideal of multiple jurisdictions within 
which one could exercise conscience communally. The 
alternative to this was the highly impractical creation of a 
nation of Thoreaus searching for solitude and total autonomy. 
The concept of multiple jurisdictions was the beneficent 
American solution to the perennial problem of how to balance 
the needs of the one and the many in politics. By the time of 
the founding, and certainly by the time Tocqueville visited 
America, this dialectic had produced a kind of New England 
version of the Westphalian solution to the ideological 
conflicts of the Thirty Years War.
Whereas the revolution in England unfolded within a 
centralized political system, the separate colonies had the 
benefit of decentralized authority. This point is important 
for two reasons. First, this "administrative 
decentralization", as Tocqueville called it, survived into 
the creation of the United States. In this sense, the 
revolution in England had more in common with that of France 
than America. Tocqueville goes to great lengths, in both 
Democracy in America and in The Old Regime and the French
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Revolution, to proclaim that centralization of administration 
is harmful. He states that administrative centralization, 
like that seen under Louis XIV, "can contribute wonderfully 
to the ephemeral greatness of one man but not to the 
permanent prosperity of a p e o p l e . I n  the case of France, 
centralization led to the ability of revolutionary leaders in 
Paris to engage in the Terror. But he finds the United States 
in a very different position with administrative powers 
divided across multiple jurisdictions. America has 
centralization of government, something without which a 
country cannot prosper. Centralization entails granting 
powers with national import to a central, national authority. 
Tocqueville is not specific as to what these are, mentioning 
only "the enactment of general laws and the nation's 
relations with f or ei gn e r s . T h e  Constitutional framers, 
were, however, very specific, citing foreign trade, 
interstate commerce, and providing for the national defense, 
as being among enumerated national powers. Madison made this 
principle a key part of his argument for federal rule, 
referring to "great and aggregate interests being referred to 
the national, the local and particular to the State 
legislatures."72 Within its proper sphere, government must be 
given sufficient power to function effectively; but, its 
sphere must be limited. One could hardly find a better
70 Tocqueville, 88.
71 Ibid.. 87.
72 James Madison, "Federalist 10," 83.
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definition of a covenantal concept of authority.
The second reason the American experience is important 
is that, unlike the English or French (or Russian) 
revolutions, the American colonies had to solve a 
particularly difficult collective action problem under the 
severest of circumstances. To do so, the leaders of the 
revolution appealed not to interests per se but rather to a 
moral vision, a compact with profound ethical implications. 
And they pledged to remain faithful to this vision even if, 
in the end, it proved injurious to themselves. That is not to 
say that there were no commercial interests at stake, but 
rather that the ideals of the revolution encompassed much 
more than financial interest. The vision of the commonwealth 
profoundly affected the domestic order of the US. Yet 
covenant is larger than domestic politics. Its effects on 
organizational culture, and the capabilities that arise from 
that culture, are visible at the international level as well.
Covenant as the Organizational Culture of Global Leadership
In this chapter, I have primarily focused upon 
intellectual and political developments in England and the 
United States. The philosophical evolution of politics 
described herein is seen most powerfully in these nations.
Yet the political consequences of these ideas profoundly 
altered other nations as well. Switzerland, Scotland, the 
Netherlands, England and the U.S. were all changed by 
reformers and their migration to new environments.
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One might also note that of these nations, the latter 
three are the successive global hegemons of the modern 
period.73 This fact is difficult to ascribe to coincidence or 
luck. There was something about the effects of federal 
principles of organization, and the habits of mind they 
produced, that had a lasting effect on these nations. George 
Modelski points out that the advantages held by these global 
powers were fourfold: they had global reach and power 
projection capabilities; they had comparatively open 
societies; they invented and produced lead technologies; and 
they responded to global problems such as the need for open 
trade across the seas.?^
In the case of Britain and the Netherlands, these 
attributes had already been incorporated as policy before the 
rise of liberalism. One might even argue that many liberal 
nations are wealthy and powerful not because they are 
liberal, but because of circumstances that led to both 
economic development and political freedom simultaneously. 
This is something that contemporary liberal theory has 
difficulty accounting for. There is no guarantee that the 
morally autonomous individual, motivated by interests, will 
rise to the task of helping to solve collective action 
problems at the domestic level. Nor is there any clear reason
73 On this point see Modelski and Thompson's Leading Sectors and 
World Powers and Paul Kennedy's The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers 
(New York; Random House, 1987).
74 George Modelski, "From Leadership to Organization : The Evolution 
of Global Politics,* Unpublished paper presented to the Xlllth World 
Congress of Sociology in Bielefeld Germany, July 18-23, 1994, 14.
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why nations made up of politically empowered interest-seeking 
individuals will choose to do so at the international level.
As one of the premier historians of global politics, 
Modelski himself does not inquire too closely about the 
relationships between Reformational thought and the identity 
of hegemonic powers. In his work on long cycles and global 
politics, he does give some detail about the rise of 
transnational linkages within the "Calvinist International," 
that collection of powers affected by the new religion in the 
sixteenth century. But he remains agnostic on what he terms 
"the Weberian question," that is, the influence of Reformed 
thought on overall political and social organization. He 
states:
For students of long cycles the question may be rephrased as 
follows: what explains the predominance of Protestant states 
in positions of global leadership from the Dutch cycle 
(seventeenth century] onward? Why is it that the world 
powers have been predominantly Protestant?^^
Modelski has no answer to this question, as he himself
plainly s t a t e s . T h e  answer, however, lies in the power of
the covenantal ideal as a form of social organization in
elevating its practitioners into positions of economic, then
national, then global power. Like Skinner and Walzer,
Modelski wants to make it clear that he is not asserting any
direct relationship between theology and the dynamism of
modernity. But to the degree that, as Weber believed,
theology affected patterns of political organization, their
George Modelski and Sylvia Modelski eds., Docxmenting Global 
Leadership (London.: Macmillem. Press, 1988), 111.
Ibid., 112.
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analyses appear incomplete.
During this pre-liberal period, the relationships 
between state and civil society were created. For the first 
time, there emerged a political theory that asserted that 
government was simply another form of voluntary association 
that arose out of civil society. The state was not considered 
to be transcendent, but constructed by ordinary people to 
serve their needs, an idea Locke and Tocqueville later 
incorporated into their theories of the good state. The 
relationships between individual and community that balanced 
rights, interests, and obligations within a larger ethical 
framework were largely defined. The covenantal, or properly 
federal, solution to problems of social organization was 
utilized in different ways and in different countries touched 
by these ideas. At this early stage, theory and theology were 
still closely intertwined. The process of rationalization had 
not yet occurred. This was a delicate project. A rational 
justification of the covenantal approach had to describe in 
universal, rather than parochial, terms what was superior 
about the principles of federalism while not losing sight of 
the ethical and political requirements of statecraft, the 
Scylla and Charybdis with which liberal international 
relations theory is still struggling. The spirit of science 
that arose at the end of this proto-liberal period set off a 
search for just such principles.
The transformation of theology into secular, 
unversalizable principles was a necessary part of the
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evolution of the international system. Modem thinkers were 
looking for principles that would provide guidance for all 
peoples, not just Christian Europeans. Just as there was no 
Christian physics or Christian chemistry, there should be no 
culturally specific science of politics or ethics. As the 
next chapter shows, these attempts provide one of the 
brightest moments in the history of philosophy. Yet, they 
could not succeed in the long run because the brilliant 
political and ethical formulations they provided were not 
accompanied by an epistemology that could support them.
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CHAPTER 2
THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE LOCKEAN TRANSITION
The previous chapter outlined the nature of the 
covenantal paradigm and how it differs from contract. In 
addition, the chapter revealed how covenantal thought was 
integrated into social theory through the Reformational 
revival of a Jewish, rather than Greek, conception of the 
good life. This conception synthesized commerce and the good 
in ways that would have been unrecognizable to many classical 
Greek thinkers, who idealized the vita contemplativa.
This chapter explains how covenant was pushed to the 
margins of social thought during the Enlightenment. During 
the early Enlightenment, classical liberals rendered politics 
rational by an appeal to interests, considered within the 
context of natural law. This conception was not at all far 
from that of Reformed thinkers. It contained a synthesis of 
ethics and interests that sought to universalize the ethical 
traditions of covenantal thought. Over time, however, ethics 
and interests were separated through the removal of natural 
law by later liberal thinkers, an act which led political 
ethics in two profoundly different directions. The appeal to 
interests was strengthened and narrowed in scope over time by 
"Anglo-Saxon," utilitarian liberals in order to make
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liberalism as rational as possible. This rationality, 
however, was of the sort described by Weber as instrumental. 
Consequently, to many thinkers on the Continent, it lacked 
transcendence of any kind and had all the aesthetic 
attractiveness of a nineteenth-century British industrial 
town. In response to this instrumental conception of 
political ethics, German thinkers, in particular, often 
turned to an ethic of transcendence, something detailed 
further in Chapter 4. Kant is the most important of these 
thinkers because his solution to the problem of uniting 
ethics and interests affected nearly all ethical thought that 
followed. His theory also led German philosophers in the 
direction of radically separating individual and political 
ethics. While Kant provided a transcendent basis for 
morality, that basis was in the end untenable, leading many 
German thinkers and statesmen to the conclusion that morality 
was a personal matter; statesman must recognize that politics 
involves a diabolical contract with evil in order to bring 
about good.
Liberals also adopted much of Kant's philosophy, 
especially his epistemology and ethics. Deontology is the 
most common ethical theory in liberal international thought. 
But Kant's thought, as it influenced international thinkers, 
presented serious problems for international ethics, problems 
highlighted in the next chapter.
After the decline of classical liberalism, covenant went 
underground, not to reemerge until after World War II.
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Political ethics followed the path of the philosophy of 
science after the demise of natural law theory. First came 
positivism; then postmodern skepticism. Neither explain the 
rise of science nor how it is sustained as a practice. Nor do 
they provide a basis for humanistic political ethics.
To show how this philosophical evolution occurred, this 
chapter begins with a discussion of the relationship between 
the metaphysical and epistemic cultural matrix that led to 
modern science. I then discuss the origins of the 
Enlightenment and Locke's thought in particular. I show how 
Locke and other early Enlightenment figures integrated ethics 
and interests. Following this, I examine the separation of 
ethics and interests and Kant's response to this separation. 
The chapter moves ahead to positivism and Weber, who 
integrated Kantian theory and positivism in a way critical 
for liberals and realists. Weber's separation of ethical or 
value-rationality and instrumental rationality as a normative 
principle is important because both international traditions 
rely upon it, leading to contradictions in their political 
ethics. The substance of those contradictions are discussed 
in Chapters 3 and 4.
Newton. Locke, and the Origins of Enlightenment Rationalitv
The epistemic realism of the period just prior to the 
Enlightenment appears naive in the era of postmodernism. The 
belief that phenomena in their essences can be known through 
human perception was a hallmark of the ancient and medieval
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periods, and fell by the wayside with the advent of 
Enlightenment empiricism. Yet, that realism provided an 
epistemological basis for the continuation of scientific 
activity. The development of a self-sustaining tradition of 
science began in the medieval period, continuing through the 
Renaissance and Reformation. The Enlightenment project of 
making all thought scientific occurred in an intellectual 
culture in which science had already prevailed as an 
independent activity.
Science, as a means of investigation of nature and 
organizing knowledge, has much in common with political 
ethics. Both require a sense of epistemic realism to be 
systematically coherent. As Hume showed, belief in the 
uniformity and intelligibility of phenomena is not obvious or 
necessary.1 Postmodernism reveals why the same can be said for 
political ethics.
Isaac Newton was relatively unconcerned with matters of 
epistemology and metaphysics per se. Despite the availability 
of other historical options, Newton simply assumed the 
intelligibility and underlying uniformity of phenomena and 
proceeded to work upon that basis. In 1687, Newton's
 ^ This point is etymologically confirmed when one considers that 
the Greek root of "epistemology* is pistis, that can be translated as 
"faith" or "belief." It is similar to the Latin credere. When one 
considers the connection of "faith" to foedus, the relationship between 
scientific and covenantal epistemologies becomes clearer. Putneun, in 
Making Democracy Work, links credere to the invention of credit and 
bonds of social capital. (128). This also highlights the relationship 
between trust as an independent variable and a number of dependent 
outcomes in a variety of spheres: science, economics, and politics, 
eunong others. In all of these spheres, belief, as credibility or 
reliability of perception, is critical to the establishment of 
successful practices.
75
Principia Mathematica Philosophiae Naturalis heralded the 
discovery of laws uniting the celestial and terrestrial 
realms. The influence of this work on the rise of modernity 
is difficult to overestimate. The inverse square law of 
gravity served as a model for the way social inquiry ought to 
be done: orderly, rational, ateleological, and, most 
importantly, universal. One hundred years later, for example, 
Immanuel Kant was obsessed with Newton's ability to summarize 
universal motion with one elegant equation. Attempting to 
imitate Newton's successes in physics and politics, Kant, 
relying upon a priori assumptions, assured readers of his 
Universal Natural History that intellectuals on Mercury would 
have to be inferior to even the lowest intellect on Earth 
who, in turn, would be far inferior to those on Saturn. He 
stated, in 1791, that Napoleon must land in Portugal and, 
when confronted with the fact that the great leader had 
landed in Egypt, he insisted the news was false.- These 
examples reflect the difficulty the a priori approach 
presented, not just for cosmology, but for social theory as 
well.
Philosophers of this period were also fascinated by the 
way Newton described the physical reality of white light in 
his Opticks, published in 1704. Newton insisted that the 
belief in the special, spiritual qualities of white light was 
nonsense. The phenomenon was simply made up of an aggregation
2 cited in Stanley Jaki, The Road of Science and the Ways to God 
(Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1980), 115.
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of primary colors. His rational debunking seemed to be just 
what was needed for the inquiry into human affairs.
John Locke, an avid reader of Newton's works, applied a 
rational approach—  more akin to Newton's than to Kant's— to 
politics. His Two Treatises on Civil Government, appeared in 
1690. His work on epistemology. An inquiry into Human 
Understanding, was published that same year. This latter work 
was celebrated as a model of rational inquiry, pushing aside 
all the complicated elements of non-rational thought in favor 
of empirical clarity. Of the two, Locke's Inquiry, rather 
than the political works, tended to be most influential on 
American readers during the founding period.^
In many ways, the Enlightenment as a movement took its 
bearings from these two theorists. As John Garraty and Peter 
Gay put it;
The appeal of the Enlightenment was that it undercut . . .
[the] clutter by proposing the great simplicities. Just as 
the philosophes mocked at the Ptolemaic scheme's trying to 
cope with celestial movements by hooking orbits upon orbits, 
and said, "Follow Newton instead and all is clear,* so in 
human affairs they said: "Begin with Locke and all 
follows.
What is striking about the reliance upon these thinkers, 
however, is the way their thought is narrowed and 
reinterpreted to fit the desires and assumptions of later 
Enlightenment theorists. In some ways, the story of that 
transition is the story of the transition of liberalism
 ^ Donald Lutz, "The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late 
Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought," American Political 
Science Review 78 (March 1984), 196.
4 Geurraty and Gay, 701.
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itself from its classical to modem formulations. In modern 
liberalism, the complexity of relationships and ethical 
obligations has been stripped away and replaced by interests. 
This is an aspect of liberalism that is wide open to 
postmodern critiques. This is no less true in the realm of 
international relations. The richness of substantive ethical 
assumptions underlying Locke, Grotius, Pufendorf, and even 
Kant--once removed by the scalpel of modernity--are exchanged 
for the positivism, scientism, and interest-based 
prescriptions of modern international jurisprudence 
justifiably attacked by critical legal theory.
In the case of Newton, the rationalistic and mechanistic 
interpretation of his work is at odds with the degree to 
which he was epistemologically and metaphysically committed 
to a very non-mechanistic perspective. Stanley Jaki calls 
this commitment "the instinctive middle." He points out 
Newton's uncanny ability to ignore the theoretical 
consequences of the two epistemic extremes of the day: 
Cartesian rationalism with its dangerous attachment to innate 
ideas and Baconian empiricism that led to the exaggerated 
skepticism found in David Hume's epistemology.^
 ^ Jaki, 90. This chapter relies heavily on Jaki's interpretation 
of the epistemic and metaphysical transitions taking place at this time. 
Jaki is among the foremost scholars in the world in the area of 
comparative history of scientific epistemology. He is important to this 
work because he highlights the importance of epistemology to science 
and, thus, the importance of epistemology to all rational inquiry. 
Liberal thought is directly tied to the modem emphasis on reason; this 
includes liberal international thought, as Mbrgenthau points out. In a 
number of publications, Jaki has persuasively argued that the absence or 
presence of a self-sustaining tradition of science depends largely on 
the degree to which epistemic realism prevails in that society.
Cultures which have fostered trust in human's ability to perceive 
physical interactions in the environment have had greater success in
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One might rightly wonder in what way Newton's 
epistemology is significant to a discussion of the problems 
of liberal international thought. The point made here is 
twofold. Newton and Locke shared a common intellectual 
background grounded in a complex view of both nature and 
society, a view rooted in a covenantal perspective that was 
radical for its time. That perspective entailed a resistance 
to both the absolutism of Greek neo-Platonism or the 
relativism contained within radical skepticism. It was at 
this juncture that science, including social science, and 
theology met. Jaki discusses the primary problem for science 
presented by Renaissance neo-Platonism, the belief that "the 
world was an uncreated whole and therefore a non-contingent 
entity.*® Resistance to that belief required an epistemic 
balancing act between the two extremes already mentioned. As 
he states:
To a large extent the resistance had therefore been an 
exercise in natural theology— in which Protestant divines 
showed much interest once the first wave of supernatural 
reaffirmation was over. This is a point which one historian 
of science implicitly recognized by giving much credit to 
'moderate Puritans' for the rise of science in the century 
of genius. Being moderate, however, meant adopting an 
epistemological median, the common basis of the road of 
science and the ways to God.
Science owed to [the resistance to neo-Platonism] a 
renewed awareness of the contingency of the world. From this 
contingency there followed the logical need of painstaking, 
experimental investigations. They could not be justified 
within Cartesian a priorism rooted in a spurious natural 
theology. Baconian empiricism could be of no use either, 
because research had to be directed in order to be fruitful.
This direction could only come from a conception of the
developing science. He also argues that some cultures began with those 
epistemic tendencies, only to lose them and the capacity to sustain 
scientific inquiry on a self-sustaining basis.
® Ibid.
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mind's role which transcended empiricism without being 
trapped in a priorism. This conception had its most cogent 
and constant expression in the classical proofs of the 
existence of God. They represented an epistemological middle 
road which Newton followed by instinct. Part of that 
instinct was rooted in Newton's remote connection with the 
sixteenth-century Christian revival.^
Jaki believes that the foundations of certainty upon 
which Newton worked allowed him to write the Principia, in 
which there was no direct role for natural theology, only an 
implied one. The irony was that Newton's certainty in the 
rationality, order, and coherence of phenomena--directly 
related to his theology--greatly reduced the need for God to 
show up as a means of explanation in scientific work. God did 
not direct; he merely tinkered.
The fact that Newton wrote more works on theology than 
he did on physics gives some credence to this belief.
Judaism had a tremendous effect on Newton's theology and on 
his epistemology. He was an avid Hebraist who taught himself 
Hebrew in order to be able to translate the Tanach himself. 
Hebraic studies had become quite popular in the Civil War 
period, and a number of Newton's contemporaries, such as 
Henry More, John Locke, and Robert Boyle, also had ties to 
this movement. John Maynard Keynes, who came to be in 
possession of many of Newton's manuscripts, believed Newton 
to be more a follower of Maimonides than the rational 
mechanist the Enlightenment made him out to be.®
Ibid,
® Matt Goldish, Judaism In The Theology Of Sir Isaac Newton 
(Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), 4.
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Newton believed that nature, history, and revelation, 
all consistently pointed to similar truths that had to be 
carefully studied to be understood. The universe was a riddle 
designed by God to be solved by human inquiry. Just as the 
inverse square law defined gravity's effects in absolute 
space and time, the law of nature defined our ethical 
responsibilities to one another. And the covenants of 
Judaism, those given to Noah( Newton uses the Hebrew 
"Noach"), Abraham, and Moses, pointed us in the direction of 
that law.
Thou shalt love the lord thy God with all thy heart & with
all thy soul £é with all thy mind. This is the first & great
commandment & the next is like unto it. Thou shall love thy 
neighbour as thyself. Upon these two hang all the law & the 
Prophets. These are the laws of nature, the true natural
religion. These are the part of religion which ever was and
ever will be binding to all nations, being of an eternal 
immutable nature because grounded upon immutable reason.^
Newton's impact on the Enlightenment, and its absorption 
of what was considered to be the Newtonian rational 
mechanistic paradigm, was enormous. As A.O. Hirschman points 
out, if liberalism was anything, it was rational. The 
writings of early international legal theorists mirror 
Newton's views here exactly. Passions were to be replaced by 
rational interest-seeking behavior conducted within the 
bounds of the laws of nature. The emphasis in this definition 
should clearly be upon the word "rational." But the narrative 
of liberal history is caught up in the evolution of the 
boundaries of rationality itself. It was not long until the
® Isaac Newton, Of Che Church, MS. Bodmer; quoted in Goldish, 
Judaism In The Theology Of Sir Isaac Newton, 41.
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epistemic foundations of Newton's work were marginalized in 
order to make room for Newton the rational mechanist and icon 
of the Enlightenment. Hugh Kearney writes eloquently on the 
fictive creation of the "Enlightenment Newton."
Prom our point of view the significance of Newton lies in 
his bringing together the mechanistic and magical [or 
alchemical] traditions. In one of them, the world was a work 
of art and God was an artist. In the other, the world was a 
machine and God was an engineer. The two world pictures were 
clearly incompatible but Newton himself managed to meet the 
difficulty by creating a Deity who combined engineering 
skill with artistic solicitude. Newton's God was an 
aesthetic mecheinic who was forever tinkering with his 
creation. This compromise barely survived Newton's death.
The general trend of scientists in the eighteenth century 
was to see the world in terms of a machine. Newton the Great 
Amphibium managed to span two worlds, but his successors 
could not. Hence the Principia came to be regarded as the 
foundation of a mechanistic view of the universe.
In Newton's historiography, covenants provided the means by
which God accomplished this "tinkering" among humans.
Covenantal renewal reversed, for a time, the process of
corruption Newton believed to be pervasive in history. In the
Irenicum, he wrote:
All nations were originally of the Religion comprehended in 
the Precepts of the sons of Noah. . . . This religion 
descended to Melchisekec [sic] 6 Job & to Abraham Isaac 
Jacob Moses & the Israelites & to the proselites of the 
gate. . . . But the Kings of the nation by degrees causing 
their dead ancestors to be celebrated with sacrifices 
praises & invocation, the religion of Noah & his sons passed 
into the worship of dead men 6 the laws of their courts of 
justice into the moral Philosophy of the heathens. . . .
Then Moses reformed the Israelites from those 
corruptions & added many new precepts to ye Moral law, 
writing all down in a book & imposed the whole upon the 
people of Israel by the covenant of circumcision, & allowed 
strangers of all nations to live within their gates without 
entring [sic] into that covenant provided they kept the 
Precepts of the sons of Noah.^^
Hugh Kearney, Science and Change: 1500-1700 (New York: McGraw- 
Hill, 1971), 196.
Isaac Newton, Irenicum, MS. Keynes 3; quoted in Goldish, Judaism 
In The Theology Of Sir Isaac Newton, "Appendix A, * 167.
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The ultimate act of tinkering by God, Newton believed, would 
come at the covenantal renewal that comprised the end of 
history, the messianic millennial period marked by the second 
coming of Christ. Given these positions, it is difficult to 
see how Newton could be considered the founder of a 
mechanistic paradigm.
Thomas Spragens, discussing the relationship between 
science and the rise of liberalism, categorizes moral thought 
that arose during the post-Newton Enlightenment period as 
"moral Newtonianism." Moral thinkers and philosophers 
attempted to mirror in social theory what Newton had done in 
physics. The rationality of moral acts was derived from the 
contemplation of nature and, while such thought originally 
had autocratic overtones, it eventually evolved through the 
eighteenth century into more democratic forms.
The problems with the moral Newtonians' approach are 
central to this premise that liberal ethical theory fails to 
account for the need to apply rules contextually. Key 
assumptions of Newton's philosophy, assumptions that point to 
the difficulty of applying anything like the inverse square 
law to social theory, were ignored or removed. This 
application created an untenable goal, that of a rule- 
oriented social theory based on reason according to nature. 
But this was not the orthon logon of Hellenic thought. When 
the Greeks attempted to construct a theory of the social
Thomas Spragens, The Irony of Liberal Reason (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1981), 75-94. See also the discussion of 
this phenomenon in his book Reason and Democracy (Durham NC: Duke 
University Press, 1990), 43-46.
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good, they made phronesis a central element, recognizing the 
contingent element of the good in practical reason. 
Enlightenment scholars eschewed this approach, seeing it as 
unscientific and attached to metaphysics. Newton, they 
believed, had already shown the way beyond these parochial 
attachments through his equation. But nature is not clear 
about what constitutes the good, at least not as clear as the 
inverse square law is about gravity.
This lack of clarity points to inevitable contradictions 
inherent in the reinterpreted Newtonian rationalism of post- 
Enlightenment theories of ethics and politics. Over time, it 
became more and more difficult to defend the connections made 
between the rational, the natural, and the ethical. This 
difficulty had profound implications for domestic and 
international liberalism. Locke's work, and the responses to 
it, show why this is so. For Locke is considered a founder of 
both domestic social contract theory and legal 
institutionalism in international thought.
John Locke and the Rationalization of Covenant
Until recently, there has been a remarkable lack of 
interest in the circumstances shaping the historical and 
ethical characteristics of Locke's philosophy. Over time, 
Locke's moral assumptions were stripped away, leaving only 
the framework of self-interested behavior found in 
microeconomic or rational-choice theories. Some, though not 
all, of the blame for this change lies with the author
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himself, as we will see. Locke is an important figure for 
both domestic and international liberalism because he serves 
as the transition point between covenantal and contemporary 
contractual liberalism.
Locke desired to place liberal theory upon a rational 
foundation in order to justify the accession to the throne of 
William and Mary. He was not the first, of course, to 
consider placing rationality upon a foundation of interests 
that could counteract man's irrational passions, passions 
that Thomas Hobbes had clearly and brilliantly exposited. 
Indeed, Blaise Pascal wrote of the "admirable arrangement" 
man had managed to construct out of the opposition of his 
countervailing passions.Giambattsita Vico, whose work in 
the early eighteenth century anticipates both the 
communitarian critique of liberalism and the rhetorical 
emphasis of postmodernism, also believed in the ability of 
society to transform the basest passions through the pursuit 
of economic interests.i* And while some scholars such as Leo 
Strauss look to Hobbes as the founder of modern political 
philosophy, it is John Locke to whom liberal theorists turn 
as the founder and originator of modern liberal theory. This 
is no less true in international relations.is
IS Blaise Pascal, Pensees, Brunschvicg Edition, introduction and 
notes by Marc des Granges (Paris: Gamier Freres, 1948), paragraph 402, 
171. Pascal's states: "Grandeur de l'homme dans sa concupiscence meme, 
d'en avoir su tirer un règlement admirable, et d'en avoir fait un 
tableau de la charité'.'
Giambattsita Vico, The New Science; Third Edition, trzms. Thomas 
Goddard Bergin and Max Heurold Pisch (Ithaca NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1968), paragraphs 132 and 133, 62.
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Hobbes did provide some of the most important 
theoretical foundations for Locke's work, however, and he is 
important to the secularization of covenantal thought. He 
says a great deal in Leviathan (particularly in Books II and 
III) about natural law, which he states is "undoubtedly Gods 
Law," a position he shared (at least in public) with Locke.
He also has much to say about covenant as the foundation for 
the commonwealth. He states, for example:
The Law of Nature and the Civill Law, contain each other, 
and are of equal extent. . . . The Law of Nature therefore 
is part of the Civill Law in all Common-wealths of the 
world. Reciprocally also, the Civill Law is a part of the 
Dictates of Nature. For Justice, that is to say. Performance 
of Covenant, and giving to every man his own, is a dictate 
of the Law of Nature. But every subject in a Common-wealth, 
hath covenanted to obey the Civill Law. . . . Civill, and 
Natural1 Law are not different kinds, but different parts of 
Law; whereof one part being written is called Civill, the 
other unwritten. Natural1.^^
Natural law plays a role in Hobbes' theory but it requires
the covenantal commonwealth in order to secure its benefits
and protections. The natural law of justice, which includes
self -preservation as the foundation of interests, is in
perfect accord with a civil law that is properly formulated.
Locke accepts this important point as well. This is a very
covenantal perspective. However, Hobbes, the royalist,
influenced by Machiavelli as much as his own chaotic
Fukuyama, for example, sees Locke as the founder of the Anglo- 
Saxon variant of liberal IE theory. And, as Michael Doyle explains, the 
intellectual origins of liberal international thought lie in Lockean 
theory to a great extent. He mentions Locke as a founder of "liberal 
institutionalism* and defender of the school of international law 
consistent with natural law. Zacher and Matthew cite Locke as one of the 
two founders of international liberal theory, the other being Rousseau.
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Norton Critical Edition, eds. Richard 
E. Plathman and David Johnston (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1997), 
Book II, Chapter 26, section 4, 134.
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political environment, deviates severely from other elements 
of covenantal thought.
The most important of these deviations is found in 
Hobbes' reliance on the absolute authority of the state, a 
position that leads to all the problems of the Weberian 
bureaucratic nightmare. Hobbes' state becomes hierarchical in 
order to preserve covenant, a contradiction in terms. The 
natural rights of men will never be facilitated and preserved 
by covenanting together to hand power over to an absolute 
authority. Though Hobbes uses biblical examples of covenant—  
e.g. the Abrahamic and Mosaic covenants— that would have been 
very familiar to his audience, he takes them out of 
covenantal context. Rather than focus upon the power-limiting 
quality central to covenantal politics, he focuses upon the 
way these relationships reflect the sovereignty of God, and 
by implication, the need for sovereign rulers. This was not 
the lesson Locke, the Puritans, or the American founders drew 
from the implications of covenant theology.
Hobbes also breaks from the covenantal tradition by 
relying upon a materialistic and deterministic epistemology. 
His focus on sensations becoming knowledge breaks with 
ancient and medieval beliefs that knowledge of things 
involved a knowledge of essences, not just surface 
impressions. As Spragen states, this earlier view, one that 
Newton inherited, contained the idea that “forms are 
impressed on the mind through sensation. In Aristotle's (and
Hobbes, Leviathan, Book II, Chapter 26, section 7, 144.
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Plato's) rendition, these forms are the essences of a finite 
cosmos. . . Locke, for one, relied upon Hobbes' epistemic
sensationism which only aided in the breakdown of classical 
liberalism into modern variant. As the breach between 
sensationism and humane liberal ethics grew wider and wider, 
the Enlightenment project became more and more untenable.
Locke's political theory focused primarily on how to 
explain the rational foundations of government. To do so, he 
defined the state of nature somewhat differently from Hobbes 
for whom the state of nature was a war of all against all. 
Locke's concept is more beneficent, one defined by "Men 
living together according to reason, without a common 
superior on earth, without authority to judge between them. 
But while those in the state of nature are equal and free, 
freedom ought not to be taken for license. Rather, much like 
the federal liberty of winthrop, their freedom is 
circumscribed by natural law.
But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state 
of license; though man in that state have [sic] an 
uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person or 
possessions. . . . The state of nature has a law of nature 
to govern it, which obliges every one; and reason, which is 
that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it that, 
being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm 
another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions; for 
men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and 
infinitely wise Maker— all the servants of one sovereign 
master, sent into the world by his order, and about his 
business— they are his property whose workmanship they are.
20
18 Spragens, The Irony of Liberal Reason, 209.
John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, ed. Thomas P. 
Peardon (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1952), paragraph 19, 13.
20 Ibid., paragraph 6, 5f.
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Considering the blessed state one finds in nature, one might 
reasonably ask why any person would want to leave it in order 
to develop first civil society and, then, government? This is 
because the peace found in the state of nature is tenuous and 
unstable. Locke states that while the state of nature is 
good, it is not perfectly designed to deal with conflicts 
that may arise. The law of God is consonant with the law of 
nature, but God does not immediately enforce it upon men, a 
point entirely consistent with covenantal t h e o r y . I n  order 
to secure property and well-being, men must compact together 
to create institutions that can enforce this law. Otherwise, 
one may find one's life, liberty or property in jeopardy.
Thus the end of civil society is "to avoid and remedy those 
inconveniences of the state of nature which necessarily 
follow from every man being judge in his own case by setting 
up a known authority to which everyone of that society may 
appeal upon any injury received or controversy that may 
arise, and which everyone of the society ought to o b e y . I t  
is from these inconveniences or from the inconstancy of human 
judgment, that civil society and government serve to protect 
us.
Michael Doyle writes that the origins of Locke's theory 
lie in "the ideas of Protestant theologians and the
This was a major point o£ contention between Locke and Filmer. 
Filmer used covenant doctrines in Genesis to support the idea of the 
rights of kings while Locke believed they existed to secure the rights 
of all.
Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, paragraph 90, 50.
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traditions of the seventeenth-century English Puritan 
R e v o l u t i o n . "23 Locke's own father, a Puritan and his son's 
first teacher, fought on the side of Parliament during the 
Civil War. Locke clearly absorbed the lessons of the 
conflict, particularly the justifications given for 
resistance. He also absorbed more subtle aspects of the 
intellectual climate in which he was raised. He believed that 
natural law and reason parallel one another. He defined 
liberty in ways similar to the Puritan divines. In addition, 
the reasons he gives for the need for government are 
strikingly similar to those found in Puritan theology. The 
previously quoted passage of "every man being judge in his 
own case" would have been very familiar to seventeenth- 
century Englishmen with any kind of theological education, 
reminding them of the pitiful state of Israel at the end of 
the Judges period. Indeed, in Judges 21:25, we find similar 
language to Locke's: "In those days Israel had no king and 
everyone did as he saw fit." In the Second Treatise, Locke 
quotes from Judges himself. He relies upon the conflict 
between the Israelites and the Ammonites to explain the 
hazards of the state of nature which, as he says, shows why 
men quit the state of nature for society.2^  The Israelite 
solution, like that proposed by Locke and his whig brethren, 
was not an absolute monarchy, but rather a constitutional one 
with strictly limited powers established by covenantal
22 Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, 214.
24 Locke, Second Treatise of Government, Chapter 3, paragraph 21,
14.
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consent.25 It was just this kind of regime that Locke 
attempted to justify
While there are striking similarities between Locke and 
his Puritan predecessors, there are also differences, the 
most important of which is Locke's appeal to interests as a 
means of devising a rational political theory. Hirschman 
writes: "Although Locke does not appeal to interest to keep 
inconstancy at bay, there is clearly an affinity between the 
Commonwealth he is attempting to construct and the 
seventeenth-century image of a world ruled by interest."25 
While inconstancy (man's tendency to act inconsistently and 
imprudently in the state of nature) was not to be solved by 
interests, interests would draw men into civil society which 
was the solution to that vexing problem.
The Critique of Anglo-Saxon Liberalism
Communitarian Mary Ann Glendon finds the roots of the 
Anglo-Saxon obsession with rights and autonorry in Locke's 
insistence that all rights are a form of property rights, a 
peculiarity of the common law which, to a large extent, arose 
out of the law of trespass.
[Locke] seems to have expected his readers to accept without 
question that proprietorship of one's body was a God-given 
right, as natural as breathing. . . . After his 
"demonstration* that individual property rights were 
anterior to government, Locke went on to his next 
proposition, namely, that the essential reason human beings 
submit to government is to safeguard their "property." In a
25 On this point see Elazar, Covenant and Polity in Biblical 
Israel.
25 Hirschman, 53.
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move that was to have great significance for Americans, he 
announced that he would use the word "property* to 
designate, collectively, 'Lives, Liberties, and Estates.* 
According to Locke, the preservation of property, in this 
capacious sense, is 'the great and chief end* for which men 
come together into commonwealths.
Glendon argues that, by placing the foundation for rational
political action in interest and specifically in terms of
property rights, Locke began a process of rights-expansion
that has lasted up until the present day. Rather than
emphasizing duties and obligations, the Anglo-American
tradition of liberalism has focused on rights claims almost
exclusively.
Francis Fukuyama, in his defense of liberalism, also 
finds a Lockean beginning to what he terms 'Anglo-Saxon 
liberalism.* He distinguishes this regime from a more civic- 
minded Hegelian polity. But, to the extent that modern 
liberal international relations theory is Anglo-American, or 
to the extent that liberalism in international relations is 
an extension of domestic liberal theory, this Lockean 
appellation is appropriate. As he states,"[T]he oldest and 
most durable of liberal societies— those in the Anglo-Saxon 
tradition--like England, the United States and Canada— have 
typically understood themselves in Lockean terms.*2® While it 
is true that Hobbes is the first theorist to argue for an 
interest-based rationality as the basis for government, the 
government he is attempting to justify is an absolute
Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political 
Discourse (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 21. Emphasis in the 
original.
“® Fukuyeuna, The End of History, 145.
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monarchy. According to Fukuyama, Locke is the progenitor of 
the truly liberal 'first man.' This political being cleverly 
combines the desire for material well-being with his 
calculative ability to reason, leading eventually to the 
'last man" or bourgeois predicted by Nietzsche. This last man 
cares only for his material interests; he has no interest in 
anything beyond the fulfillment of his desires for material 
gain, in Trust: the Social Virtues and the Creation of 
Prosperity, Fukuyama outlines the relationship between the 
rights-oriented rationality of this first man, rooted as it 
is in the preservation of property, and the rationality of 
homo economicus of economic theory.
Man in the state of nature for early Anglo-Saxon liberal 
political theorists was the exact counterpart of the 
economic man of classical economic liberalism. Both were 
portrayed as isolated individuals, seeking to protect their 
own basic rights (in the case of political liberalism) or 
their private 'utility' (in the case of economic 
liberalism). In both cases, social relationships emerged 
only through contractual relationships in which the rational 
pursuit of either rights or interests led to cooperation 
with other human beings.29
There are clearly ambiguities in Locke's theory that 
lend credence to Fukuyama's critique. No doubt, this is one 
of the reasons for the existence of so many interpretations 
of Locke: the 'Lockian' [sic] consensus of Louis Hartz; the 
capitalist interpretation of C.B. MacPherson; and the neo- 
Puritan interpretation of John Dunn and John Dienstag. After 
rejecting these interpretations, Thomas Pangle takes even 
another approach, citing Locke as a neo-Machiavellian who
29 Francis Fukuyama, Trust; the Social Virtues and the Creation of 
Prosperity, Free Press Paperback edition (New York: Free Press, 1996), 
286. Emphasis added.
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altered Christian theology in order to make it compatible 
with acquisitive and calculative liberalism. As sympathetic 
as he is to Locke's agenda, even he is troubled by the 
inability of Lockean theory to explain civic solidarity and 
morality.
Locke's apparent failure to explain his own civic spirit is 
only the most egregious instance of a more general 
unanswered question that pervades his writings. For Locke 
seems to continue— surreptitiously or unjustifiably, it 
would seem, given his principles— to count on citizens and 
parents running risks and making sacrifices for country and 
family. He seems to presume in others— and exhibit in 
himself— a concern for the social contract that goes beyond 
what can be explained in terms of comfortable self- 
preservation, or self-interest however understood. In short, 
we may doubt whether the new Lockean moral reasoning 
provides an adequate rational justification for the moral 
action that is required and expected in even a permissive 
Lockean civil society.3°
Pangle misses an important point, however, as does Glendon in
her critique of Locke's emphasis on property. Locke's liberty
is federal liberty, the freedom to do good. This freedom
entails the pursuit of happiness but not the pursuit of goods
for their own sake, which would involve natural liberty. This
point is of great importance because it reveals a great deal
about the development of self-interest rightly understood
which Tocqueville later finds in New England.
The Lockean Integration of Interests and Ethics in Sanctified 
Labor
Pangle begins his chapter on Locke's theory of property 
with the subheading “The Assault on the Biblical Conception.“
30 Thomas Pangle, The Spirit of Modem Republicanism: The Moral 
Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1988), 270f.
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Locke's view on property, however, is not as revolutionary as 
Pangle claims. Pangle also contends that Locke's beliefs 
about the good life are Machiavellian rather than Puritan, a 
fact most obvious in his view on property. Locke's theory of 
property, however, derives from his theory of labor, one that 
is similar to that of Aquinas and Marx. Property is labor
mixed with matter. But thought is also a form of labor for
Locke. He states, "General and abstract ideas . . . are the 
Workmanship of the M i n d . A n d ,  as Joshua Dienstag, points 
out, in the Two Treatises, he uses the term "workmanship" to 
describe man as God's c r e a t i o n . work, then, is a calling 
for Locke, and property becomes a metonymy for that calling. 
Work is attached to dominion, the goal of subduing and 
improving the earth. On this important point, the distance 
between Locke and Weber's Puritans is minute.
Labor, in Jewish and Christian covenant theology, is an 
act of dominion commanded by God in the book of Genesis. Far 
from being a burden, labor was the first command of God given
before the fall of humans from paradise. The curse on nature
was not, as is often supposed, that humans were sentenced to 
work, but that their work would be more difficult. This is 
not just theological obscurantism. Locke goes straight to the 
Hebrew text to argue against Filmer's point that God gave
John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book IV, 
Chapter 12, paragraph 3, ed. A.S. Pringle-Pattison (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1934), 329f.
Joshua Poa Dienstag, "Serving God and Mammon: The Lockean 
Sympathy in Early American Political Thought," American Political 
Science Review 90(September 1990), 501.
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dominion only to rulers. In this way, Locke draws together an 
argument about property with his larger point about the role 
of all men in taking dominion, not only rulers.
Property is a grant from God to be used to take dominion 
in accordance with, and through the use of, reason. In The 
Second Treatise, he states:
God, when he gave the world in common to all mankind, 
commanded man also to labor, and the penury of his condition 
required it of him. God and his reason commanded him to 
subdue the earth, i.e., improve it for the benefit of life, 
and therein lay out something upon it that was his own, his 
labor.
Because labor serves to secure preservation and to fulfill a 
holy calling, there is no contradiction between the two as 
long as acquisition does not give rise to "the fancy or 
covetousness of the q u a r r e l s o m e . I n  the First Treatise of 
Government, he states:
God having made Man, and planted in him, as in all other 
Animals, a strong desire of Self-preservation, and furnished 
the World with things fit for Food and Payment and other 
Necessaries of Life, Subservient to his design, that Man 
should live and abide for some time upon the Pace of the 
Earth, and not that so curious and wonderful a piece of 
Workmanship by its own Negligence, or want of Necessaries, 
should perish again, presently after a few moments 
continuance: God, I say, having made Man and the World thus,
spoke to him, (that is) directed him by his Senses and
Reason . . .  to the use of those things, which were
serviceable for his Subsistence, and given him as a means of
his Preservation.
Locke tells us that the same law of nature that gives us 
property also sets limits upon it. He places acquisition
33 Locke, Second Treatise of Government, Chapter 5, paragraph 32,
20.
34 Ibid., paragraph 34, 20.
35 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (New 
York: New American Library, 1965), 86f.
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within the framework of Pauline theology by citing I Timothy 
6:17. From that passage, he draws the phrase "God gives us 
all things richly. But the entire verse is an admonition to 
the rich, who may fall into the temptation of greed, not to 
put their hope in r i c h e s . I n  contrast to Pangle's 
characterization of acquisition as being "unlimited" in 
Locke's theory, Locke makes it clear that one may only hold 
what one can use, a stipulation that applies both to food and 
to land.
This is precisely how ethics and interests were 
synthesized by covenantal thinkers in the pre-liberal period, 
by seeing interest-seeking as a means of fulfilling a holy 
enterprise. Just as politics was sanctified in covenant 
theology, so was economics. Weber understood this well, 
though he overestimated the ascetic quality of the synthesis. 
The Protestant emphasis on dominion was simply a return to 
the ethic of the Tanach that was hardly ascetic. To reiterate 
a point made earlier, nowhere in the Bible does God exhort 
humans to do good for its own sake; the covenant promises 
blessing for obedience, not existential fulfillment apart
Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, Chapter 5, paragraph 
31, p. 19.
Pros Timotheon A (Textus Receptus) 6:17-19 states "Tois 
plousiois en to nun aioni paraggelle, me upselophronein, mede elpikenai 
epi plouto adeloteti, all en to theo to zonti, to parechonti emin 
plousios panta eis apolausin; agathoergein ploutein en ergois kalols, 
eumetadotous einai koinonikous, apothesaurizontas eautois themelion 
kalon eis to mellon, ina epilabontai tes aioniou Zoes." "To the rich in 
the present age charge, not to be high-minded, nor to have hope in of 
riches the uncertainty; but in God the living, who gives us richly all 
things for enjoyment; to do good, to be rich in works good, liberal in 
distributing to be, ready to communicate, treasuring up for themselves a 
foundation good for the future, that they may lay hold to eternal life."
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from circumstances.
In examining Locke's biblical hermeneutic, Pangle does 
make a case for some ambiguity in Locke's theory concerning 
self-preservation and interests. One can argue, as Pangle 
does, that Locke did not believe in the biblical revelation 
underlying his theory. That may well be true. But Pangle's 
argument that Locke's theory on property represents a radical 
discontinuity from earlier tradition is overstated.
Even if we were to accede to Pangle's point, however, 
that Locke is more influenced by Machiavelli than by biblical 
sources, the question remains as to how political ethics were 
perceived by early Americans. Pangle, following Strauss, 
argues that Locke's real message of impious individualism was 
targeted only to a few careful readers who could make the 
Machiavellian connection. Few Americans were intimately 
familiar with Machiavelli; nearly all had read Genesis and 
Deuteronomy in which was contained the essentials of the 
dominion conc e p t . i t is likely that, as Tocqueville argued, 
ordinary Americans, when considering their own personal 
ethics, viewed interests in conjuction with religion or 
natural law rather than with the ideal of unlimited 
acquisition.
Once again. Lutz's study is instructive. Of all citations in 
the founding period literature (1760-1805), Deuteronony is cited most 
because of its prevalence in pro-revolutionary religious pamphlets. The 
Bible as a whole makes up 34% of the 3,154 citations in the literature. 
Citations of Machiavelli make up .5% of the total. This information by 
itself, of course, tells us nothing about the relative influence of the 
Bible and Machiavelli on Locke. But it does say a great deal about their 
relative roles in American society. Lutz, "The Relative Influence of 
European Writers on Late Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought, " 
192. Cf. 194.
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This balance of interests and humane ethics does not 
come about by chance. Nor is its continuance guaranteed.
While a critique of this shift towards interest-based 
behavior is the subject of the next chapter, what should be 
noted at this point is that the subtle shifts in the 
definition of interests would become the basis for further 
movement towards a utilitarian, interest-oriented, liberal 
theory. All that was required was a removal of the crucial 
element of natural law so prominent in Locke's theory. That 
element created certain guiding assumptions for Locke about 
what was appropriate behavior, not only at the level of 
domestic politics but also for states at the international 
level. The inconveniences that plague individuals in the 
state of nature also plague states. Thus, in a system lacking 
a supranational authority, states must act with prudence in 
judging their interests. That is to say, they ought to act 
with realism in foreign-policy decision-making.Michael 
Doyle, states:
The international condition is not . . . inherently warlike, 
a tract of time when the will to do battle must be assumed.
. . . Instead, for Locke, it is a troubled peace where war 
is a clear act of aggression violating rights to life, 
liberty or property or a stated declaration of intent to do 
so. All else is peace. And in peace, natural law— now 
international law— should rule.^°
One might argue then that the only thing separating realist
prudence from Lockean prudence is this presence of natural
law in Locke's theory, an important distinction but one that
Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, paragraph 147, 83. 
Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, 219.
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was to become less tenable over time. With a decline in the 
fortunes of natural law, prudence serving interests alone 
would become the guide for policy-makers until the early 
twentieth century. At this juncture, it is important to 
recall previous definitions of covenants, compacts and 
contracts. Whereas Locke continues to speak of compact, the 
language of utility--whether at the domestic or international 
level— is contractual.
The Synthesis of Interests _and_ the Good in International
Jurisprudence 
Locke was not the only theorist to circumscribe his 
theory of interests with the obligations and limitations of 
natural law. The importance of natural law, and the way it 
mitigated the pure pursuit of interest in early liberal 
theory, is also seen in the works of Hugo Grotius and Samuel 
Pufendorf. Both of these writers greatly influenced the 
development of liberal international thought. While Doyle 
refers to Locke as the inventor of "legal institutionalism, " 
Grotius is often called "the father of international law, " 
and was an important source of ideas for the American 
founders.Pufendorf also had an enormous influence on 
international legal theory, the American founders, and on 
Locke himself.'*2
Lutz, * The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late 
Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought,* 194,
42 On the influence of Pufendorf on the Founders, see Lutz, *The 
Relative Influence of European Writers," 193. Hirschmcm cites 
Pufendorf's influence on Locke especially with regards to the doctrine
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Grotius and Pufendorf rely on the concept of right 
reason to justify their theory of international law. This 
reason evolved within a theological context that gave it 
transcendent meaning. As the science of international law 
developed beyond Grotius and Pufendorf into the world of the 
Enlightenment, the theology giving "nature* its meaning was 
discarded in favor of theories that did not rely on natural 
law foundations. Kant and legal positivists, for example, 
attempted to rid international jurisprudence of natural law 
which they saw as inappropriately teleological.
In the first chapter of The Law of War and Peace (1625), 
Grotius presents a theoretical foundation for international 
law. The law of nature— that part of law that gives meaning 
and intelligibility to all other law--is defined. "The law of 
nature is a dictate of right reason, which points out that an 
act, according as it is or is not in conformity with rational 
nature, has in it a quality of moral baseness or moral 
necessity; and that, in consequence, such an act is either 
forbidden or enjoined by the author of nature, G o d . W h i l e  
there are other forms of law— divine law, positive law, human 
law— it is this form that gives substance and direction to 
all the others. No law of man can conflict with the universal 
principles of the law of nature, since the laws derived from 
nature are good in se. This universal quality of law made the 
very idea of international law possible for Grotius. Note the 
of inconstancy. See Hirschman, 53.
Hugo Grotius, On the Lew of War and Peace, trans. Francis Kelsey 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Press, 1962), 38.
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reason he gives for the writing of this work:
Fully convinced, by the considerations which I have 
advanced, that there is a common law among nations, which is 
valid alike for war and in war, I have had many and weighty 
reasons for undertaking to write upon this subject.
Throughout the Christian world I observed a lack of 
restraint in relation to war, such as even barbarous races 
should be ashamed of; I observed that men rush to arms for 
the slightest causes, or no cause at all, and that when arms 
have once been taken up there is no longer any respect for 
law, divine or human; it is as if, in accordance with 
general decree, frenzy had openly been let loose for the 
committing of all c r i m e s . *4
There is among nations a common law to which all are subject, 
but one gathers from this passage that Christian nations are 
more subject than others. Grotius codifies the duties of 
Christian nations, drawing upon the dictates of both custom 
and international agreements.
Grotius' political philosophy is similar to Locke's 
theory, insofar as reason propels men to covenant together 
for their common good. On that same basis, states covenant 
together overtly, or by implication, through agreement or 
commerce.45 There is, then, a duality to Grotius' theory that 
would later allow both naturalists and positivists to lay 
claim to his heritage. While the law is universal, it is 
activated only by agreement. States agree to be bound because 
they find it advantageous to cooperate, but the benefits of 
cooperation must be obtained through concessions to law. In 
other words, to benefit communally, states must limit their 
own power, a very covenantal idea. Though the law's power is 
activated by agreement, its authority is in no way diminished
44 Ibid., 48-50.
45 Ibid., 14f.
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since its ultimate authority does not come from agreement but 
from its own inherent rightness. Grotius desires to maintain 
the notion of Christendom as a kingdom unified by law; 
however, he also desires to uphold, as a realistic observer 
of m o d e m  politics, the rights of nations to create 
agreements and law on the basis of sovereignty. This duality 
makes sense ethically only if, indeed, law can be tied to a 
transcendent source of ethics binding kings regardless of 
their consent. Kings can only covenant to accomplish good 
ends.
Grotius defends private property as a function of 
natural law with one important caveat. Because property is 
instituted by God for human sustenance, it is not an absolute 
right. Property does not exist for the sake of acquisition 
alone, for this violates its purpose. It may be appropriated, 
therefore, in extreme need.
Grotius is attached to the covenantal paradigm in the 
prominence he places on the role of consent in legitimizing 
law. Consent given willingly assists cooperation and 
overcomes the hazards of the state of nature and natural law. 
But positive law that arises from consent does not allow 
moral laxity in law. As Steven Forde puts it, "In some cases, 
Grotius notes, human positive law forbids things merely 
discouraged by natural law. Here it may be said to tighten 
the moral laxity of the natural law.*^ "^
46 Ibid., 193.
Steven Forde, "Hugo Grotius on Ethics amd War," American 
Political Science j%eview 92 (September 1988), 643.
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For purposes of this paper, the important point about 
Grotius' work is not the preeminent place he gives to a 
deity. Rather it is the way that he perceives rulers to be 
accountable to principles beyond their interests and, even 
more importantly, the way that reason itself contains ethical 
qualities that denote the duties of rulers to one another.
For Grotius, doing good is profoundly rational because of the 
benefits achieved through cooperation, an idea very similar 
to the definition of rationality proposed by social capital 
theory or a Jewish conception of ethics in which the good and 
the beneficial are intertwined without sacrificing the 
integrity of either. Hans Morgenthau is certainly correct to 
call Grotius one of the "two men whom we recognize as 
pioneers of the philosophy of reason in the social sphere* 
(the other being the Abbe' de St. Pierre) .‘*® But it should be 
noted that, because of the natural law element, Grotius' 
rationalism, like Locke's, was not yet that of Bentham, Mill, 
or later liberal theorists. Reason had not yet been emptied 
of its compellingly ethical qualities, nor was it yet 
conflated with the pursuit of material gain or pleasure.
Pufendorf (1632-1694) had a great deal of influence on 
John Locke, particularly on Locke's beliefs about the problem 
of inconstancy as the reason to leave the state of nature. 
Pufendorf ' s work. On the Duty of Man and Citizen, contains a 
theory of natural law as the basis for international law.
Like Grotius, he believed in the naturalness of man's
Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific Man, 41.
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sociability for common benefit and aid. From this sociability
arises the need for law, which compensates for the defects in
this natural order. The influences of Pufendorf on Locke are
clearly seen in the following passage.
In order to be safe, it is necessary for [man] to be 
sociable; that is to join forces with men like himself and 
so conduct himself towards them that they are not given even 
a plausible excuse for harming him, but rather become 
willing to preserve and promote his advantages. The laws of 
this sociality . . . laws which teach one how to conduct 
oneself to become a useful . . . member of human society, 
are called natural laws.**®
Pufendorf finds the source of law in reason, but it is reason
in a context of divinely mandated ethical and metaphysical
constraints. The other precepts of law following from the
fundamental law of nature must conform to the basic
principles of that law.
Though these precepts have a clear utility, they get the 
force of law only upon the presuppositions that God exists 
and rules all things by His providence, and that He has 
enjoined the human race to observe as laws those dictates of 
reason which He has Himself promulgated by the force of the 
innate light. For otherwise though they might be observed 
for their utility. . . they would not be laws. Laws 
necessarily imply a superior, and such a superior as 
actually has governance of another.SO
Because of the undeniable presence of reason as given by 
God, and the knowledge of good and evil in the hearts of men, 
it is possible to derive an understanding of how we may 
differentiate between just and unjust causes of war. When it 
is necessary to preserve our property from those who would 
indiscriminately take it, or when our lives are in danger.
40 Scimuel Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen According to 
Natural Law, ed. James Tully, trans. Michael Silverthome (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 35.
50 Ibid., 36.
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war may be rightly engaged in. But when the purpose of war is 
to satisfy avarice or ambition, it is not justified.
The Impact of the Appeal to Interests
The appeal to interests radically affected the religious 
argument for liberalism. As Weber asserted, Calvinism had 
never been devoid of interest-seeking. But the way interests 
were defined by early proto-liberals was closer to 
Tocqueville's "self-interest rightly understood" than the 
more modern variant. Interest-seeking was to be carried out 
within a restricted frame, one amenable to community 
interests, as revealed by the sumptuary laws of Geneva. But, 
by Weberian standards, these were vestiges of value- 
rational ity that were to be transformed into instrumental 
rationality by deemphasizing the spiritual, the humane, and 
the sacred.
The attractiveness of Locke's solution to making 
covenants rational is seen in the way Americans, in 
particular, integrated Lockean thought with their own.
Locke's thought was most influential in America in the period 
between the Great Awakening and the Revolution.One can see 
the effects of a Lockean theory of interests, for example, on 
John Witherspoon, the Presbyterian divine, who signed the
51 Ibid., 168.
52 Lutz, "The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late 
Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought," 196. Locke is cited 
frequently in revolutionary literature during the 1760's and 1770's. 
After that, his influence drops off dramatically.
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Declaration of Independence and provided James Madison with 
his education on ethics and politics at the College of New 
Jersey (Princeton) . As a Presbyterian, Witherspoon was imbued 
with the neo-Calvinist tradition of believing in the benefits 
of divided government. As a Scottish immigrant, he drew from 
the writings of Knox and other Reformers, and the 
epistemology of Thomas Reid's "common sense realism." As 
Barry Alan Shain points out, Witherspoon's reputation as an 
intellectual was made by his synthesis of republican. 
Reformed, and rationalist philosophies. In that sense, he is 
a paradigmatic example of the American mind during the pre­
revolutionary p e riod.His beliefs about the structure of 
regimes is very similar to the views of Calvin. Divided 
government is necessary; power must be shared to prevent 
tyranny. But he differs from Calvin and sounds much more like 
Locke, whom he had also read, when he states that these 
divided powers of government "must be so balanced, that when 
everyone draws to his own interest or inclination, there may 
be an over-poise on the whole."^ 4 Thus Witherspoon, Calvinist 
and Lockean, passed along his belief in the benefits of a 
balance of power combined with interest-seeking behavior to 
his students. Clearly Madison took this lesson to heart.
The synthesis of Locke's rationalization of interests
Barry Alan Shain, The Myth of American Individualism: The 
Protestant Origins of American Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1994), 25.
4^ John Witherspoon, "Lectures on Moral Philosophy, " in The 
Selected Writings of John Witherspoon, ed. Thomas Miller (Carbondale, 
111.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1990), 203. Emphasis added.
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with public-spiritedness is abundantly evident in other 
eighteenth-century works as well. Though Thomas Gordon and 
John Trenchard, (known by their collective appellation:
Cato), were English, their letters were read throughout the 
colonies. Showing the unity between individual reason, 
property, and the public good, they state:
[E]very Man has a right and a Call to provide for himself, 
to attend upon his own Affairs, and to study his own 
Happiness. All that I contend for is, that this Duty of a 
Man to himself be performed subsequently to the general 
Welfare, and consistently with it. The affairs of All should 
be minded preferably to the Affairs of One.55
As Shain points out, the rational pursuit of interests
was, at this time, still believed to be consistent with the
pursuit of the public good. Individualism remained the right
of the individual to pursue interests in accordance with
universal norms. Liberty had not yet come to mean absolute
autonomy; nor did this view hold that the good was the
inevitable outcome of men pursuing their own interests. It
came through covenanting together to secure the rights and
liberties of all participants in the covenantal polity.
Nearly sixty years after the Revolution, Tocqueville
found Americans living out this same philosophical synthesis.
They accepted the role of interests but placed them within
the context of the general good consistent with transcendent
religious sentiments.
55 John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, Cato's Letters, no. 35, in The 
Eofflisb Libertarxaji Heritage, ed. David L. Jacobson (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 196),89; quoted in Shain, 43. Lutz's study on source 
citations shows that Trenchard and Gordon are the seventh most cited 
European thinkers in the American founding literature. Lutz, "The 
Relative Influence of European Writers on Late Eighteenth-Century 
American Political Thought," 194.
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[Americans] . . .  do not raise objections to men pursuing 
their interests, but they do all they can to prove that it 
is in each man's interest to be good. . . .
It gives them pleasure to point out how an enlightened 
self-love continually leads them to help one another and 
disposes them freely to give part of their time and wealth 
for the good of the state.
But what of the future of interest-seeking? Tocqueville
realizes that there are two possible outcomes when he states:
One must therefore expect that private interest will more 
than ever become the chief if not the only driving force 
behind all behavior. But we have yet to see how each man 
will interpret his private interest.S?
These interpretations can remain broad or they can narrow. 
Should the latter occur, devastating consequences will 
result. Once the circumscriptions of natural law were removed 
from liberal theory, the path was cleared to conflate 
interests, narrowly understood, with happiness. This was the 
approach taken by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill and the 
consequentialist school. Or, in order to preserve the purity 
of ethical prescriptions, one could make them utterly 
transcendent to interests. This was the path taken by Kant. 
Yet Kant also made a place for interests in his philosophy. 
They were the engine of history that made perpetual peace 
inevitable.
Kant and the Interest-Ethics Split: The Critical Division
By the end of the eighteenth century, the philosophical 
foundations of international law had significantly chcinged. 
Reason became an entity considered more and more from a
56 Tocqueville, 527.
57 Ibid,, 527.
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scientific perspective, apart from revelation or natural law, 
to sustain its moral force. With the fall of the 
philosophical centrality of natural law, international law 
came to be understood as an expression of the will of states 
and the sovereigns who ruled them. Both Grotius and Pufendorf 
rejected the idea of raison d'état because they believed 
positive law had to be consistent with natural law. The 
French Enlightenment, as opposed to its English counterpart, 
saw the rejection of this belief and more concessions made to 
the power of states to act as they would in conformity with 
the need for survival. In his work on Emmerich de Vattel, 
Frank Ruddy portrays the intellectual climate of the later 
Enlightenment^® regarding international law. Citing Voltaire, 
Rousseau, Diderot, and other philosophes of the period, he 
writes:
In such a maelstrom, to use Frederick the Great's term, 
there was no international law generally recognized. What 
there were of principles grew mainly in the light of rules 
adopted by the major powers in their negotiated treaties of 
peace or through prize courts or other institutions set up 
to determine international legal relationships. There was no 
one system of law universally recognized, but there were 
laws which each system was ready to uphold. . . . [N]othing 
was sacred, no principle inviolable. . . . Not even the most 
explicit treaty arrangements need be honored.®®
The balance of power principle ostensibly replaced "law" as
®® Following Lundberg and May, one could call this period the 
second and third Enlightenments which would include the works of 
Voltaire, Helvetius, Diderot, Rousseau, Mably, and Raynal. D. Lundberg 
and H.F. May, "The Enlightened Reader in America, " American Quarterly- 
28 (Special Issue), 262-293; cited in Lutz "The Relative Influence of 
European Writers on Late Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought," 
192.
Frank S. Ruddy, International Law in the Enlightenment: The 
Background of Emmerich de Vattel's Le Droit des gens (Dobbs Ferry NY: 
Oceana Publications, 1975), 42f.
110
the guide to international behavior, a major shift in 
intellectual justifications for state actions. There was one 
more grand attempt, however, to place international behavior 
on a universalis tic foundation, that of Immanuel Kant.
In Perpetual Peace, Kant constructs a theory of 
international relations that substantiates a basis for 
international law, a basis in reason that does not appeal to 
the authority of God or natural law. Rules for behavior come 
from a priori premises rather than from natural theology. In 
fact, Grotius, Pufendorf and Vattel are condemned for their 
naiveté. Kant refers to them as "irritating comforters.
Kant states that, in one important sense, there is no such 
thing as international law because there is no one to enforce 
it. Thus, it cannot be law. Yet, Kant believes in the 
eventual success of a world federation, a foedus pacificum, 
of republican states arising over time that will obey 
universal principles in harmony with one another, principles 
that could be conceived of as natural law.^ '- Paradoxically, 
he sees the condition for the existence of international law 
as being discord and separation. The type of law that will 
replace international law, as understood at that time, will 
be based upon the dictates of reason and on a spirit of 
commerce and republicanism.
Immanuel Kant, 'Perpetual Peace,* In Kant On History, ed. and 
trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: MacMillan, 1985), 99.
Ibid., 98.
62 Ibid.. 114.
Ill
There are two elements of Kant's theory that must be 
examined, i.e., the predictive and descriptive components of 
his analysis. Kant was a much better analyst of international 
politics than he was of physics. His work in this area is 
quite remarkable. Commerce and republican states do seem to 
add to the peace, though the reasons may not be as clear as 
Kant would have us believe. Human foibles must be considered, 
and it will take time for them to be curbed, particularly as 
they are manifest in government. At the time of Kant's 
writing, there were few republican states; now they are in 
abundance. Recent history tends to suggest that, relative to 
illiberal states, republican government curbs the appetite of 
states for war, at least with each other. If republicanism 
were to become a universal pattern, it is not inconceivable 
that war might be greatly reduced. Kant also believes that a 
global federation is preferable to a one-world state insofar 
as the latter may become a despotism.
There is an uncanny realism apparent in this work that 
is often lacking in other works by Kant, a lucidity that 
makes much of his account seem reasonable even when human 
nature is considered with all its downfalls. But from where 
does the transcendent quality of Kant's prescriptive language 
come? Kant appeals to nature as the guarantor of peace, but 
it is not the nature of the natural law theorists. There is 
no sense of the necessity of God to bolster the rationality 
of his theory. Kant, ever the devotee' of Newton, wants to
63 Ibid., 113.
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describe his theory in terms that make its course inevitable 
and rational in a naturalistic sense.
The guarantor of perpetual peace is nothing less than the 
great artist, nature. . . .  In her mechanical course we see 
that her aim is to produce a harmony among men, against 
their will and indeed through their discord. . . . We do not 
observe or infer this providence in the cunning contrivances 
of nature, but, as in questions of the relation of the form 
of things to ends in general, we can and must supply it from 
our own minds in order to conceive of its possibility by 
analogy to actions of human art. . . . The use of the word 
"nature* is more fitting to the limits of human reason and 
more modest than an expression indicating a providence 
unknown to us. This is especially true when we are dealing 
with questions of theory and not religion, as at present, 
for human reason in questions of the relation of effects to 
their causes must remain within the limits of possible
experience.64
This last phrase is quite salient when we consider Kant's 
larger epistemology. Kant desires to effect a Copernican 
shift in epistemology, showing why phenomenal reality (the 
only type we are capable of rationally knowing) is a 
construct of our minds alone. We will never know the essence 
of things in themselves. Our ability to perceive things 
exterior to ourselves comes from the categorical organization 
of sensory data by the mind. From this, it follows that 
rational categories can be deduced from first principles—  
what must be— to explain our perceptions of natural 
phenomena. What is apparent from the quote cited above is 
that nature, as Kant will interpret it for us, not God, is 
the securer of the reasonable. Nature in Kant's theory, 
however, is not the nature of Locke, Grotius, Pufendorf, or 
other natural law theorists. It is the material, the 
empirical, and the sensory, caught up in the deterministic
64 Ibid.. 107f.
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maw of the laws of physics. Nature is the disenchanted world 
(to use Weber's term) of the post-Newtonian mechanists.
The Greeks posited a view of nature, and of man arising 
rationally from nature, that did not involve theism as seen 
in Christianity. But Kant's nature is not even the nature of 
the Greeks, for the Ding an sich, the thing in itself of the 
noumenal world, will never be known. Kant's ethics follows 
from his epistemology. They are categorical as are the a 
priori categories of perception he borrows from Aristotle. If 
we do not find ourselves in agreement with Kant's explanation 
of the categories of perception, we need not believe in his
ethics either. There is no transcendence in Kant except Kant
himself. As Jaki puts it:
The Kantian knowledge of things was a construction by the
mind of the semblance of things and not a natural grasp of
intelligibility embodied in them. As a result, whatever 
Kant's longing for an intellectual touch with things other 
than his own mind, the Kantian impossibility of being in 
touch with the Ding an sich meant being trapped within one's 
own mind.65
Why is ic chat we muse treat every man as an end? Why 
must we desire to act only as if our actions were the basis 
of universal law? There can be no appeal to God, for his 
presence, as part of the noumena, is made marginal and 
unknowable from a rational perspective. The appeal must be on 
the basis of reason, but as Jaki states, Kant's reason is 
really Kant's reasons rather than being universal principles 
of absolutely undeniable rationality. This fact is 
necessitated by the synthetic a priori approach within the
65 Jaki, 119.
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Kantian framework. If rules must be devised prior to 
experience in order to be rational, then consequences cannot 
be a factor. For Kant, the inverse-square law is the 
paradigmatic example of the synthetic a priori. It is exactly 
the form of valid knowledge needed to carry out his 
transcendental deductive method. Newton's law explains all 
material behavior. Matter follow the dictates of Newton's law 
regardless of circumstance. Therefore, all phenomenal 
explanations must have that same inevitability to meet Kant's 
criterion of rationality. Kant does not appeal to utility or 
some practical sense of virtue arising from the nature of 
human relations per se. Rather, his ethics are deducible from 
first principles as are his metaphysics and epistemology.
Once we leave the world of Kant, we leave the world of a 
priori principles and are left without a meaningful framework 
of transcendence.
In After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre explains why Kant's 
ethical theory is problematic.
[Kant] does indeed look for a foundation of morality in the 
universalizable prescriptions of that reason which manifests 
itself both in arithmetic and morality; and in spite of his 
strictures against founding morality on human nature, his 
analysis of the nature of human reason is the basis for his 
own rational account of morality. Yet, in the second book of 
the second Critique he does acknowledge that without a 
teleological framework the whole project of morality becomes 
unintelligible. This teleological framework is presented as 
a 'presupposition of pure practical reason.' Its appearance 
in Kant's moral philosophy seemed to his nineteenth century 
readers . . . ein arbitrary and unjustifiable concession to 
positions which he had already rejected. Yet if my thesis is 
correct, Kant was right; morality did in the eighteenth 
century, as a matter of historical fact, presuppose 
something very like the teleological scheme of God, freedom 
and happiness as the final crown of virtue which Kant 
propounds. Detach morality from that framework and you will 
no longer have morality; or, at the very least, you will
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have radically transformed its character.®®
Kant must slip into his argument some sort of teleology which 
violates the deontic quality of the imperatives. But he 
cannot systematically incorporate a teleology because this 
would violate, in turn, his desire to be the Newton of 
philosophy. Kant recognized that a unity of perception 
between noumena, or the spiritual realm of human thought and 
freedom, and phenomena was basic to any credible philosophy, 
but he had no real way of achieving that unity. In the end, 
he came to believe that imagination was the link to the unity 
of mind and phenomena.
From imagination to the autonomy of the will took only 
one step, a step taken by Johann Fichte.®? At that point, it 
was possible to dispose of Kant altogether. Friedrich 
Nietzsche retained Kant's disembodied will but rid himself of 
the rest of Kantian ethics that, as he recognized, had no 
foundations given Kant's reliance on imagination. Kant's 
Perpetual Peace is an interesting account of how history may 
develop; however, it is impossible to see it as a basis for 
international law or morality. The failure of Kant's ethical 
stance is rooted in the failure of his epistemology. As the 
next two chapters show, liberal, postmodern, and realist 
theories were all greatly affected by the division between 
Kant's ethics and his epistemology. His own philosophical 
failures had devastating consequences on future attempts to
®® Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, Second edition (Notre Dame, 
IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 56.
®"^ Jaki, 20.
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develop a humane and rational ethic.
Positivism: Interests as Utility
Hans Morgenthau documents the transition from hopes for 
a science of ethics in the early Enlightenment to the 
autonomy of the modern liberal agent. Morgenthau asserts that 
traditional ethics was grounded in the familiar distinction 
between 'is' and 'ought-to-be,' a distinction lost to 
modernity.
It was only one step from [the]rational!ration of ethics to 
the disappearance of ethics as an autonomous system of 
norms, distinct from empirical fact. . . . The nineteenth 
century abandons this dichotomy in a development which 
starts with Kant's formalization of the ethical imperative 
and ends with Comte's identification of ethical rule and 
scientific law. The deductive reason of the seventeenth aind 
eighteenth centuries had fallen victim to Hume's and Kant's 
criticism, and the normative character of the ethical 
command follows the deductive method into oblivion.®®
Morgenthau's point is made clear when one looks to the effect
of the decline of natural law theory. By the end of the
eighteenth century, Jeremy Bentham was already referring to
Locke's emphasis on natural rights as "nonsense on stilts."®®
Bentham believed the pre-rational vestiges of Lockean thought
needed to be excised by the pure rationality of utility. This
was to be the new foundation for moral Newtonianism, a truly
scientific basis for ethical behavior. The ground for this
transition had been sown ky the appeal to rational interests
as a means of countering irrational passions, passions best
seen at the international level in the form of atavistic
®® Morgenthau, Scientific Man, 15f.
®® Quoted in Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, 226.
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State behavior. As Michael Doyle points out, Bentham was 
heavily influenced by the “commercial pacifists" of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Adam Smith, for example, 
believed that when nations and individuals pursued their 
interests, a common good would a r i s e . T h e  appeal to 
interests as a means to international peace was, to liberal 
thinkers like Bentham, necessary and obvious. In Plan for a 
Universal and Perpetual Peace (1789) , modern liberal 
solutions to international problems began to appear. Bentham 
argued for collective security arrangements, an international 
court, and a “Pacific or Philharmonic Society* made up of 
intellectuals who would educate the public about what sort of 
policies would be in their best interests.
Robert Dahl more recently proposed something similar in 
his article “On Removing Certain Impediments to Democracy in 
the United St a t e s . A n x i o u s  about whether the public, newly 
liberated from the judicial tyranny of “Madisonian 
democracy,* would be able to act in their own interests, Dahl 
proposed to have “quasi-experts* educate them as to what 
their interests were. Only by having such guides available 
would the public be able to make wise choices and have an 
“enlightened understanding.What this means is uncertain.
70 Ibid.. 228.
Robert Dahl, “On Removing Certain Impediments to Democracy in 
the United States." Chapter in The Moral Foundations of the Americeui 
Republic, Robert H. Horwitz ed.. Third edition (Charlottesville VA: 
University of Virginia Press, 1986), 230-252.
72 Ibid., 250.
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however. How we get from procedure to substance in Bentham, 
or Dahl, for that matter, is not made clear.
Max Weber understood the problem of reconciling means 
and ends in politics. He believed that it was the duty of 
social scientists to serve as experts for decision-makers on 
the relationships between means and ends. He concluded that, 
given the contemporary state of modern epistemology and its 
implications for ethics, ends could not be rationally chosen. 
To some degree, it is this pessimism that separates him from 
liberals per se. This is certainly the case with regard to 
international relations, a realm he characterized as a war of 
the gods. For this reason, his international theory will be 
dealt with more fully in the discussion on realism below.
Weber believed the Enlightenment hope of placing values 
on a rational basis is no longer tenable. The modern world is 
disenchanted and meaning, including ethical meaning, is 
created, not discovered like some buried treasure. There is 
no way to turn back the process of disenchantment nor can 
science teach us to be happy. Like Nietzsche, and like many 
Germans of his day, Weber believes that happiness is the 
creation of the bourgeois "last men.
After Nietzsche's devastating criticism of those 'last men' 
who 'invented happiness,' I may leave aside altogether the 
naive optimism in which science— that is, the technique of 
mastering life which rests upon science— has been celebrated 
as a way to happiness. Who believes in this?— aside from a 
few big children in university chairs or editorial
Max Weber, "Science as a Vocation, " in From Max Weber: Essays in 
Sociology, trans. and eds. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: 
Galauy Books, 1958), 142.
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offices
This critique is important for two reasons. First, 
Weber's assertions are powerfully echoed by the realists who 
are skeptical of liberalism's ostensible rationality. This is 
especially true of Hans Morgenthau in his critique of liberal 
scientism.75 He quotes John Stuart Mill's statement on the 
link between educability and interests that is so crucial to 
liberal thought. The key, according to Mill, was "to alter 
people's opinions; to make them believe according to 
evidence, and know what was their real interest, which when 
they once knew, they would, we thought, by the instrument of 
opinion, enforce a regard to it upon one a n o t h e r . B u t  
Morgenthau believed that the "debunking" that occurred as 
liberal rationality was hollowed out, both in theory and in 
practice, led to political paralysis and a general disbelief 
in political philosophy of any kind, a theme to be taken up 
in the discussion of postmodernism. 7^
Second, there is continuity between Bentham and a 
contemporary liberal like Dahl. That continuity lies in their 
reliance on the educability of the masses to act in their own 
interests, though both theorists believe the masses need help 
in determining what those interests are. These actions by the
74 Ibid., 143.
75 Morgenthau, Scientific Màn, 11-40.
7® John Stuart Mill, Autobiography; quoted in Scientific Man Vs. 
Power Politics. Midway Reprint Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago, 
1974), 17.
77 Morgenthau, Scientific Man, 73.
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masses will lead to a positive, common good. Lying in the 
middle of the timeline between these two theorists is Weber, 
who reveals the futility of claiming that such a project is 
"rational" in any normative sense. And Weber argues that, 
empirically, the rationalizing project of the Enlightenment 
leads not to the enlightenment of the masses but rather the 
stultification of modern life, disenchantment and the iron 
cage. Turning liberal optimism on its head, Weber wrote:
Not summer's bloom lies ahead of us, but rather a polar 
night of icy darkness and hardness, no matter which group 
may triumph externally now. Where there is nothing, not only 
the Kaiser but also the proletarian has lost his rights.
When this night shall have slowly receded, who of those for 
whom spring apparently has bloomed so luxuriously will be 
alive? And what will have become of all of you by then?
Will you be bitter or banausic? Will you simply and dully 
accept world and occupation? Or will the third and by no 
means the least frequent possibility be your lot: mystic 
flight from reality for those who are gifted for it, or— as 
is both frequent and unpleasant— for those who belabor 
themselves to follow this fashion? In every one of such 
cases, I shall draw the conclusion that they have not 
measured up to their own d o i n g s . ^ 8
This confluence between ethical skepticism and the 
appeal to utilitarian interests in the period between Bentham 
and Weber worked well for the European powers. It was the 
period of empire and colony-building, when Europe had to find 
an outlet for its dramatically increasing population as well 
as an intellectual justification for imperialism. The 
language of interests, detached from its earlier moral 
context, served this purpose beautifully. This is not to say, 
of course, that colonialism did not exist before this period, 
only that the language used to justify it was altered to 
appear more rational. The language of interests played a
Max Weber, "Science as a Vocation," 139f.
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remarkable role in creating a continuity between the earlier 
rational framework provided by classical liberals and the 
rise of positivism in international affairs and law. As the 
definition of interests was denuded of its natural law 
framework, however, interests took on much more of an 
instrumental quality not anticipated or desired by classical 
liberal thinkers. Interests became separate from covenantal 
limits on power and covenantal requirements of ontological 
equality. The organic ontology of social and biological 
Darwinism was much more fitting for modern liberal 
imperialism than covenantal thought, which had all but 
disappeared from view.
Positivism and Ethical Irrationality in Liberal Language
By the early nineteenth century, the sprit of positivism 
began to take hold of the European intellectual world in a 
number of spheres. Only that which could be factually 
ascertained was of importance in the sciences, both natural 
and social. In international affairs, this translated into an 
interest in the expressions of authority or agreements made 
by states, in international jurisprudence, this trend was 
particularly powerful as legal scholars repudiated natural 
law theory after Kant's maledictions.
Liberalism was not immune to the effects of this new 
emphasis on the factual. On the contrary, liberal theory 
remained consistent with its earlier focus on interests while 
embracing the new scientism of the nineteenth century. This
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was accomplished through the works of Adam Smith and David 
Ricardo and the accent on liberal international political 
economy. Smith's role as a founding member of this school of 
thought is well known; Ricardo's role is more obscure though 
just as important. Ricardo was one of the first theorists to 
bring methodological individualism into political economy (an 
accomplishment for which Mill is often heralded), emphasizing 
the individual as a rational economic actor. Ricardo is also 
important because his theory of comparative advantage showed 
that states could still profit from trade even if they did 
not have an absolute advantage in a specific area of 
production.79 Applying an aggregate analysis of rational 
actors, he showed how states could act in their own interests 
yet contribute to global stability and peace.9° m  the 
economic sphere, there is a direct line between this argument 
and John Maynard Keynes' desire to create the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank after the Second World War. 
These new institutions, Keynes believed, would facilitate 
interdependence and lessen the likelihood of repeating the
79 Ricardo's theory can be illustrated by the following 
(oversimplified) contemporary example. Suppose Dr. Smith, a highly 
capable neurosurgeon, earns $1000 an hour. Suppose Mr. Jones, who mows 
lawns, earns $50 an hour. While Dr. Smith is perfectly capable of 
mowing her own lawn for free (an absolute cost advantage), she is better 
off contracting with Mr. Jones to do it. The hour she would have spent 
mowing her lawn can be spent in surgery, a trade-off which makes her 
$950 richer and Mr. Jones $50 richer. Comparative advantage theory is 
just one more example of how doing good can also be in one's interests. 
National economies, Ricardo argued, could profit from such trade-offs as 
well.
9® David Ricardo, "On Foreign Trade," in The Theoretical Evolution 
of International Political Economy, eds. George T. Crane and Abla Amawi 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 72-82.
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terrible conflict of the First World War
By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
these economic arguments led to systematic political 
arguments by theorists such as J.A. Hobson and Joseph 
Schumpeter. Hobson stated that imperialism was the result of 
the insufficient penetration of liberal democratic principles 
into a polity. This allowed for the manipulation of monopoly 
capital by the financial class (meaning, he lets it be known, 
Jews, in the British case) who must export capital to 
increase r e t u r n s . capital exports require the existence of 
colonies that can serve as markets for the métropole or host 
nation. This theory influenced Lenin's own theory of 
imperialism, as well as that of Joseph Schumpeter.
Schumpeter also believed imperialism to be the result of 
atavistic and monopolistic elements retaining control of the 
polity. And, like Hobson, he believed that as society became 
more democratic, imperialism withered. Contrary to Lenin's 
claims that capitalism gives rise to war, Schumpeter stated: 
•Export monopolism . . .  is not yet imperialism. And even if 
it had been able to arise without protective tariffs, it 
would never have developed into imperialism in the hands of 
an unwarlike bourgeoisie.*®^
Both Hobson and Schumpeter argue that the pursuit of
81 Paul Johnson, Modem Times: The World from the Twenties to the 
Nineties, Revised Edition (New York: Harper Collins, 1992), 659.
82 J.A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (New York, 1902), 64.
®® Joseph Schumpeter, Imperialism and the Social Classes: Two 
Essays, Heinz Norden trans. (New York, 1955), 97.
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economic interests leads to peace and prosperity at the 
global level. As bourgeois values play a greater role in 
politics, international violence becomes a drain on the 
fulfillment of material desires, rendering violence an 
unwanted nuisance. The goal of peace is to be achieved, 
therefore, by the spread of institutions that facilitate the 
creation of liberal democracies. The greatest good is 
achieved for the greatest number by the spread of liberalism. 
History appears to vindicate these theorists. Just as liberal 
states do not seem to fight one another, there does seem to 
be an historical correlation between the rise of parties like 
Labour in Britain and decolonization policies.
The theories of Hobson and Schumpeter assume an 
inevitable relationship between the pursuit of economic 
interests and peace. However, this assumption ignores the 
ethical basis that undergirded the original understanding of 
interests found in classical liberal theory. Among the 
political economists and commercial pacifists, only Smith's 
theory retains a place for the circumscriptions of natural 
law. Ethical theory of any kind is always about the 
possibility of choice. An autonomic or deterministic ethical 
theory is a contradiction in terms. By eliminating that 
element, and regarding economic interests independently of 
ethics in general and public goods in particular, commercial 
pacifists added to the process of fundamentally altering the 
nature of liberal thought.
At the level of domestic theory, however, the
125
substantive elements of liberal ethics were becoming more and 
more difficult to identify. As Mill discovered, utilitarian 
theory was insufficient in its definition of happiness as the 
end of human existence. Mill altered Bentham's theory in two 
important ways. First, he introduced the principle of non­
restriction which entailed a definition of freedom much like 
the "natural liberty" maligned by the Puritans. As long as no 
harm was done to others, acts should not be restricted. 
Second, he asserted that there could be no unitary ends 
defined publicly in a liberal polity, emptying utilitarianism 
of rational content. There is no necessary substantive 
element to be found in the pursuit of Mill's happiness or in 
the pursuit of interests.
By the end of the century, interests were being used 
both to justify imperialism and as a remedy to imperialism, 
depending upon who was allowed to define what these interests 
entailed, with the advent of logical positivism and 
"therapeutic philosophy,* ethics in the early twentieth 
century fared no better than international relations theory. 
Positivists argued that words like "good," "right," or 
•immoral* had no positive content and, thus, were emotive.
Yet liberal theorists and activists continued to advocate 
social reform and an agenda of progress even though words 
like "reform" and "progress" could not possibly be given 
rational content. These expressions had to reach beyond 
principles of liberalism for substantive meaning, even while 
so doing was an inherent act of repudiation of liberalism, a
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recourse to the non-rational of Weber's Wertrationalitàt. 
When, at the turn of the century, the Supreme Court of the 
United States was busy striking down state laws limiting the 
right to contract, the Court's jurisprudence was in accord 
with the marketplace metaphor of contract. Upon what basis 
could such acts be morally repudiated? Upon what basis could 
it be argued that child labor and compulsory sixteen hour 
workdays were immoral when contractors were engaged in 
pursuing their interests? And again, when such acts were 
legally repudiated, how was their prohibition anything more 
than an arbitrary act, an appeal to some non-rational ethical 
ideal. This appeal to something "beyond" is the heart of the 
critique of liberal jurisprudence by critical legal 
theorists, a topic to be taken up more thoroughly in the next 
chapter.
Here the division between realism and liberalism breaks 
down. It is difficult to imagine how liberals could 
rationally hold that there are no definable public goods 
beyond interests and, then, argue with choices made by their 
own policy-makers. How could they push for a change in the 
international moral climate or decry the amorality of 
positivism in international law, as many of them did? 
Nevertheless, this is precisely what happened when, as 
Morgenthau notes, the rise of social reform in domestic 
liberalism found its way into international affairs at the 
turn of the century.®^ Just as ethics and epistemology were
84 Morgenthau, Scientific Man, 25.
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C o m  asunder in domestic liberalism, the divorce eventually 
worked its way into international politics as well.
The illusory quality of the epistemic division between 
realism and liberalism at the international level can be seen 
as far back as the tendency to distinguish between Hobbes, 
the realist, and Locke, the liberal. What unites them both is 
their appeal to interests that rationally justify men leaving 
the state of nature to form civil society. What also unites 
them is the belief that they can give objective content to 
such interests. In modern rational choice parlance, 
preference formation has a unitary justification and 
substance for both theorists; such formation is endogenous. 
Both were ethical objactivists. But as epistemological 
uncertainty increased, and the normative assumptions of 
seventeenth century thinkers dwindled away, preferences 
became arbitrary and not rationally justifiable. They became 
exogenous to the means-ends language of interest pursuits, 
the only pursuits that retained their rational character in 
post-Weberian t e r m s . A s  one current work on rational choice 
explains : "[T]he individuals in our analysis are rational. 
This means that they act in accord with their [exogenously 
defined] preferences for final outcomes and their beliefs 
about effectiveness of various actions available to them."®® 
There are no criteria by which one can judge the ethical
Thus the division in Weber's work between value and instrumental 
rationality.
®® Kenneth A. Shepsle and Mark S. Bonchek, Aaalyzinç Politics: 
Rationality, Behaviors, and Institutions (New York: W.W. Norton t Co., 
1997), 35.
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quality of those preferences. That is beyond the scope of 
rational inquiry.
This same dilemma holds true in the sphere of 
international law. The division between positivism and 
natural law during this period is a chimera. For natural law 
requires a theory of natural right which itself requires a 
theory of nature. As was pointed out earlier, Bentham refers 
to Locke's attachment to natural right as "nonsense on 
stilts," a peculiar interference of metaphysics into what 
ought to be a rationalist ethic. In the nineteenth century, 
calls for a return to natural law theory were circumscribed 
by the awareness that, epistemologically, such law had to 
rely upon state behavior for its vindication, not some larger 
transcendent ethical theory. Critical legal theorist Martii 
Koskeniemmi makes the point that the dichotomy of 
naturalism/positivism obscured larger assumptions about 
ethics in international law, namely that the state was the 
only legitimate actor and that any natural argument had to 
rely upon those states' consent. Natural law was transformed 
into the recognition of right by states, a transformation 
that renders any connection with earlier natural law theory 
dilatory.
[M]ost professionals expressly preserved some idea of 
natural law in their system which, though usually termed 
"secondary" in respect of positive law, fulfilled the 
important function of offering arguments when positive ones 
were not available. Secondly, positivism and naturalism are 
not really so separate as it is made to seem. In the 
professionals' argument initially "positivistic" points 
about consent turn regularly {though silently) into 
naturalist ones under the argument from tacit consent . . . 
or generalization from treaty. Furthermore, the primacy of 
the State, its "absolute" rights and its will to the law is
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based on the liberal-naturalist assumption about the primacy 
of the individual to the society.®^
Koskenniemi is in no way arguing for a covenantal
perspective, but his argument supports the covenantal
critique of hierarchical liberalism. Liberals and realists
both looked to the state as the primary source of authority,
domestically and internationally. The influence of Weber on
international realism and domestic liberalism reveals this
important point. The further liberalism evolved away from its
classical and covenantal origins, the less we are able to
distinguish it from state-centered realism. They look and act
very much the same. Liberals used domestic analogies about
rights while forgetting the reality behind those analogies.
The first premise of covenantal politics is that power must
be divided and limited; that includes state power. Nor is the
state the ultimate arbiter of natural right. The idea of the
state as holding the monopoly of legitimate violence is
anathema to classical liberals. These premises concerning
limited state power were handed down to classical liberal
theorists but were promptly forgotten by modern liberals, in
no small part, because of their view that transcendent
natural right was an irrational prejudice.
By the beginning of the twentieth century, liberal
international relations theory was caught in the trap of
having to rely upon the opposition of apology (positivism as
relativism) and utopia(natural law as absolutism) in order to
Martii Koskenniemi, From Apology To Utopia: The Structure of 
International Legal Argument (Helsinki: Finnish Lawyer's Publishing 
Company, 1989), 107.
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make sense of itself.®® One or the other sides of this 
opposition must be emphasized, depending upon the 
circumstance, while the other must be pushed to the margins 
of consciousness. Two primary problems must be confronted.
The first, so acutely analyzed by the realist tradition, is 
the belief in a harmony of interests. The second involves a 
larger and more fundamental contradiction between liberal 
ethical prescriptions and the epistemology necessary to 
ground them theoretically. Both of these problems arose at 
the international level as a result of the epistemic faith in 
scientism leading to the formulation of ethics as interests, 
a process that was accompanied by an unawareness of how 
unstable liberal epistemology had become. The natural law 
basis of Locke's liberalism had been dispensed with.
Bentham's "happiness" had been shown by Mill to be untenable. 
Liberal legal theory, by the late nineteenth century, had 
ceased to believe in the possibility of a unitary 
understanding of a common good and had moved to the 
"marketplace of ideas" metaphor and the empirical case system 
of legal education. Despite all these developments, 
liberalism at the international level failed to take into 
account these changes in the epistemic climate. The 
divergence between theory and practice only became wider as 
the century progressed.
®® Ibid., 108. The similarity of Koskenniemi's terms to Mannheim's 
is not accidental.
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The Harmony of Interests
Like their nineteenth century predecessors, twentieth 
century liberals asserted that a harmony of interests existed 
between the pursuit of instrumental interests for their own 
sake and the public good. In 1912, Norman Angel 1, in The 
Great Illusion, argued that war was not cost-effective policy 
and that political leaders, if educated about the malignant 
economic consequences of war, would make other choices.This 
reflected that long-standing liberal faith in the connection 
between education and enlightenment. As the events of 1914 
showed, it was Angell's theory that was to prove illusory.
The same could be said for Woodrow Wilson's 
international vision which contained fatal contradictions of 
its own, contradictions which still haunt international 
relations. Wilson supported two contradictory objectives: 
self-determination (which implies non-intervention) and the 
presence of enforceable public international law. Wilson 
believed in the liberal tenet of consent being the basis for 
legitimate government. But, his theory is undermined by the 
same problem contemporary liberalism faces of being unable to 
reconcile the rights of individuals with the rights of 
ethnicity. Self-determination on the basis of ethnicity 
continues to wreak havoc in the international system. How 
liberal states can be committed to state sovereignty and 
self-determination is a problem not yet solved. As Morgenthau 
points out, this contradiction was one reason liberals were
Norman Angell, The Great Illusion (London: G.P. Putneun, 1912) .
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unable to stand up to Hitler's pre-war annexations of 
territories with large German contingents.9° According to one 
pole of liberal theory, his acts were perfectly justifiable.
These contradictory views reflect Koskenniemi's 
criticism of international law: there is an untenable 
combination of positive sovereignty and naturalistic morality 
in Wilson's agenda. And, as the Nuremburg trials later 
showed, which element was to be emphasized depended upon 
political circumstances, a fact which revealed liberal rule- 
oriented discourse to be an assertion of power rather than 
reason, in the Nuremburg trials, liberals, who had long since 
discarded natural law theory apart from state consent, 
exchanged the emphasis on state sovereignty for international 
morality. This allowed them to convict Germans, acting under 
the positive law of a sovereign state, of crimes against 
humanity, an entirely new charge in international law.
But inconsistency at the level of policy conduct is 
hardly news. Observations about this inconsistency is part of 
the perennial critique of liberalism by realists who see any 
foreign policy pursuit not focused upon some definition of 
interests as muddled and dangerous. What is more challenging 
is the disjuncture between ethics and epistemology in liberal 
theory. When one examines the elevated moral language of 
liberal theorists, such as that found in modern human rights 
documents concerning civil and political rights, or the lofty 
goals of those engaged in international institution building.
9° Morgenthau, Scientific Man, 54.
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such as bringing about an end to global conflicts, it is 
difficult to pinpoint the theoretical source for such 
language given the current state of liberal theory in law and 
politics. How we got to that point has been the focus of this 
chapter. Subsequent chapters take up the question of whether 
the evolution of liberal thought leaves us with the 
intellectual tools to develop a viable international ethic 
for the future.
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CHAPTER 3 
DECONSTRUCTING LIBERALISM
This chapter takes up the communitarian and postmodern 
critiques of liberal theory. While communitarians attack the 
primacy of interests in liberal theory, postmodernists focus 
on liberalism's rationality, rule-orientation, and equity. 
Earlier chapters examined the origins of both of these 
qualities in liberal theory, qualities that have resulted in 
pendulum swings between passivity in dealing with 
international conflict and millenarian attempts to create a 
peaceful world order. While classical liberal scholars 
integrated interests and ethics, modern liberal thinkers have 
been less successful in this venture. Methods of analysis 
derived from deconstruction show why this is so.
A deconstruction of liberalism requires more than just 
the revelation of flawed arguments. The process involves 
showing how categories of thought are built upon binary 
conceptual oppositions, one side of which will then be 
privileged at any given moment. In the case of international 
liberalism, that opposition is found in the two poles of 
international ideals versus sovereignty and self- 
determination. These poles, in turn, are connected to another 
opposition, the universal requirements of law versus
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individual conceptions of national interest. The ideal of 
community depends on the ability of nations to make rules for 
themselves. The ideal of sovereignty depends upon a belief in 
interests as preferences which are outside of rational 
criticism. Both oppositions are absolutely necessary to 
liberal theory yet the components of each stand opposed to 
each other.
This chapter examines each of these critical elements of 
liberal theory by reflecting upon the communitarian and 
postmodern critiques. Communitarians critique interest- 
seeking and the liberal emphasis on autonomy and rights. 
Postmodernists, especially critical legal scholars, have 
opposed the deontic or rule-oriented aspect of liberal law. 
But these critiques do not stand alone. Neither communitarian 
theorists nor postmodernists offer a viable theoretical 
solution to the problems they reveal in liberal theory; 
hence, they must be transcended as well.
The Present State of Liberal Theory
Liberal theorists have been accused by their 
intellectual descendants of relying upon ethical theories or 
metaphysical conclusions that are unwarranted by their 
epistemic assumptions. Such accusations are, more often than 
not, justified. The previous chapter showed how values gained 
autonomy within the 'private* realm in which no public good 
could be defined and in which natural law or natural right 
was held to be metaphysical nonsense. Although rationality
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became more and more instrumental, liberals never doubted for 
a minute that reason was still "reasonable." The Victorian 
obsession with facts, which prompted the criticism of Matthew 
Arnold and the satire of Dickens, led in the twentieth 
century to the hyperempiricism of logical positivism in 
epistemology and emotivism in ethics. Political economy, 
microeconomic theory and its social science equivalent, 
rational choice theory, did much to support the idea that 
preferences could stand in place of more traditional ethical 
conceptions.
While Anglo-American thought emphasized instrumental 
rationality. Continental thought rejected this approach. 
German thinkers, in particular, posited a separate vision of 
the good and a detestation of the bourgeois "last man", the 
"shopkeeper" who is only concerned with material comforts. 
Initiated by Rousseau's horror of the scientism and 
rationalism of Enlightenment France, this theme was picked up 
particularly by German theorists such as Nietzsche and Martin 
Heidegger, as well as their postmodern descendants. But 
rather than opposing instrumental reason with a classical 
conception of reason, the postmodernists appealed to the non- 
rational and the aesthetic as a basis for critique.
Max Weber brilliantly combines instrumentalism and 
postmodemity, thereby solidifying his influence over the 
social sciences. Weber is of great importance because he 
takes both Nietzsche and science seriously, something that 
would have rendered the work of a lesser scholar
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unintelligible. Perhaps the reason many social scientists 
are comfortable with Weber is because he mirrors the current 
Weltanschauung so well. Values are created and held relative 
in his theory, while the instrumental is equated with the 
rational.
Thomas Spragens characterizes this philosophical 
composite as "positivist pluralism," a term that fits nicely 
with the liberal version of Weberianism. He sums up its 
essential features in the following way:
Democratic politics is not the story of any grand 
ideological vision. It is not even the story of a quest for 
justice or for the common good, both of which are rhetorical 
concepts of no cognitive meaning anyway. Instead, democratic 
politics is a story of conflicting plural interests. Around 
these interests, which are normatively equivalent 
preferences, groups are formed. . . . Since none of the 
groups can in fact dominate or secure all of its goals, 
public policy is formulated by compromise and piecemeal 
"muddling through.*^
This "muddling through," the movement across the line 
from the relative to the absolute, from the principium 
individuationis to the collective, and from preferences to 
the public good, is not just a peripheral characteristic of 
liberal international relations theory; it is at the heart of 
the vision liberals have of the global future. To see how 
this is so, it is necessary to return to the characteristics 
ascribed to liberal theory by Mark Zacher, Richard Matthew, 
and Charles Kegley. Zacher and Matthew cite a number of 
characteristics that provide the common threads of various 
liberal schools. International liberalism is progressive; it
Spragens, The Irony of Liberal Reason, 291. Emphasis added.
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holds that peace justice and welfare are realized by 
international cooperation, that these values are enhanced by 
the effects of modernization, and that individuals are the 
primary actors in the international sphere.2 History is 
ateleological, according to Zacher and Matthew.2 They believe 
that there should be no “expectation that men will converge 
upon a single, shared view of the ends of life."^ But there 
must be enough convergence for rational persons to agree on 
what is entailed by such words as "progressive," "justice," 
and "welfare." While one could argue that justice is a 
procedural matter, clearly progressivity and welfare have 
substantive overtones that render their equation with 
preferences problematic.
Kegley fares no better in dealing with the problem of 
preference formation and public goods. He also relies upon a 
notions of progressivity and discusses "good" human nature 
versus "bad" human behavior, as well as behavior brought on 
by "evil" institutions. More importantly, Kegley states that 
"international society must reorganize itself institutionally 
to eliminate the anarchy that makes problems such as war 
likely."5 in addition, he states; "War and injustice are 
international problems that require collective or 
multilateral rather than national efforts to eliminate them."®
2 Zacher and Matthew, 117f.
3 Ibid, 109.
4 Ibid.
® Kegley, "The Neoliberal Challenge," 4.
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In his work on peace settlements, Kegley argues that the core 
of liberalism, which distinguishes it from realism, is 
adherence to ethical principles.? This assumption lays the 
foundation for his entire approach to war and peace; yet, 
nowhere are we told how unity of ethical purpose is achieved 
within, or between, liberal states in which individual moral 
autonomy is a defining characteristic. Kegley assumes this is 
a problem liberal theory has already solved.
These statements reveal a pattern of movement from 
relative to absolute ethical claims and from preferences to 
coercion. In the absence of shared goals or values, social 
order must be brought about by force that is non-consensual. 
Liberals first assert that there is no teleology inherent in 
liberal thought and that preferences ought to remain 
supremely free, exogenous to coercion of any kind. Only then 
can one claim, in Orwellian terms, that some preferences are 
more equal than others. Human rights, treaty obligations, and 
the like, are given a preeminent place in a hierarchy of 
preferences that ought not to exist. This line of thinking is 
defended on the basis of an appeal to neutral principles 
(e.g., sovereignty or international legal standards for 
intrastate behavior) that are largely procedural. In other 
words, all questions of a substantive nature, particularly 
those that challenge the claims of neutrality, are relegated 
to the procedural realm. After covering over the movement
 ^ Ibid. Emphasis added.
? Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond, How Nations Make 
Peace (New York: Worth Publishers, 1999), 21.
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from relative to absolute, liberals often appeal to coercion, 
as Kegley does, in order to defend the existing structure of 
political and legal relationships among nations. These 
appeals rely upon definitions that liberal leaders have 
constructed on the basis of their own conceptions of 
rationality. For it is one thing to coerce a dissident group 
in one's own nation. Nations contain structures of positive 
law and, as Weber put it, the monopoly on legitimate 
violence. It is quite another to coerce a sovereign nation 
which may appeal to rules in the UN Charter prohibiting 
intervention. The distinction between this sort of behavior, 
and the Kiplingesque vision of colonial powers a century ago, 
is difficult to determine absent some kind of ethical 
foundation that reaches beyond emotivism or the language of 
preference formation. The only obvious difference is that 
now, rather than action being taken by one colonial power, it 
is taken by a greater number of nations in the UN Security 
Council, four of whom are former colonial powers.®
Liberals themselves have recognized that there is a 
tendency to allow absolutism to guide liberal nations into 
conflict. Doyle, following Hume, recognizes the tendency 
towards "imprudent vehemence" in liberal foreign policy.® 
Liberal states emulate a pendulum that alternates between 
passivity in dealing with some crises and vehement aggression
® Of these, three, the US, France, and Britain, are liberal. The 
other, Russia, is presently and marginally liberal though quickly moving 
toward illiberalism.
® Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, 265.
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in others.
The best statistical evidence indicates that the 
"libertarian" or "democratic" states (slightly different 
measures) are not less war-prone than nonlibertarian or 
nondemocratic states. Indeed, in these measures they appear 
to be more war-prone. . . . Liberal states ("libertarian") 
acted as initiators in 24 out of the 56 interstate wars in 
which they participated between 1816 and 1980 while non- 
Liberals were on the initiating side in 91 out of 187 
times.10
Though this recognition exists among some liberals, it does 
not appear that there is any keen awareness as to why it 
occurs. If there is no rational ethical theory to which 
liberals can appeal when making decisions about the 
implications of foreign policy, all such decisions must be, 
by definition, atheoretical and ad hoc. Judgment requires 
judicial criteria; if such criteria are considered outside 
the bounds of rationality itself, then one ought not expect 
policies that are both rational and ethical. One ought to 
expect interest-based behavior, defined narrowly, to prevail. 
Ironically, we often find interest-seeking as the only 
rational explanation of international behavior. That 
explanation, however, cannot adequately distinguish between 
the behavior of liberal and illiberal states.
Interests and Collective Action Problems 
Kant looms as a central figure to the analytical 
questions dealt with in this chapter. His empirical theory 
of international relations relied on the interest-based
Ibid., 26Bf. R.J. Rummel's study of international violence 
confirms this tendency though he finds that liberal states initiate wars 
less often than illiberal states. See R.J Rummel, 'Libertarianism and 
International Violence.*
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theory of "asocial sociability," whereby men, despite their 
asocial tendencies, eventually construct peaceful relations 
primarily through trade and commerce because it is in their 
interest to do so. In this way, he was in line with the 
political economists of his time, such as Smith and Ricardo, 
as well as with the later utilitarians who saw interests as 
the source of the rational itself.
The normative aspects of Kant's international theory, 
however, could not be less utilitarian. While he appealed to 
interests in Perpetual Peace, this was purely a matter of 
empirical observation rather than normative desire. Kant 
clearly believed he was placing ethics upon a firmer 
foundation than what was provided by natural law. Be that as 
it may, asocial sociability was, for Kant, of the same a 
priori quality as gravity was for Newton's inverse square 
law. Interests would lead to the perpetual peace and the 
foedus pacificum as surely as gravity attracted matter to 
matter.
The Problem with Interests
In order to examine why interest-theory is a problem for 
liberal international thinkers, it is not even necessary to 
turn to the communitarians per se. Rather, one can look at 
the figure who has done so much to herald the present triumph
Kant, "Idea For A Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of 
View, " chap. in Kant on History, ed. and trans. Lewis White Beck (New 
York: Macmillan, 1985), 12. Actually, Kant mentioned both Kepler and 
Newton as both expositors of and creations of the same Nature which has 
produced man's asocial sociability.
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of liberalism, Francis Fukuyama. In The End of History and 
the Last Man, Fukuyama argues chat "liberal democracy may 
constitute the end point of man's ideological evolution and 
the final form of human government.*^- The advent of liberal 
democracy as the final stage of the dialectic of historical 
forms of regimes was also spurred on by the irreversible 
effects of science and the technology it produces. The clock 
cannot be turned back; cyclical patterns are no longer 
possible. The need for technology as a means of military and 
economic survival necessitates the development of social 
structures that allow this development to occur in the most 
efficient way possible.Highly centralized systems of 
government preclude that development in the long run, despite 
the possibility of short term gains. History is directional, 
and its direction is focused on reaching the goal of liberal 
democracy, the form of government best able to facilitate 
political and economic development.
If the end of history is upon us, the question becomes 
"what now"? Is it possible for liberalism to sustain itself? 
For if it cannot, liberalism as the end of history must be 
seriously questioned. At this point, Fukuyama's defense of 
liberalism becomes even more distinctive from the mainstream.
Liberal democracies . . . are not self-sufficient; the 
community life on which they depend must ultimately come 
from a source different from liberalism itself. The men and 
women who made up American society at the time of the 
founding of the United States were not isolated, rational 
individuals calculating their self-interest. Rather, they
Fukuyama, The End Of History, xi. 
13 Ibid., 73f.
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were for the most part members of religious communities held 
together by a common moral code and belief in God. The 
rational liberalism that they eventually came to embrace was 
not a projection of that pre-existing culture, but existed 
in some tension with it. "Self-interest rightly understood" 
came to be a broadly understandable principle that laid a 
low but solid ground for public virtue in the United States, 
in many cases a firmer ground than was possible through
appeal to religious or pre-modern values alone. But in the
long run, those liberal principles had a corrosive effect on 
Che values predating liberalism necessary to sustain strong 
communities, and thereby on a liberal society's ability to 
be self-sustaining.^^
This is Che core of the communitarian argument made, in 
this case, by a theorist committed to defending a theory of 
sustainable liberalism. If liberalism is defined by its 
commitment to individual autonomy, then its sustainability 
does indeed become problematic. But why should this be so? 
For Fukuyama, the "first man* of interest-oriented liberal 
theory is one with what he calls "Lockean Man.* In the 
attitudes and drives of this first man are found the causes
of the unsustainability of liberal polities.
Lockean man did not need to be public-spirited, patriotic, 
or concerned for the welfare of those around him; rather, as 
Kant suggested, a liberal society could be made up of 
devils, provided they were rational. It was not clear why 
the citizen of a liberal state . . . would ever serve in the 
army and risk his life for his country in war. For if the 
fundamental natural right was self-preservation of the 
individual, on what grounds could it ever be rational for an 
individual to die for his country rather than trying to run 
away with his money and his family? Even in times of peace, 
Hobbesian or Lockean liberalism provided no reason why 
society's best men should choose public service and 
statesmanship over a private life of money-making. Indeed, 
it was not clear why Lockean man should become active in the 
life of his community, be privately generous to the poor, or 
even make the sacrifices necessary to raise a f a m i l y . 15
Locke clearly did not believe this tendency toward a
narrow view of interests would be the end result of his
1^  Ibid., 327. Emphasis added. 
15 Ibid., leOf.
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rationalizing project. Locke, indeed, placed a number of 
circumscriptions around the concept of interest, most of 
which were derived from natural law. Yet Fukuyama is 
instructive concerning the evolution of thought that has 
arisen from classical liberal origins in which those 
circumscriptions were replaced by preferences.
Fukuyama does not mention the effect that interest- 
seeking has on solving collective action problems at the 
international level. But one could make an analogous argument 
for international politics. Just as one strives in vain to 
find good reasons for this first man to act unselfishly, one 
could strive in vain to understand why nations ought to 
contribute to solutions of common problems in coordination.
Fukuyama's critique of interests is similar to that of 
Nietzsche, who equated bourgeois democracy with the 
shopkeeping mentality of English liberals.^® The creation of 
interest-based liberalism is not the heroic and wise 
individual of Enlightenment mythology but, rather, the "last 
man." How to prevent the creation of this last man is, for 
Fukuyama, the great question for liberal theory to solve. 
Indeed, it must be solved because, like other liberals, 
Fukuyama believes that the most important elements of 
international liberal theory are rooted in domestic politics. 
It is crucial that liberalism tame irrational tendencies like
Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, Aphorism 12 in 
"Maxims and Arrows", in The Portable Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Walter 
Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1968), 468. Nietzsche states, "Man 
does not strive for pleasure, only the Englishman does."
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nationalism— just as it did religious intolerance--in order 
to secure global p e a c e . B u t  liberal nations must also 
satisfy the spiritual (what he calls thymotic) longings that 
give rise to religion and nationalism. If liberal societies 
are not self-sustaining, if they do not satisfy such longings 
or if they cannot motivate citizens towards a larger, more 
enlightened understanding of self-interest, then they will 
devolve into tyrannical forms of government as Plato--and 
Tocqueville-- predicted.^® This would put an end to the 
separate peace among once-liberal nations.
Mancur Olson's work, The Rise and Decline of Nations, 
reinforces Fukuyama's claims about the consequences of 
interest-seeking for solving collective action problems.
Olson deals with the problem of interest-seeking at the 
national level but his thesis could just as easily be applied 
to the society of states. Olson believes that there exists 
within nations interest groups with high incentives to 
redirect resources to themselves. He vividly likens this 
process to "wrestlers struggling over the contents of a china 
shop."19 In the language of political economy, these are rent- 
seeking agents who have little incentive to contribute to the 
solution of collective action problems. Over the life of a 
nation, these groups become better organized and more skilled
1^  Fukuyama, The End of History, 271.
1® Ibid., 288.
19 Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven : Yale 
University Press, 1982), 44.
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at the political maneuvering necessary to acquire resources. 
As they succeed in these endeavors, other groups arise to 
join them in order to prevent their own marginalization. 
Barring some kind of interruption, the existence of these 
groups eventually brings about a collapse in the ability of 
nations to solve even the most urgent of problems.
Olson's theory is clearly applicable to international 
life; for example, global collective action breakdowns often 
lead to global violence. As we have seen, the liberal 
international agenda is ameliorative and progressive. But it 
is an agenda which requires cooperative action. As Olson's 
theory predicts, lacking specific "selective" incentives, 
liberal nations acting on the basis of interest often fail to 
secure public goods.
The Versailles Treaty and its economic consequences 
illustrate this principle. Keynes predicted that the 
agreement would have disastrous consequences, not only for 
Germany but for the Allied powers as well. By seeking their 
short-term interests, the Allies found themselves facing a 
suboptimal outcome in the two decades that followed. Keynes, 
and US Treasury Secretary Harry Dexter white, attempted to 
ameliorate these conditions after the World War II through 
the creation of the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund. In addition, they sought currency stability through a
Ibid., 146-180. Olson deals for the most part with 
macroeconomic variables but he also deals with social issues as the 
title of chapter 6 of his book indicates: "Inequality, Discrimination, 
and Development."
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fixed rate exchange system in which currencies would be 
linked to the US dollar, which was itself linked to gold. The 
US sustained this system until the early 1970's when, unable 
to continue paying for the costs of two wars simultaneously, 
one on poverty and the other on the people of Vietnam, the US 
defected from the system. In the absence of this standard, 
exchange rates began to free-float against one another; they 
also became subject to wild speculation. The consequences of 
this instability continue to be felt and developing nations 
feel it most deeply.
Other cases of Olsonian logic abound in a number of 
different areas of international affairs. In the area of 
human rights, for example, of the twenty conventions on human 
rights, the US is either not a signatory or has signed but 
not ratified fourteen of them.-- In the area of environmental 
law, the Bush Administration— contrary to all other major 
powers—  refused to sign the Rio Pact. The Clinton 
Administration, with its talent for creative legal solutions 
to such thorny problems, signed the instrument in 1993 but 
declared that this signature merely signified agreement in 
principle and should in no way be construed as agreement to 
it as binding law.
In the case before the International Court of Justice,
Joan Bdelman Spero, The Politics of International Economic 
Relations, Fourth Edition (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 44.
22 William R. Slomanson, Fundamental Perspectives on International 
Law (New York: West Publishing, 1996), 497f.
149
Nicaragua v. US ( 1 9 8 5 ) , the US was accused by Nicaragua of 
engaging in paramilitary activities against it, another 
sovereign state. Rather than allowing the case to be 
adjudicated, the US illegally withdrew jurisdiction from the 
International Court of Justice without giving the six months 
notice required by treaty arrangement. After Nicaragua won 
the case--the US failed to appear--the ICJ held that damages 
must be negotiated, something the US failed to do.
The US is, of course, not the only liberal nation to 
flout international law when it is convenient. One can raise 
the same point about the French in the Rainbow Warrior 
Incident, in which the French government destroyed a 
Greenpeace vessel and killed a member of the crew,-'* British 
selectivity in complying with decisions of the European Court 
of Justice, or the EU's unwillingness to abide by decisions 
of the World Trade Organization. US actions simply carry more 
consequences than those of other nations because of its 
present political, military, and economic power. Nor is this 
point raised to argue that US reticence to make certain 
agreements is always unjustified. In the case of Clinton's 
hesitance to accept the Rio Conference provisions as binding, 
the President articulated valid concerns about intellectual 
property rights that needed further protections. With regards
Case Concerning The Military And Paramilitary Activities In And 
Against Nicaragua, (Merits). Hereafter cited as Nicaragua v. United 
States o£ America, In International Court of Justice: Case Si2mmaries (27 
June 1986) : 24 pp. 8 March 1999 <http://www.icj- 
cij .org/icjwww/idecisions/isummaries/inussummary860627 .htm>.
See 26 Int'I Legal Materials 1346 (Washington D.C.: American 
Society of International Law, 1987).
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to the Kyoto Convention on Climate Change, the Administration 
signed knowing that ratification was impossible. The US 
Senate made it clear that the provisions written into the 
Treaty, giving 130 nations significant exemptions to control 
agreements, was unacceptable. The resolution articulating 
this concern passed the Senate on a bipartisan basis. This 
95-0 vote included Senators with serious concerns about the 
environment; it cannot simply be passed off as a case of 
parochial jingoism.
While all cases of defection from a system may not be 
due to narrow Olsonian interest-seeking, all Olsonian 
behavior does lead to defection and breakdown of collective 
problem solving systems. One can justifiably argue that 
securing copyright laws is a good thing for all states; it is 
much harder, however, to make this argument for the illegal 
withdrawal of jurisdiction from the ICJ, for killing 
environmentalists, or blowing up their vessels. If “selective 
incentives,* are all that can motivate liberal actors, the 
system cannot efficiently solve the collective action 
problems that require transnational solutions. Among these 
are precisely the issues mentioned above, wealth 
distribution, peace, the environment, and resource scarcity.
What is significant about this quandary for 
international liberal theory is that no ethical objections 
can easily be made to interest-seeking that leads to 
defection. To do so requires an argument that reaches beyond 
preferences to some kind of rules. This may not at first seem
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obvious. It is possible to argue that it is in one's interest 
to solve problems of pollution and war, for example. But 
this does not explain why one ought to prefer one solution 
over another. Why not simply shift negative externalities, 
the malificent consequences of certain actions, to developing 
nations? And it is not at all clear that democracies do not 
find war to be in their interests, returning us to the 
problem of "imprudent vehemence." Furthermore, one can 
imagine a whole host of preferences more amenable to a 
rational actor in an interest-based system than 
redistributing wealth (the left's solution) or the capacity 
to create wealth (the right's solution). Or upon what basis 
should liberal nations sacrifice interests for the pursuit of 
human rights agendas in illiberal nations? These policies 
imply that there are ethical ends beyond interests to which 
liberals appeal, theretsy resurrecting Fukuyama's point that 
liberalism must reach beyond itself to be coherent. Neutral 
principles do not appear to be sufficient to motivate the 
"first man" of liberal theory to transcend himself. 
Communitarians contend that, ultimately, this defect in 
liberal motivations makes sustainable liberal life difficult, 
if not impossible, to achieve.
What is revolutionary about the communitarian argument 
is its assertion that the very element of liberal theory 
designed to ensure peace and prosperity, interests, will, if 
left unchecked, lead to its eventual demise. This hearkens 
back to Offe's definition of systemic contradiction cited
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earlier: *a contradiction is the tendency inherent within a 
specific mode of production to destroy those very pre­
conditions on which its survival depends. Though Fukuyama 
is influenced heavily by Kant's view of history and his 
belief in the separate liberal peace, he is clearly at odds 
with Kant's (and Rousseau's) belief that rational devils can 
sustain a liberal polity. This aspect of Kant's theory would 
be labeled by critical legal theorists, like Koskenniemi, as 
"ascending." Just as with other commercial pacifists like 
Smith, Ricardo and Keynes, Kant believes that interests 
provide a bottom-up solution to conflict. But there is also 
an aspect of Kant's thought that is "descending," one that 
deals with top-down solutions derived from the rule-making 
function of pure reason as it affects practical reason. 
Ascending interests, rooted in the deterministic world of 
phenomena, and descending rules, rooted in the noumenal realm 
of free action, stand on opposite sides of an epistemic chasm 
that cannot be crossed.
Deoncic Liberalism 
To a large extent, agreement with Kant's ethical 
principles depends upon agreement with the substance of his 
epistemology and the way that rationality can and must 
determine those principles. Consensus on just what Kant's 
rationality entailed was short-lived for many reasons, the 
most important of which were epistemic in nature. Kant's
cited in Cox, 32.
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first two critiques (The Critique of Pure Reason and The 
Critique of Practical Reason) appear to undermine each other. 
By attempting to provide a foundation for reason in the first 
and morality in the second that would rival Newton's work in 
physics, Kant diminishes our ability to believe in either 
reason or morality. If the mind organizes phenomena through 
the categories, then the individual can never have direct 
knowledge of those phenomena or any kind of reality. Reality 
becomes a construction of the mind itself.
Stanley Jaki describes Kant's reliance upon imagination 
as the key to the attempt to unite the mind with reality.
It must have been with secret despair that at long last Kant 
credited the unity of mind and phenomena to the faculty of 
imagination. Imagination was hardly the concise, scientific, 
logical factor which, to all expectation, should have served 
as the keystone of the arch representing the structure and 
genesis of valid knowledge.
The appeal to imagination was certainly troubling for the
m o d e m  project of developing a rational ethic, a point that
did not go unnoticed by later theorists.
Despite the troubling implications of Kant's ethical
theory, deontology remains one of the primary ethical
standards of international liberalism. This is especially
true of assertions made about the good for humanity in areas
such as human rights. Thomas Donaldson writes:
Kant's historical impact on [deontic ethics] is difficult to 
exaggerate, and the form itself probably constitutes the 
dominant contemporary tradition of moral reasoning among 
philosophers. . . .
It is worth noting in this vein that most contemporary 
rights-based theories are also deontological theories with 
Kantian affinities. Rights are principles that assign claims
26 Jaki, 120.
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or entitlements to someone against someone . . . that are 
usually interpreted as "trumping" precedence over 
consequential claims made in the name o£ collective 
welfare.
The word 'consequential' in this passage is emphasized 
because it highlights a key difference between realist and 
deontic theorists. For Kant, something is right because the 
agent's intent, her will, is in accord with what is rational. 
Though a good consequential case may be made for such an 
action, it is irrelevant to the inherent rightness of that 
act. This makes perfect sense when we remember that the 
interaction of consequences with phenomena are outside the 
purview of direct knowledge or the noumenal realm.
The realist reply to this approach is that the principle 
of fiat justitia; pereat mundus is not a valid foreign policy 
option for the statesman concerned with the general welfare 
of the nation. What is accomplished for the cause of justice 
if the world, indeed, perishes? While this is surely a valid 
objection, there is a deeper problem with Kant's theory. 
Alasdair MacIntyre explains the dilemma as the imputation of 
moral content into Kant's ethics in a way that cannot be 
justified by Kantian methodology.
Kant is not of course himself in any doubt as to which 
maxims are in fact the expression of the moral law; virtuous 
plain men and women did not have to wait for philosophy to 
tell them in what a good will consisted and Kant never 
doubted for a moment that the maxims which he had learnt 
from his own virtuous parents were those which had to be 
vindicated by a rational test.-®
One finds in Kant's ethics a suspicious correlation between
Donaldson, 150. Emphasis added.
2® MacIntyre, 44. Nietzsche refers to this tendency of Kant to 
vindicate common wisdom as "Kant's Joke."
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the rational and the pietistic Christian. This criticism 
echoes that made by Leo Strauss of the neo-Kantian^^ (and 
culturally pietistic Christian) Weber, whose intellectual 
integrity and scholarly values seemed hard to reconcile with 
the fact-value dichotomy
MacIntyre is also puzzled by the maxims Kant relies upon 
to determine whether a moral act is rational, wondering why 
such maxims as "Keep all your promises throughout your life 
except one," or "Always eat mussels on Mondays in March," do 
not pass the test. Donaldson is also troubled by this 
problem. He cites a particularly thorny problem in 
understanding a deontic approach to rule-making in the UN.
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter instructs all
I use this term to define Weber because he draws directly from 
the Kantian noumenal-phenomenal dichotomy developing his own epistemic 
theories. This is further detailed in chapter 4.
Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History, Paperback ed. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1965), 43. Strauss hints at this 
connection in Weber when he states, "One is thus led to think that Weber 
admitted the existence of absolutely binding norms, namely the moral 
imperatives. Yet one sees immediately afterward that what he said about 
the moral commands is not much more than the residue of a tradition in 
which he was brought up and which, indeed, never ceased to determine him 
as a human being."
31 MacIntyre, 46.
The UN, despite being comprised of most of the world's nations, 
liberal or otherwise, is based upon broadly liberal principles such as 
autonomy and a restricted form of majority rule. This is not surprising 
since it was created, for the most part, by liberal states. Koskeniemmi 
states that doctrines of rights, non-intervention, the public/private 
analogy found in domestic/international dichotony, and sovereign 
equality, are all transpositions of domestic liberal theory. "The 
Friendly Relations Declaration passed by the ON General Assembly in 1970 
is a declaration of liberalism writ large." See Koskeniemmi, 72. See 
also UN General Assembly Resolution 2625, "Declaration on principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, " in Knud 
Krakau, Henning v. Wedel, Andreas Gdhmann eds., UN-General Asseaibly 
Resolutions (Frankfurt Am Main: Alfred Metzner Verlag QnbH, 1975), 21- 
24.
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States to 'refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state in any manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.* But 
even here, in one of the strongest proscriptions on 
intervention, two exceptions are identified: namely, self- 
defense and force authorized by the UN Security Council.
But what, critics will ask, is to guide the UN Security 
Council in its deliberations about intervention if not 
consequential decisions? And, if the exceptions defining 
application of deontological principles are hostage to 
consequential considerations, then are the principles 
themselves not also hostage?^^
Donaldson cites here the two prescribed exceptions to the 
2(4) statement on the use of force. But the situation is in 
fact much more ambiguous. It is not even clear what these 
exceptions themselves mean. Anthony Arend and Robert J. Beck 
have found there to be at least five new principles that have 
arisen since the inception of the Charter, all of which 
violate a strict reading of the 2(4) exceptions: anticipatory 
self-defense, intervention in civil and mixed conflicts, 
intervention to protect nationals, humanitarian intervention, 
and responses to terrorism.^'* These principles have, in 
practice, drawn upon older and well-established rules of 
international law for jurisprudential support. These 
developments would seem to support Koskenniemi's assertion 
that what the rules are is less important than who is making 
the rules. But they also show the unworkability of a non­
consequent ialist theory of international behavior.
Despite these problems, the rule orientation of deontic 
ethics is at the forefront of contemporary liberal
Donaldson, 154.
Anthony Clark Arend and Robert J. Beck, International Law and 
the Use of Force (London: Rout ledge, 1993), 71-173. Each of these 
exceptions is given its own explanatory chapter.
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international thought. Moral and categorical imperatives 
appear vividly in human rights discourse. These rights 
transcend any notion of consequentialism or utility; they 
precede any notion of desert.
Presumably any modem discussion of rights founded upon 
a deontic base will be affected by the problem of finding a 
way to ground them rationally when, as postmodernists claim, 
the whole idea of a unitary rationality is seriously in 
doubt. MacIntyre goes so far as to wonder how we can 
distinguish talk about human rights from claims made about 
unicorns and witches.
The eighteenth-century philosophical defenders of natural 
rights sometimes suggest that the assertions which state 
that men possess them are self-evident truths; but we know 
that there are no self-evident truths. . . .  In the United 
Nations declaration of human rights of 1949 what has since 
become the normal UN practice of not giving good reasons for 
any assertions whatsoever is followed with great rigor. And 
the latest defender of such rights, Ronald Dworkin (Taking 
Rights Seriously, 1976), concedes that the existence of such 
rights cannot be demonstrated, but remarks on this point 
simply that it does not follow from the fact that a 
statement cannot be demonstrated that it is not true (p.81).
Which is true, but could equally be used to defend claims 
about unicorns and witches.3%
Clearly there are problems with applying Kant's ethical 
theory. Those problems continue to affect the viability of a 
deontic solution to the need for ethics at the international 
level.
The Rawlsian Solution
To a great extent, the work of John Rawls has focused on 
ways around these dilemmas. In his Theory of Justice, he
MacIntyre, 69f.
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constructs his now familiar synthesis of interests and 
unitary rule-based rationality.^® In order to secure the place 
of distributive justice simultaneously with interests, Rawls 
proposes a thought experiment not unlike the state of nature 
arguments of past theorists. Rawls proposes that we consider 
a situation in which all individuals are stripped of their 
specific characteristics such as origin, family, class, and 
even talents. We are, in essence, blind to any knowledge of 
ourselves. If we attempt to determine upon what basis goods 
ought to be distributed, then a Rawlsian answer would lead us 
to a rule of equality.
Rawls believes that applying his theory to states would 
result in fair principles in international relations.
The basic principle of the law of nations is a principle of 
equality. Independent peoples organized as states have 
certain fundeimental equal rights. This principle is 
analogous to the equal rights of citizens in a 
constitutional regime. One consequence of this equality of 
nations is the principle of self-determination, the right of 
a people to settle its own affairs without the intervention 
of foreign powers. Another principle is the right of self- 
defense against attack. . . .  A further principle is that 
treaties are to be kept, provided they are consistent with 
the other principles governing the relations of states.
Though Rawls is dubious about extending international
applications of his theory too far, it has been applied on a
3® John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press, 1971). See particularly 136-166. The 
interest of actors, not knowing where they stand in terms of desert, 
predisposes them to desire such equitable distribution, insofar as any 
other choice might lead to an inequitable outcome for them personally. 
The contract need not rely upon any normative principle of natural right 
or objective good, a fact implied by the use of the term contract. This 
contractual relationship, like all others, rests upon both consent and a 
calculation of interests.
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 378.
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broader basis by Charles Beitz. Specifically, Beitz holds 
chat the "state-as-individual" metaphor of other liberal 
theorists is flawed. Instead, he believes that the proper 
unit of analysis, at both domestic and international levels, 
is the rights-bearing autonomous individual who must be 
afforded both juridical and substantive equality.^® 
Considerations of state autonomy are irrelevant; autonomy is 
superseded by the requirement for social justice as justified 
by recourse to the Rawlsian contract. If state autonomy is 
irrelevant, so too then is the principle of non-intervention.
Human rights concerns are especially significant for the 
global rights-bearing individual depicted in Beitz's 
formulation. Consider the military interventions of the US 
into Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Serbia, and other scenes of 
intra-national conflict. These military actions are precluded 
by the UN Charter's Article 2(4) which prohibits the threat 
or use of force by one state against another. Yet they could 
also be justified on the grounds that individuals in these 
nations have rights that are not protected by their 
governments.^® One conclusion that can be drawn from this 
argument is that intervention is not only permissible but 
actually required if states are to act e t h i c a l l y T h i s  is 
particularly true if individuals rather than states are the
Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 77-81.
Ibid., 90.
Beitz denies this but he includes a consequent ialist empirical 
element that is wholly inappropriate in a deontic theory. See Ibid.
160
primary units of international law.
The roots of Rawlsian theory in Kant's ethical 
formulations have important theoretical consequences.'*^ In 
Kantian terms, the categorically rational and the ethical are 
inextricably linked together; there is no room for 
consequentialism or prudential concerns in purely ethical 
decisions. Kant does recognize a role for consequential 
calculations, but that role lies outside of what can be 
considered truly right behavior. Kant states:
For if any action is to be morally good, it is not enough 
that it should conform to the moral law— it must also be 
done for the sake of the moral law: where this is not so, 
the conformity is only too contingent and precarious, since 
the non-moral ground at work will now and then produce 
actions which accord with the law, but very often actions 
which transgress it .'*-
The same is true of deontology which emphasizes the absolute
quality of rights. Yet Kant does not anticipate the way in
which moral practice of the kind he describes can lead to
pernicious consequences. The Kantian international actor may
find himself in the peculiar position of justifying coercion
in order to make concrete a theory based upon consent.
Rawls' contractarianism was a monumental contribution to
modern ethical theory. But there are serious problems with
his theory, many of which are identical to those found in
Kant's theory. Roberto U n g e r i s  dubious about the claim to
For Rawls' interpretation of the Kantian basis for his theory, 
see, A Theory of Justice, 251-257.
Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. 
H.J. Paton (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1964), 57f.
Unger is difficult to categorize as a theorist. He is generally 
considered a member of the critical legal school yet he does have a 
constructive programmatic agenda that could be called left-
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neutrality asserted by Rawls' theory. His concerns eibout 
deontic liberalism center on the inability of the theory to 
find "a neutral way to combine individual, subjective 
values. "^ 4 when it comes to matters of actual legislation, 
Unger argues, the neutrality principle of liberalism shows 
itself to be unworkable.
The difficulty with this [theory] is analogous to the 
objections against the earlier types of the substantive 
theory of freedom. The less concreteness we allow to the 
persons in the ideal position, the less they will have 
standards by which to legislate specific laws, leaving the 
problem of legislation unsolved. But the more they becomes 
like actual human beings, with their own preferences, the 
more they will be forced to choose among individual, 
subjective values in the ideal situations itself.
Both the formal and substantive theory of freedom are 
confronted and destroyed by the same dilemma, the 
impossibility of reconciling the needs for concreteness and 
for neutrality in the doctrine of legislation. The same 
premises that bring the liberal problem of freedom into 
being, the principle of subjective value and the related 
principles of rules and values, and of individualism, make 
the problem insoluble.45
This critique is similar to Koskenniemi's position, in 
that Unger alleges that liberal thought cannot solve the 
contradiction between ascending and descending principles.
The rule-making or legislation function requires a certain 
concreteness that accounts for individual wants in very 
specific areas; however, those wants must be dealt with 
neutrally, that is, according to some descending principle of
commxmitarianism. His theory relies upon a teleological argument not 
unlike Michael Sandel's. Social transformation requires "shared values* 
and "a conception of the ideal that should guide the reconstruction of 
the institutional forms* of society. See Roberto Unger, "The Critical 
Legal Studies Movement," in Critical Legal Studies, ed. Allan C. 
Hutchinson (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1989), 334.
44 Roberto Unger, Knowledge and Politics (New York: The Free
Press, 1975), 86. 
45 Ibid., 87.
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fairness. What fairness means must be determined apart from 
individual preferences; but that becomes impossible given the 
fact that, in any real polity, there is profound disagreement 
by individuals on how fairness is to be applied in particular 
areas.**® One can say that moral and religious differences must 
be placed outside the realm of public discourse, but that 
does not solve the problem of "value-allocation. " As Unger 
states, it only postpones it. Koskenniemi is doubtful as 
well, stating that Rawls' theory leads to "embarrassing 
questions about how to justify our concept of 'fairness' so 
as to avoid the objections voiced against naturalism.
The Communitarian Critique of Deontology
Michael Sandel's communitarian critique of Rawls' theory 
is similar to that of Unger and Koskenniemi. Sandel sees the 
hypothetical contract not as the liberating device it was 
meant to be but just the opposite, a means of 
disempowerment. **® He is also disturbed by the moral 
implications of this hypothesis. The deontological self is 
devoid of moral experience. Its preferences are arbitrary 
because there is really no "self* to draw upon. " . . .  [T]he
This point is made, for example, by feminist critics of Rawls. 
Mari Matsuda is dubious of Rawls' thought experiment and the values it 
presupposes. See Mari J. Matsuda, "Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted 
Visions of Human Nature: A Feminist Critique of Rawls' Theory of
Justice," in Feminist Legal Theory: Foundations, ed. D. Kelly Weisberg 
(Philadelphia: Temple University press, 1993): 476-484.
Koskenniemi, 35.
Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Second 
Ed. (Cambridge, OK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 177.
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deontological self, being wholly without character, is 
incapable of self-knowledge in any morally serious sense."49 
In response to the objection that it is only private ends and 
attachments that are excluded from the scenario, Sandel 
argues that the ability to distinguish between public and 
private requires just the sort of substantive commitments not 
admissible to Rawls' theory. This leads to another question 
only hinted at by Sandel. Is the understanding of justice as 
fairness one that is held to be universal for all rational 
actors at all times, or is it the result of particular 
concatenation of events in a specific intellectual 
environment? Rawls himself was troubled by this question and 
addressed it in his more recent work, Political Liberalism.
Whereas A Theory of Justice was grounded in a Kantian 
understanding of rationality and personality, in this latest 
work Rawls narrows the scope of his theory. He focuses on the 
political realm rather than "comprehensive" theories that 
encompass an understanding of the totality of human 
experience. Political liberalism seeks only citizens who 
"share a reasonable political conception of justice" upon 
which most, though probably not all, cases can be decided. 
Whatever our private attachments, they must be detached from 
our participation in public life.
What distinguishes this revision from the earlier
49 Ibid., 179.
50 Ibid., 182.
51 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1993), xx-xxi.
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hypothesis is that Rawls' theory is limited to political 
decision-making in democratic societies. For the first time, 
we see that his theory rests upon the political culture of 
liberal societies.5% In accord with the turn to political 
culture, Rawls suggests that we adhere to a principle of 
justice as fairness in the beginning, because of religious 
and moral beliefs, but eventually we value justice because it 
is good in itself.
Sandel recognizes the changes in Rawls' theory but, 
again, sees the argument as fundamentally flawed. First,
Rawls would have us bracket moral questions in order to 
secure a greater level of political cooperation. But, as 
Sandel points out, we must also assume that any moral or 
religious claims are untrue. For if they were true, they may 
have preeminence over the value of political cooperation. 
Sandel looks, for example, at the case of slavery. If it is 
true that slavery is an absolute wrong, then the value of 
political cooperation and consensus-seeking cannot trump the 
claim that slavery must be en ded.This  case highlights the 
gap in Rawls' theory between the beliefs that are to be 
bracketed and the actual experience of liberal politics.
There is a great deal of difference between the construction 
of hypothetical constitutions and real ones.
Ibid., xxi. Though Rawls believes the Reformation was critical 
to the development of liberalism, he seems to think it the result more 
of an accident of circumstances than due to any inherent characteristics 
of Reformed theology. See especially pps. xxi-xxviii.
53 Ibid., 147.
54 Sandel, 199.
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Sandel also critiques Rawls' assumption that, although 
we have disagreements about good ends politically, those 
disagreements should not invade the realm of right. In other 
words, the reasonable pluralism of democratic society is 
somehow kept out of questions about justice. Sandel argues 
that, just as Rawls' claim for the superiority of his theory 
of distribution over that of libertarians can be justified by 
reason (a point with which Sandel agrees) , so too can 
arguments about the moral and the good. They should not be 
bracketed off as beyond reason or beyond politics.
Sandel next takes up the limits of liberal public 
reason. Public deliberation, in Rawls' conception, must be 
sterile and narrow, focusing on the procedural in order to 
avoid moral and religious debates. Sandel points out that, in 
the case of abolishing slavery, public discourse relied 
heavily on religious ideals.
Rawls acknowledges this problem and deals specifically 
with the link between evangelical Protestantism and early 
abolitionist movements. But his answer seems awkward at best, 
relying upon the notion that at times it may be necessary for 
such discourse to turn to comprehensive moral theories in 
order to bring about the kind of society in which more 
rational appeals are possible.But how can we possibly know 
if our own liberal polity is ready for such appeals? At what 
point is it no longer permissible to rely on comprehensive 
moral or religious ideals in public discourse? Imagine the 
55 Ibid., 249f.
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impoverishment of the public discourse of Martin Luther King 
Jr. had his religious and moral arguments been bracketed. 
Imagine how different the language of Jesse Jackson's 
presidential campaigns would have to be in order to meet the 
Rawlsian standard. Or one could inquire into the similar 
rhetoric of his son who, at present, serves in the US 
Congress. Surely this must be “public language.“ Yet, it 
seems inappropriate in the deontological world where moral 
and religious appeals are not rational and ought not appear 
in the public square.
The problem of bracketing moral principles at the 
international level is more problematic than at the domestic 
level. This is true for two reasons. If states need a certain 
level of development in order to recognize the value of 
justice as fairness, then how can the rule be universally 
applicable? Once Rawls detaches his theory from a particular 
conception of man and limits it to a particular type of 
polity, it is difficult to recognize the theory as deontic. 
Second, just as domestic discourse is impoverished by the 
bracketing of moral and religious elements, so too is 
international discourse, both normatively and empirically.
The problem is, in fact, more serious internationally. In the
Rawls does deal with the civil rights issue but in the process 
of doing so, delegitimizes King's religious appeals as a part of public 
discourse. He does not account for the fact that religious discourse 
clearly motivated blacks to be involved in the movement and had some 
effect on whites persuaded by religious appeals, just as they had been 
during the abolitionist debate. Rawls, in the end, renders illegitimate 
the reasoning of almost all of the political accomplishments of the 
religious left in the US and Europe, presumably regions “advanced* 
enough to move beyond comprehensive theory. Political Liberalism,
249f.
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absence of global government, states can rely on discourse to 
bring about change within other states; yet Rawlsian 
discourse is narrow and constrained, and will probably not be 
well received in illiberal states. Strong states, on the 
other hand, can rely upon coercion to carry out global policy 
as they see fit. Given his belief in non-intervention, Rawls 
would presumably preclude the second possibility, and so we 
are thrown back upon the first. Once again, we confront the 
historical fact that the expansion of rights has, more often 
than not, relied upon the kinds of appeals that incorporate 
ethical discourse that ought to be bracketed.
The crusade by William Wilberforce to make British 
foreign policy anti-slavery relied heavily upon religious 
language. As Britain was the nation securing the freedom of 
the seas in the nineteenth century, this was very much an 
international issue. Or would the issues surrounding the 
Holocaust have made much sense without the incorporation of 
religious language and the particular ontological quality of 
"Jewishness*? Can Jews who lived through that experience be 
asked to see themselves not as a specific group with specific 
reactions to history but rather as unencumbered selves? In 
the arena of international affairs, where anarchy prevails, 
it makes little sense to require a broad separation between 
civil society— which can incorporate moral and religious 
language— and the public realm which cannot. In fact, one of 
the key elements of liberal international theory is the 
recognition of the decline of the nation-state and the rise
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of non-state actors. Liberals rightly celebrate this 
development as ameliorative; global civil society can now 
have a positive effect on global issues. But it hardly seems 
reasonable to place liberal theory upon a foundation in which 
much of the public discourse that arises from that 
development must be excluded.
As long as illiberal states exist, it will be difficult 
to apply deontic ethics. Rawls' theory, and Beitz's 
applications of it, do not account for the fact that many 
states still exist that do not value liberal ideals. And 
those illiberal states often rely upon moral language in 
international policy-making that is ill-suited to deontic 
theory. In addition, these states also draw heavily from the 
parochial language of interests rather than rational rules 
that are universally and neutrally applicable.
Both pillars of liberal theory, interests and rational 
rules, encounter serious obstacles in attempting to provide a 
viable international ethic or a reasonable description of 
international behavior. This is only magnified when we recall 
that liberal international discourse relies on both rules and 
interests depending upon the situation. Deontology cannot 
incorporate the kinds of specific interests found in everyday 
foreign policy discourse. A policy that cannot account for 
consequences is not only limited but dangerous. Nor can the 
language of utility retain a place for rights that is as 
secure as the language of international rights documents make 
them out to be.
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Communitarian theory lays bare many of the 
contradictions within the late liberal synthesis. 
Communitarians focus on both aspects of liberal ethics and 
policy, the interest-oriented and the deontic.
Postmodernists, on the other hand, focus on the way liberals 
preserve the ideal of law as a central concern of liberal 
order. Yet liberalism, as postmodernists argue, privileges 
the discourse of law by masking acts of power through legal 
language, an argument also made by realists. One great irony 
of these critiques is that liberals, postmodernists, and many 
realists rely upon different aspects of Kantian theory, 
thereby revealing the tensions within it. Thus, it makes 
sense to return to Kant momentarily to see how his theory 
gave birth to the very postmodern elements used to critique 
his ethical positions.
Nietzsche. Postmodemitv and Liberal Theory 
Kant sought to carve out a separate autonomous realm for 
the aesthetic. His Critique of Judgment laid the basis for 
this autonomy, describing the nature of the aesthetic as 
"purposiveness without purpose. " In The Birth of Tragedy out 
of the Spirit of Music, Friedrich Nietzsche states that Kant 
played an important role in shifting aesthetic judgment from 
the rational to the intuitive. This seems justified given 
Kant's point that, as one contemporary critic puts it, there 
can be "disagreements* about tastes, for example, but not 
•disputations," as there are no rational a priori principles
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to which we can ap p eal.The autonomy of the aesthetic is 
important because of the way that future theorists reacted to 
Kantian premises, particularly those in the postmodern school 
and the critical legal studies movement. as the next 
chapter shows, for example, the intellectual autonomy found 
in Kant's vision of the aesthetic affected both the theory 
and the practice of international relations by realists.
The beginnings of postmodernism are found in Nietzsche 
who recognized the inherent ethical assumptions--more often 
than not Christian in origin and in substance— in the 
philosophy of his day. These assumptions had been subtly 
insinuated into philosophy, and Nietzsche saw it as his 
life's work to root them out. The split between ethics and 
epistemology, manifested in Kant's theories, is central to 
Nietzsche's thought. To Nietzsche, the autonomy of the 
aesthetic made perfect sense whereas the autonomy of reason 
was utterly chimerical. To the degree that ethical principles 
relied upon a Kantian epistemology, he concluded, they were 
creations of the will and, thus, human constructs. MacIntyre 
shows why Nietzsche's philosophy was so devastating to the 
Enlightenment project of rationally grounding ethics.
In a famous passage in The Gay Science (section 335)
Nietzsche jeers at the notion of basing morality on inner
David H. Richter ed.. The Critical Tradition: Classic Texts and 
Contemporary Trends, Second Edition (Boston; Bedford Books, 1998), 255.
On the origins of postmodernity in interpretations of Kant's 
Critique of Judgment, see Thomas Bangle in The Ennobling of Democracy 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 23-26, Stanley 
Rosen's Nihilism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), 81, and Allan 
Megill's Prophets of Extremity: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 4f.
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moral sentiments, on conscience, on the one hand, or on the 
Kantian categorical imperative, on universalizability on the 
other. In five swift, witty and cogent paragraphs he 
disposes of both what I have called the Enlightenment 
project to discover rational foundations for an objective 
morality and of the confidence of the everyday moral agent 
in post-Enlightenment culture that his moral practice and 
utterance are in good order. 9^
In Nietzsche's thought, the public/private distinction 
in liberal thought is shattered.®® The world is the creation 
of those who are strong enough to face the death of God and 
brave enough to create new horizons within which the rest of 
us can live. These creators are Weber's charismatic figures 
who are not bound by the bureaucratic rationality that 
restrains the rest of us. But there is no guarantee that 
these creators will construct horizons that contain rights, 
individual autonomy, or the other elements of a humanistic 
ethic. In fact, should they remain faithful to the substance 
of Nietzsche's thought, they most certainly will not.®i 
Rights, interests, and the rest of the trappings of liberal 
language belong to the "last man," the despicable creature
MacIntyre, 113.
This distinction, of course, entails the idea that society can 
be ordered in such a way that artificial distinctions are drawn between 
the realm of the state and the realm of the individual, with the former 
being about law and rule, while the latter is the proper realm for 
creativity and experimentation. Nietzsche would have none of this, 
arguing that the creative force of man is central to all thought and 
cannot be regulated or compartmentalized within the purely private.
This idea can be seen, to some degree, in Arendt's notion that politics 
ought once again to become an agonistic art, a competition of aesthetic 
(rhetorical) power, as it was in Periclean Athens. See, for example, 
Hannah Arendt, "Power and the Space of Appearance," in The Human 
Condition (University of Chicago Press, 1958), 199-212.
See Nietzsche's critique of English moral hypocrisy on this 
point in Twilight of the Idols, Aphorism 5 in "Skirmishes of an Untimely 
Man", 515f. He states, "In England, one must rehabilitate oneself after 
every little emancipation from theology by showing in a veritably awe­
inspiring manner what a moral fanatic one is."
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desiring only security, material comforts, and sated 
appetites. Liberal democracy is the polity of the last man, 
and social democratic or socialist regimes are only more 
contemptible. All are vestigial remnants of the slave 
morality made universal by Christianity and reinforced by 
Socratic rationalism.
Nietzsche's work presents an obvious problem for 
liberalism, if, as he says, "the will to a system is a lack 
of i n t e g r i t y , a n d  all horizons are socially constructed, 
then there can be little room for rights that are inalienable 
or any other concepts that require rational foundations. What 
justifies any horizon is its aesthetic qualities, not its 
ultimate truth value, something that has no meaning in 
Nietzschean thought. He recognizes that we will need great 
men who can create new tables of values for us; but there is 
absolutely no guarantee that they will be liberal values.
Heidegger's flirtation with National Socialism 
illustrates this problem as does Paul DeMan's anti-Semitic 
writings during World War II, a point I will explore in the 
next chapter. One can read the writings of other 
postmodernists--Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Jacques 
Lacan— and rightly wonder where there can possibly be room to 
secure rights or even the most basic kinds of equity. For 
these writers, all discourse is fictive. All accounts of the 
world are mythical, aesthetic creations designed to make
Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, Aphorism 26 in "Maxims and 
Arrows", 470. He means here that all system-building in pursuit of 
eternal verities reveals weakness of spirit.
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sense of chaos to an ego that is itself a fiction. When 
Derrida states that "II n'ya pas de hors texte," (There is 
nothing outside the text), this is what he means. All 
interpretations are just that, interpretations, not truths. 
What matters most is the aesthetic quality of the 
interpretation, in other words, its power as art.
The incompatibility of humanism and much of postmodern 
theory is not as clear as it ought to be because of ethical 
commitments by more recent postmodern writers, commitments 
that their methodology does not account for and which 
Nietzsche would have disdained. The epistemology of 
postmodernity, with its denunciation of metanarratives, or 
any overarching discourse, is not compatible with the ethical 
needs of liberalism. This includes even the minimal needs of 
procedural justice. For this reason, Allan Megill, in his 
excellent (and sympathetic) exposition of postmodern 
aestheticism, states that "one would have to be a madman or a 
fool to believe literally in these aestheticist theses."®^ 
Megill cannot accept that we ought to take these thinkers at 
face value precisely because of their illiberal implications. 
Rather they ought to be seen as attempts to break us out of 
the stultifying torpor of bourgeois life with which Weber was 
so concerned.
Ironically, however, it was precisely through Weber that 
Nietzsche was made amenable to liberal consciousness. 
Nietzsche's thought has been tamed and made more amenable to
“  Allan Megill, 343.
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those with democratic sympathies by postmodernists and late 
liberals alike; he is now rendered as a kind of Teutonic 
Mill. In addition, Megill ignores the role postmodernity 
plays in almost all universities and in popular culture of 
liberal societies. We cannot be certain that the pluralism of 
postmodernity will reinforce the pluralism of liberal theory. 
They are not one and the same.
The Critical Legal Argument Against Liberal International 
Jurisprudence
While Nietzsche was mainstreamed by Weber, his thought 
entered into jurisprudence via the Critical Legal Studies 
movement (CLS) . His il liberalism and anti-humanism, however, 
are mitigated by the addition of elements of Marxian theory, 
typical of the Frankfurt School in the early part of the 20th 
century. One might say that Nietzschean procedure is combined 
with Marxian substantive norms in critical legal theory. Two 
primary Nietzschean assumptions are made by members of the 
CLS movement: the notion that ethics are socially constructed 
and the belief that the language of reason masks assertions 
of power made by the will.
Nigel Purvis, explaining CLS theory in international 
law, states that the "intellectual origins of the movement 
are in Legal Realism, New Left anarchism, Sartrean 
existentialism, neo-progressive historiography, liberal 
sociology, radical social theory, and empirical social
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science.*®^ From Foucault, CLS theorists borrow the notion 
that power creates consciousness which is perceived as 
"truth" {pouvoir/savoir) ; from Derrida they borrow what 
Heidegger called a "pernicious ontological relativism" that 
leads to the indeterminacy principle.®^ The principle states 
that no particular adjudicated outcome is necessitated by a 
given rule of law.
For postmodernists, politics is the realm of creative, 
not rational, activity. Rationality is a chimera. Because 
every rule is the simultaneous expression of an emphasis and 
a marginalization of some aspect of ideology, rules 
incorporate their opposites within their definition, giving 
birth to thinking about rules in terms of binary oppositions. 
Within every opposition, one term is privileged over another, 
say postmodernists, for political reasons. These oppositions 
predetermine the avenues of discourse possible in legal 
reasoning.®® From this principle follows the belief that law 
is simply politics, and politics is the outcome of the 
conflict of social forces representing classes or some other 
social group, some of which are dominant and others of which 
are oppressed. Judges can never speak or find "truth"; they
®^  Nigel Purvis, "Critical Legal Studies in Public International 
Law," Harvard International Law Journal (Winter 1991), 89.
®® For an example o£ the use of Derrida in a deconstruction of 
domestic liberal jurisprudence, see Matthew Kramer, Legal Theory, 
Political Theory, and Deconstruction (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1991), 95-144.
®® Mark Tushnet, "Critical Legal Studies: a political history," 
The Yale Law Journal (March 1991), 1522.
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can only represent the interests of classes. Because those 
interests represent inherently distinct forces, they can not 
be rationally adjudicated and no compromise based on neutral 
principles is possible. Compromise implies an "arena" view of 
government that can somehow serve as a neutral playing field 
for the representation of interests.®'^ Due to structural 
inequalities, no objective arena can exist. Thus, no outcome 
can be stipulated by principle, legal or otherwise.
with regard to legal interpretation, Mark Tushnet, a 
founding member of the CLS movement, explains how the 
indeterminacy principle undermines originalist or 
interpretivist approaches to the study of American 
constitutional law. Critiquing the liberal agenda of 
constraining judicial tyranny by relying on neutral 
interpretive principles, Tushnet states that the application 
of neutral principles requires an "imaginative transposition 
of former world views into the categories of our own.
Somehow, the past must be made to fit the present. But this 
entails extreme difficulties as shown by the indeterminacy 
principle.
[S]uch ein imaginative transposition implies an ambiguity 
that is inconsistent with the project of liberal 
constitutional theory (and interpretivism). The project of 
imaginative transposition can be carried through in a number
Theda Skocpol and other state-centric theorists make a similar 
argument against the "arena" or pluralist structuralist-functionalist 
views of government held by Robert Dahl, David Truman, and others. See 
Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschmeyer, and Theda Skocpol eds.. Bringing 
the State Back In (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985) .
Mark Tushnet, "Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of 
Interpretivism and Neutral Principles," in Critical Legal Studies, 162. 
Emphasis added.
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of different ways, with a number of different results, none 
of which is more correct than the others. The existence of 
such an indeterminacy means that interpretivism, unless it 
falls back on nonliberal assumptions, cannot constrain 
judges sufficiently to carry out the liberal project of 
avoiding judicial tyranny.®^
Tushnet is not just criticizing narrow interpretivists 
often characterized as judicial conservatives, but any 
interpreter who lays claim to an * interpretation" of a past 
case in support of a present ruling, stare decisis is an 
utter illusion used to propagate the notion that what is 
happening on the bench is somehow furthering justice as 
opposed to political goals. He expands this argument by 
pointing to several cases that are usually considered to 
serve as examples of improper judicial activity, including 
Griswold v. Conneccicuc and Roe v. Wade.'^ ° Both cases are 
useful in that their lack of philosophical subtlety reveals 
the political quality of all decisions. They show how 
judicial interpretation can simultaneously adhere to, and 
depart from, precedent.
Tushnet's point may seem simple and unremarkable, 
especially given the prevailing empirical, policy-oriented 
approach to judicial studies in American universities. It is 
true that, in some ways, CLS is simply a more virulent form 
of the legal realist critique of objective law. This critique 
holds that law is, in fact, created, not found, by judges.
69 Ibid., 162.
Ibid. Tushnet sardonically calls Harry Blackmun's opinion in Roe 
"an innovation akin to Joyce's or Mailer's. It is the totally unreasoned 
judicial opinion."
On judges as policy-makers and the role of legal realism in
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But where many legal realists have been content to accept the 
political character of law and continue to work within a 
liberal framework, CLS theorists see this as unacceptable.
CLS has been devastating to attempts by liberal legal 
theorists to justify their jurisprudence in terms of neutral 
principles. CLS has uncovered the contradictory bases of 
operation and the inconsistencies between procedural and 
substantive components of liberal jurisprudence and revealed 
the fact that contemporary liberal law is praxis without 
theory. To be successful, liberal jurisprudence must hide its 
own premises by focusing on process and covering over its 
substantive components with the language of neutrality.
The First Critique: The Arbitrary Choice of Values
Similar political and legal arguments are made at the 
international level. The most powerful means by which 
international legal discourse hides its own premises is 
through the elevation of procedure.’- CLS theorist David 
Kennedy states;
Discourse eüxjut process . . . dominates the field of 
international law. If process rules supreme, moreover, it 
also rules alone. Doctrines about problems of participation 
and authority in international legal life— doctrines which 
address actors and their jurisdictions— proceed relatively 
free of consideration of either substantive standards of 
behavior or sources of law.
bringing this role to light, see Walter F. Murphy, Elements of Judicial 
Strategy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), especially 29-31.
72 David Kennedy, *A New Stream of International Law Scholarship." 
Wisconsin International Lav Journal 7 (Pall 1988), 33.
’3 jjbid., 32.
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The marginalization of source doctrines and substantive 
standards in favor of procedure gives rise to a focus on 
sovereignty insofar as the entire project of law becomes the 
proper determination of whether consent (treaties) or 
compulsion (custom arising from historical standards) will 
prevail. From this determination comes the debate between 
natural and positive law that fills the law journals and 
texts on jurisprudence. It is one of those debates that is 
interminable. The premises of each legal tradition give rise 
to the other and no conclusion can be reached based on a 
neutral principle that transcends both natural and positive 
arguments.
Ironically, these inconsistencies did not exist in 
premodem legal theory because there was a clear substantive 
element to law. Natural law theories rooted in theology 
contained obvious appeals to moral, material, and political 
ideals. There was no attempt to create substantively neutral 
principles because rationality had a clear teleological 
component. Only with the transition to "moral Newtonianism' 
did such a need arise.
Critical theorists see liberal international law as 
incoherent, relying upon premises that undermine each other. 
Liberalism rests upon the fundamental principle of 
individualism as state sovereignty, "international life's 
unencumbered unit. Added to this is the liberal belief in 
subjective value. As Purvis states:
Purvis, 94.
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This radical epistemology emphasizes that moral truth and 
moral worth are subjective, because as an epistemological 
matter universal morality is unknowable. There is no 
accessible "objective value," intelligible essence,"
"virtue," or Platonic form.^^
As a result of these assumptions, the decisions of sovereign
states must be held to be of equal moral validity. Yet
liberalism must find a way to deal with "competing claims of
sovereign liberty. States are given bundles of rights, and
international law must apply neutral legal principles in
light of those rights. But this is where liberal
jurisprudence becomes contradictory. "[L]iberalism cannot
deny the existence of objective value and at the same time
claim to resolve international conflicts through an appeal to
rules of objective neutrality. For example, we could apply
Mill's harm principle to international law, stating that
liberty is absolute in the absence of one state harming
another. But to do so, we must appeal to some kind of
objective standard of harm that serves as a threshold for
illegality. This threshold, to be made substantively
meaningful, must appeal to some kind of "intelligible
essence.
This contradiction can also be substantiated in the 
relationship between the UN Charter and aggression. In order
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.. 95,
77 Ibid.. 96.
78 Ibid.
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to justify aggression, liberalism must go beyond neutrality 
and appeal to substantive principles. Justification for 
aggression must be ad hoc. For example, Article 2 of the UN 
Charter discusses international activity in terms of 
“members,* meaning states. And clear limits are place upon 
international jurisdiction over these states. For example:
Article 2(3); All Members shall settle their international 
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that 
international peace and security, and justice, are not 
endangered.
Article 2(4); All members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations.
Article 2(7); Nothing contained in the present Charter 
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters 
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of 
any state or shall require the members to submit such 
matters to settlement under the present Charter. . . .
Of significance here is the language of sovereignty written 
into the language of Article 2 provisions. Concern for 
national sovereignty is also manifest in the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice. Nations signing the UN 
Charter automatically ratify the Statute and accept its 
provisions for international adjudication. They do not, 
however, grant compulsory jurisdiction to the Court except by 
ratifying the Statute's optional clause found in Article 36. 
This mechanism was put into place in order to preserve 
national autonomy over international affairs, and most 
nations who have ratified the clause have done so with 
reservations excluding certain areas from ICJ jurisdiction. 
Exceptions to the rules prohibiting international
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aggression are outlined in chapter VII of the Charter, which 
provide for Security Council authorization of force in some 
cases or for the self-defense exception found in Article 51. 
An abundance of other qualifications also exist on a de facto 
basis. Self-defense has been expanded to include anticipatory 
strikes, responses to terrorism, and protection of 
nationals.^® And, despite the prohibition on intervention in 
domestic affairs, UN members have become more involved in 
civil conflicts. Ironically, many interventions in civil wars 
occur when states assist one side or the other in the 
struggle for self-determination, itself a form of sovereignty 
claim.
The first act of aggression by NATO, an alliance of 
liberal states,reveals much about the paradoxes of liberal 
theory. In the case of the NATO bombing of Serbian territory, 
NATO forces were technically in violation of the UN Charter 
and the international law arising from it. They also violated 
the North Atlantic Treaty through which NATO was created. 
Article 1 of the Treaty states that NATO will only use force 
consistent with the principles of the UN. Article 3 states 
that collective military action will be used to resist 'armed 
attack.' Article 5 states that military action is justified 
under Article 51 of the UN Charter which allows collective
Arend and Beck, 196-201.
One can argue that Turkey's liberal credentials are questionable 
though it is the most liberal of Muslim states in existence. Doyle 
includes it within his list of liberal nations, stating that all four of 
Kant's criteria, market econony, sovereignty, juridical rights, and 
republiceuiism, are present. See Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, 263f.
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self-defense.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result 
thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security 
Council [of the ON]. Such measures shall be terminated when 
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to restore 
and maintain international peace and security.®^
And, in Article 7, we find:
This treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as 
affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the 
Charter of the Parties which are members of the United 
Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security 
Council for the maintenance of international peace and 
security.®2
These principles are reaffirmed in the official NATO 
Communiqué issued at the London Summit held in July 1990. The 
Summit was held in order to reassess the objectives and 
purposes of NATO after the end of the Cold War.
Alliance strategy will continue to reflect a number of 
fundamental principles. The Alliance is purely defensive in 
purpose: none of its weapons will ever be used except in 
self-defence, and it does not consider itself to be anyone's 
adversary. . . . The forces of the Allies must therefore be 
able to defend Alliance frontiers, to stop an aggressor's 
advance as far forward as possible, to maintain or restore 
the territorial integrity of Allied nations and to terminate 
war rapidly by making an aggressor reconsider his decision, 
cease his attack and withdraw. The role of the Alliance’s 
military forces is to assure the territorial integrity and 
political independence of its member states, and thus 
contribute to peace and stability in Europe.®^
Nowhere in the rationale of NATO is there a provision
justifying the offensive use of force against a sovereign
nation. To make sense of their actions, the NATO aggressors
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The North Atlantic 
Treaty, Washington D.C., Article 5(4 April 1949): 4pp. 5 May 1999 
<http : / / www.vm.ee/nato/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm>.
®2 Ibid., Article 7.
®® The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Alliance's New 
Strategic Concept, Official NATO Communiqué, Agreed by the Heads of 
State and Governments participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council in Rome (7th-8th November 1991) : 18pp. 6 May 1999 
<http://www.vm.ee/nato/docu/comm/c911107a.htm#I>. Emphasis added.
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in. Serbia appealed to the principle of humanitarian 
intervention which they defined in their own terms and which 
does not appear in the charters of NATO or the UN. Of the 
nations engaged in bombing Serb forces, three have permanent 
seats on the Security Council. This is not to say the bombing 
was not justified, only that it reveals the contradiction 
between the de jure and de facto (or ad hoc) elements of 
liberal international law. Upon close examination, the ad hoc 
construction of legal reasoning to justify political 
decisions appears to be at work in international law as well.
The Second Critique: Law Masking Power
International law has incorporated the oppositions of 
domestic liberal jurisprudence such as the 
ascending/descending and naturalist/positivist dichotomies 
described by Koskenniemi. But in the post-Nietzschean period, 
when values are created and not found, no objective ethical 
prescriptions or theories of natural right can stand alone. 
They are all socially constructed. Legal arguments must favor 
one side of an opposition, but there is no material or 
substantive metatheory to which the argument may appeal for 
ultimate justification. If that is the case, as Nietzsche's 
assertions indicate, then what do we make of rational legal 
assertions? They are simply the language of legal process 
masking the exercise of power. This is the second critique 
made by CLS theorists of liberal international law and, 
interestingly enough, by realist critics of liberalism in
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general. It is one of the most striking and arresting 
critiques of liberalism and the one most difficult for 
liberals, engaged in what appears to them as progressive and 
ameliorative politics, to grasp.
Liberalism is founded upon the consent of autonomous 
self-interested individuals. These individuals seek their own 
interests in opposition to one another; however, this 
opposition leads to the greater good as long as there are 
procedural safeguards. No predetermined ends, even about what 
makes for proper regulation, however, are in view to justify 
the exercise of legal rationality. This is where the problem 
arises. As Unger puts it:
The ideas [sic] that there is no natural community of common 
ends and that group life is a creature of will help explain 
the importance of rules and of their coercive enforcement. .
. . The less one's ability to rely on participation in 
common ends, the greater the importance of force as a bond 
among individuals. Punishment and fear take the place of 
community.
Moreover, when they view everything in the social world 
as a creature of the will, men come to believe there is 
nothing in society a will cannot preserve or destroy. Thus 
legalism and terrorism, the commitment to rules and the 
seduction of violence, are rival brothers, but brothers 
nonetheless.
Liberal states follow other regimes in relying upon 
"experts" or bureaucrats to implement such compulsory 
bonding. MacIntyre devotes a substantial portion of After 
Virtue to explaining the link between emotive ethics found in 
liberal theory and the reliance upon "experts" to direct 
policy-making and application: the social scientist, the 
therapist, and the manager.Weber saw this expansion of the
®^  Unger, Knowledge and Politics, 75. 
®® MacIntyre, 75-108.
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role of the expert-as-bureaucrat as central to the 
construction of the iron cage of modernity. Ralph Hummel, 
relying upon Weber's insights, describes this bureaucratic 
vision as follows;
Bureaucracy gives birth to a new species of inhuman beings.
Man’s social relations are being converted into control 
relations.86 His norms and beliefs concerning human ends are 
being torn from him and replaced with skills affirming the 
ascendancy of technical means, whether of administration or 
production.87 Psychologically, the new personality type is 
that of the rationalistic expert, incapable of emotion and 
devoid of will.88 Language, once the means for bringing 
people into communication, becomes the secretive tool of 
one-way commands.88 Politics . . .  is replaced by 
administration.8°
If Nietzsche is correct about the will to power masking
itself as rationality in liberal thought, as CLS theorists
claim, then this pessimism about the expansion of experts'
power is justified.
While there may be limits to the domestic applications
of Unger's critique, at the international level, it is highly
descriptive. At this level, limitations on domination are
less clearly defined; liberal states are freer to act as they
please. Liberal states can choose which side of a binary
opposition will be used to justify any given action. If
86 Max Weber, Econon^ and Society: An Outline of Interpretive 
Sociology, 3 vols., eds. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, trans. Ephraim 
Pischoff et al (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), 987; quoted in Ralph 
Hummel, The Bureaucratic Experience (New York, St. Martin's Press,
1977), 2.
87 Ibid,
88 Ibid,
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid,
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aggression is deemed necessary, it could be justified on the 
basis of self-defense (autonomy-positive law) or 
international morality (community-natural law) , depending 
upon the circumstances. I have already given several examples 
of this operation as it applies to the indeterminacy of 
value-choices. But these examples also reflect the way that 
law masks coercion in the international sphere.
In the case of Nicaragua v. United States of America, 
the US relied upon the autonomy argument, denying 
jurisdiction to the International Court of Justice. The US 
argued that solutions to the conflict should be political and 
regional. In its 1946 agreement with the ICJ, the US created 
the Connally Amendment, which states that the US will 
determine which cases are justiciable under ICJ jurisdiction 
and which are not. This amendment underscores a fundamental 
type of sovereignty claim that has no domestic equivalent.
In Nicaragua, the US relied upon a reservation, arising out 
of the Amendment, stating that cases involving multilateral 
treaty obligations would not be justiciable in the ICJ.^^ The 
ICJ upheld this reservation as valid and then proceeded to 
hear the case anyway under rules of customary international 
law, the UN Charter, and rules arising from the UN.^^
In the arguments on the merits of the case, the US, 
Nicaragua, and the ICJ all relied upon sovereignty in their
91 To see how this reservation was applied and the ICJ's response, 
see Nicaragua v. United States of America, (Merits), Section V.
92 Ibid., Section IX.
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reasoning. The US claimed a right of collective self-defense 
to protect the sovereignty of Honduras and El Salvador from 
Nicaraguan-supported incursions. Nicaragua claimed a 
violation of its sovereignty by the US. And the ICJ, agreeing 
with Nicaragua, relied, among other things, upon the 
principle of non-intervention found in the UN Charter 
(Article 2).93 At the same time, however, simultaneous 
sovereignty claims led to vastly different conclusions not 
only on the merits but also with regards to questions of 
justiciability and jurisdiction. This outcome recapitulates 
Tushnet's argument against domestic liberal jurisprudence as 
an ad hoc and indeterminate approach to legal reasoning. But 
it also reveals the way legal procedure can be used to 
justify violence when it is convenient.
In the case of the bombing of Serbia, the US and its 
Allies, relied on a theory of community rather than autonomy. 
They denied Serbian sovereignty and relied upon principles of 
humanitarian intervention. The principles of sovereignty and 
humanitarian intervention, or any other transcendent moral 
argument used to justify intervention, cannot be 
simultaneously applied as abstract: legal principles. They 
cancel each other out. Liberal nations use the indeterminacy 
of law to their own advantage and cannot be distinguished 
from their illiberal neighbors on the basis of law. 
Indeterminacy has a way of justifying coercion again and 
again.
93 Ibid., Section X(2).
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In order to add weight to the argument for Balkan 
intervention, NATO appealed to the interests of liberal 
states. The theory of the “domino-effect,' used to justify 
intervention into Vietnam, was used to distinguish America's 
intervention in the Balkans from its lack of intervention in 
other humanitarian crises around the world. But the appeal to 
interests cannot be an option for a late-liberal theory of 
law that requires neutrality and a consensual basis for 
action. Additionally, it is difficult to see how an interest- 
based conception of law distinguishes liberalism from its own 
conception of realism.
The Realiab Critique of Liberal Moral Blindness 
Realists, in fact, have been acutely aware of the 
problem of coercion latent in liberal legal theory.
Classical realists— Morgenthau, Carr and Niebuhr--have 
detected the tendency of liberal states to engage in violence 
beyond the extent justified by interests, on behalf of legal 
or moral principles. Ironically, though liberals espouse an 
ideology of peace, conflicts may be exacerbated by the 
inability of liberal policy-makers to distinguish moral 
principle from rationalizations for aggression in the name of 
principle. Each of these theorists rely upon a critique of 
what they term "the harmony of interests" argument found in 
liberal theory. This term communicates the idea that what is 
best for the world is to follow liberal principles; whatever 
must be done to bring this to pass is justified. Morgenthau
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quotes E.L. Thorndike on this point: “[IJnjustice and the use 
of force by nations or by groups within a nations will not 
disappear until the governments of nations and groups become 
reasonable or are somehow coerced by a higher force into 
abiding by reason.
Tocqueville was particularly concerned about this 
problem as it existed specifically within democratic nations 
because of the way policies were legitimized by the majority 
from whom there is no appeal.*5 But there is no reason that 
this tyranny might not apply to foreign affairs as well. In 
that instance, anyone standing in opposition to a policy of 
aggression, for example, could be seen not only as wrong but 
somehow irrational.
In Moral Man and Immoral Society, Niebuhr argues that 
there is a kind of moral blindness and hypocrisy to nations 
that appeal to universal principles to justify coercion. 
Liberal nations in particular are susceptible to this 
temptation because universalism is at the heart of liberal 
rationality.
[The Moralist] usually fails to recognise the elements of 
injustice and coercion which are present in any contemporary 
social peace. The coercive elements are covert, because 
dominant groups are able to avail themselves of the use of 
economic power, propaganda, the traditional processes of 
government, and other types of non-violent power. By failing 
to recognise the real character of these forms of coercion, 
the moralist places an unjustified onus upon advancing 
groups which use violent methods to disturb a peace
Morgenthau, Scientific Man, 76. One is hard pressed to 
distinguish this language from that attributed to Vito Cor leone in The 
Godfather either asking or forcing his enemies to “be reasonable." 
Emphasis added.
55 Tocqueville, 252.
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maintained by subtler types of coercion. Nor is he likely to 
understand the desire to break the peace, because he does 
not fully recognise the injustices which it hides.
This critique is remarkably similar to that made by CLS
theorists, who state that there are subtle forms of coercion
in liberal concepts of law and politics masked by appeals to
procedure and a neutrality that does not exist.
Morgenthau attributes this tendency to the fact that
liberal thinkers view international relations as simply
domestic politics writ large. Noting that domestic conflicts
rarely challenge the overall liberal order, he states that
there is "no such community of rational interests and values"
at the international level.This recognition leads directly
to the realist belief that the interests of all parties must
be accounted for in settling disputes. There is a higher kind
of morality implicit in this belief, one that looks far into
the future to anticipate how current perceptions may lead to
future political consequences. It is ironic--given the
militaristic and amoral reputation of realism among liberals-
-that realists, in assuming the contestability of reason,
have on many occasions taken a more pacific tone than
liberals with regards to specific policy issues.
Morgenthau's position on US involvement in Vietnam
illustrates this irony. Morgenthau objected to US involvement
in Vietnam as far back as 1961, pointing out the folly and
Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in 
Ethics and Politics (New York; Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960), 233. 
Emphasis added.
Morgenthau, Scientific Man, 107.
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contradictory nature of American policy. He wrote: "A 
government imposed on an unwilling or . . . indifferent 
people by a foreign power to defend the status quo against a 
national and social revolution is by dint of its very nature 
precluded from doing what Americans expect it to do."®® It was 
the liberal Johnson Administration that carried out this 
aggressive policy with what Stanley Kamow refers to as 
"missionary zeal,"®® and who savagely attacked the reputation 
of Morgenthau.
Liberals often accuse realists of using deception to 
gain their objectives, a charge I examine in the next 
chapter. However, this charge must also be examined as it 
applies to liberalism. The similarity between the Allies' 
treatment of the Germans in World War I and NATO's treatment 
of the Serbs is remarkable. In both cases, states laid down 
their arms based on the guarantees of liberal leaders, the 
terms of which were then altered significantly. Again, this 
is not to defend the behavior of Germany or Serbia. These 
examples do shed light, however, on the precarious moral 
position of liberal policy.
®® Hans J. Morgenthau, "U.S. Misadventure in Vietnam," Current 
History, LIV (January, 1968), 29-30. Cited in Greg Russell, Hans J. 
Morgenthau and the Ethics of American Statecraft (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
state University Press, 1990), 201.
®® Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin Books,
1983), 255.
100 Greg Russell, Hans J. Morgenthau and the Ethics of Americeui 
Statecraft (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press,
1990), 200.
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Communitarianism. Postmodernism. Realism: the Need for
Transcendence
This chapter has examined liberalism from communitarian 
and postmodern perspectives. In addition, attention was 
devoted to the similarity between the postmodern and realist 
arguments that liberal jurisprudence can lead to coercion.
But none of these critiques stand alone as an internally 
consistent, positive alternative to liberalism. Chapter Four 
explains why this is so for realism, the primary alternative 
to liberalism at the international level. In the remainder of 
this chapter, I examine the faults of communitarian and 
postmodern alternatives to liberal thought.
Communitarianism as a Corrective
Communitarianism is problematic as a constructive 
political theory because it is difficult to determine just 
what the term entails. Even scholars who have been placed 
within the communitarian camp, like MacIntyre, Walzer, or 
Sandel, either deny the appellation's appropriateness or 
carefully redefine it.i°i Walzer, for example, believes 
communitarianism should serve as a corrective to liberalism 
rather than as a self-sufficient t h e o r y . walzer's 
international theory is consistent with this statement.
States have the right to be governed only by their consent.
101 See, for example, Sandel, x.
Michael Walzer, "The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, " 
Political Theory (February 1990), 15.
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The legal principle of non-intervention is important as it 
reflects communal autonomy, though state behavior may be 
subject to international social criticism.
Communitarians often point to the example of Athens as a 
model of civic engagement where virtuous persons could 
express themselves politically. But, as Benjamin Barber 
rightly points out, "Contemporary America remade to 
specifications of ancient Athens would probably come to 
resemble not Athens but wartime Berlin. It is difficult to 
imagine an acceptable mode of political organization that 
does not limit the power of the state in some way.
Liberalism presently does this by asserting the primacy of 
the morally autonomous individual. Communitarians can only do 
this by appealing to structural characteristics like the 
distinction between the state and civil society borrowed from 
early liberal thought. Yet how state power would be limited 
precisely in a communitarian regime is unclear. This problem 
highlights the difficulty communitarian thought has in 
serving as a separate theory of regimes, as something other 
than a corrective to the excesses of liberalism.
David R. Mapel, "The Contractarian Tradition," in Nardin, 
Traditions of International Ethics, 192.
Michael Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), 78f. Walzer relies 
upon his reading of the biblical books of Amos and Jonah to make this 
point.
0^5 Benjamin Barber, "The Compromised Republic: Public 
Purposelessness in America, " in Robert H. Horowitz, The Moral 
Foundations of the Republic, Third Edition (Charlottesville, Va. : 
University of Virginia Press, 1986), 57.
195
Postmodernism as Ontic Fragmentation
Postmodernists face a different problem. They argue that 
there must be a preservation of humanism and morality in 
politics; yet they have difficulty accounting for such 
qualities theoretically. The inability of rules and 
applications to ever meet in the middle is just as applicable 
to CLS theory as it is to liberalism. The synthesis of 
Nietzsche and Marx is eventually undermined by the 
Nietzschean element, rooted as it is in an eschewal of 
metannaratives and moral absolutes of any kind. Postmodern 
thinkers posit a radical epistemology connected to a radical 
ontology. Knowledge is socially constructed and arbitrary; 
there is no objective reality of which thought is a 
reflection. Identity, therefore, must be just as arbitrary.
No one facet of identity can serve as an intelligible essence 
describing the whole. To state otherwise is to commit the 
error of "essentialism." If that is the case, then there are 
literally an infinite number of identities possible for any 
one person, giving rise to what might be termed as the 
"multiplicity of consciousness* component of postmodern 
ontology. Consciousness-raising has been an important part of 
postmodern empowerment movements, but it is becoming less and 
less clear which facet of consciousness ought to be raised. 
While the multiplicity component may be unproblematic for 
literary theory or poststructural linguistics, it presents a 
major problem for jurisprudence as a discipline that requires 
some notion of legal personality, without a stable
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ontological essence, courts have no means of determining 
matters of standing, or the justiciability of cases, other 
than arbitrary and coercive choice of one characteristic over 
another.
The evolution of CLS into an increasing number of 
subdisciplines reveals the collision of ontology and the need 
for stable legal personality. Feminist critical legal 
theorists have complained that the origins of CLS are white, 
male, and Ivy League, focusing on Marxian notions of class 
rather than on the special problems women face. Feminist 
scholars have also critiqued one another for reifying the 
ontology of women. Angela Harris critiques well-known 
feminist legal scholar Catharine MacKinnon by claiming, 
"MacKinnon rediscovers white womanhood and introduces it as a 
universal truth. In dominance theory, black women are white 
women, only more so.'^°® CLS has given way to analyses based 
on gender, race, sexual orientation, religion, and various 
combinations of these and other e l e m e n t s . E a c h  critique 
claims a distinct legal personality with special rights based
Angela Harris, "Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory,
* Stanford Law Review 42 (February 1990), 585.
107 pqj- examples of the possible permutations of legal ontology, 
see Kimberle Crenshaw, "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and 
Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist 
Theory and Antiracist Politics," in Feminist Legal Theory: Foundations, 
383-395; Fransisco Valdes, "Queers, sissies, dykes, and tomboys: 
deconstructing the conflation of 'sex,' 'gender,' and 'sexual 
orientation, ' in Euro-American law and society, " in California Law 
Review 83 (January 1995), 1-377; Catharine MacKinnon, "Feminism, 
Marxism, Method, and the State : Toward Feminist Jurisprudence," in 
Critical Legal Studies, ed. Allan C. Hutchinson (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1989), 56-76; and Diane Polan, "Toward a Theory of Law and 
Patriarchy," in Feminist Legal Theory: Foundations, 419-426.
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on those claims.^®®
The process of ontological fragmentation is well 
underway in international relations theory. For example, 
feminist scholar Rebecca Grant faults critical international 
theorists for developing theories that still "draw upon 
political and philosophical texts that contain gender 
bias."109 The application of critical race theory to 
international theory goes beyond the normal critiques of 
cultural imperialism. Roxanne Lynn Doty relies on Derrida's 
claim that language is constructed by the privileging of one 
side of semiotic oppositions, such as North/South, 
developed/underdeveloped, and core/periphery. All these 
oppositions reveal the way that language was used to justify 
oppressive p o l i c y . W h a t  she does not mention, however, is 
that Derrida's concept of différence reveals how meaning is 
in constant flux, subject to infinite interpretability. Its 
arbitrariness is no less visible when engaged in analyses of 
colonialism or when discussing words like "oppressive." Nor 
are we ever certain why we ought to consider terms like
l°® On the problem of arbitrary ascription of ontological 
characteristics in postmodern conceptions of law, see Matthew Kramer, 
Critical legal Theory and the Challenge of Feminism: A Philosophical 
Reconception (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995), 300.
Rebecca Grant, "The sources of gender bias in international 
relations theory,* in Gender and International Relations, eds. Rebecca 
Grant and Kathleen Newland (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1991), 19. See also Robert Keohane's excellent response to Grant and 
feminist IR theory in "International relations theory:contributions of a 
feminist stamdpoint," in Gender and International Relations, 41-50.
Roxanne Lynn Doty, "The Logic Of Différence In International 
Relations," in Post-Realism: the rhetorical turn in international 
relations, eds. Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman (East Lansing: 
Michigan State University Press, 1996), 331-345.
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•Philippines* or •Filipino* as being stable or ontologically 
absolute. Or we could combine Grant and Doty's critiques in 
ways that would undermine the integrity of both. One can 
imagine a critique that is both feminist and race-oriented. 
Just as in domestic CLS theory, the components of identity 
are endless.
In international law, which already struggles with the 
issue of legal personality, these critiques render the 
attempt to develop a humanistic international ethic 
unintelligible. Minority critics of postmodern jurisprudence 
argue that the destruction of essentialism in law would have, 
in fact, undermined the ability of minorities to make real 
gains in the area of civil r i g h t s . T h e s e  gains relied upon 
an essentially stable definition of those who had been harmed 
by state policy. One can imagine what a powerful tool the 
critique of essentialism might have been in the hands of 
white southern majorities during the civil rights era in the 
US. The same holds true for international law. Would it have 
been possible to deconstruct the concept of "Jew" as a 
defense during the Nuremberg trials? Would the crime of 
genocide then make any legal sense? Rather than solving the 
problems of liberalism, CLS theory, in its evolving form, 
seems to exacerbate its atomism. There is no convenient 
stopping point in the application of the social construction 
theory. Like identity, good and evil are infinitely
111 John Heirdwlck, “The Schism Between Minorities And The Critical 
Legal Studies Movement: Requiem For A Heavyweight?' Boston College Third 
World Laur Journal 11 (Autumn 1991), 152f.
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interpretable.
Nor can we be certain that the value-commitments of
participants in political discourse will be amenable to the
material objectives of distributive justice and equity that
CLS theorists hold so dear. Just as in liberalism, where
rights trump the good, so in CLS theory, Nietzsche trumps
Marx every time. All horizons are socially constructed; any
attempt to limit the implications of that fact involves an
appeal to objectivism. That appeal is, to Nietzsche, a sign
of the intellectual cowardice of one unable to rise above the
slave morality of secularized Christianity.
Though he is sympathetic to CLS, Purvis recognizes the
implications of this dilemma very clearly. To the degree that
CLS and postmodernism have absorbed the radical
epistemological assumptions of modernity, it cannot escape
the contradictions of modernism.
[Mlodernist thought paralyzes deconstructionists, removing 
their ability to exercise judgment. At the moment the New 
Stream [of CLS] adopts some affirmative vision of 
international life, it will have abandoned critical 
epistemology in favor of objectivism, thereby contradicting 
its own modern premises. . . . Critical knowledge seems to 
offer little more than the opportunity to exist as a 
convincing nay-sayer. There is, therefore, a strange duality 
to the New Stream's epistemology. It can produce a reasoned 
critique of international utopian theories, but not offer
its own alternatives.
In this chapter, I have argued that neither liberalism 
nor its critics can articulate a vision of international 
ethics that can stand alone. The doctrines of interest and 
utility do not secure rights or distinguish liberal thought
112 Purvis, 123.
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from its own conception of realism. Kantian epistemology does 
not allow for the humanistic ethics espoused by liberal 
scholars, including Kant. Kant's separation of the noumenal 
and the phenomenal, as developed and expanded by Nietzsche, 
is an ephemeral foundation at best for grounding ethics. 
Communitarianism, in turn, is prescriptively vague and cannot 
distinguish itself from the liberalism it critiques. Like 
liberals, postmodernists have trouble uniting their 
epistemology, their ontology, and their ethics. The alliance 
between Nietzsche and humanism is untenable and destructive. 
Realists have also been affected by Kant and Nietzsche. Like 
the postmodernists, the ability of realists to develop a 
consistent ethic has been undermined through a reliance on 
radical epistemology. It is to this point that I now turn.
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CHAPTER 4 
REALISM, TRAGEDY, AND POSTMODERNITY
In the previous chapter, I described the striking 
similarity between the postmodern and realist critiques of 
liberalism's moral blindness. But postmodernity and realism 
share something else as well. They share both a profound 
pessimism and a tragic vision of human life. In this chapter, 
I explain how this vision grows out of the relationship 
between Kantian epistemology and the ethical positions 
Nietzsche drew from it. Whereas liberalism covered over this 
relationship, realist theory self-consciously incorporated 
it. Though liberal policy can becomes coercive, realism finds 
itself unable to assert an ethical position that can 
transcend its own tragic vision. Where liberalism is morally 
blind, realism is rendered helpless.
In order to show why this is the case, I focus on the 
writings of four realists in particular: Max Weber, E.H.
Carr, Henry Kissinger, and Hans J. Morgenthau. These four 
master thinkers, with the exception of Reinhold Niebuhr, 
remain unsurpassed in laying out the roots of realist theory. 
But, unlike Niebuhr, their vision of international ethics is 
not rooted in theology or a doctrine of the problem of sin 
and its corollary, the belief in the possibility of
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redemption.^ While Hellenism and Christianity both share a 
belief in tragedy, the Christian conception also entails a 
belief in progressive history that the Greek does not. These 
four also view man as being thrown into a life in which 
meaning is not found but rather must be created. Three of the 
four were German by birth and all were heavily influenced by 
the Kulcurpessimismus of late nineteenth century German 
thought. None of these four are amoral in their approach to 
politics or ethics. On the contrary, each individual had a 
profound moral vision, particularly Morgenthau. Yet, none of 
them could overcome the inherent limitations of their 
epistemic views, views which colored their political 
perspective on what an ethical foreign policy entailed.
Kant, Nietzsche, and Kulturoessimismus 
In Chapters Two and Three, I described the division in 
Kantian epistemology between noumenal and phenomenal realms 
as well as the use of imagination to unite the two. In 
Chapter Three, I showed how Nietzsche's thought was affected 
by this division, leading him to assert that there are no 
facts, only interpretations. In The Birth of Tragedy, 
Nietzsche states that knowledge takes two forms, AppolIonian 
and Dionysiac. The Appollonian consists of constructions of 
the human imagination, particularly those that are aesthetic, 
that help us forget the inevitable presence of death and
 ^ While Morgenthau does discuss the problem of sin, it is as an 
empirical observation. Its normative implications are limited by the 
absence of the possibility of redemption, as I will show below.
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tragedy. The tragic is associated with the Dionysiac, which 
is related to the miasmic, the chthonic realm of nature, and 
a loss of individuality within the whole of being. Where the 
Appollonian involves rational perception, the Dionysiac is 
wildly irrational. While the Dionysiac is directly known, the 
Appollonian is, like the knowledge of phenomena in Kant's 
theory, indirect and known only at a distance. The 
constructed quality of the Appollonian is covered over, 
hidden from human awareness, in order for it to be effective 
in helping us forget our shared tragic fate. Nietzsche 
writes :
The Greeks were keenly aware of the terrors and horrors of 
existence; in order to be able to live at all they had to 
place before them the shining fantasy of the Olympians.
Their tremendous distrust of the titanic forces of nature :
Moira, [fate] mercilessly enthroned beyond the knowable 
world . . . the Greeks conquered— or at least hid from view- 
-again and again by means of this artificial Olympus. In 
order to live at all, the Greeks had to construct these 
deities.2
Just as the Greeks constructed their gods, so have modern men 
constructed poor imitations, in Nietzsche's view. The 
rationalism of Socrates, he asserts, devolved into the nyth 
of rationality itself, which separates us from a knowledge of 
the tragic basis of life. Those who can overcome this 
rationalism, who recognize that God— in the form of 
transcendent meaning--is dead, and construct new worlds for 
themselves, are the heroic figures of the modern period. But 
to accomplish this, these men must rewrite a table of values 
from the ground up; they cannot be held to normal codes of
2 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Trage<fy out of the Spirit of 
Music, in David H. Richter ed., The Critical Tradition, 422.
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conduct. Neither they nor their actions can be judged by any 
conventional standards for it is just these standards that 
are suspect. If their creations are powerful, they may become 
the basis for new codes, new laws, even new civilizations.
Three qualities of Nietzsche's thought are of particular 
importance for the works of the four realists examined in 
this chapter. First, there is a strong suspicion or outright 
hostility to rationalism or systems of knowledge, especially 
of the Enlightenment variety. Rational systems are socially 
constructed, a product of will, and serve the ends of 
particular groups, nations, or classes. Rationalistic ethics 
do the same, masking the implicit coercion buried in the 
language of reason. Knowledge of things-in-themselves is 
difficult if not impossible. Second, these thinkers are 
skeptical about the possibility of progress in history. For 
progress to exist, there would need to be meaning inherent in 
its unfolding. But history must be given meaning; it does not 
contain it. This is the tragic existential element of human 
life. As Bloom noted, Nietzsche saw this as a catastrophe but 
one that could be overcome by a few, very few, brave souls. 
M o d e m  liberals see this "catastrophe* as a liberation from 
the constraints of tradition and custom. Like Nietzsche, 
realists find the liberal position to be fatuous, a denial of 
man's fundamental existential position. They would agree with 
Freud that man is engaged in a perennial struggle within 
himself between eras and thanatos, the forces of life and 
death. And like Freud, they are skeptical about the outcome
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of that struggle.] There is no cure for humanity's condition. 
All that is available is adjustment to the realities of that 
condition in order to mitigate its pernicious effects.
Finally, those who find themselves in the post-Nietzschean 
period are confronted with a tragic choice. One can choose to 
act within normal ethical standards or one can be involved in 
world-creation; one cannot do both. Creative politics 
requires a "diabolical contract" to secure the interests of 
one's constituents. While ordinary citizens can afford to 
turn the other cheek, the responsible politician cannot.
One might note the similarity of these points to those 
made by postmodernists. That relationship is not accidental, 
due to the reliance of both realists and postmodernists on 
the radical epistemic claims of Kant as transmitted through 
Nietzsche. Realists denounce rationalism and scientism; 
postmodernists eschew metanarratives. Realists assert that 
progress is illusory; postmodernists, having begun with the 
relativity of history as historicism, have concluded that 
history is an infinitely interpretable concept in which no 
transcendent position, and no concept of progress, is 
possible.
There are also differences, however. Many postmodernists 
have gone so far in pursuing the logic of their epistemic 
assumptions that th%r seem to have lost touch with the belief 
in the knowledge of phenomena altogether.* Realists have not
] Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, ed. and trans. 
James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1961), 67f.
 ^ Lacan is the figure which most immediately comes to mind. His
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gone this far. They clearly adhere to a belief in the 
objectivity of some knowledge. Kissinger's reliance upon the 
principles of geopolitics, and Morgenthau's assertions 
concerning both the objectivity of human nature and the 
autonomy of politics, come to mind. Even for these theorists, 
however, it is not clear how objective principles are 
integrated into philosophies with radically skeptical 
underpinnings.
Part of the answer to this intellectual dilemma may be 
found in the cultural and intellectual milieu of Germany in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As the 
power of romanticism and German idealism (both having their 
origins in different aspects of Kant's philosophy) began to 
diminish, a sense of pessimism seemed to overcome German 
intellectuals. This is strange in hindsight, given the rise 
of German political power during this time. Indeed, it is not 
possible to speak of German power per se until this period 
which includes German unification in 1870. But the ideal of 
cultural autonomy, and the superiority of culture over 
politics, is not just chronologically coincidental with the
belief thaC all knowledge is constructed, even scientific knowledge, is 
apparent in his reconstruction (some would say abuse) of scientific 
concepts. For an example of the misappropriation of science by 
postmodemity, see Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, Fashionable Nonsense 
(New York: Picador USA, 1998). See also Alan Sokal, "Transgressing the 
Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity," in 
Social Text 46/47(Spring/Summer 1996),217-252 and Sokal, "A Physicist 
Experiments with Cultural Studies," in Lingua Franca (May/June 1996), 
62-64. Both articles are also available online at
http://www.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokal. Sokal is a physicist at NYU 
who humiliated a premiere postmodern journal with the article on 
postmodern physics that was full of simplistic errors. The first 
citation is the parody. The second is an article in which he explains 
his motivations, which were largely to discredit the misuse of science 
by postmodernists.
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rise of German power. The first is, in many ways, a function 
of the second.
Kultur and Zivilisation
The division between Kultur and Zivilisation is crucial 
to understanding the role of culture in German thought. The 
English words "culture" and "civilization" do not communicate 
the meaning these words have held for Germans. In the minds 
of many Germans, the Enlightenment was largely a product of 
French and British intellectuals. From the beginning, Germans 
were cautious about accepting the premises of Enlightenment 
thought, a feeling that only grew more powerful as the new 
rationality became more and more associated with materialism, 
utilitarianism, and industrialism. All of these qualities, 
and the decadence associated with them, were tied to the 
West, to zivilisation. Kant's method of preserving a place 
for freedom in the midst of the natural world of cause and 
effect was subtle. He accepted the fact that the physical 
laws controlled the phenomenal world, the world of nature; 
however, he retained a place for the spirit (.Geist) and human 
freedom in the noumenal realm of the will. This divide was to 
have profound consequences for later German thinkers.
Rational devils, working within the phenomenal realm of 
calculation and consequential thinking, might be able to 
construct a good society out of necessity; it did not make 
them any less diabolical, a point not missed by later 
theorists. Kultur was the means through which pure freedom
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and pure morality were expressed, and the autonomous realm of 
the aesthetic provided a place for their expression. From the 
very beginning of the nineteenth century, Kultur was 
synonymous with freedom while Zivilisation became synonymous 
with control and enslavement, first to nature and then to 
rational systems of human control. The obsession with power, 
the militarism of unification under Bismarck, and the loss of 
the organic unity of German Kultur (as opposed to the new 
unity of the state) were abhorrent to many observers of late 
nineteenth century events.
German intellectuals of the nineteenth century watched 
as the influence of Zivilisation permeated German society. 
Their reactions took two forms. German nationalists made much 
of the Kultur-Zivilisation divide and attempted to provide 
solutions to the invasion of Germany by the West. They saw 
the process as one that might be reversed by esteeming the 
uniqueness of German life. German academics, however, were 
less sanguine about the reversibility of the encroachments of 
modernity. As David L. Gross states:
•Spirit,* these academic intellectuals felt, had gone out of 
everyday experiences, leaving only a culture full of dead 
objects without inherent meaning or value. Their response to 
this was, for the most part, not to try to change the world 
but to withdraw into a sphere of elite "high culture,• to 
defend their own conception of the "spiritual personality* 
in a mass age, and to argue that the good life would have to 
be pursued outside the realm of ordinary culture, a realm 
they believed was being corroded by an insidious process of 
"Americanization.*5
This retreat into culture was to have terrible consequences
5 David L. Gross, "ifultur and Its Discontents," in Essays on 
Culture and Society in Modern Germany, eds. Gary D. Stark and Bede Karl 
Lackner (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1982), 75.
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for German politics. Politics was seen as part of the 
"disenchantment of the world," as Weber put it, a necessary 
evil. Most of the day-to-day work of running the state was 
done by bureaucrats, rational and soulless— the two were 
becoming identical— who participated in the imprisoning 
process of modernity.
There was another sense in which pessimism prevailed in 
German thought, one that has profound implications for 
realist thought. Though Kant may have seen the noumenal 
freedom of will as a liberation, later theorists saw the 
implications of this concept in less benign terms. For it was 
not at all clear why or how the mind could organize data, as 
Kant believed it did, in ways that reflected objective 
conditions. Over the span of the century, this belief came to 
seem more and more absurd, a point reflected by Nietzsche's 
statement that there are no facts, only interpretations. 
Knowledge then was constructed out of a meaningless stream of 
perceptions, and its unity as a representation of reality 
could in no way be assured. The problem of explaining 
intersubjectivity, how knowledge could be shared, became a 
serious question with which epistemologists had to grapple.
It remains one of the central questions of postmodemity.
The sense of decay and gloom hanging over the heads of 
German intellectuals remained powerful through the First 
World War and in many ways was reinforced by its outcome. 
After this defeat, some Germans realized they had to come to 
terms with politics however distasteful it might be to do so.
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Therein, lies the roots of the tragic perception of realist 
political theorists. Though the moral chasm separating Kultur 
and Zivilisation had to be spanned, the nature of the chasm 
itself was never questioned. Nowhere is this fact better 
illustrated than in thought of Max Weber.
Weber: Politics as a Necessary Evil 
Weber's thought clearly reveals the influence of 
Nietzsche's work. His solutions to questions of ethics, 
epistemology, and politics all rely heavily upon Nietzschean 
premises, though their aristocratic qualities are often tamed 
to make these applications more amenable to democratic 
society. To see how this is so, I examine how each of the 
three points of Nietzschean thought mentioned above were 
incorporated by Weber, a pattern I will follow which each of 
the other theorists as well.
Weber on the Construction of Reason
Weber's beliefs about international relations arise out 
of his Kantian and Nietzschean assumptions about the nature 
of knowledge. The “stream of events," the data of history, 
are devoid of inherent meaning.® Meaning must be ascribed by 
human intentionality. Data must be organized through the 
ideal type or categorical concept that can make sense of 
empirical information.^ Ideal types are “utopias," nowhere to
® Weber, Economy and Society, 7.
 ^ Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, trans. Edward 
A. Shi Is and Henry A. Finch (New York: Free Press, 1949), 90.
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be found in reality. Through the ideal type, "the adequacy of 
our imagination, oriented and disciplined by reality, is 
judged."® Once again, the imagination is the keystone of 
knowledge which is, by necessity, ultimately a human 
construction.
Weber has in mind here the construction of descriptive 
typologies for the purpose of doing empirical science; 
however, values are no less subject to imaginative creation. 
In Chapter 1, I discussed the division in Weber's thought 
between value and instrumental forms of rationality 
(Wertrationalitât and Zweckrationalitât) . Values are not 
subject to rational critique in and of themselves; they can 
only be described. All values have their own internal 
rationality to those who hold them, but there is no neutral 
stance by which they may be judged. This would require the 
imposition of the noumenal realm into that of the phenomenal. 
Imagination cannot bear the weight of such a burden and, 
thus, the journey across the divide is impossible. Nor can 
the phenomenal give insight into meaning. Science is helpless 
to justify values; it can only explain them 
phenomenologically. One might recall Weber's statement that 
since Nietzsche, no one believes science can provide answers 
to meaning in life. "Life with its irrationality and its 
store of possible meanings is inexhaustible."® Or as 
postmodernists might say, life's meaning is infinitely
® Ibid., 93. Emphasis in the original. 
® Ibid., 111.
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interpretable.
What are the implications of this position for 
politics and for political ethics? Weber explains them in 
detail in "Politics as a Vocation." Politicians need three 
qualities: "passion, a feeling of responsibility, and a sense 
of proportion."10 By passion, he means "devotion to a 'cause,' 
to the god or demon who is its overlord."H As this language 
suggests, the commitment is more important than the cause 
itself. Nor can judgment be made of which god or demon is 
chosen. Gods and demons arise out of the realm of the 
charismatic rather than the more prosaic traditional or 
bureaucratic-rational realms.
Weber on Progress
The second point which unites realists with Nietzsche is 
the lack of belief in positive secular change. Weber shares 
Nietzsche's perspective that modernity, the conquest of 
rationalism, is devolutionary and imprisoning. Characterizing 
the direction of history toward bureaucratic-rationalism as 
the "iron cage," Weber agrees with Nietzsche that the 
Socratic emphasis on scientific or representational 
rationalism, the idea that the good is rational rather than 
aesthetic, has brought disenchantment to m odem life.i- Modern
1*1 Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation, ' in From Max Weber: Essays 
in Sociology, trans. and eds. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: 
Galaxy Books, 1958), 115.
11 Ibid.
12 Weber, “Science as a Vocation," 141.
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civilized life is the life of technical mastery, a form of 
progress, that ironically entails the loss of meaning itself. 
Death is meaningless because it takes place within the 
context of the march of scientific progress. "And because 
death is meaningless, civilized life as such is meaningless; 
by its very 'progressiveness' it gives death the imprint of 
meaninglessness.
The view that progress is an illusion is consistent with 
Weber's belief that order must be given to random chaotic 
facts, a point made earlier. In the realm of politics, we see 
a cycle of events that is unceasing, a form of eternal 
recurrence, Hellenic in quality. Charismatic figures give 
meaning or horizons to societies. They create culture by 
their own force of will. Over time, charisma is replaced by 
traditions that institutionalize and reify the forms of 
organization created by the charismatic figure. In modern 
European society, the process of rationalization begun by 
Calvinists overcame traditions and developed into 
bureaucratic-rationality.
This pattern explains much of Weber's attraction to 
"plebiscitary democracy," in which normal democratic 
decision-making is supplemented and even guided by a national 
leader.14 This leader, brought to power by his charismatic 
appeal, directs the nation and is subject only to the will of
13 Ibid., 140.
14 Wolfgang Mommsen, MSx WeJber and German Politics : 1890-1920, 
trans. Michael S. Steinberg (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1984), 381-89.
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the people on the basis of plebiscites. Weber hoped that the 
inclusion of charismatic domination in German politics might 
forestall the stultifying effects of bureaucratic- 
rationality. He incorporated this element of his political 
thought into the Weimar Constitution by creating a powerful 
and independent presidency elected by plebiscite. In 
addition. Article 48 of the Constitution reinforced the power 
of this figure. This article granted the President emergency 
powers in times of crisis, in other words, during times when 
bureaucratic-rationality failed and decisions from the 
wellspring of charismatic creativity were needed. During the 
Weimar period, when parliamentary government was weak and 
struggling. Article 48 was used frequently to bypass the very 
laborious and ignoble activity of liberal democratic 
politics.IS We cannot be certain what Weber would have made of 
this, as he died in 1920.1* But we also cannot be certain how 
it is that, given Weber's view of charisma and values as a 
war between gods, we may discern between gods and demons when 
they appear to us in human form.
International politics is no less subject to these 
questions. In "Science as a Vocation," Weber uses the
IS Johnson, 110.
1* Both Paul Johnson and Michael Smith make connections between 
Weber's theory of politics and Article 48. Mommsen disagrees with this 
view, stating that Weber showed no interest in it when the Constitution 
was being formulated. Whatever the case may be, Weber clearly did not 
anticipate the way a charismatic figure might rely upon such powers to 
expand his scope of action though, in hindsight, such an expansion seems 
inevitable. See Johnson, Modem Times, 110; Mommsen, 378; and Michael 
Joseph Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge, LA: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1986), 41.
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metaphor of warring gods to describe the conflict between 
cultures and nations.^' Absent a world-state, no political 
entity has a monopoly on legitimate violence. Nations seek 
their destinies in the international sphere without any 
absolute or transcendental guidance. The conflict between 
nations will never lead to an ultimate harmony; struggle is 
inherent in international life.
You can change the means, the circumstances, even the basic 
course and those who are responsible for it, but you cannot 
put the struggle itself aside. . . . 'Peace' means the 
displacement of the form of struggle or of the enemy in 
battle, or of the circumstances of battle, or finally the 
chance of selection, and nothing else.is
This important point distinguishes Weber from both the
Marxist and liberal traditions. For Marxists and liberals,
conflict is systemic in origin and can be mitigated and
eventually removed altogether from the international sphere.
For Weber, Freud, and most classical realists, the desire to
dominate is an inherent part of human life that will never be
removed. This is why systemic, secular progress is illusory.
No social restructuring can alter the presence of the will to
power in human life. If history is the story of man's
inhumanity to man, there can be no end or final utopian stage
in that historical process. Evil cannot be stamped out; it
can only be mitigated by the honest evaluation of
circumstances, resources, and the will to employ those
resources responsibly.
Weber, "Science as a Vocation," 152. 
18 Quoted in Mommsen. 40.
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Weher on Ethical Dualism
Like Machiavelli and Nietzsche, Weber believes that 
ordinary standards cannot apply to those with the creative 
power to provide new tables of morality that give meaning to 
life. Given that politicians must follow these gods or 
demons, in what manner ought they to do so? Weber believes 
passion must be tempered by proportion or a sense of 
"distance."^
Lack of distance per se is one of the deadly sins of every 
politician. It is one of those qualities the breeding of 
which will condemn the progeny of our intellectuals to 
political incapacity. For the problem is simply how can warm 
passion and a cool sense of proportion be forged together in 
one and the same soul? Politics is made with the head, not 
with other parts of the body or soul.20
Weber points to the dharma or duty of the Hindu warrior 
caste, communicated in the Bhagavad-Gita, as an exemplary 
synthesis of passion with proportion. The ethic found in the 
Gita is distinct from that found in the Sermon on the Mount. 
Weber notes that while Hindu ethics allowed for the 
integration of war and caste-morality, Christianity did not.21 
As Germany was ostensibly a Christian nation, this 
distinction did not bode well for an integration of politics 
and morality, a point also noted by Bismarck.22 Christianity
2  ^ Weber, 'Politics as a Vocation,' 115.
20 Ibid.
22 Ibid., 124.
22 Bismarck believed that acting to placate one's religious 
conscience rather than striving for the interests of state, which had 
its own laws apart from those of the Gospel, was tantamount to making 
room for 'unfaithfulness' (Untreue) toward the state. See 'Briefe 
Bismarck's an Gerlach, den 2 Mai 1857,' in Gedanken and Errinnartmgen 
von Otto von Bismarck {Stuttgart: Verlag der J.G. Gottaschen 
Buchhandlung, 1898), 157.
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requires love, compassion, and charity. While these are 
virtuous qualities for the individual to possess, they are 
deadly for political leaders, who must have a sense of 
distance from the fate of any individual. Leaders must have a 
certain perspective that allows them to stand above the fray.
Here we encounter the third characteristic of Weber's 
ideal politician. He will recognize the distinction between 
two kinds of ethics, that of "responsibility* and that of 
"ultimate ends." Ultimate ends are the absolutes found in the 
Sermon on the Mount. These are the prescriptions of love, of 
forgiveness, of peace and charity. The ethic of 
responsibility, on the other hand, requires one to take 
responsibility for one's actions, knowing all the while that 
circumstances beyond one's own control may alter the outcome 
and have unintended consequences. The responsibilities of 
politics require the statesman to go beyond the ethics of 
ultimate ends in order to secure the survival of those whom 
he leads. In the modern age of bureaucratic disenchantment, 
when premodern ideals such as dharma of are no help, one must 
recognize the chasm that exists between these two realms is 
unbridgeable. The politician cannot be good and successful.
Also the early Christians knew full well the world is 
governed by demons and that he who lets himself in for 
politics, that is, for power and force as means, contracts 
with diabolical powers and for his action it is not true 
that good can follow only from good and evil only from evil, 
but that often the opposite is true. Anyone who fails to see 
this is, indeed, a political infant.23
The exercise of power is always a contract with the devil to
23 Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," 123,
218
achieve good ends, an alignment of forces that may 
necessitate the reliance upon evil means. At some level, 
politics is always fundamentally immoral by ultimate 
standards. The ideal politician understands this and can take 
responsibility for engaging in evil to secure the greater 
good.
Weber's solution to the tragic character of human 
existence was, in essence, an appeal to the irrational 
through the charismatic. This solution finds its origins in 
the cultural despair of the German intellectual milieu common 
to both Nietzsche and Weber. And despite Weber's pains to 
distinguish himself from what he saw as Nietzsche's nihilism 
and attraction to cruelty, he cannot overcome the relativism 
of Nietzsche's thought. Weber wants to have it both ways.
Like Kant, he seems certain that the good secured by the 
charismatic ethic of responsibility is the good of bourgeois 
German liberal politics. But he cannot show where or how 
Nietzsche's epistemology and Kant's ethics meet. As we will 
see, this is a characteristic he shares with other realists.
E.H. Carr; Kulturoessimismus and Appeasement
Carr on the Construction of Reason
The social constructionist aspects of E.H. Carr's 
thought are visible from the very beginning of his work The 
Twenty Year's Crisis. In the preface to the first edition, he 
acknowledges the influence of two books. One is Niebuhr's 
Moral Man and Immoral Society. The other is Karl Mannheim's
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Ideology and Utopia, which provides the epistemic 
underpinnings for his own work. Though Carr was English, 
Mannheim serves as his link to the characteristics of German 
thought I have discussed in this chapter. Carr's solution to 
the interwar instability of international politics takes the 
form of appeasement and moral equivalency. The moral 
qualities of German claims cannot be judged because there is 
no unitary moral standard. Niebuhr's suspicion of group 
morality in Moral Man reflects this position to some degree; 
yet Niebuhr never asserted that there was no justice, only 
that its attainment was difficult and to be carefully 
considered. Carr derives his substantive pessimism about 
moral claims not from Niebuhr but from Mannheim. In fact,
Carr goes beyond Mannheim in questioning moral discourse; as 
is often the case, the disciple zealously exceeds the master. 
To see why this is so, it is necessary to examine the thought 
of Mannheim himself.
Mannheim emigrated to Germany from his native Hungary, 
where he had been under the tutelage of George Lukâcs. He 
eventually came to Heidelberg where he studied under Albert 
Weber, the brother of Max Weber. Max Weber died in 1920, not 
long after Mannheim came to Germany. But Mannheim was exposed 
to, and animated by, Weber's works all his life.
Mannheim believed that there was a tragic element to 
modernity. That tragedy was a result of the dissolution of 
the organic unity of traditional culture. Like Nietzsche, he 
believed that in the modem period, there could no longer be
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a unitary rational perspective that in the past had been 
provided by that culture. In fact, he states that his 
approach is influenced by Nietzsche's theory of ressentiment 
as the source of moral judgments. 4^ Nor could empiricism be 
of any assistance. As Charles Jones states: "Is it possible 
that all knowledge could be derived by an individual from 
experience of the world through the sense?— No, replies 
Mannheim, because the stream of raw sense data would not 
constitute meaningful knowledge until it was organized. 
Naturally, it would be organized by different parties in 
different ways, a notion that serves as the basis of the 
sociology of knowledge. There were a multiplicity of 
rationalities that were dependent on class. Those in power 
relied upon what Mannheim called "ideology." Ideology was 
constructed in order to legitimize the institutions and rules 
that supported the status quo. Those seeking to overturn the 
status quo relied upon "utopia." Utopian perspectives were 
also constructed to achieve certain ends but, they tended "to 
burst the bonds of the existing order.*-®
Though Carr had certain Marxian affinities, his own 
theory adopted Mannheim's epistemology completely. His 
critique of liberal policy in The Twenty Years ' Crisis 
replaces Mannheim's term "ideology* with "utopia." He then
24 Karl Mannheim, 22.
25 Charles Jones, "Carr, Mannheim, and a Post-positivist Science 
of International Relations" Political Studies XLV(1997), 233. See also 
Mannheim, 240.
25 Mannheim, 173.
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proceeds to contrast the coercive quality of utopia with the
cynicism and amorality of realism, which for him is a form of
Realpolitik.
The antithesis of utopia and reality— a balance always 
swinging towards and away from equilibrium and never 
completely attaining it— is a fundamental antithesis 
revealing itself in many forms of thought. The two methods 
of approach— the inclination to ignore what was and what is 
in contemplation of what should be, and the inclination to 
deduce what should be from what was and what is--determine 
opposite attitudes towards every political problem.-^
Whereas the utopian liberal attempts to impose what he
believes ought to be through coercive and unrealistic
policies, the realist cannot transcend his entrapment in the
determinism of political and military circumstances. Carr's
dichotomy arises out of his acceptance of the Weberian
distinction between facts (nature) and values.
Carr relies on Mannheim's social constructivist theory
to make sense of the unity of ethics and politics. Citing
Kant, Carr maintains that facts without purpose are
irrelevant; purpose must be given to them in order to bring
organization and understanding. Otherwise we remain in the
purely phenomenal realm of natural s c i e n c e . politics, in
particular, requires the application of purpose to facts that
have no intrinsic value. Given the relativity of historicism,
one wonders how we may be sure that these purposes are benign
and amenable to democracy or peace. Carr also assumes the
reasonableness of political actors who will positively
E.H. Carr, The Twenty years' Crisis: 1919-1939. Harper Torchbook 
Edition (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 11.
28 Ibid,, 3. Carr relies upon The Critique of Pure Reason here.
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respond to international political developments that take 
their own interests into account. But there is no reason why 
rational assumptions like these must be a part of the 
organizing purpose given to the chaos of phenomena.
Carr on Progress
At the end of The Twenty Years' Crisis, Carr explains 
his theory of peaceful change. It rests upon a peaceful 
mechanism that can replace violence as the primary means of 
altering international conditions. Change involves a 
carefully constructed compromise between power and morality. 
About the former, Carr is quite explicit. At both the 
domestic and international levels, the terms of bargaining 
between contending parties rests largely upon the ability to 
back up one's position with force. Absent power, political 
reality dictates that the weaker must yield. "Yielding to 
threats of force is a norroal part of the process of peaceful 
change."29
Given this situation, it is preferable that change
should come about without violence. Parties must accept the
realities of power and alter their policy accordingly.
If we consider peaceful change merely as a more or less 
mechanical device, replacing the alternative device of war, 
for readjusting the distribution of territory and of other 
desirable things to changes in the equilibrium of political 
forces, it performs a function whose utility it would be 
hypocritical to deny. Many changes made in national 
communities whether by legislation or otherwise, and 
recognised as salutary, have no other basis than this.^O
29 Ibid., 218. 
20 Ibid., 219.
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Some of these changes have indeed been salutary. Carr 
mentions the rise of trade union power as a domestic example 
of the relationship between positive change and political 
power. What of the role of morality? How do we distinguish 
between salutary change and change that is to be resisted on 
moral grounds? Having spent a good deal of his book 
criticizing the liberal belief in the harmony of interests, 
Carr relies upon a kind of harmony principle to ground his 
moral theory. Two examples are provided: the desire for Irish 
home rule and the German situation in the interwar period.
In the Irish example, Carr makes the point that change 
came about due to a confluence between morality and power.
The moral element is seen in the "stock of common feeling 
between Great Britain and I r e l a n d . T h e r e  was enough 
agreement on what was "just and reasonable" between parties 
to bring about an acceptable solution. The fortuitous change 
in conditions of power occurred, says Carr, because the 
British were militarily engaged elsewhere.
The German scenario is more troubling insofar as, unlike 
the Irish case, it ended in failure. Carr believes there was 
enough agreement between Germans and Britons on the 
pernicious effects of the Versailles Treaty. But Germany 
could not back up its concerns with power for fifteen years. 
By that time, they had already become cynical and 
a g g r e s s i v e . 32 peace was, under these circumstances, nearly
31 Ibid., 220.
32 Ibid., 221.
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impossible. Other than giving us these examples of morality 
in politics, Carr says little else about moral criteria. That 
may be because establishing "methods of peaceful change is 
therefore the fundamental problem of international morality 
and of international p o l i t i c s . I f  a conflict between 
justice and peace occurs, the latter must trump the former.
If this moral goal is primary, then other criteria for 
morally acceptable compromise can be set aside.
There is an additional reason why moral criteria may be 
secondary. Carr's epistemology is very much in accord with 
that of postmodern historicism. Like Mannheim, he believes 
the process of unmasking ideology is endless. There is no 
final act of unmasking, no Hegelian (or liberal) end of 
history which provides the overarching perspective on 
objective history. This element of his thought is most 
clearly seen in his work What is History? Decrying Whiggish, 
Marxist, liberal, and other teleological perspectives, Carr 
asserts that every age constructs the meaning of history and 
of progress anew for itself. Carr's view of progress is 
complex and is somewhat akin to the perspective of Thomas 
Kuhn. He believes there has been progress, particularly in 
areas of technical expertise and science. But he also 
believes humanistic inquiry has progressed; one can learn 
lessons from history.
Carr remains unaware of the incommensurability of these
33 Ibid., 222.
3^  E. R. Carr, What is History? (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962}, 
84-86.
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positions throughout the book. How can one contend that 
meaning is socially constructed anew in every age and yet 
find some principle of progress, if by progress we mean a 
transcendent perspective that provides meaningfulness to the 
concatenation of facts and events of human activity? For to 
say meaning is objective "to me* is to say very little at all 
about history per se. There is no absolute content to 
progress. "But if the historian is to save his hypothesis of 
progress, I think he must be prepared to treat it as a 
process into which the demands and conditions of successive 
periods will put their own specific content."^" His thesis 
goes beyond the recognition of historiographical variation 
into historicist relativity. *[0]bjactivity in history does 
not and cannot rest on some fixed and immovable standard of 
judgment here and now, but only on a standard which is laid 
up in the future and is evolved as the course of history 
advances. How that standard appears in history, or what its 
relationship is to notions of ethical responsibility, cannot 
be decided apart from the circumstances of history.
Carr's doubts about moral certainty rendered questions 
beyond the achievement of peace— at whatever price-- 
irrelevant. One could point to the examples given earlier to 
illustrate Carr's theory of peaceful change. Carr refers to 
the new power of trade unions who can redefine domestic 
politics by the application of that power. But one could just
35 Ibid., 152.
36 Ibid., 173.
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as easily inquire about the respective power relationships 
between the German state and Jews in Germany during the time 
Carr was writing his book. It is difficult to imagine what 
common interests or moral perspectives Jews would have had 
with Nazis. Carr certainly would have responded that he was 
in no way justifying peaceful change that would allow for the 
destruction of a people. One can argue, however, that this 
was the effect of appeasement at Munich. Carr implicitly 
noted this when he removed from the second edition of The 
Twenty Years' Crisis offensive passages suggesting the 
dismemberment of Czechoslovakia was an example of his 
"mechanism of change.*
Raising the Jewish question, or what Leo Strauss 
referred to as the argumentum ad Hitlerum, may seem excessive 
until we consider further examples of wartime appeasement, 
collaboration, or moral failure, by others who hold 
postmodern epistemic positions. The flirtation of Heidegger 
with National Socialism is well known. Though he later 
renounced his allegiance to the Party, he never reconsidered 
how his understanding of Dasein (Being-in-the world)led him 
to conclude that Being was unfolding in concordance with 
Party expansion. One may also consider the de Man affair that 
took place in the late 1980s. Paul de Man, a well-known 
deconstructionist teaching at Yale, was embarrassed to have 
his anti-Semitic and collaborationist wartime journals 
discovered by The Nation magazine. In these articles, de Man, 
a Belgian, wrote of the "decency, justice, and humanity" of
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the Nazis occupying France in 1941.^^ He urged his fellow 
Belgians to cooperate with the Nazis, writing "the necessity 
of action which is present in the form of immediate 
collaboration is obvious to every objective mind. Many 
people during the war made mistakes; yet, what is disturbing 
about this case is the unwillingness of de Man to admit it. 
Jacques Derrida compounded this problem when he defended de 
Man through deconstructive methodology. He argued that the 
journals were inconclusive because all texts are inconclusive 
and that all of de Man's writings "carry within them a 
counterproposition."39 Of course one could say the same thing 
about Mein Kampf. This is not to attempt to defend the absurd 
conclusion that all deconstructionists or poststructuralists 
would, in similar circumstances, do the same thing. Rather, 
these examples illustrate the difficulty of providing a firm 
theoretical foundation for humanist ethics in postmodern 
epistemology. When examining the crime of the Holocaust and 
the collaboration that made it possible, one would hope to 
find a more reasonable response than that provided by 
Derrida.
Carr is subject to these same failures. His uncertainty 
about the commonality of the human experience, and the 
tentative quality of his ethical assumptions, lead him to
3’^ cited in Richard Wolin, Labyrinths : Explorations in the 
Critical History of Jdeas(Amherst; University of Massachusetts Press, 
1995), 213.
38 Ibid., 214.
39 Ibid., 215.
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regrettable conclusions. He makes it clear that, in the 
absence of power, the submission of the weak to the strong is 
not only an empirically tragic fact, it is a normative good 
that prevents violence. Though it may be in the interests of 
the strong to make concessions as well, they have a much 
better bargaining position. When emphasizing peace over 
justice, strength becomes a great virtue and weakness a 
terrible vice. As the Jews and the West learned during the 
Nazi period, appeasement may lead to more appeasement and to 
more violence. Carr assumes a rationality not present in some 
policy-makers, an assumption of common purpose he decries 
when posited by liberals.
Carr on Ethical Dualism
As is the case with other realists, Carr's philosophy 
leads to a dualistic international ethic with one standard 
for statesmen and another for everyone else. Locating the 
source of rule in both power and morality, Carr states: 
“Political action must be based on a co-ordination of 
morality and power.“4° Yet, in his critique of realism, he 
suggests that, “Politics are made up of two elements--utopia 
and reality--belonging to two different planes which can 
never meet. At this point, the influence of Niebuhr on Carr 
becomes quite apparent. Carr believes there to be a 
distinction between the morality of the individual and that
40 Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, p. 97. 
4^  Ibid,, 93. Emphasis added.
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of the group.
The group is not only exempt from some of the moral 
obligations of the individual, but is definitely associated 
with pugnacity and self-assertion, which become positive 
virtues of the group person. . . . Acts which would be 
immoral in the individual may become virtue when performed 
on behalf of the group person.*2
Niebuhr, however, appeals to a principle of transcendence
which places limits on the kinds of policies a nation or
group may claim to be justified. He draws freely upon
religious and moral resources that are free from the
corrosive effects of historicism. Even Mannheim, late in his
life, came to see Christianity as a useful means of building
consensus in post-war Britain for progressive social reform.
Carr does not make use of these resources in any
systematic way. Entering into politics means acknowledging
the fact that we must engage in "uneasy compromises."<4 These
compromises must be enacted by those who understand that "the
ideal can never be institutionalised, nor the institution
idealised. "45 The intuitive response to the need for both the
ideal and real, along with the final incommensurability of
both, requires something akin to Weber's ethic of
responsibility. Though Carr denies the politically good is
42 Ibid., 159.
45 Mannheim, while a refugee in Britain, was a central figure in 
the British Moot society which sought to organize support for social 
planning by appealing to Christian principles. Though Mannheim was 
Jewish, he saw Christianity as a means of giving systematic moral 
coherence to English support for the 1942 Beveridge Report that promoted 
the idea of planning. See Charles Jones, The Intellectual Development of 
Karl Mannheim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 150f.
44 Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 100.
45 Ibid., 100.
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always the morally bad, or that politics necessitates a 
contract with the diabolical, his statesman must be able to 
see circumstances for what they are and overcome them through 
uncommon means. If the real and the ideal require moral 
thought to occur within the boundaries they create, if they 
are "planes that never meet," then the statesman can have no 
guidance from "normal science," to use Kuhn's terms. The 
statesman must be extra-paradigmatic and this requires not 
reason but imagination and intuitive insight. An unresolved 
issue in Carr's work is how easily the common man, who seems 
to play an important role in moral philosophizing for Carr, 
can follow the statesman into this realm.
Kissinger: Kulturoessimismus as Praxis 
Associating Henry Kissinger with postmodernity might 
seem odd at first glance. Postmodern scholarship often is 
abstract and inaccessible to the more pragmatically-minded. 
Kissinger, both as an Assistant to President Nixon for 
National Security and as Secretary of State under Nixon and 
Gerald Ford, had many practical diplomatic problems to solve. 
But Kissinger began his career in international relations as 
a student at Harvard, and his work there gravitated to 
theoretical and philosophical issues in world politics. 
Kissinger was consumed by history and the lessons it held for 
the astute observer. His senior thesis is, in actuality, a 
philosophy of history, focusing on Spengler, Toynbee, and 
Kant, Like the other realists examined in this chapter.
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Kissinger was highly influenced by German philosophy and by 
the epistemic implications of Kant in particular. Those 
implications— the uncertainty and limitations of knowledge, 
the radically autonomous quality of human freedom, and the 
ideal of imaginative creation as the means of expression in 
the world--affected not just his theory about politics but 
also his statecraft.
Social Conscruetivism
Kissinger's social constructivism is seen from the very 
beginning of his thought in his response to Spengler, Toynbee 
and Kant as philosophers of history. He shares the pessimism 
of Weber concerning the rise of technical expertise of 
bureaucrats, with whom he later had a great deal of 
experience. Kissinger's almost Nietzschean disdain for mass 
society, socialism, and positivist philosophy all arise from 
their connection to the increasing bureaucratization of human 
existence. This disdain was itself a result of his own 
Kantian assumption that nature represented the determined and 
the un-free, whereas history represented the open vistas of 
human action in which freedom was vitally expressed by those 
who had the power to do so.
In his senior thesis, Kissinger finds Spengler and 
Toynbee unsatisfying as philosophers, but for opposite 
reasons. Though he accepted Spengler's pessimism about the 
encroachments of utility and materialism, he felt that 
Spengler was unable to transcend the limitations of the
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phenomenal world. Spengler's vision is too closely connected 
to the empirical and the ephemeral; it is too determined, 
leaving no room for human freedom and purpose in history. In 
contrast, Toynbee's view was too optimistic. Toynbee sees 
purpose in history, a higher, transcendent meaning to life 
that is a result of his theology. Like Mannheim, Kissinger 
rejects any notion of an inherent meaning to history; meaning 
is given to history by those who exercise their freedom 
within it.46 The great challenge is to recognize this tragic 
quality of life and to overcome the circumstances history 
places before one.
In his doctoral dissertation on diplomacy at the 
Congress of Vienna, Kissinger incorporates this belief into 
his assessment of Clemens Metternich, the Austrian diplomat. 
Mettemich had the unenviable job of representing a fragile 
and divided Austrian Empire. Though he was skillful as a 
diplomat, Metternich is faulted by Kissinger for not 
overcoming the tragic circumstances with which he was faced. 
His view of the Austrian diplomat is strikingly similar to 
Weber's view of Bismarck. Weber believed the German statesman 
had kept Germany in its political infancy by his heavy-handed 
approach to statecraft. Kissinger saw this same quality in
46 In his senior thesis, Kissinger writes, "An analysis of 
historical phenomena reveals but the inevitability inherent in completed 
action. Freedom, on the other hand, testifies to an act of self- 
transcendence which overcomes the inexorability of events by infusing 
them with its spirituality. The ultimate meaning of history— as of life- 
-we can find only within ourselves. Henry Kissinger, "The Meaning of 
History: Reflections on Spengler, Toynbee and Kant." Undergraduate 
Honors Thesis (Harvard University, 1950), 22f; quoted in Peter W. 
Dickson, Kissinger and the Meaning of History (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1978), 39.
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Metternich. 'But Mettemich's diplomatie skill enabled 
Austria to avoid the hard choice between domestic reform and 
revolutionary struggle; to survive with an essentially 
unaltered domestic structure in a century of rationalized 
administration; to continue a multi-national empire in a 
period of nationalism."4? In both cases, what Kissinger calls 
'manipulation and not creation' left problems unsolved, 
problems which would lead to ruin for both countries during 
the First World War. This passage states so much more about 
Kissinger than it does about Metternich that I shall quote it 
at length.
Only a shallow historicism would maintain that successful 
policies are always possible. There existed no easy solution 
for Austria's tragic dilemma; that it could adapt itself by 
giving up its soul or that it could defend its values and in 
the process bring about their petrification. Any real 
criticism of Metternich must therefore attack, not his 
ultimate failure, but his reaction to it. . . . Lacking in 
Metternich is the attribute which has enabled the spirit to 
transcend an impasse at so many crises of history: the 
ability to contemplate an abyss, not with the detachment of 
a scientist, but as a challenge to overcome— or to perish in 
the process. . . . For men become myths, not by what they 
know, nor even by what they achieve, but by the tasks they 
set for themselves.4®
History is the background of great men who create the world 
of the future without transcendental guidance. Purpose must 
be given to history by these men; to do otherwise is not to 
control but to be controlled by history, an unacceptable fate 
in Kissinger's mind. This is why Kant's views were so 
attractive to him. As Peter Dickson puts it:
4"^ Henry Kissinger, A World Restored; Metternich, Castlereagh and 
the Problems of Peace, 1812-1822, Sentry Edition (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1973), 322.
48 Ibid., 322.
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[Kissinger] correctly perceived Kant's ultimate objective, 
which was to reconcile the materialistic philosophy implicit 
in the scientific interpretation of the world with the 
Protestant notion of inner spirituality. More importantly, 
he identified and sympathized with the philosopher's attempt 
to limit the claims of science to "make room for faith."*®
For Kissinger however, this faith was not a faith in God but
a faith in his own creative abilities to overcome obstacles,
something he had been doing all his life.
Kissinger on Progress
Kissinger's analysis of Kant focuses on the issue of 
determinism in Kant's theory of history. While he accepts 
Kant's epistemology, Kissinger is troubled by the 
implications of Kant's eschatology found in the Perpetual 
Peace. In fact, he sees Kant's ethics and epistemology as 
utterly contradictory. He finds Kant's notion that history is 
a part of the phenomenal realm, and therefore subject to the 
determinism of nature, abhorrent.
This point is important to note for it is central to 
this work as well. reading of Kant is much the same as 
Kissinger's, insofar as Kant's eschatology is bound up with 
his ethics. That the two are inextricably tied together was 
the primary point of Carl Friedrich's postwar book on Kant, 
Inevitable Peace. Friedrich, one of Kissinger's mentors at 
Harvard, believed that Kant's works could provide a basis for 
intellectual and political reconstruction, in Inevitable 
Peacef Friedrich argues that Kant's moral philosophy is found
Peter W. Dickson, Kissinger and the Meaning of History 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 34.
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within his vision of a future world made up of republican 
states that guarantee the basic dignity of persons regardless 
of their particular characteristics. This book was 
Kissinger's introduction to Kantian thought, but he quickly 
moved beyond it. His senior thesis ultimately rejects his 
mentor's position because he cannot reconcile the absolute 
freedom of Kant's noumenal self with the inevitability of 
progress in history. Kissinger, who lost thirteen family 
members in the Holocaust, cannot reconcile the immediate past 
with a beneficent understanding of history. Evil cannot be 
contained by a reliance on the movement of history towards a 
liberal end. The dignity of human beings must be secured by 
those who create the conditions within which human freedom 
can be realized. There is nothing inevitable about the 
relationship between absolute freedom and the good as it is 
found in history.
Kissinger refused to believe that the truly creative 
political actor would be ruled by either dystopian or utopian 
aspirations, as his rejection of the eschatologies of Kant 
and Spengler shows. Nevertheless, he does see a tragic 
element to history that is intertwined with the inability of 
man to accept limits, the problem existentialists refer to as 
the refusal to recognize the "facticity" of life.^° Nature, as 
history, always stands in ready opposition to overthrow the
50 On facticity in existential thought, see John Macquarrie, 
Existentialism (Harmondsworth, England: Pelican Books, 1973), 189-193. 
This rather cumbersome word is a translation of the German Faktizitàt 
and the French facticité.
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artist's creation; every generation must overcome its own 
abyss on its own terms. That is why, ultimately, progress is 
chimerical.
As Secretary of State, Kissinger expressed a view of the 
heroic actor in history that is strikingly similar to 
Nietzsche's outlook. Denying he was a "pessimist," he 
remarked that he was, in fact, simply a careful observer of 
history.
I have said, what is after all empirically true, that most 
civilizations that we know anything about have eventually 
declined. All you have to do is travel around the world and 
look at the ruins of past cultures to confirm that fact. As 
a historian one has to be conscious of the possibility of 
tragedy. However, as a statesman, one has the duty to act as 
if one's country were immortal. . . .^ l
The true statesman, in other words, must see the abyss for
what it is and persevere despite its existence. History
provides only data, not moral direction. Nor can moral
direction come from God or any other transcendent source. The
statesman must create his own moral framework, one that in
the final analysis cannot be subject to scrutiny by others.
In his senior thesis, he wrote:
since an experience is always unique and solitary, its 
simultaneous appearance in others can not be postulated.
For this reason, history offers no guarantee for the 
achievement of man's moral norms nor does it exhibit values 
in its own right. . . . The transcendental experience of the
moral law, on the other hand, leaves the question of
purposes in history u n d e c i d e d . 52
Kissinger's skepticism about intersubjactivity cannot 
help but affect his beliefs about progress. When he states 
that there is no inherent purpose or design within history.
51 Quoted in Dickson, 79.
52 Ibid., 74.
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this is because purpose can only be decided by action, not by 
philosophy. But this is a dubious criterion for ethics in 
politics, one that would have effects on both Kissinger's 
further writings on international politics and, more 
importantly, on his own policies.
Kissinger on Ethical Dualism: Theory and Praxis
Kissinger's philosophy of history leads him to 
differentiate between morality and legitimacy. While the 
former is purely subjective and non-rational, the latter is 
the primary objective of the diplomat. Only belief in the 
legitimacy of the global order can guard against 
dissatisfaction, disorder, and chaos. Chaos is the greatest 
evil in the Kissinger economy, a fact that may have much to 
do with the chaotic circumstances of his childhood in Nazi 
Germany. One of the lessons he learned in those 
circumstances, and through his own part in fighting the War, 
was that only force can overcome force. Morality in politics 
without force is of no value. This belief leads him to 
emphasize the role of power in his theory. The confluence of 
power and morality, for Kissinger, is legitimacy. But 
legitimacy ought not be confused with ultimate or 
transcendental justice; it is rather an agreement that is 
acceptable to those with different perspectives on what 
constitutes justice. Kissinger here echoes Weberian 
legitimacy whose goal is peace through adjustment to 
difference by all parties. "Diplomacy in the classic sense.
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the 'adjustment' of differences through negotiation, is 
possible only in 'legitimate' international orders."53
Should one inquire as to the limitations on means by 
which statesmen may morally achieve policy objectives, one is 
hard pressed to find them in Kissinger's thought. He makes 
recourse again and again to the distinction between armchair 
moral philosophy that may pass judgment on statesmen's 
intentions and the effectiveness of those actions in 
achieving legitimacy.54 The implication is that philosophers, 
ignorant of the lessons of history, can pretend that other 
alternatives were available. Kissinger accepts the Kantian 
equation of the moral and the possible, but only after 
turning Kant's statement on its head. Where Kant believed 
"ought" implies "is," Kissinger believes "is" defines the 
limits of "ought."
Though Mettemich never reaches the ideal of 
statesmanship, Kissinger still sees him as the kind of 
statesman who understands these crucial points. "[HJe was 
responsible only to his conscience and to history--to the 
former because it contained his vision of truth, to the 
latter because it provided the only test of its validity."5s
53 Kissinger, 2.
54 In A World Restored, Kissinger equates the actions of knaves, 
heroes, traitors, and statesmen who are distinguishable only by their 
motives, not their actions (20) . On page 23, he uses the phrase 
“Whatever one may think of the morality of this step, * in speaking of 
Metternich's hedging his bets between France and Russia. On page 82, he 
states, “Philosophers may quarrel with the moral stature of this policy 
. . . ,“ referring to Mettemich's simulataneous alliance with France 
and with Russia.
55 Ibid,, 11.
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As Peter Dickson points out, this statement applies to 
Kissinger, not to Metternich.^® Mettemich was constrained by 
his own transcendental religious beliefs. His world was not 
value-free, awaiting his own existential assertion of values 
to mold it. Kissinger, by virtue of his philosophy, is alone 
with his conscience and history. He is the consummate 
Weberian politician, who must serve as his own moral guide 
and who must be accountable to his own conscience. He alone 
must be responsible for his actions.
Kissinger adopts Weberian thought categorically at the 
end of A World Restored. His analysis mirrors Weber's 
language in "Politics as a Vocation." Kissinger discusses 
"the temptation to conduct policy administratively."S? Too 
often, nations attempt to conduct foreign relations the same 
way they conduct domestic politics. Domestic administration 
is largely a bureaucratic endeavor; international politics is 
creative. Additionally, unlike the bureaucrat, the statesman 
must be "responsible."
For this reason too, it is dangerous to separate planning 
from the responsibility of execution. For responsibility 
involves a standard of judgment, a legitimacy. But the 
standard of bureaucracy is different from that of the social 
effort. Social goals are legitimized by the legitimizing 
principle of the domestic structure, which may be 
rationality, tradition or charisma, but which is in any case 
considered an ultimate value. Bureaucratic measures are 
justified by an essentially instrumental standard, the 
suitability of certain actions for achieving ends considered 
as given.58
Because bureaucrats deal with the instrumental, they are not
58 Dickson, 26.
5^  Kissinger, 327.
58 Ibid. Emphasis in the original.
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trained to consider the ultimate ends of policy, the 
strategic implications of decisions, or their political 
contexts. Policy controlled by bureaucratic engineers will be 
wholly inappropriate for the international sphere which 
involves the clash of different, ultimate ends. Only 
statesmen have the creative capacity to bring harmony out of 
the chaos.
For these same reasons, Kissinger notes that statesmen 
will always have to struggle with domestic political 
limitations or misunderstandings of their policy. Using 
language reminiscent of the artist's contempt for the 
philistine, Kissinger bemoans the inability of a people to 
transcend its own experience as the statesmen must. Each 
people has its own conception of justice which seems 
absolute. "But the international experience of a people is a 
challenge to the universality of its notion of justice, for 
the stability of an international order depends on self­
limitation, on the reconciliation of different versions of 
legitimacy."S9
These limitations place an extraordinary burden upon the 
statesmen. He must bring harmony and order out of chaos, 
resist domestic bureaucratic thinking, and somehow legitimize 
domestically policies that may seem immoral to his own 
people.GO Herein lies the tragedy of statesmanship. He must 
pursue his creative vision, knowing that he will be utterly
59 Ibid., 328.
GO Stephen R. Graubard, Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Co., 1973), 276.
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misunderstood.
The statesman is therefore like one of the heroes in 
classical drama who has had a vision of the future but who 
cannot transmit it directly to his fellow-men and who cannot 
validate its "truth". But statesmen must act as if their 
intuition were already experience, as if their aspiration 
were truth. It is for this reason that statesmen often share 
the fate of prophets, that they are without honor in their 
own country, that they always have a difficult task in 
legitimizing their programmes domestically, and that their 
greatness is usually apparent only in retrospect when their 
intuition has become experience. The statesman must be an
educator; he must bridge the gap between a people's 
experience and his vision, between a nation's tradition and 
its future.61
The traditions of men must be replaced by the guiding vision 
of the charismatic who shapes the horizons of the future.
Only he can see beyond the present and anticipate what comes
next, because he is able to competently shape history to 
conform to his creative vision.
Kissinger is not hopeful about this project. His tragic 
view is grounded in the fact that nations refuse to learn 
from the past. A certain wisdom, a presence of mind, is 
necessary to even recognize the constant perils present in 
history much less to render those forces harmless. Those who 
can see ahead often share the fate of Cassandra; they warn 
and are not believed. The truly creative statesman is the one 
who can transcend the tendency of ordinary men to silence 
those with the insights necessary for national survival.
"This is the challenge of history and its tragedy; it is the 
shape "destiny* assumes on the earth. And its solution, even 
its recognition, is perhaps the most difficult task of
61 Kissinger, 329. Emphasis in the original.
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statesmanship.
One ought not be surprised that such a solitary figure 
might have difficulty in conducting foreign policy in a 
democracy during a time of intense political division. Any 
statesman would have faced an overwhelming task in 
extricating the US from the quagmire of Vietnam while 
attempting to limit its consequences for US prestige. 
Kissinger's beliefs could only add to that difficulty for two 
reasons. First, passages like those quoted above are not wont 
to give comfort to those already suspicious of the national 
security state. Second, one can legitimately raise the 
questions applicable to all the representative thinkers 
included in this chapter: how can an essentially existential 
or postmodern conception of international morality be 
reconciled with the needs of political accountability in a 
democratic state? More fundamentally, how can such a 
conception be reconciled with humanistic moral concerns in 
general?
Kissinger's policies during his tenure in the White 
House reveal both the virtues and the perils of his 
intellectual approach. His China policy was a masterful step 
that dramatically changed the dynamic of global relations. 
This policy arose directly from his belief that American 
policy-makers had been incorrect about communism and about 
the role of ideology in politics in general. The foreign 
policy establishment had long seen China as an appendage of
52 Ibid., 332.
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the Soviet Union and asked "Who lost China?" Kissinger 
believed that nations, including China, had objective, 
permanent interests that could not be simply replaced by 
ideology. The important question was not who lost China but 
rather how to appeal to its interests in order to "get it 
back." The events which followed North Vietnam's victory over 
the South validated Kissinger's assumptions. The communist 
nations of Southeast Asia did not become one large 
cooperative bloc; instead, they engaged in bitter wars and 
pursued what they perceived to be their own national 
interests. But as one looks more deeply at the details of his 
policies, there are disturbing political patterns that are 
difficult to separate from his philosophy of history and of 
the role of the solitary and transcendent statesman.
The secrecy of the National Security Council in the 
white House, the exclusion of Secretary of State William 
Rogers— and the State Department in general— from foreign 
policy decisions, and the hoarding of policy control within 
the Executive— all of these highlight Kissinger's tendencies 
towards autocracy. The decision to invade Cambodia was made 
against the advice of even his own NSC s t a f f . T h e  bombing of 
Cambodia, for example, and the CIA working group's decision—  
controlled by Kissinger®^— to affect elections in Chile seem
Dana Ward, "Kissinger: A Psychohistory,* in Dan Caldwell ed., 
Henry Kissinger: His Personality and Policies (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1983), 60.
Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1992), 290. Kissinger, along with the 40 Committee, a group of 
officals heading covert activities, decided to manipulate Chilean 
elections to prevent Salvador Allende, the Socialist candidate, from
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consistent with a Weltanschauung of ethical dualism. These 
decisions reveal the disdain Kissinger had for ordinary moral 
constraints and their impact on statesmen. Ordinary morality 
is appropriate for ordinary people who do not have the weight 
of political responsibility on their shoulders. Statesmen 
cannot, and should not, be required to remain within the 
confines of these limitations.
Kissinger's vision also failed him in his handling of 
Vietnam. His geopolitical perspective led him to correctly 
predict that North Vietnam would seek its own interests after 
the conflict ended. However, his concern for the prestige of 
the US led him down a precarious path with regard to the 
conduct of war and the withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam. 
Nixon was elected to extricate the US from Vietnam, and 
Kissinger ought to have seen that American involvement there 
was pointless (as had other realists). But his acceptance of 
legitimacy as a higher form of morality led him to push for 
an honorable withdrawal. For Kissinger, the great threat to 
world peace was the instability created by revolutionary 
regimes. The revolutionary government of the North had to be 
taught proper diplomatic behavior, by force if necessary.
This was to be accomplished by negotiating while continuing
becoming president of Chile. Under his authority, American intelligence 
officials were engaged in a number of operations to accomplish this 
objective. As Isaacson reports, Kissinger authorized the spending of 
$250,000 to bribe members of the Chilean Congress, who could refuse to 
seat Allende. After Allende was seated, Kissinger continued to support 
anti-Allende activities in Chile designed to destabilize the Chilean 
government (311) . On the OS involvement in Chile, Kissinger stated "I 
don't see why we have to let a country go Marxist just because its 
people are irresponsible" (290) .
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to engage in military action. It would be unwise, thought 
Kissinger to unilaterally withdraw from Vietnam, while 
simultaneously attempting to convince the North to allow free 
elections. Most importantly, American credibility was at 
stake. Kissinger stated:
The commitment of 500,000 Americans has settled the issue of 
the importance of Viet Nam. What is involved now is 
confidence in American promises. However fashionable it is 
to ridicule the terms "credibility" or "prestige," they are 
not empty phrases; other nations can gear their actions to 
ours only if they can count on our steadiness. . . .^ 5
This policy could never make sense to the American public 
who was being asked to make sacrifices for something that 
sounded terribly ethereal. Like Douglas MacArthur in Korea, 
Kissinger sought to end the war by expanding America's 
involvement rather than curtailing it. MacArthur was sent 
home; Kissinger was not.
Here we see the consequences of statesmen who must 
reconcile different visions of morality in the international 
sphere. Under Kissinger's direction, the US sought stability 
in Southeast Asia. In contrast, the North sought autonomy and 
greater regional influence according to their revolutionary 
and postcolonial morality. Kissinger's reconciliation of 
these interests had to appeal to some standard that 
transcended ordinary morality, which could only be known by 
Kissinger himself. Knowing that this extraordinary moral 
transcendence would never be understood or accepted by
Quoted in Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography {New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1992), 160. For this reason, he was also opposed to Nixon's 
later policy of Vietnamization of the war, seeing this as a decoupling 
of force from diplomacy (236f).
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ordinary persons, he had to act in secret on their behalf.
Michael Smith, analyzing Kissinger's ethics, believes 
that Kissinger, by his own standards, failed as a statesman.®® 
Kissinger once wrote that "the acid test of a policy . . .  is 
its ability to obtain public support."®^ Smith is surely 
correct in pointing out that Kissinger failed to do this. Nor 
was Kissinger able to leave his stamp upon American policy in 
the way he undoubtedly would have wanted. But Smith and other 
critics, and perhaps even Kissinger himself, overlook the 
extent to which Kissinger's foreign policy approach was 
entirely consistent with his philosophy. In fact, given 
Kissinger's larger philosophical vision, one might ask why he 
felt himself bound to any constraints at all in the pursuit 
of his foreign policy objectives? By definition, the ethic 
of responsibility, as a contract with the diabolical, cannot 
be constrained so easily. As the passages quoted above show, 
Kissinger sees the tragedy of statecraft as a result of the 
incompatibility of power politics with domestic political 
limitations. This tragedy is the result, not of Cassandra's 
failure to speak out, but of Troy's inability to hear. 
Kissinger wrote: "A statesman who too far outruns the 
experience of his people will fail in achieving a domestic 
consensus, however wise his policies; witness Castlereagh. A 
statesman who limits his policy to the experience of his
®® Smith, 211.
®^  Kissinger, 326.
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people will doom himself to sterility; witness Metternich. 
Finding himself in power, with the stakes so high in the age 
of nuclear weapons and totalitarian states, Kissinger 
apparently decided that following Metternich's approach was 
unacceptable. He never inquired how it was, however, that the 
solitary creator of new horizons could ever be understood by 
his people in a democratic society on any other basis than 
charismatic authority? He never seems to have clearly thought 
out the incongruity between his theory of international 
relations and the normative foundations of liberal societies. 
Instead, as a matter of praxis, he frequently sought to 
c i rcumvent them.
Hans J. Moraenthau: Aristeia and International Ethics
Hans Morgenthau's theory of international politics is 
the most self-consciously constructed theory advanced by 
leading American realists. Morgenthau was aware of the 
ethical dilemmas presented by international relations in an 
anarchic world. Like other realists, he was haunted by the 
profound presence of tragedy in human history and disturbed 
by the failure of scholars and policy-makers alike to 
acknowledge the tragic presence of evil among men.
Nietzsche was tremendously important for Morgenthau's 
early intellectual development, though he played down his 
role in later years. In fact, he says nothing about him in 
his own autobiography, preferring to cite Weber as his
Ibid., 329.
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intellectual role m o d e l . A s  Christoph Frei's recent 
biography on Morgenthau shows, however, Nietzsche was the 
critical figure in his intellectual development.
Immer wieder ist dabei zu fragen: Was beschâftigt ihn? Und:
Gibt es klar bestinanbare âussere Beeinflussungen im Zuge der 
Artikulation seiner Gedenken? Dies wiederum fûhrt zu der 
vielleicht aufregendsten Frage im Rahmen einer 
intellektuellen Biographie: Hat Morgenthau einen geistigen 
vater?
Urn es vorwegzunehmen: die Antwort lautet *Ja* . — Sein 
Naune? Friedrich Nietzsche.
The young Morgenthau, living in the perilous times of 
Weimar Germany, was attracted to Nietzsche's intellectual 
integrity. In his diary, Morgenthau referred to the 
philosopher as "the god of my y o u t h . H e  believed himself to 
be much like Nietzsche in that both were alienated from 
German society and thought, and both were figures who did not 
fit well within the constraints placed upon them by German 
culture. It is no surprise, then, that Morgenthau was 
especially moved by Nietzsche's Unzeitgemâsse Betrachtungen,
Hans. J. Morgenthau, "Fragment of an Intellectual Biography," 
in Truth and Tragedy: A Tribute to Haas J. Morgenthau, eds. Kenneth 
Thompson and Robert J. Meyers (Washington DC: New Republic Book Co., 
1977), 7.
Christoph Frei, Hans J. Morgenthau: Ein intellektuelle 
Biographie (Stuttgart: Paul Haupt Bern, 1994), 96. This reads, roughly, 
"Again and again, one is led to wonder: what fascinates him? And, are 
there clear, decisive, extraordinary influences in the course of the 
articulation of his memories? This, in turn, leads perhaps to the most 
exciting question in the framework of an intellectual biography: Does 
Morgenthau have a spiritual father? To get to the point, the answer is 
"yes."— His name? Friedrich Nietzsche" (my adaptation) . On this page and 
the one following, Frei also argues that Morgenthau later used Weber 
both to "cover over* (belegen) and incorporate Nietzsche into his 
thought. Frei believes Morgenthau felt the need to leave Nietzsche out 
of his intellectual biography because "Natûrlich war sein Denken noch 
immer 'deutsch'— doch waren es undeutsche Zeiten. Ab 1941 stand Amerika 
im Krieg; fortan machte nicht jeder Zeitgenosse einen Unterschied 
zwischen "Nazis" und "Germans" (113).
Quoted in Frei, 101.
249
a title which later could just as easily have been applied to 
his own work.
Morgenthau's approach to international relations 
centered on a few important principles he derived from 
Nietzsche's works and which he felt had been ignored by other 
theorists. Most important among those were the autonomy of 
politics and the role the will to power plays in human 
affairs. The two are, in fact, corollaries of one another. 
Given his belief in power as an objective principle, it might 
seem odd to conclude that Morgenthau has any connections 
whatsoever with postmodernism. Postmodernists do not often 
use the language of objectivity. But by looking more closely 
at his view of tragedy, we can see that his empirical vision 
is also heavily affected by Nietzsche's rejection of 
objective rationality and rational ethics. This fact cannot 
help but have significant consequences for Morgenthau's 
political theory.
Morgenthau as a Social Constructivist
Morgenthau's philosophy is most clearly seen in his 
work. Scientific Man Vs, Power Politics (1946) . This book, 
published when Morgenthau was at the University of Chicago, 
attacked Enlightenment rationality and its misapplication in 
politics. At a time when behavioralism in the social sciences 
was becoming ascendant, Morgenthau's critique of "the 
irrationality of scientific man" was not well received.
The social constructivist qualities of the work are most
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apparent in his discussions of epistemology. Morgenthau 
creates a dichotomy that by now ought to appear familiar. He 
distinguishes between the natural world of phenomena and the 
world of human affairs in which human consciousness plays the 
central role. The great error of liberal rationalists is 
mistaking the principles of one for the other. The influences 
of Kant, Nietzsche, and Weber on Morgenthau can be gleaned 
from his discussion of this mistaken "unity of nature and 
society." Speaking of the physical or phenomenal world, he 
states:
We are able to know [the physical world] only within the 
limits of our cognitive faculties; that is, we know it only 
in so far as the structure of our mind corresponds to the 
structure of the physical world. On the other hand, the 
relationship between mind and nature is not exclusively 
cognitive even when the human mind confronts nature only for 
the purpose of perception. It cannot do so without 
intervening in its course and thus disturbing it. . . .
Nature as the object of human knowledge is, therefore, 
somehow the product of human action.
This creative influence is strongest when intervention 
and disturbance are not the mere by-product of a cognitive 
purpose but the goal of purposeful action itself Inasmuch 
as nature is subject to human action, it is the human mind 
which actually creates it, and the creation must bear 
witness to the quality of the creator. 2^
If this is true of nature, it is even more true of society. 
Social scientists cannot be objective. Analysis itself 
influences its own objects of s t u d y
Not far after this passage, we see Morgenthau reaching
72 Morgenthau, Scientific Man, 141.
Ibid., 141, 143. Morgenthau cites the principles of quantum 
mechanics to provide an illustration of this fact in the physical world. 
The point is correct though the analogy is inappropriate. See Douglas 
Hofstadter, "Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle and the Many-Worlds 
Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, chpater in Meteaaagical Themas: 
Questing for the Essence of Mind and Pattern (New York: Basic Books, 
1985), 455-477.
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conclusions similar to those of Nietzsche concerning the 
place of human will. If the phenomenal world is in some way 
the function of the will, then rationality as such is 
illusory. "However, the common element of which mind, nature 
and society partake is no longer reason pure and simple but 
reason surrounded, interspersed, and underlaid with unreason, 
an island precariously placed in the midst of an obscure and 
stormy ocean.Appollonian reason is surrounded and 
permeated by Dionysiac irrationality. "Even when we speak of 
'the pure reason of the natural scientist,' we cannot mean a 
reason divorced from the irrational forces determining human 
behavior but only a reason whose cognitive relation to its 
object is not influenced by its irrational determination."^: 
Reason is the force which brings harmony to competing 
irrational impulses. Once an end has been decided upon, 
reason may be consulted as to how to effectively achieve it. 
"The triumph of reason is, in truth, the triumph of 
irrational forces which succeed in using the processes of 
reason to satisfy themselves."^" Our preferences are creations 
of our values that are themselves irrationally created. We 
may think that reason provides answers within ourselves; in 
reality, this is simply the victory within of the strongest 
impulses over those which are weaker. Strength uses the
Morgenthau, Scientific Man, 145.
75 Ibid.. 154.
76 Ibid., 155.
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language of reason to justify itself.7?
The creative statesman, however, requires some kind of 
data upon which he may act. Thus, Morgenthau places limits on 
the contingency of knowledge. The world is "not devoid of a 
measure of rationality if approached with the expectations of 
MacBethian c y n i c i s m . L i k e  Weber, he believes patterns can 
be discerned in history that reveal the possibilities with 
which we must contend. The ability to discern what those 
patterns or ideal types are, and the courage to respond to 
them, are both necessary qualities in the statesman. Given 
the irrational origins of reason itself, the statesman can 
only do his best to make sense out of his environment.
"While his mind yearns for the apparent certainty of science, 
his actual condition is more akin to the gambler's than to 
the scientist's."79 The data of international relations theory 
are the events of history; and though history is contingent, 
it will yield up only a few possible alternatives for which 
the statesman must prepare.8° His duty is to state things 
simply as they are and find ways to respond to the facticity 
of circumstances. This aspiration forms part of Morgenthau's 
debt to Nietzsche and is indicative of the role Nietzsche 
plays in realist thought in general. As Christoph Frei
77 Ibid., 155.
78 Ibid., 151.
79 Ibid., 221.
8° Hans J. Morgenthau, Truth and Power: Essays of a Decade, 1960-
1970 (New York: Praeger, 1970), 256f.
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States: "So liegt Morgenthau bel Nietzsche, um es dann spâter 
selbst zu sagen: 'Je constate simplement ce que je vois.' 
Denkursprünge eines Realisten."®^
Morgenthau on Progress
Morgenthau's view of progress is shaped by his belief 
that life is tragic. Nietzsche believed the recognition and 
portrayal of tragedy represented a means of coming to terms 
with the meaninglessness of human existence, where Nietzsche 
believed the loss of the tragic vision to be exemplified by 
Socratic rationality (and Italian opera), Morgenthau sees 
evidence of this loss in the scientific approach to 
international affairs.
For Nietzsche and Morgenthau, man's existence is like 
that of Tantalus for whom the objects of desire were in view 
but always just out of reach. In a few remarkable pages of 
Scientific Man, Morgenthau expresses his tragic vision and 
its implications for the idea of progress. This vision arises 
out of the fact that human nature is perennially motivated by 
the animus dominandi, the will to power. All of politics 
relates to that basic motivation, which Morgenthau calls "a 
general quality of the human mind. The centrality of the 
will to power carries over into his theory of international 
relations. In Politics Among Nations, he states: "All 
politics, domestic and international, reveals three basic
81 Frei, 105f.
8^  Morgenthau, Scientific Man, 194.
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patterns; that is, all political phenomena can be reduced to 
one of three basic types. A political policy seeks either to 
keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power."" 
Considering that Morgenthau relegates political activity to 
the realm of the diabolical, his definition of politics has 
profound consequences for ethics. But it is also closely 
connected to his belief that man's ability to transcend 
himself is a noble but ultimately futile hope. "Suspended 
between his spiritual destiny which he cannot fulfil and his 
animal nature in which he cannot remain, he is forever 
condemned to experience the contrast between the longings of 
his mind and his actual condition as his personal, eminently 
human tragedy. "
For this reason, Morgenthau is adamant that policy­
makers recognize the futility of the progressive, liberal 
approach to international affairs. It is founded upon the 
illusion that, just as problems in the natural sciences are 
solved once and for all, so can problems in the social realm 
be overcome with permanent solutions. Human problems are 
eternal; the struggle to deal with the inappropriate 
assertion of power is never solved for all time. All 
victories are "provisional" because "a slight change in the 
relative strength of opposing forces may reverse the
Hems J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for 
Power and Peace. Revised by Kenneth Thompson. Brief Edition (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1985), 50.
84 Morgenthau, Scientific Man, 221.
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positions. . . The belief in progress is a direct result
of the loss of the tragic vision that pre-rational societies 
accepted as conclusive. For these societies, " [t]here is no 
progress toward the good, noticeable from year to year, but 
undecided conflict which sees today good, tomorrow evil, 
prevail. . . . "** The traditional view of Western 
Civilization, says Morgenthau, understands evil as an 
inherent part of life; it is not going to be expunged by 
progressive policies.
In this tradition God is challenged by the devil, who is 
conceived as a permanent and necessary element in the order 
of the world. The sinfulness of man is likewise conceived, 
from Duns Scotus and Thomas Aquinas to Luther, not as an 
accidental disturbance of the order of the world sure to be 
overcome by a gradual development toward the good but as an 
inescapable necessity which gives meaning to the existence 
of man and which only an act of grace or salvation in 
another world is able to overcome.®^
This is not the place to discuss the theological correctness
of this perspective, particularly the idea of sin as
“necessary." Morgenthau's beliefs are surely closer to the
Athenian cosmology, and the belief in moira as fate, than
that of Jerusalem. But this passage reveals his belief in the
permanence of conflict, in its ineradicability from human
nature.
Politics is autonomous because power is an autonomous 
force in the human psyche. Morgenthau states, “In our time 
Sigmund Freud has rediscovered the autonomy of the dark and
Ibid., 219. 
Ibid., 205. 
Ibid., 204.
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evil forces which, as manifestations of the unconscious, 
determine the fate of man."®® Because the will to power lies 
in human consciousness itself, no scientific understanding 
can cure the problem of conflict. As was the case with Freud, 
the best we can hope for is alignment, the adjustment of 
forces to bring balance and coherence to international life.
Morgenthau on Ethics
Morgenthau rejects the ethical dualism of the 
Realpolitik tradition, the belief that individuals and states 
ought to live by two different standards. The morality of 
states is actually the morality of individual policy-makers 
who, if the ideal of an international ethic is to have any 
coherence, must be accountable for their policies.®® But the 
ethical constraints placed upon foreign policy are not 
completely clear in Morgenthau's theory; there is an 
ambivalence to the meaning of morality as he moves between 
empirical and normative observations.
Empirically, ethical decisions are made with both power 
and morality in mind. A policy which ignores power is 
dangerous while an absolutely amoral politics is untenable in 
the long run. On the one hand, carrying out a international 
political strategy entails " . . .  a continuing effort to 
maintain and to increase the power of one's own nation and to 
keep in check or reduce the power of other nations."®® On the
®8 Ibid., 205.
®® Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 239.
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other, legitimacy, which is not to be confused with force, 
requires that statesmen not violate their own consciences nor 
those of their fellow citizens lest legitimacy be lost. These 
moral rules pose what Morgenthau calls "an absolute barrier* 
to immoral policies though " . . .  such ethical inhibitions 
operate in our time on different levels with different 
effectiveness.
Morgenthau's empirical assessment of ethics is similar 
to his understanding of progress. This is not accidental as 
both arise from his definition of politics as the realm of 
the animus dominandi. There is a profound discontinuity 
between the classical Greek and Christian period and that of 
modernity. Though Greek cosmology was cyclical and 
Christian's linear, both saw the presence of evil as 
something permanent in the world that could not be eradicated 
completely. With the Enlightenment and the rise of 
rationalism came a belief in the ability of humans to 
transcend evil through the application of their rational 
faculties. Modernists misunderstand the fact that the moral 
dilemmas we face are eternal, that they arise out of the 
"discord between man's desire and his actual condition. . . 
.•92 Each of us plays a number of different roles, all of 
which may require contradictory ethical duties. Morgenthau 
refers to these conflicts as "insoluble," leading him to
90 Ibid., 225.
91 Ibid., 225.
92 Morgenthau, Scientific Man, 168.
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State that choice involves "the inevitability of evil."*] His 
understanding of what is entailed by evil is strikingly 
similar to Weber's descriptions of the diabolical quality of 
politics in "Politics as a Vocation." For the ethical actor 
engaged in politics, the choice is not good vs. evil but 
rather "not being too evil. " Indeed, it is not the case that 
non-political action is good and that of politics evil. All 
human action is subject to corruption; the corruption of 
political action is simply the "prototype of all possible 
corruption.
That political action and doing evil are inevitably linked 
becomes fully clear only when we recognize not only that 
ethical standards are empirically violated on the political 
scene . . . but that it is unattainable for an action at the 
same time to conform to the rules of political art (i.e., to 
achieve political success) and to conform to the rules of 
ethics (i.e., to be good in itself). The test of political 
success is the degree to which one is able to maintain, to 
increase, or to demonstrate one's power over others. The 
test of a morally good action is the degree to which it is 
capable of treating others not as a means to the actor's 
ends but as ends in themselves.*&
This passage shows why our moral aspirations will never 
be fully met and reveals key premises of Morgenthau's 
normative theory. The purely good, for Morgenthau, is defined 
in Kantian terms, but the idea of an action as good-in-itself 
is a luxury the politician cannot afford. "Whenever we act 
with reference to our fellow men, we must sin, and we still 
sin when we refuse to act; for the refusal to be involved in
93 Ibid., 190f.
94 Ibid., 192.
95 Ibid.. 195.
96 Ibid., 196.
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the evil of action carries with it the breach of the 
obligation to do one's duty."^ '' Like Weber, Morgenthau 
combines Kant and Nietzsche to produce a synthesis in which 
duty is paramount, but the moral content of that duty is 
ultimately inscrutable. The Nietzschean aspect of 
Morgenthau's position becomes even more apparent in his 
response to this tragic contradiction. "To know with despair 
that the political act is inevitably evil, and to act 
nevertheless, is moral courage.*®® The statesman requires 
courage to face the inevitability of evil inherent in 
political action and the courage to accept the "unsolvable 
contrast between what he needs, what he wants and what he is 
able to obtain. . . . "®®
This is not to say, from a normative standpoint, that 
there are no moral constraints on statecraft, a position 
Morgenthau was often accused of holding. His theory is not 
the mere Americanization of European Realpolitik. Morality 
must be situated and expressed in the experience of a culture 
or a nation in order to be comprehensible, but Morgenthau 
does not advocate cultural relativism. All cultures 
participate in a common moral experience that brings a 
certain uniformity to conscience as it unfolds in history.
"We are all moral beings to some degree because we are
97 Ibid., 201.
98 Ibid., 203.
99 Ibid., 221.
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human,* he states.
How do you explain that the moral ideas of Plato and Pascal, 
of Buddha and Thomas Aquinas are . . . acceptable to our 
intellectual understanding and moral sense? If the historic 
systems of morality were not erected upon a common 
foundation of moral understanding and valuation, impervious 
to changing conditions of time and place, we could [not] 
understand any moral system but our own. . . .  It is only 
because we as moral beings have something in common with all 
other men--past and present— that we are able to understand 
. . . the core of the moral systems of others.lOl
Common moral principles do not just empirically place
limitations on policy, they ought to do so. Morgenthau sees
this as a normative good, giving examples of these
limitations in history. No justification for mass
extermination of one's enemy, for example, is available on
the basis of political expediency. It is proscribed by
"absolute moral principle* that stands resolutely in
opposition to expediency.
Despite these statements, Morgenthau was frequently
criticized for holding to an amoral political position.
After such criticisms were leveled against Scientific Man, he
wrote despairingly in a letter, "They literally don't know
what I am talking a b o u t . *^ °3 To some degree, he was surely
right. As Allan Bloom points out, Americans had appropriated
much of German thought without fully understanding its
implications. When confronted with the tragic side of
Kulturpessimismus, they were at a loss to comprehend it. The
100 Ibid., 249.
101 Cited in Russell, 157.
102 Morgenthau, Politics Amonff Nations, 228.
103 Quoted in Prei, Hans J. Morgenthau, 218.
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constant refrain in Weber and in Morgenthau, concerning the 
role of evil in human action, could only appear 
incomprehensible to pragmatic and victorious Americans after 
the end of the Second World War. The leap from "Politics as a 
Vocation" and "Science as a Vocation" to Talcott Parsons' 
social theory is just one example of this phenomenon. Yet 
Morgenthau himself must be held partly responsible for this 
misunderstanding. The ambiguity in his work on the role of 
morality is not just the result of specious interpretations 
by •scientistically-minded" reviewers. One reviewer notes:
Morgenthau's pessimistic view of man raises an additional 
difficulty. The pervasive evil in human nature and politics 
rendered his formal ethic so transcendent that it could not 
easily function as a vital force directing man's creative 
energies in an imperfect world. Morgenthau asserted that 
"all nations stand under the judgment of God, " but he also 
acknowledged that God's will is "inscrutable to the human 
mind." Morgenthau believed that operative political norms 
are ultimately derived from transcendent ethical principles; 
however, he was less helpful on how, and to what degree, 
these principles are capable of guiding political action 
when distorted by the institutions of sinful roan.^ '^*
Thus, on the one hand, Morgenthau could write in a letter to
Edward Dew, "I affirm two basic moral values : the
preservation of life and freedom in the sense of the Judeo-
Christian tradition and, more particularly, of Kantian
philosophy. "105 On the other hand, he wrote "It is impossible
. . . to be a successful politician and a good Christian, "lo®
As with Weber, ultimate, absolute ends seem to collide with
104 Russell, Hans J. Morgenthau and the Ethics of American 
Statecraft, 169f.
105 Quoted in Prei, 230.
10® Quoted in Russell, 158.
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the necessities of countering power with power, a response 
that in turn requires the willingness to engage in evil to 
prevent a worse evil.
One might suggest that, for Morgenthau, ethics and 
politics could be synthesized through prudence or phronesis, 
practical reason. The classical concept of prudence, 
particularly as understood by Aristotle, is one of aligning 
means and ends in a way that cannot be systematized outside 
of specific circumstances. It involves doing the right thing 
at the right time and is derived from experience. Morgenthau 
seems to have something like this in mind. Morgenthau 
contrasts the mentality of the statesman with that of the 
engineer. Whereas the engineer seeks certainty and absolute 
rules that can be applied in every situation, the statesman 
must be guided by the particularities and needs of specific 
circumstances. He quotes Edmund Burke's comments on the 
prudential approach to statecraft. "A statesman, never losing 
sight of principles, is to be guided by circumstances; and, 
judging contrary to the exigencies of the moment, he may ruin 
his country forever. " Prudence as phronesis, however, 
requires a guiding principle that assumes much more certainty 
than we can find in Morgenthau's epistemology. Aristotelian 
and medieval conceptions of prudence articulate moral 
absolutes--i.e., specific virtues that ground the moral 
experience of moral actors. These absolutes set limits on the 
applications of prudent action. Just indignation {nemesis),
Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific Man, 220f.
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truthfulness (aletheia), temperance {sophrosune), and courage
iandreia), for example, are all required of ethical political
actors. It is not the existence of ethical precepts but
rather their application that is contingent. In the Hellenic
period, the substantive element of phronesis was rooted in
the virtues of the polis; in the medieval era, it was
connected to the virtues of European Christendom. Without
this element, prudence collapses into a malign cleverness
ideinotes), precisely the quality Morgenthau criticized in
Carr's theory of statecraft.
Prudence, in Morgenthau's theory, is more akin to,
though not identical with, Kant's understanding of phronesis
than Aristotle's. The Kantian notion involves a calculation
of interests. Because one considers consequences, phronesis
cannot be connected to the purely good for which intent, not
consequences, are paramount. Thomas Spragens sums up Kant's
position as follows:
•Prudence,”. . . has for Kant none of the ennobling 
overtones of Aristotelian phronesis. It is no longer the 
practical knowledge of what is good for man but simply the 
skill of calculating accurately the best means to one's 
self-interest. (Kant writes: 'Now a man's skill in choosing 
the means to his own greatest well-being may be called 
prudence in the most specific sense.*) The prudent man is 
not, then, the man of moral wisdom venerated by Aristotle; 
he is the Benthamite petty shopkeeper despised by Marx.^°^
It is unfair to draw too strong a link between Bentham's
Immanuel Kant, Metaphysical Foundations of Morals. Chap. in 
The Philosophy of Kant: Immanuel Kant's Moral and Political Writings, 
trans. Carl J. Friedrich (New York: Random House, 1949), 164; quoted in 
Thomas Spragens. The Irony of Liberal Reason (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1981), 243f.
109 Spragens, The Irony of Liberal Reason, 243f.
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prosaic utilitarianism with Morgenthau's Hellenically- 
oriented consequentialism. What remains Kantian in 
Morgenthau's theory, however, is that politics remains within 
the world of the phenomenal whereas the good remains in the 
transcendent realm of the noumenal. As is the case with other 
realists, the connection between the two realms is tenuous at 
best. Because the purely good cannot take consequences into 
account, and politics requires a measuring of consequences, 
politics is inevitably evil. As Spragens explains Kant's 
position, the "very lack of empirical content [in pure 
practical reason] is what guarantees its moral purity." What 
ennobles the engagement of evil in Morgenthau's theory is the 
fact that it is done not to serve one's own interests but 
those of one's country.
Nietzschean pessimism and prudence collide in 
Morgenthau's theory. Nowhere are we shown how, in an era 
which has recognized the death of God, we can retain any kind 
of real transcendence from the contingency of history. 
Morgenthau's ethics and his attachment to humanism are the 
result of existential assertiveness rather than transcendence 
per se, a kind of Nietzschean equivalent of faith.
Conclusion
The realists examined in this chapter are united by the 
German origins of their thought, and by their attachment to 
Kant and Nietzsche in particular. They share a common 
understanding of the impossibility of moral certainty in the
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post-Kancian world, a recognition which forms the basis of 
their tragic vision of life. Though none of them advocate an 
amoral political or foreign policy perspective, this 
uncertainty makes it difficult to draw boundaries around 
moral actions. Their commitments to democratic life and 
humanistic ethics cannot easily be attached to their 
epistemic assumptions; these commitments seem to arise more 
from existential assertiveness, the desire to engage in the 
process of world-creation as an act of will.
Ironically, this existential assertiveness is an 
important characteristic they share with liberals. Neither 
liberals nor realists examined here can convincingly show how 
anything other than imagination can connect the phenomenal 
and noumenal realms. Imagination is a dubious basis for 
international ethics; consequently, realist and liberal 
theories alike, attempting to outline a moral basis for 
politics, routinely end in the uncertainty of postmodemity.
Realists criticize liberal chiliasm, objecting to the 
way liberal theorists ignores the reality of evil and the 
role of power in history. That critique is valid up to a 
point. But realists have a more difficult time expressing a 
constructive moral perspective. Since realists view the good 
as being synonymous with the noumenal, it remains unclear how 
political life escapes the maw of evil in phenomenal human 
action or upon what foundation the good life can be built. 
Herein lies the postmodern connection. Both postmodemity and 
realism are critical of the scientism of liberal theory, its
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tendency to mask power with unitary rationality, and its 
belief in the inherent harmony of interests among reasonable 
people. As both postmodernists and realists have German 
roots, this ought not be surprising. But realism also shares 
in the problems of postmodemity. It cannot escape the 
contingency of history. There is no inherent reason why 
realists ought to assume humanistic values are the correct 
values to substantiate. All of these realists reject the 
total transvaluation of all values (to use Nietzsche's term). 
Given their assumptions, however, it is not clear why they 
ought to do so. Whereas liberals misunderstand Nietzsche, 
realists cannot seem to transcend him. Liberals may be 
blinded by Apollo, but realists are mired in the chthonic 
realm of Dionysis. If liberalism's fate is that of Icarus, 
realism's is found in the despair of Sisyphus.
Covenantal thought provides a way out of this morass.
As evidenced by its origins in Jewish thought, covenant 
recognizes the fact that humanity is mired in sin, (a point 
also recognized by Morgenthau and Niebuhr). As Elazar points 
out, covenantal thought is profoundly realist in its 
perception of the range of human behavior, good and evil. Yet 
the idea of the covenantal community is rooted in the belief 
that regeneration and progress in history are possible and, 
thus, that history is directional and meaningful. Unlike 
liberal theory, however, covenantal thought does not see this 
progress as an inevitable outcome of increasing rationality 
or economic growth. The covenantal political paradigm
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requires carefully constructed institutions that stand 
alongside carefully constructed social relationships. Both 
are engaged in a partnership which serves to achieve a moral 
vision rooted in a belief in transcendent values. This vision 
cannot help but have implications for international 
relations, the point to which we now turn.
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CHAPTER 5
COVENANTAL LIBERALISM: SOCIAL CAPITAL WITH MORAL PURPOSE
Previous chapters have outlined the deconstructive 
consequences for liberal theory. The original vision of 
liberal thought, however, contains elements that are of great 
value for developing a comprehensive theory of international 
ethics. Liberalism originated in profoundly spiritual and 
moral conceptions of the dignity of every human life, though 
it took centuries to bring those beliefs to bear in real 
political terms. Early liberals believed their own moral 
premises, grounded in theology and natural law, served as the 
basis for a general— but universal--understanding of the 
human good. Rights, liberty, equality, and property were not 
just procedural attachments but substantive necessities for 
pursuing the good life.
Hans Morgenthau is correct in saying that liberal 
international relations theory is rooted in domestic liberal 
theory. But that is not necessarily a vice. Humanistic 
advances have largely occurred within liberal states.
Liberal international theory developed as an analogy to 
conditions within those states. Therefore, a viable liberal 
international theory must be rooted in a viable domestic 
theory. This theory must overcome the limitations of
269
interest-oriented instrumental rationality and of deontic 
ethics that ignores the presence of evil. Such a revised 
liberal theory ought to take into account the empirical 
research of international behavior to see what patterns have 
emerged in the two centuries since the rise of the first 
liberal states. The theory ought to contain a perspective 
which limits imprudent vehemence, the liberal tendency 
towards imperialism in the name of liberal values. And it 
must account for the ongoing presence of evil, a fact of 
international life that cannot be wished away. While 
phronesis or prudentia can accomplish many of these 
requirements, prudence must be grounded in a transcendent 
moral perspective, without transcendence, prudence too easily 
becomes cleverness, a point made in the previous chapter. The 
formal and substantive elements of covenantal relationships 
provide prudence with its moral foundations.
This chapter deals with two primary issues. First, I 
address the covenantal qualities of Tocqueville's work and 
examine more recent scholarship on democratic practice that 
relies heavily on Tocquevillean arguments. I previously 
outlined the basic assumptions of the covenantal paradigm as 
a general theory of social interaction.i I now turn to works 
that deal more specifically with its political implications. 
Tocqueville's social theory, found in his analyses of the US 
and France in Democracy in America and The Old Regime, 
outlines many of the elements of a covenantal order. Though
 ^ See chapter 2, 32-37.
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modern theories of covenant originated with other European 
thinkers, Tocqueville's work is part of a stream of thought 
that links covenant with modernity.
Second, I outline a more systematic model of the 
covenantal polity, in order to show the link between social 
capital as a domestic variable and the workings of 
international politics. Because liberal international theory 
relies upon assumptions drawn from domestic politics, it is 
necessary to show how these domestic concerns impact states 
at the international level. This connection is not obvious; 
many realists deny it can be made at all, holding that 
international politics remains a separate, autonomous sphere.- 
If liberal theory is correct, however, there should be 
evidence that liberal states are set apart in visible ways 
from those that are illiberal within the realm of 
international behavior, evidence that can be theoretically 
linked to peculiarly liberal attributes. Social capital, I 
argue, provides the basis for political and economic 
stability, both of which are necessary for the consolidation 
of liberal states. In turn, it is the expansion and 
consolidation of liberal states upon which liberal theory 
rests its hopes for the future of a covenantal global 
society.
Tocoueville as a Covenantal Thinker
Tocqueville's work contains many profoundly covenantal
 ^ Kenneth Waltz's work is, of course, a prime example of this 
realist contention.
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elements.3 He recognized the growth of democracy, with its 
emphasis on ontic equality, as a powerful force of the 
future.4 He understood the need for liberty in a democracy to 
be circumscribed by ethical constraints. He also recognized 
problems inherent within democratic regimes that could lead 
to their downfall. Like Nietzsche, he understood the dangers 
of mediocre egalitarianism that disdains achievement and 
diversity, ressentiment, and the despotism that was their 
end; yet, he did not turn to power or aristocratic radicalism 
to solve these problems. He did not believe in the 
inevitability of despotism, bureaucratic or otherwise. He 
sought to protect democracy from its enemies and, as Pierre 
Manent puts it, from its "excessive or immoderate friends. 
Tocqueville's conception of the good society is, in fact, 
fundamentally covenantal in perspective.
Tocqueville's analysis of American democracy can be 
divided into his insights into American political culture and 
into American political institutions. The positive aspects of 
both— those that tend to facilitate sustainable democracy-- 
are really not indigenous to America as a whole but only to 
New England. New England is contrasted with the Mid-Atlantic 
colonies and the South which have their origins in
 ^ On the covenantal qualities of Tocqueville's thought, see Barbara 
Allen, "Alexis de Tocqueville on the Covenantal Tradition of American 
Federal Democracy," Publius 28, No.2 (Spring 1998), 1-23.
4 Tocqueville, 12.
® Manent, 130.
272
commercialism or worse, in a slave economy.®
Tocqueville's analysis of these issues is important for 
two reasons. First, he provides insights, confirmed by more 
recent research, into the basis for sustainable domestic 
liberal life. Second, his analysis can be applied to the 
international level. His analysis shows how, in an 
increasingly interconnected world, states can cooperate to 
protect their interests and solve collective action problems 
without the help of an overarching global state.
Political Culture
Tocqueville believes there are three qualities of New
England political culture that have either facilitated or
maintained democracy in America: enlightened self-interest,
or what he terms "self-interest rightly understood," the art
of association that Americans have skillfully developed, and
mores, especially as affected by religion. These qualities
have prevented the rise of the individualism he finds so
pernicious to a vibrant democratic polity.
Tocqueville describes the American variant of "self-
interest rightly understood" as a kind of enlightened
understanding of the benefits of cooperation. Collective
action is a means of solving individual problems and sharing
the costs of those solutions. Americans, he states, have made
this principle into a general doctrine.
In the United States there is hardly any talk of the beauty 
of virtue. But they maintain that virtue is useful and prove
® Ibid,, 50f.
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it every day. American moralists do not pretend that one 
must sacrifice himself for his fellows because it is a fine 
thing to do so. But they boldly assert that such sacrifice 
is as necessary for the man who makes it as for the 
beneficiaries. . . .
They therefore do not raise objections to men pursuing 
their interests, but they do all they can to prove that it 
is in each man's interests to be good.?
One ought to note a very important distinction here.
Tocqueville does not argue that Americans believe the good
and their interests to be identical. There is certainly some
utility to following one's interests, but utility does not
wholly comprise the good. On the other hand, Americans do not
see much virtue in a non-consequential good. The idea is
foreign to them.
One ought not expect Americans to see virtue as being
separate from consequences. From the beginning, Americans
eschewed a classical view of virtue (one that held commercial
interests in disdain) for one consistent with both biblical
and modern doctrine. Hebrew tradition, in contrast to Greek,
had always seen commerce as an integral part of the good
life.® On this point, Weber was correct. Calvinism, as a
renewal of Jewish modes of life in the church, did sanctify
the most mundane of callings. As Thomas Pangle and others
have forcefully argued, the American Founders, influenced by
? Tocqueville, 525f.
® Michael Walzer, Exodus and Revolution, 105f. Walzer identifies 
this integration of the commercial and the spiritual as being present 
during the development of the Torah itself. He states, "In their minds 
(as in ours), the material and the ideal, the carnal and the spiritual 
are not so easily separated." Walzer also makes a direct connection 
between this Jewish understanding of labor as a holy calling, of the 
relationship between the ideal and the material, with the perspectives 
of English Puritans, the American Founders, and contemporary liberation 
theologians.
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Locke, were more attracted to modern than classical 
republicanism.® The Federalist Papers reveal the fact that the 
modern republican polity was one in which commerce was 
necessary to, and consistent with, vibrant democratic 
republican life.
Yet, a problem remains with this understanding of 
virtue. Weber's critique of Protestant life is not of its 
origins per se. but rather of the effects of its 
secularization. The Puritan gives way to the bourgeois, the 
last man, who leaves behind the transcendental 
circumscriptions on his behavior and becomes solely motivated 
by interests. These interests become less and less "rightly 
understood" and lead directly to the problem of 
individualism. Tocqueville would certainly agree this is one 
possible outcome of interest orientation. But Tocqueville 
believes this possibility to have been avoided, at least for 
the time being, by Americans' peculiar capacity for 
association. He believes this to be the most important lesson 
he has to offer democratic societies.
Among laws controlling human societies there is one more 
precise and clearer, it seems to me, than all the others.
If men are to remain civilized or to become civilized, the 
art of association must develop and improve among them at 
the same speed as equality of conditions spreads. 0^
Associations, he believes, makes people into citizens. They
are integral to self-goveimment. If individualism is the
greatest danger to freedom because of the way it invites
® Thomas Pangle, The Spirit of Modem Republicanism. See esp. 
Chapter 9, "The New Meaning of the Active Virtues. "
10 Tocqueville, 517.
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despotism, associations are the solution. And, if the pursuit 
of interests narrowly understood is what leads to 
individualism, then the cooperation of those within 
associations is critical to broadening the definitions of 
interests.
Tocqueville also believes that the mores of the American
people, cultivated by religion, are a preventive to tyranny.
He believes that, in the American experience, the spirit of
religion and the spirit of democracy are in harmony.
Freedom sees religion as the companion of its struggles and 
triumphs, the cradle of its infancy, and the divine source 
of its rights. Religion is considered as the guardian of its 
mores, and mores are regarded as the guarantee of the laws 
and pledge for the maintenance of freedom itself.
This is a crucial point in developing a viable theory of
liberal life insofar as mores--the habits or enculturation of
behaviors--are the basis of culture itself. Any social theory
of liberalism must show how and why it is that behaviors
evolved consistent with, and amenable to, democratic life.
For there have been innumerable circumstances in which
religion and democracy have not been complementary.
Tocqueville's answer lies in his analysis of the Puritan
origins of American mores and the way these mores influenced
social and political practice. His account is not unlike that
given by Elazar in his discussion of the effects of
covenantalism in America, a point to which I will return.
Tocqueville's analysis of New England shows how
covenantal thought can influence political culture and
11 Ibid., 47.
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institutions of governance. If his analysis is correct, then 
covenantal thought may provide a means of avoiding the 
problems of liberal and realist theory addressed earlier. He 
shows that ethics and interests are not incommensurable.
Based upon the implications of his model, states should 
benefit from pursuing their interests within ethical 
circumscriptions. At the same time, they can develop 
institutional habits of c o o p e r a t i o n ^ ^  that can lead to 
solutions to collective action problems that do not involve 
diabolical bargains or moral crusades, both of which involve 
dubious uses of power.
Social Capital Theory and Political Culture: Fukuvama and
EutnaiD
One can rightly raise the question as to whether there 
is any evidence that--one hundred and sixty years after 
Tocqueville wrote— his theories remain plausible. There is a 
more recent line of interdisciplinary research that 
substantiates the importance and correctness of Tocqueville's 
concerns about political culture: social capital theory.
The "New Institutional * literature in comparative politics, 
public administration, management, and other fields attests to why this 
statement is more than just an idle anthropomorphism. Institutions 
create organizational cultures, habits and memory that circumscribe 
available choices made by individual actors in those institutions. 
Despite criticisms of this approach, methodological individualism is not 
sacrificed. New Institutionalists merely recognize the constraints 
decision-makers within particular contexts place upon themselves. See 
Edgar Schein, Orgranizational Culture and Leadership (San Fransisco, CA: 
Jossey-Bass, 1985), especially 1-22; James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, 
"The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life,* 
American Political Science Review 78 (September 1984), 734-749; Donald 
D, Searing, 'Roles, Rules, and Rationality in the New Institutionalism," 
Americeui Political Science Review 85 (December 1991), 1239-1260.
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Social capital is the foundation of political and
economic effectiveness. It is a universal variable, and as
such, fits well within the liberal framework. Yet, unlike
late liberal theory, which emphasizes autonomous individuals,
social capital describes communal interactions and beliefs.
As a result, it can easily be applied to the international
level. States can accrue or expend social capital, depending
upon international behavior. The peace between liberal
states, for example, can largely be attributed to the wealth
of social capital between them.
Social capital is described by James Coleman, the
scholar most responsible for its original development, in the
following way:
Social capital . . . comes about through changes in the 
relations among persons that facilitate action. If physical 
capital is wholly tangible, being embodied in observable 
material form, and human capital is less tangible, being 
embodied in the skills and knowledge acquired by an 
individual, social capital is less tangible yet, for it
exists in the relations among persons. Just as physical
capital and human capital facilitate productive activity, 
social capital does as well. For example, a group within 
which there is extensive trustworthiness and extensive trust 
is able to accomplish much more than a comparable group 
without that trustworthiness and trust.
Relationships are primarily placed in moral terms as
evidenced by the words "trust", and "trustworthiness." But
this is not morality devoid of a circumstantial component ;
this is morality structured to accomplish particular goals of
cooperation that lead to mutual benefits for all involved in
the trust community. Indeed, the combination of social norm
James Coleman, "Social Capital in the Creation of Human 
Capital," AmericêUJ Joxxmal of Sociology Supplement (1988), SlOOf. 
Emphasis in the original.
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theory and rational choice theory into one conceptual 
framework is social capital's greatest conceptual virtue.
Social capital theorists provide theoretical and 
empirical grounding for Tocqueville's conception of self- 
interest rightly understood. In this section, I discuss two 
theorists who have written a great deal on the subject, both 
of whom also have much to say about international and 
comparative politics: Francis Fukuyama and Robert Putnam.
Both rely heavily on Tocqueville's insights regarding the 
importance of associations in a democratic society. Their 
work also has great similarities to Elazar's covenantal 
theory.
Fukuyama on Social Capital
Chapter 2 discussed Fukuyama's concerns about "Anglo- 
Saxon* liberal theory which he associates with Hobbes and 
Locke. In his book. Trust, Fukuyama relies upon a social 
capital argument to deal with these concerns, Fukuyama 
defines social capital similarly to Coleman as “a capability 
that arises from the prevalence of trust in a society or in 
certain parts of it. *^  ^ It is "created and transmitted through 
cultural mechanisms like religion, tradition, or historical
Ibid., S98. Coleman believes social norm theory to be deficient 
because there is no explanation of agent motivation, "no engine of 
action" (S96). Economic or rational choice theory "flies in the face of 
empirical reality" (S96). It ignores the fact that rationality is 
severely bounded by social context.
Fukuyama, Trust, 26.
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habit."16 He distinguishes social capital arrangements from 
contract in that contracts are understood to be interest- 
based relationships that, in the minds of economists, do not 
require a great deal of trust. Like Elazar, Fukuyama sees 
social capital relationships requiring more; they require 
"shared ethical values,
The most important subset of social capital is what 
Fukuyama calls "spontaneous sociability," the tendency within 
a culture to "form new associations and to cooperate within 
the terms of reference they establish, "i® This tendency is 
bottom-up, not top-down, requiring initiative and motivation 
on the part of individuals who seek a common good through 
cooperation. This important point goes to the heart of the 
Tocquevillean thesis concerning association.
The economic consequences of spontaneous sociability are 
profound. Those societies which have a tendency to associate 
will flourish; those who do not will not. On its face, this 
supposition makes a great deal of sense. One would expect a 
greater degree of productivity if employees and employers 
were trustworthy, if everyone honored their agreements 
without having to resort to third-party (state) intervention, 
if companies could use capital to improve products rather 
than hiring attorneys or security guards who produce nothing. 
Obviously this is a relative, rather than absolute, argument.
16 Ibid,
11 Ibid,, 26f. 
18 Ibid,, 27.
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Societies must be compared with each other to see if the 
argument has empirical merit.
Fukuyama examines a number of countries to prove his 
point. The US, Germany, and Japan have first-world economies 
because they produced associations that led to extra-familial 
trust. In Japan, this was due to laws that secured the legal 
status of adopted children and the remnants of feudalism 
after the Meiji Revolution.^® In Germany, it was largely due 
to the existence of guilds arising out of the early free 
c i t i e s . I n  the US, spontaneous association occurred largely 
because of Protestant sectarianism.21 In addition, he utilizes 
social capital as a method of analyzing economic activity in 
a number of Asian and European nations such as C h i n a ,22 
France, 22 and Italy, to show why their economies have had 
great difficulty developing large corporations without state 
intervention. Fukuyama points to research done by Michel 
Crozier, Douglass North, and Robert Thomas, on the economic 
consequences of familial-based industry and a state-led 
e c o n o r t y . 2 4  Because of a lack of spontaneous associations, the 
state has been forced to step in to construct or maintain
2® Ibid., 166f; 171-175.
20 Ibid., 245-249.
21 Ibid., 287-290.
22 Ibid., 69-95.
22 Ibid., 114.
24 Ibid., 118-122. Fukuyama cites one example mentioned by North
and Thomas of historical state bureaucratic intervention that was 
typical: the regulations concerning the dyeing of cloth which ran to 317 
articles.
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large firms. Yet this has had appalling consequences for 
France's ability to develop a truly vibrant private sector.
Fukuyama's thesis is quite important. Understanding how 
it is that national economies flourish, or wither, provides 
insight into the relationship between variables used to 
explain the rise and sustainability of democracy. Most of the 
democratization literature argues that economic growth 
precedes democratic transitions. Economic growth serves as an 
independent variable, the source of which is itself not 
questioned. Yet, as Fukuyama argues, economic growth itself 
relies upon social capital, a point also made by Robert 
Putnam in his analysis of Italy.
Putnam on Social Capital
While Fukuyama makes a strong case for the importance of 
social capital, Robert Putnam's is stronger still. Putnam's 
study of Italy, discussed in Making Democracy Work, is a 
model of powerful social science research. He relies on 
interviews, survey data, and public records— rendered 
meaningful by factor analysis— that cover a period of more 
than twenty years. His model integrates social and historical 
contexts with a rational choice model, covering the social 
and economic elements of social capital theory. In addition, 
his study has some remarkable similarities to the accounts of 
Tocqueville and Elazar on the North-South divisions in US 
political culture. In many ways. Making Democracy Work is an 
empirical verification of the theoretical integrity of these
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accounts.
Putnam divides modern Italy into two regions: the civic 
North and an interest-seeking and individualistic South. He 
raises the question central to this paper: how are collective 
action problems effectively solved in liberal societies? For 
the self-interested individual, might it not be rational to 
pursue one's own interest rather than that of one's neighbor 
or the community? How may communities, or in this case 
regions, avoid the nefarious arithmetic of rational action in 
pursuit of individualism of the sort Tocqueville is so 
concerned about?
From the data he collects, Putnam concludes that 
Italians in the North are civic-minded, engaged, and have a 
sense of broad-based enlightened self-interest. Southerners 
are more willing to leave politics to the professionals who 
are able to look after their interests and provide them with 
what Mancur Olson refers to as "selective incentives," direct 
favors in exchange for v o t e s . F a r  from being irrational in a 
rational actor model, the behavior he finds in the South 
becomes rationally justifiable when it is necessary for 
survival and where levels of trust are abysmally low.
One can then raise the question as to how this cultural 
division came about in Italy. Putnam shows that, in the 
Italian example, medieval northern Italians came together to 
form communal relationships for both protection and mutual
25 Putnam, 91-120. This section contains the heart of the 
statistical case Putnam makes to test his theory.
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aid. In his account of northern Italian history, Putnam goes 
to great lengths to show that far from the 14th and 15th 
centuries being highly secularized, the period of communal 
development was in fact very religious.He states: 
"Ecclesiastical authority in the communal republics was 
minimal, not because religiosity was replaced by secularism, 
but because church hierarchy was supplanted by lay 
associations." He goes on to say that this change was one of 
the elements that led to the development of "a powerful and 
unparalleled degree of civic commitment.
The South suffered from less favorable circumstances. 
Its cities were ruled by Norman kings through an increasingly 
powerful bureaucratic apparatus which, as in Tocqueville's 
France, prevented the kind of political balancing act that 
occurred further north. Both state and church stood in a 
vertical relationship to the people of the South who found 
themselves ruled either by kings or priests.-®
Putnam also shows in great detail that civic engagement 
preceded economic growth in the North. With the rise of 
industrialism, northern provinces where social capital 
flourished were able to form thriving corporations. The South 
was unable to do so without state intervention. As he writes, 
" [C] ivic traditions turn out to be a uniformly powerful 
predictor of present levels of socioeconomic development.
26 Ibid., 127.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., 130.
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even when we hold constant earlier levels of d e v e l o p m e n t . "2* 
This is a point of extreme importance, one that is 
justified in light of empirical democratization research. 
Scholars like Samuel Huntington, Adam Przeworski, and Seymour 
Martin Lipset have emphasized the role of economics as a 
necessary condition of stability. These scholars believe that 
stability can be closely correlated with specific threshold 
levels of per capital GDP. Huntington argues that for those 
nations with a per capita GDP of $3000, "coups are rarely 
attempted and almost never succeed.Przeworski provides 
evidence that the likelihood of a democracy "dying" falls 
from 12% at a per capita GDP of less than $1000 to 1% at 
$4000-$6000.21 Lipset shows that of low-income economies, 75% 
of states have authoritarian regimes, while no high end 
industrial economies do; they are all democratic.22
These analyses, however, treat economic growth as an 
independent variable. Fukuyama and Putnam, on the other hand, 
treat it as dependent. If economic growth is a necessary 
condition for stable democracy, and social capital is a 
prerequisite for vibrant economic growth, then the importance
23 Putnam, 157.
20 Samuel Huntington, "Democracy for the Long Haul,* in 
Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies, eds. Larry Diamond et al 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 8.
21 Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio, and Fernando 
Limongi, "What makes Democracies Endure?" in Consolidating the Third 
Wave Democracies, 296.
22 Seymour Martin Lipset, Kyoung-Ryung Seong and John Charles 
Torres, "A Comparative Analysis of the Social Requisites of Democracy," 
ONESCO (1993), 157.
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of social capital in consolidating democratic transitions is 
critical.
The belief in expansion and consolidation is central to 
liberal thought, whether of the covenantal or late modern 
variety. This follows from the chiliastic roots of liberalism 
in early covenantal religious thought which predicted that, 
despite trial and tribulation, there would be a secular trend 
toward expansion of the kingdom of the saints. This belief 
was secularized during the Enlightenment and transformed into 
the idea that liberal states would eventually prevail, a view 
seen in the works of Kant, Hegel, and, of course, Fukuyama.
Together, Putnam and Fukuyama make a strong case for 
social capital as a beneficent factor in solving collective 
action problems. The development of an organizational culture 
that can produce attitudes amenable to solving these problems 
occurs from the bottom up. Both scholars assert that 
historically, the variable that best explains whether social 
capital would arise or not is the presence or absence of 
hierarchy. The same is true at the international level. Their 
findings suggest that while coercive top-down solutions to 
global problems might have short-term benefits, in the long 
run, such an approach will prove counterproductive. As 
inefficient and frustrating as the present process of 
international agreement-making seems to be, the alternative 
of a world-state envisioned by some liberals and realists 
alike presents a specter of hierarchy not likely to engender 
an increase in levels of trust or community-building.
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The Covenantal Commonwealth: Elazar on Political Culture 
Elazar agrees with Putnam and Fukuyama that culture 
affects politics and institutions. Like Tocqueville before 
him, Elazar distinguishes two different projects that were at 
work in the American colonial founding, one commercial and 
the other devoted to a "commonwealth" concept. In the former:
[T]he political order is conceived of as a marketplace in 
which the primary public relationships are products of 
bargaining among individuals and groups acting out of self- 
interest. In the second, the political order is conceived to 
be a commonwealth— a state in which the whole people have an 
undivided interest— in which the citizens cooperate in an 
effort to create and maintain the best government in order 
to implement certain shared moral principles.
How much a given region or polity emphasizes one or the other
of these poles will also determine how they solve the
problems that inevitably arise out of the opposition of power
and justice. Recall that these are, according to Elazar, the
two foundational elements of p o l i t i c s . it is not
inconsequential to note that this same dichotomy is the
animus behind much of the literature on international ethics.
This is particularly true for realists, like those discussed
in the previous chapter, who have spent much time
contemplating what appears to them as an aporia, an
unsolvable puzzle. Both in theory and in praxis, the way that
interests and ethics are ordered will have a tremendous
effect on how future international relations are constructed.
Elazar provides three categories of political culture
Daniel Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States, 2nd 
Edik Ion (New York: Harper 6 Row, 1972) 90f.
Ibid., 91.
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that lead to specific modes of organizational behavior, each 
of which integrates interests and ethics in a distinctive 
way. He separates American political culture into three types 
reflecting the degree to which regions place value on the 
public good over interest-based market considerations. These 
three types mirror exactly Tocqueville's own divisions of 
American culture. They are denoted as individualistic, 
traditionalistic, and moralistic.The distinctions Elazar 
makes are of extreme importance for this work because of 
their explanatory value at the international level. All of 
these cultures appear within the US, a liberal democratic 
state. They can also apply to democratic states in general.
Individualistic cultures are those in which the 
marketplace is used as a metaphor for good governance. "In 
its view, government is instituted for strictly utilitarian 
reasons, to handle those functions demanded by the people it 
is created to serve.Government interventions into 
community affairs is to be very limited and autonomy is 
placed at a premium. In such a system, party loyalty is more 
important than the implementation of some notion of the 
public good. Politics is just a necessary evil. When one 
looks at the chart of American political cultures designed by 
Elazar, one finds that such commercially-oriented attitudes 
are found in the mid-Atlantic area at the founding and have 
spread West from there. This is hardly surprising since, as
35 Ibid., 93. 
35 Ibid., 94.
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Tocqueville writes of those who settled this region.
It was . . . gold-seekers who went to Virginia, men without 
wealth or standards whose restless turbulent temper 
endangered the infant colony and made its progress 
vacillating. . . .  No noble thought or conception beyond 
gain presided over the foundation of the new settlements.
The colony had hardly been established when slavery was 
introduced.
AC Che incernacional level, scaces engage in 
individualisCic behavior when chey engage in inceresc-seeking 
defined in Che narrowesc Cerms. This can, and does, include 
liberal scaCes in periods of self-absorpcion, such as when 
proceccionism prevails economically or when scaces fail Co 
solve colleccive acCion problems adequacely or in a cimely 
fashion. Isolacionism, boch poliCical and economic, is Che 
incernacional equivalenc of pernicious individualism.
However, one could reasonably argue chac imperial colonialism 
also represenced a form of individualism, wich each nacion 
grabbing cerricory in Che so-called terra nullius, land chac 
belonged Co no one according co Che criceria of modern 
scaces. IndividualisCic scaces will normally adhere Co public 
incernacional agreemencs, chough occasionally chey will 
violacé chose agreemencs, primarily due co confliccs wich 
illiberal scaces.
The cradicionaliscic culCure Elazar characcerizes as 
"pre-commercial" in ics accicudes, buc in some ways ic simply 
exacerbaces all che negacive qualicies of Che individualisCic 
culCure. This culCure "funccions Co confine real poliCical 
power Co a relacively small and self-perpeCuaCing cproup drawn
Tocqueville, 34f.
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from an established elite who often 'inherit' their right to 
govern through family ties or social p o s i t i o n . T h e  
citizenry, in such a culture, makes few demands and plays 
little role in political decision-making at any level. In the 
patron-client relationships of the traditionalistic culture, 
however, no broad mass-based appeal is necessary. Interest 
takes on a whole new pernicious meaning; it is carried to its 
logical conclusion as a motivating factor.
At the international level, these states will be 
primarily illiberal or marginally democratic. Many 
transitional democracies might fall into this category, such 
as Russia, or some Latin American states. Their behavior is 
plagued by all the problems raised by a patron-client system. 
Regardless of their formal governing structure, they lack 
social capital and find it difficult to engage in trust 
relationships with other states. The utilization of 
international organizations or law will be to serve a narrow 
conceptions of interests. In this framework, law, domestic 
and international, is what critical legal theorists suppose: 
politics by another means.
Elazar's third political culture, the moralistic or 
commonwealth culture, is clearly his ideal model as a support 
for good governance. In the commonwealth culture, 
individualism is tempered by "a general commitment to 
utilizing communal--preferably non-govemmental, but 
government if necessary-power to intervene into the sphere of
38 Blazar, American Federalism, 99.
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'private' activities when it is considered necessary to do so 
for the public good or the well-being of the community The 
definition of good government is "measured by the degree to 
which it promotes the public good and in terms of the 
honesty, selflessness, and commitment to the public welfare 
of those who govern.
In the commonwealth culture, politics is not seen as 
dirty or a necessary evil. Nor is political engagement a 
compact with the diabolical. Elazar characterizes the view of 
politics in the commonwealth as "healthy," an arena which is 
"every citizen's responsibility. In America, Elazar found 
that commonwealth cultures arose in regions settled by the 
Puritans and spread West as descendants of these colonists 
moved to the Midwestern region of the country. Today's 
commonwealth states are found primarily in New England and 
the upper Midwest (Wisconsin and Minnesota, for example). 
States in this region are not known either for their 
conservatism or their political passivity. They have 
professional, responsible state governments, high levels of 
political participation, and a comparatively high level of 
solidarity with regards to the need to achieve public goods 
as a moral enterprise.
No one could accuse colonial New Englanders of being 
uninterested in commercial gain. Yet their pursuit of
39 Ibid., 97.
40 Ibid., 96f.
41 Ibid., 101.
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interests was carried out in such a way that both public and 
private goods were provided, and political institutions were 
maintained with a high degree of efficacy. Commonwealth as an 
ideal-type integrates interests and ethics so as to preserve 
both over the long run.
Examples of international level covenantal behavior are 
abundant. When states engage in cooperation to solve global 
problems ethically, they are one step closer to covenantal 
behavior. This can be seen in the means by which the US 
carried out its postwar policy in Europe and Japan. In both 
cases, the Marshall Plan and the reconstruction of Japan 
after 1947 represent classic cases in which the US integrated 
interests and ethics. It was clearly in its long-term 
interests to provide funds for the rebuilding of both 
regions. By doing so, the US created economic partners as 
well as creating a buffer against communism.
It was this principle that George Kennan had in mind 
when he penned the now-famous "X" article in Foreign Affairs. 
Kennan believed that by helping US allies to rebuild, they 
would not fall prey to the social and economic pathologies 
that made illiberalism such a temptation to poorer states. 
Unfortunately, his concept was misinterpreted by Truman as an 
argument for creating military commitments across the globe 
to fight the Soviet bloc, even in venues where fundamental 
interests were not at stake.
The Bretton Woods agreement, as I mentioned in a 
previous chapter, also serves as an example of the merging of
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ethics and interests. The GATT, the IMF (until recently), and 
the World Bank not only worked to benefit global economic 
leaders but gave special consideration to developing nations. 
These nations were allowed to retain tariff barriers to 
protect their infant industries while their goods entered 
many developed nations tariff free. This assisted their 
development to the degree that they were willing to become a 
part of the global economy. Even after the end of the gold 
peg for international currencies, liberal states have, on 
occasion, successfully cooperated to provide currency 
stability, despite negative short-term consequences.
Along these same lines, the US has, until now, resisted 
the temptation to return to protectionist practices despite 
enormous merchandise trade deficits. When asked about this, 
leading members of both major US political parties make 
similar arguments, for example, about the US' $60 billion 
deficit with China. It is good for the US to trade because it 
reduces inflation and it keeps China on the road to economic 
development. As China develops, democratic pressures will 
only intensify. Thus, in the long-run, open trade is good for 
the US and for China despite short-term problems in the US 
balance-of-payments.
It is possible to find liberal states acting in the 
international arena within the confines of any of these three 
typologies. Consolidated liberal states, however, will 
normally act in individualistic or commonwealth modes. A 
truly stable liberal democracy, by its very nature, must have
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already risen above the kind of patron-client relationships 
typical in the traditionalistic states.
One would expect that the most effective international 
institutions would be those created by and limited to liberal 
states themselves, states who have created what Robert 
Axelrod calls iterated patterns of trust among themselves.<2 
Indeed, if one examines the examples of successful 
cooperation given above, they involve liberal states helping 
or defending one another, though there may be positive 
externalities for other states.
The clearest example of liberal cooperation is, however, 
the democratic peace predicted by Kant. The lack of military 
conflict among consolidated liberal states is the best 
evidence for the positive integration of interests and ethics 
in those states. Most importantly, this peace has not been 
enforced by a world state or international army. It has 
occurred, in fact, in spite of formal anarchy at the global 
level and realist contentions that regime type is irrelevant 
to global concerns. This fact highlights the key link 
between domestic and international behavior. Organizational
2^ See Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York:
Basic Books, 1984).
'*2 Despite his belief in the autonomy of international politics, 
Kissinger alluded to the importance of domestic political culture in his 
discussion of foreign policy. He stated, for example, that Napolean's 
bellicosity were a reflection of his domestic autocratic tendencies. In 
addition, he believed that the Soviets were so contentious in their 
foreign policy because they "had prevailed in a system that ruthlessly 
weeds out the timid and the scrupulous." Cited in Spencer R. Weart, 
Never At f/arr Why Democracies Will Not Fight One Another (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1998), 78.
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culture creates domestic patterns of power application that
are then transposed to the international level. In his
exhaustive study of the democratic peace thesis, Spencer
Weart states:
Experiments in social psychology show us, and common sense 
tells us, that we cling to our ways of thinking. We repeat 
accustomed practices in new situations, unless emphatic 
experience convinces us that we must change. This fact 
suggests a key hypothesis: leaders will tend to act toward 
their foreign counterparts in the way they are accustomed to 
act toward rival domestic political leaders.'*^
Weart notes that this treatment is only afforded to those who
are seen as worthy of trust or equal regard, meaning other
liberal states. However, this explanation might also shed
light on the pendulum swings in democratic foreign policy
between passivity and imprudent vehemence. Some leaders, like
Chamberlain, may have projected trust unworthily, assuming
that illiberal regimes ought to also receive the same
treatment as liberal ones. Weart's argument may also explain
why in other circumstances, leaders may demonize other
nations. In both cases, democratic leaders misapply
international ethics in ways consistent with realist
critiques. They either pretend there are no differences or no
similarities between regime types. Either way, the results,
ethically speaking, will be disastrous.
Regardless of the problems liberal states face in
dealing with those that are illiberal, there is clearly a
habituated tendency in the informal norms that have arisen
between liberal states to keep the peace, a monumental
44 Ibid., 15.
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achievement given global history. Cooperation is not enough, 
however, to ensure the development of the sustainable 
integration of interests and ethics of the sort found in 
commonwealth cultures. There are limits to the influence of 
culture or informal norms. Covenants are more than just tacit 
agreements or relationships; they involve design. As such, 
the role of institutions in covenantal thought is of great 
importance.
Tocqueville and Elazar on Institutions
I have argued above that institutional arrangements and 
practices limit and constrain the choices available to actors 
within them. Nowhere is this more evident than in federal 
arrangements that are specifically designed to limit the 
power of political actors. The Founders specifically had this 
role in mind when they developed the Constitution of the US. 
In addition, they believed that there ought to be 
institutional constraints on the ability of executives to 
wage war and be engaged in dubious enterprises overseas. The 
US Constitution, Article I, section 8 provides that Congress 
shall declare war and have regulatory power over military 
support and spending. The same article limits the ability of 
Congress to provide money to the military for more than two 
years at a time. Article II, section 2 requires a president 
to get approval of two-thirds of the Senate to ratify 
treaties, limiting the ability of the executive to 
unilaterally entangle the US in various alliances. Though
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Tocqueville did not speak specifically of these limitations, 
he was impressed by the general diffusion of administrative 
power in the US, a factor he believed to be singularly 
important in the preservation of liberty.
While Tocqueville was impressed with the political 
culture of New England, he also had a great deal to say about 
the institutional structure of American government. Two of 
his observations are of particular importance: the 
distinction between centralization of administration and 
government, and the benefits of federalism. Both of these 
qualities, he believes, contribute to the well-being of the 
American polity.
In his discussion of public administration at all levels 
in the US, Tocqueville distinguishes between centralization 
of administration and centralization of the government.
Certain interests, such as enactment o£ general laws and the 
nation's relations with foreigners, are common to all parts 
of the nation.
There are other interests of special concern to certain 
parts of the nation, such, for instance, as local 
enterprises.
To concentrate all the former in the same place or under 
the same directing power is to establish what I call 
governmental centralization.
To concentrate control of the latter in the same way is 
to establish what I call administrative centralization.^^
Because of ics federal system, the US has governmental but
not administrative centralization. This is in contrast to
France, which has both. The combination of the two, says
Tocqueville, is dangerous and, in a democracy, a sure road to
majoritarian despotism.^®
45 Tocqueville, 87,
46 Ibid,, 87f.
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This observation is close in tone to that made by an 
important covenantal thinker, Abraham Kuyper. Kuyper, Prime 
Minister of the Netherlands from 1900 to 1905 and founder of 
the Free University of Amsterdam, developed a political 
theory based largely on covenantal premises. Unlike many 
other theorists, however, he had the opportunity to implement 
a political program based upon that theory. Kuyper advocated 
what he referred to as the ideal of "sphere sovereignty." 
There are a multiplicity of spheres of activity: families, 
private associations, government, universities, businesses, 
churches, etc. Each sphere has a relative degree of autonomy 
from the others, and each functions according to its own 
specific r u l e s . T h e y  do not stand in opposition to one 
another, said Kuyper, but they are to cooperate in pursuing 
larger public goals. What is remarkable about this 
characterization is the way the state is seen as merely 
another form of association, one that has no inherent 
supremacy except within its own limited sphere. Tocqueville 
uses similar terms to describe the limitation of the power of 
the national government. "It is true that the Union, as 
constituted in 1789, has only restricted [limited] 
sovereignty, but it was intended that within this sphere it 
should form one and the same people. Within this sphere it is
Abraham Kuyper, "Calvinism and Politics," in Lectures on 
Calvinism; Six lectures Delivered at Princeton University, 1898 under 
the auspices of the L.P. Stone Foundation. 12 May 1999 
<http : / /www.kuyper .org/stone/Lecture3 .html>, 96f.
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sovereign. "48
This observation leads Tocqueville to make an important 
point concerning the US Constitution. The ideal of sphere 
sovereignty is deliberate, constructed according to design. 
The US, he says, is not the first confederation in history. 
He rightly points out that Switzerland, the Netherlands, and 
the German Empire have a confederal system. What is unique 
about the US is that it is a mixture of confederacy and 
national government. Its inhabitants are citizens of both 
states and the national government. They have dual loyalties 
which, in Tocqueville's mind, is a benefit.
Here the central power acts without intermediary on the 
governed, administering and judging them itself, as do 
national governments, but it only acts thus within a 
restricted circle. Clearly here we have not a federal 
government but an incomplete national government. Hence a 
form of government has been found which is neither precisely 
national nor federal; but things have halted there, and the 
new word to express this new thing does not yet exist.49
Tocqueville is right about the unique structure of the US
federal relationship. However, his statement that the US is
not properly federal is correct only if we conflate
confederation with all federal forms of polity. But if we
recall that the root of federal is foedus. the Latin
translation for covenant, we find that there are a number of
different covenantal forms of polity of which confederation
is one form. Elazar lists eight different types of polities
that fall within this category: union, consociation.
4® Tocqueville, 145. 
49 Ibid., 157.
299
federation, federacy, condominium, confederation, league, and 
inter-jurisdictional functional authorities.
Rather than discussing the differences, it makes more 
sense to examine the qualities which unite all of these 
regime types. Elazar provides us with a list of the central 
components of the covenantal or properly federal 
commonwealth. As we will see, these will provide us not only 
with an understanding of what is necessary for sustainable 
domestic political life, but for international politics as 
well, a point discussed in the following chapter.
The foundations of a covenantal or federal theory involve 
three overarching principles that integrate cultural and 
institutional elements: limitations on power through design, 
the exchange of natural for federal liberty, and a strong 
measure of realism. First, covenants are primarily designed 
as power-limiting arrangements. This is true at all levels 
and in all types of associations— e.g., family, political, 
private, public, etc. Power is limited by design, based on 
structural arrangements of consent. Elazar states, "The 
covenant idea has within it the seeds of modem 
constitutionalism in that it emphasizes the mutually accepted 
limitations on the power of all parties to it, a limitation 
not inherent but involving willed concessions.*-^
Parties willingly concede a portion of their own power
Daniel Elazar, Covenant and Civil Society, The Covenant 
Tradition in Politics Series, Volume IV (Brunswick NJ: Transaction 
Publishers, 1998), 232.
Elazar, Covenant and Commonwealth, 3.
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to the collective whole in order to accomplish a greater 
good, part of which is the limitation on power itself. Thus, 
the very founding of the covenantal polity is itself a public 
answer to a collective action problem. There is no 
hypothetical state of nature or tacit consent given by 
ancestors that is binding upon those in the present. 
Covenanting is a public act that requires public consent and 
a means of reaffirming consent through the political process. 
That reaffirmation may, in some sense, be tacitly given. For 
example, it may be exemplified by a lack of will to alter the 
basic constitutional design through the amendment process. 
Original consent, however, may never be tacit.
Normally, the cession of power to governing bodies is 
limited and separated both functionally and geographically, 
as is the case in Switzerland, Germany, and the US. There are 
an abundance of federal relationships between citizens and 
governments at all levels. This allows for further autonomy 
in choosing more specifically the role the state will play at 
each level within the absolute boundaries of the 
constitution. Some may choose more intervention, some less. 
Some may choose one means of accomplishing policy objectives 
while some may choose another. Because of the multiplicity of 
networks that arise in power-sharing arrangements, policy 
borrowing and institutional learning are maximized, as is the 
overall level of consensus, a fact both economics and 
information theory have begun to verify. ^2
In economics, the need for multiple and decentralized sources 
of information has been long recognized, particularly by the Austrian.
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Second, in the process of engaging in this public act, 
there must be an understanding that individuals give up 
natural liberty for federal liberty. They must "live up to 
the terms of their covenants. They accept limits not only 
on state power but on their own as well. Federal liberty is 
absolutely antithetical to individualistic autonomy and 
hierarchic coercion. Covenantal relationships emphasize 
obligations, out of which come rights. This answers the 
liberal dilemma characterized by Fukuyama as the problem of 
"perfect rights and imperfect duties. In addition, sphere 
sovereignty requires that there can be no unitary public good 
or singular role to be played by any individual. There is no 
publicly defined singular virtue defined and enforced by the 
state in all spheres; rather there are virtues within 
spheres. Neither state, nor church, nor family, nor any other 
association contains a hegemonic power over the good 
institutionally.
The idea that, ultimately, no one institution is "in 
charge" is one of the most difficult aspects of the
and Chicago schools of economists. Political science was slower to 
accede this point but see Charles Lindblom's Politics and Markets: The 
World Political-Economic Systems (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 
especially chapter 22. Lindblom recognized the inherent problems of 
managing information efficiently in a planned economy long before those 
problems had become obvious to western observers. More recently, chaos 
and information theory has made it clear that decentralization is a 
necessity for maximization of learning. For public administration and 
management implications of this, see L. Douglas Kiel, Managing Chaos 
And Complexity In Government; A New Paradigm for Managing Change, 
Innovation, and Organizational Renewal (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass 
Publishers, 1994).
Elazar, Covenant and Commonwealth, 3.
Fukuyama, The End of History, 322-327.
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covenantal polity for people to accept. Weber's understanding 
of rational authority, and of the state holding the monopoly 
on legitimate violence, prevails. Even those within federal 
or covenantal cultures have difficulty conceptualizing an 
order in which there is no ultimate authority. The temptation 
to see the state not as an association but as an organic or 
hierarchical entity is powerful. The US has gone through 
periods in which it was fashionable to see power residing 
ultimately in the legislative body, as with Woodrow Wilson's 
Congressional Government, or in the executive, as was the 
case with the national security state of the Cold War period. 
Some might argue that, currently, the US is in a period of 
judicial supremacy in which the Supreme Court plays the role 
of hegemon or ultimate arbiter of conflict.
Covenantal polities require a federal concept of liberty 
precisely because this is the only way liberty of any kind 
can be sustained. A covenantal structure in which 
constituents of the polity turn from federal to natural 
liberty moves toward amoral anarchy. As the classical 
political theorists and the American Founders understood, 
this variety of anarchy inevitably devolves into hierarchical 
regimes of some kind. For this reason, federally constructed 
institutions will function only upon a foundation of 
federally minded constituents. Both culture and institutions 
are necessary, as Madison wrote in Federalist 51, one chapter 
in a profoundly covenantal document.
But what is government itself but the greatest of all
reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no
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government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, 
neither external nor internal controls on government would 
be necessary. In framing a government which is to be 
administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in 
this : You must first enable the government to control the 
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.
A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control 
on the government; but experience has taught mankind the 
necessity of auxiliary precautions
One also sees a strongly realist element in this passage 
which brings us to the third core component of covenantal 
theory. Arising as it does out of Jewish theopolitical 
thought, covenantal theory shares with international realism 
a sense of human tragedy and sin. Again, there are profoundly 
moral as well as prudential reasons for limiting power. This 
divides covenantal thought from either the hierarchical 
liberalism of late modernity and the "wartime Berlin" 
mentality of some communitarians who see a central role for 
the state in reinforcing a unitary understanding of civic 
virtue. Covenantal thought recognizes the inherent dangers of 
providing the state with overarching powers, even to 
accomplish a public good.
This recognition goes to the heart of Tocqueville's 
argument concerning centralization of administration. He 
recognized the annoyance caused 1%^  the lack of regularity in 
laws and ordinances in the US, in contrast to France. Even 
so, he understood that although the state could bring about a 
uniformity in the practices of citizens through social 
control, this would lead to the enervation of the
James Madison, "Federalist 51," 322.
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p o p u l a t i o n . In addition, it would be all too easy for states
to act aggressively in the name of some higher national (or
international) good. Pointing out that the French Revolution
was both republican and centralizing, Tocqueville states:
This ambivalent character of the French Revolution was a 
fact of which the lovers of absolute power took great pains 
to make use. When you see them defending administrative 
centralization, do you think they were working in the 
interests of despotism? Not at all; they are defending one 
of the great conquests of the revolution. . . .  In that way 
a man may retain popularity while being an enemy of the 
rights of the people; he may be the hidden servant of 
tyranny and the avowed lover of liberty.
The realistic element of covenantal thought sees 
prudence, or phronesis, as a part of transcendent morality, 
not antithetical to it. This is, in fact, the most important 
link between domestic and international politics, the view 
that covenantal thought takes on the distribution of power. 
For it is the realism of covenantal thought that leads back 
to its first principle, that power must be limited and shared 
to be ethical. R.J. Rummel echoes this principle when he 
states that "Power kills and absolute power kills 
a b s o l u t e l y . "58 what covenantal thought intuited from the 
beginning, Rummel has thoroughly documented in his studies of 
international violence. Concentrated power is dangerous. Few, 
if any, liberals would contend that the checks on power found 
in domestic due process provisions must be overturned for 
purposes of securing some good; yet many seem to ignore the
58 Tocqueville, 91.
57 Ibid., 97.
5® R.J. Rummel, Death by Government (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction, 1994), 1.
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need for such checks to exist in the ability of liberal 
states to use their power internationally. On this matter, 
covenantal thought sides with realists like Morgenthau who 
question the moral crusades of liberal states. Elazar, for 
example, states:
Covenant as a theo-political concept is characterized by a 
very strong measure of realism. This recognition of the need 
to limit the exercise of power is one example of this 
realism. It also recognizes the distinction between those 
who are bound by the covenant and those who are not. At the 
same time it makes provisions for appropriate linkages 
between those so bound and others, granted of a different 
order, but designed to keep the peace in the world in the 
face of the realities of conflicting human interests, needs, 
and demands.59
Though covenantal thought is realistic, however, it is 
separated from international realism first by seeing prudence 
and morality as part of a whole. Politics does not mean, in 
se, engaging in the realm of the diabolical. It is not a 
necessary evil. It ought to be, and can be, a sanctified and 
holy calling that serves to secure public goods. One ought 
not choose the ethic of transcendence or the ethic of 
responsibility. As previous chapters show, doing so leads to 
profoundly immoral consequences. They are inextricable. 
Prudence without transcendence (as Weber uses that term) 
underestimates the ability of humans to strive for goals 
higher than mere survival, whatever the cost. Transcendence 
without the limitations of prudent restraint leads to moral 
blindness and unintended consequences. At its most 
foundational level, prudence attached to transcendence
Elazar, Covenant and Commonwealth, 4.
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becomes a profoundly moral choice. Prudence comes from 
understanding limits, as realists have acknowledged; however, 
far from being tragic, the recognition of limits is the 
beginning of redemption. This is no less true in 
international affairs than it is in theology. Madison 
understood this well:
This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, 
the defect of better motives, might be traced through the 
whole system of human affairs, private as well as public.
We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate 
distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide 
and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that 
each may check on the other; that the private interest of 
every individual may be a sentinel over public rights.
These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the 
distribution of the supreme powers of the State.^^
In addition to being grounded in these three principles,
Elazar lists four primary attributes that all covenantal
polities share. They will all be constitutional. They will be
republican, in the sense that there is a recognition that
rulers are "custodians of power responsible to the ruled."
They will be federal in some broad sense, reflecting the
belief that "political entities can be united into a common
whole without losing their own integrity, by covenant." And
there will be a balancing of powers that prevents power
monopolies from arising.®^ This last characteristic again
reveals the pervasive realism that runs through covenantal
thought. The balance of power is not simply relevant for
international relations; it is necessary for domestic
Madison, "Federalist 51," 322. Emphasis added.
Daniel Elazar, Covenant and Constitutionalism, The Covenant 
Tradition in Politics Series, Volume III (Brunswick NJ: Transaction 
Publishers, 1998), 259.
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politics as well, perhaps even more so.
To some degree, all liberal nations share in these 
characteristics as a matter of practice. Because liberal 
polities succeed by virtue of a meeting of both institutional 
and cultural qualities, by definition, stable liberal nations 
must limit and share power. Even the most hierarchical and 
bureaucratic liberal states meet this criterion. If nothing 
else, they must share power with spheres within civil 
society.
George Modelski's characteristics of global leaders, the 
Netherlands, the UK, and the US, are instructive here. Of 
these four characteristics— control of strategic space, open 
society, lead technologies, and willingness to solve global 
collective action problems--the last three are directly 
related to the covenantal structure. The relative emphasis on 
horizontal rather than hierarchical relationships in 
combination with an ability to cooperate at the national 
level produced an organizational culture capable of global 
leadership.
Having isolated these characteristics, it remains to be 
seen what ethical and epistemic conditions would be necessary 
to acquire and sustain them. Like Kant, we can attempt a 
“transcendental deduction,“ inquiring into the necessary 
conditions for maintaining a liberal, humane social order. If 
liberal states are to avoid fundamental contradictions that 
could potentially undermine their ability to flourish, the 
assumptions of liberal theory must be revised. The next
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chapter examines how covenantal premises can provide liberal 
international thought with more stable foundations than those 
it currently possesses.
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CHAPTER 6
COVENANTAL EPISTEMOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL ETHICS
The previous chapter outlined some of the specific 
institutional requirements of the covenantal order, such as 
the need for power to be dispersed and to be used ethically 
to achieve substantive goods. These requirements are 
essentially rooted in a foundation of moral and epistemic 
realism, terms to be explained further below. This further 
separates covenantal theory from late liberalism and the 
post-Kantian realism described in Chapter 4. Not only are 
prudence and morality synthesized in this theory for purposes 
of founding and structuring a domestic political order, the 
specific requirements of foreign policy must be consistent 
with a transcendent perspective on ethics as well. In this 
chapter, I summarize the epistemic and ethical premises of 
covenantal theory and discuss some of their implications for 
international ethics. In addition, I discuss some policy 
consequences of this paradigm as well as structural 
characteristics of a covenantal world order. Finally, I 
examine the question of the transcendence of ethics in the 
covenantal paradigm.
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Premises of Covenantal Ethics and EDistemoloav 
The premises of covenantal epistemic and ethical unity 
can be summarized as follows:
Premise 1. There is a fundamental intelligibility in the 
uniformity of phenomena that allows for potential 
knowledge of consistently interacting entities.
This premise is the basis for any viable philosophy of 
science, social or natural. In addition, it is the basis for 
a viable covenantal liberal ethical theory. Here we are 
confronted with a dichotomy similar to that outlined by 
MacIntyre in After Virtue. MacIntyre shows that there is a 
fundamental choice that must be made between both the 
epistemologies and the ethics of Nietzsche and of Aristotle. 
In this instance, Nietzsche and Aristotle serve as metonymies 
for emotivism and classical rationality, respectively. One 
might just as easily characterize the bifurcation as existing 
between Kant and Aristotle. Be this as it may, I have 
outlined the consequences of this agnosticism cts it affected 
the thought of liberal and realist thinkers. What these 
thinkers have in common is a commitment to some form of 
relativistic, socially constructivist epistemology. This is 
not merely constructivism based on an empirical recognition 
of culture as practices, but a normative project of the 
relativization of the criteria of knowing altogether.^
I emphasize the word potential above because of the
1 For example, one can separate the empirical sociological 
constructivism of Peter Berger or Alan Wolfe from the "totalizing 
discourse" of constructivism in works hy Michel Foucault or Jacques 
Lacan.
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importance of retaining a contingent element in the premise. 
This avoids two hazards of Kantian epistemology: the 
difficulty in showing the potential for error 
(falsiflability) and the lack of consequentialism. Both 
aspects of Kantian theory overestimate the power of a priori 
thought. As a result, they denude science and ethics of 
their actual potential to shed light on the human condition 
and the phenomena within which it is placed. Once again, one 
might reasonably wonder why this point is important in a 
treatise on international politics. But it is precisely 
because of the existence of contingency and error in the use 
of power that a limit on power is required. Morgenthau is 
absolutely correct in recognizing the importance of scientism 
in leading to a number of pernicious outcomes in the 
international sphere. The roots of that scientism are seen 
most clearly in Kant's flawed epistemology. There must be a 
multiplicity of sources of political discourse precisely 
because of the need for continued reasoning about the 
connections between percepts and concepts in particular 
situations. A unitary hierarchical system of political 
organization can only lead to a unitary and hierarchical 
system of thought with disastrous outcomes.-
This is a point recognized by a number of other 
perspectives as well. Critical rationalists like Habermas 
have long cited the need for a dispersal of information
2 The classic example, being, of course, Leninist state socialism, 
which never progressed beyond the bureaucratic-rational stage.
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sources, a necessity of his scheme of communicative
rationality.] Even Rorty, with his horror of foundationalism,
recognizes the moral worth of dispersed sources of
communication. Discursive theorists, like those relying on
phenomenology, have reached similar conclusions. Merleau-
Ponty 's writings on the role of intentionality reflect an
understanding that actors act subjectively but within a
shared intersubjective world.® However, this world is not
simply a collection of phenomenal stuff to be molded
according to the wishes of some noumenal Cartesian will. Our
relationship to the Lebenswelt (the intersubjective lifeworld
shared by all) and to each ocher in it inherently implies
certain ethical requirements.® As Alan Wolfe states:
We are not social because we are moral; we are moral because 
we live with others and therefore need periodically to 
account for who we are. Morality matters because we have 
reputations to protect, cooperative tasks to carry out.
] Habermas, in fact, rejects two of Kant's critical beliefs that 
have bearing on this subject. First, Habermas rejects the gap between 
the intelligible and the empirical. Second, discourse ethics does not 
take Kant's monological approach in which individuals have only their 
internal consciousness to rely upon to test maxims of action; rather, 
Habermas argues that generalizations about interests result from 
•intersubjectively mounted public discourse.” See Jürgen Habermas,
Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. Christian Lenhardt 
and Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 203. 
Emphasis in the original.
See Rorty, Contingency, Irony, Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), 60. Rorty's “liberal utopia,“ for example, is 
animated by “free and open encounters of present linguistic and other 
practices with suggestions for new practices.“ What these other 
practices are is difficult to say as Rorty, like Wittgenstein, reduces 
all interaction to language games.
® Michel Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, trans. C. 
Smith (New York: Humanities Press, 1962) . On this point, see also 
Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of 
Structuration (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
® However, one potential weakness in phenomenological theory lies 
in the somewhat implicit quality of its ethics.
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legacies to leave, others to love, and careers to follow.^
The synthesis of subjective and objective realms in 
phenomenological unity requires that we do not fully 
objectify others, making them tools of our own will. As we 
share in a common objectivity, we would, then, only objectify 
ourselves. This observation is not far from Kant's dictum 
that we ought never to treat others as means, only as ends. 
But the phenomenological synthesis has the benefit of seeing 
the noumenal and the phenomenal, to use Kantian terms, as 
unified and thus avoids the epistemic dead ends of Kantian 
theory. The political implications of this observation lead 
to an aversion to hierarchy. Hierarchy involves domination 
and a limitation on discourse. This, in turn, leads to lower 
levels of information being available to decision-makers 
which is both inefficacious and immoral.®
The epistemic realism® of covenantal theory also avoids
 ^ Wolfe, 215.
® See, for example, Che introduceion to Chapter Five on discursive 
warrants in Charles J. Fox and Hugh T. Miller, Postmodera Public 
Administration (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1995) . Warrants, 
as used here, have both utilitarian and moral value, summed up by the 
term "authentic discourse."
® Epistemic realism is the perspective that patterns of phenomenal 
interaction can be rationally perceived and coherently understood, that 
there can be reliable perception and synthesis of phenomena. It should 
not be conflated with objectivist foundationalism— the idea that first- 
order beliefs can be directly perceived through sensory data. David 
Brink writes in Moral Realism and the Foundation of Ethics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989):
First-order beliefs are about features of the world 
external to us; second-order beliefs, by contrast, are 
about our first-order beliefs, typically about the 
relationship between first-order beliefs and the world. 
Second-order beliefs include beliefs at various levels of 
generality about the nature and reliability of our belief- 
formation mechanisms (127).
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the mistake of logical positivism, namely the verifiability 
criterion of meaning. This criterion assumes the irrelevance 
or non-existence of any phenomena that cannot be sensorially 
verified or that does not contain merely analytic reality 
(such as the tautology: a=a) . Ethics cannot be founded upon 
this dubious b a s i s . T h e  immorality of genocide, for example, 
cannot be sensorially demonstrated; yet no international 
ethic is plausible without a prohibition upon it.
This point recalls Thomas Spragens' assertion that the 
fundamental error of the Enlightenment's epistemology was in 
denying that the “senses are competent to perceive dynamic 
patterns of b e c o m i n g . H a d  classical liberals, including 
Locke, been content with showing the reliability of first- 
order beliefs, and thus of the entire project of science,
Hume might never have been led to undermine rational
Epistemic realism is coherentist, a view which holds that there must be 
an integrity between first and second-order beliefs, but that there is 
no ultimate foundatioaal basis for first-order beliefs. They cannot be 
proven per se. Instead, coherentism makes claims about the reliability 
of data, about their credibility. Credere— Latin for “to believe*—  
involves trust at epistemic, social, and economic realms. Trust is at 
the heart of covenant. Yet it is not blind trust, but trust developed by 
practices leading to a reliable basis for further action. On the issue 
of epistemic realism and moral judgment, see John Finnis, Natural Law 
and Natural Rights {Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); and Robert George, 
Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1993).
Nor can hyperempiricism provide a foundation for science. The 
belief in the intelligibility of phenomena that underlies all scientific 
experimentation (and enpirically-oriented philosophy for that matter) 
cannot be demonstrated sensorially, as Hume understood. Science on this 
basis would never have produced the inverse-square law or relativity 
theory, which require a belief in the reality of non-empirical 
conceptualizations.
11 Spragens, The Irony of Liberal Reason, 209.
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epistemology. This, in turn, might have prevented the Kantian 
response. Fortunately, most diplomats, political leaders, 
scientists, and others engaged in the practical work of 
political and intellectual life, have ignored these extremes 
and have found what Jaki terms, in the case of Newton, "the 
instinctive middle." For them, ontology has preceded 
epistemology. Political actors have, more often than not, 
assumed the reality of human suffering and the benefits of 
bringing justice to the oppressed, though these are entities 
that are difficult to verify empirically.
Premise 2: Any consistent humanistic ethic requires the 
belief in the intelligibility of moral phenomena, that 
they are accessible to human reason.
We have already seen this premise implied in Sandel's 
critique of Rawls. Sandel objects to the way Rawls brackets 
moral phenomena as being inaccessible to reason. He argues 
that, contrary to Rawls' objections, Rawls' own substantive 
positions about material justice could be (and Sandel 
believes should be) justified rationally.^-
As was the case with the development of the natural 
sciences, the science of ethics was developed within a 
framework of epistemic realism in which transcendence was 
originally guaranteed by an appeal to deity. This is simply 
an explanation of origins, not a justification for particular 
findings. Nevertheless, we ought not commit the genetic
12 Sandel, 207.
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fallacy and hold Chat earlier developments in ethics are 
rendered irrational because of their origins, a requirement 
that would force us to throw out several hundred years' work 
in physics, for example, simply because of the epistemic 
beliefs of Newton, Kepler, Maxwell, and others influenced by 
theology. These conclusions must be judged by rational 
criteria. If international ethics is to be placed upon a 
firmer foundation than that provided by international 
realists or contemporary liberals, a nexus between reason 
and ethics is absolutely necessary.
Is judgment of this kind possible? MacIntyre's work 
suggests that it is. His account of the virtues shows that, 
whatever our particular designs are, we have need of the 
virtues in order to accomplish them, virtue has a strong 
practical quality to it. We see this in his definition of 
virtue as "an acquired human quality the possession of which 
tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal 
to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us 
from achieving any such g o o d s . i t  is not far from this 
understanding of virtue to "self-interest rightly 
understood," for virtue, as conceived by MacIntyre, is a 
practice that occurs in social circumstances, in very 
particular contexts to accomplish particular ends. It 
involves close cooperation with others. For that reason, the 
practice of virtue requires phronesis, knowing which virtue 
to emphasize at which time. This can only be learned through
MacIntyre, 191.
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carefully cultivated experience. Most importantly, virtue is 
accessible to attentive human reason though not to those 
interested in a priori rule-formulation. There is, rather, a 
close linking of right and circumstance. Phronesis, as it 
appears in MacIntyre's work, involves relativity rather than 
relativism. MacIntyre's approach comes close to Morgenthau's 
orientation, especially when the latter discusses the 
•certain relativism in the relation between morality and 
foreign p o l i c y .Transcendent principles remain; their 
application, however, is a matter of judicious observation of 
circumstances.
Phronesis cannot be equated with the postmodern 
epistemic position which would place moral judgments beyond 
the scope of reason altogether. As we have seen, doing so 
leads diplomatic ethics down the perilous path of private 
morality, a position unacceptable in a democratic state. 
Because grounds for ethical judgments may not be immediately 
apparent to all, they remain accessible and discernible to 
rational and attentive minds. Unlike a priori or postmodern 
approaches, moral realism requires a defense of one's logic 
and one's premises in the application of moral principle to 
specific circumstances. And, as Alberto Coll explains, though 
prudence is not equated with morality, prudent political 
decisions are •ultimately grounded and justified by it.*^® The
Morgenthau, Politics Amonff Nations, 246.
Alberto Coll, •Normative Prudence as a Tradition of Statecraft, • 
in Joel Rosenthal ed., Ethics and International Affairs: A Reader 
(Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1995), 59.
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benefit of this tradition of prudence is that, unlike secular 
realism (Coll's term), it retains an attachment to 
transcendent norms while similarly rejecting the moral 
blindness of "radical Christian and secular millenarians, 
Utopians, and revolutionaries. . . Joseph l^e also 
highlights the role of prudence in his discussion of 
international ethics. Nye believes that the compulsive rule- 
orientation of deontic ethics can be dangerous when applied 
in a "one-dimensional* way. In some situations, there can be 
competing moral claims that political decision-makers must 
examine. Nye suggests two intellectual devices that can keep 
prudence from devolving into an amoral consequentialism.
First, he writes that we should always "start with a strong 
presumption in favor of rules and place a substantial burden 
of proof upon those who wish to turn to consequentialist 
arguments. " Nye adds a test of proportionality to this 
decision-rule that takes into account long-term effects of 
judgments on "the system of rules." Second, decision-makers 
ought to "develop procedures which protect the impartiality
Ibid., 58.
Joseph S. I^e Jr., Ethics and International Affairs, An 
Occasional Paper by the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies (Vi^ e 
Plantation, Maryland: Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, 1985), 6.
18 Ibid. Both of these devices are found in the rabbinical 
interpretations of Torah practice. The second is secured by procedural 
boundaries placed on deviations from the law, and the requirement that 
such deviations be justified publicly. The first device is found in the 
highest mitzvah, known as "pickuach nefesh, " in which the preservation 
of life may require the setting aside of a commandment temporarily.
Both of these elements cast further doubt on the interpretation of IR 
realists of biblical ethics as being absolute and inapplicable to the 
exigent circumstances of statecraft that may face political decision­
makers .
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which is at the core of moral reasoning and that is so 
vulnerable in the transition from the deontic to the 
consequentialist approach."
The field of moral ecology is another example of a 
consequentialist ethical approach that does not fall into 
relativism. Like its counterpart in environmental science, 
moral ecology is rooted in epistemic and metaphysical 
realism, relying upon an assumption that carefully controlled 
empirical observation can lead to reliable results. One must 
strain credulity, for example, to apply social constructivism 
theory to the material consequences of toxic pollutants. In 
the same way, moral decisions have material and empirically 
discernible consequences. As is the case with Elazar's 
moralistic political culture, moral ecology theory posits a 
social ecosystem with fragile and often esoteric 
interrelationships between actors and environment. 
Additionally, the collective action dilemma is a central 
concern as it is in natural ecology.
Allan Hertzke has developed a parsimonious, nomological 
theory of moral ecology that sheds light on how consequence 
and right can be integrated.
Both environmental analysts and cultural critics identify 
unrestrained individual freedom as a major source of 
disruption. Ironically, this diagnosis arises from within a 
rights-based liberal polity renowned for celebrating and 
protecting individual freedom. Yet this apparent paradox 
reveals an implicit Tocquevillean acknowledgment that within 
liberal societies the behavior of free persons can undermine 
the health of communities— whether biological or human. What 
links physical ecology and the moral realm, therefore, is an 
appreciation of interdependency that fosters greater concern
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for the common good and lesser stress on individual 
autonomy.19
This approach is a vast improvement on the contemporary
liberal conception of autonomy or the idea of basing liberal
ethics on the harm principle derived from M i l l . O r  one could
say that it raises the harm principle to encompass not self-
interest but self-interest rightly understood, a conception
of self-interest that is compatible with communal goods.
Hertzke believes that empirical social science can offer
a rational means of investigating effects of particular
practices on social, economic, and political life. There is
no need to bracket any kind of language that contains moral
language, comprehensive or otherwise.
As a scholarly construct, therefore, the theory of moral 
ecology appears more concrete and more enduring than 
fleeting political phenomena. Moreover, it responds to the 
lament about the inability of social science to explain 
transformations. Just as biologists do not predict the 
direction of evolution, but have explanations for why it 
will evolve, moral ecologists would not presume to predict 
precisely how complex interactions would ramify, only that 
they will. Thus, the concept of moral ecology offers a more 
dynamic empirical construct than social and political 
theories that depend on regime stability or a fragile 
epistemological framework. Moral ecology, thus, may 
represent a merging of natural law and empirical s c i e n c e .21
19 Allan Hertzke, "The Theory of Moral Ecology, ' The Review of 
Politics 60 (Fall 1998), 631f.
29 John Stuart Mill, "On Liberty," in The Collected Works of John 
Stuart Mill, vol. 18, ed. J.M. Robson (Toronto and London: University of 
Toronto Press, 1977), 223f. Mill defines his harm principle as follows: 
"That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over 
any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent 
harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a 
sufficient warrant." But Mill, like Dahl, requires that decision-makers 
be mature before they are trusted with such liberty, which is not for 
those who could be "improved by free and equal discussion" (224) . In 
addition. Mill believes that autonomous individuals ought to be free not 
only from state coercion, but the coercion of public opinion as well.
22 Hertzke, 654. Emphasis added.
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what policy-makers must do is to consider whether the liberal 
model can stand up to this kind of scrutiny. The dictum "do 
no harm" takes on new meaning in an ecological or public 
health perspective. Whatever the limitations on the exercise 
of communal power in liberal theory, liberal societies have 
had no trouble enacting regulations on all manner of private 
behaviors, drunken driving, seat belts, and now smoking, all 
of which have powerful secondary effects.
Premise 3 : Liberalism must be teleological to be
coherent.
One immediate objection to this premise is that 
teleology is inappropriate in any modern inquiry. Yet, when 
we examine the moral language used by most theorists of 
either international or domestic politics, it becomes 
apparent that there is an implicit theory of ends. In the 
case of Fukuyama's international thought, it is explicit. 
There is an end to history, both empirically and normatively; 
there is an evolution towards a specific goal within that 
history. A theory of international relations that posits no 
direction in history ignores empirical evidence to the 
contrary. In addition, the ideals set forth by international 
law and organizations clearly state the universal goals of 
justice and equity.
The belief in historical meaning and direction is 
another of those beliefs that defies sensory proofs; yet, it 
is necessary to make sense of all reformational or
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revolutionary politics. While late liberal thought cannot 
incorporate this element of ends, it is critical to 
covenantal thought. For this reason, Michael Walzer states 
that the first covenantal order, that of the Jews leaving 
Egypt, is the "first description of revolutionary politics.
It is no coincidence, then, that Puritans, socialists, 
African-American slaves in the South, civil rights marchers, 
and liberation theologians have relied on that peculiar 
narrative. As Walzer points out, it "isn't a story told 
everywhere; it isn't a universal pattern. . . ."23 indeed, 
many cultures have created what might be called ahistorical 
histories, profoundly ateleological in nature, in which the 
cycles of history go on and on eternally. Even the Greeks 
held this view. As Fukuyama points out, a belief in progress, 
universalized by the historical perspective of Christian 
thought, was critical to the development of liberal thought.24 
That perspective continues to be just as critical today, even 
in a secularized form, for sustaining a humane ethic in the 
international realm. Nowhere is this made clearer than in the 
liberal goals of world peace and the dissemination of the 
rule of law. Liberals hold to the principle that such changes 
involve normative and empirical secular trends (as opposed to 
cyclical ones) in human history.
22 Walzer, Exodus and Revolution, 133.
23 Ibid.
24 Fukuyama. The End of History, 56.
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There has been a good deal of empirical inquiry into the 
question of a separate peace by liberal states. Though there 
is some debate about how liberalism is to be precisely 
defined and operationalized, the evidence does point to the 
existence of an historically unique phenomenon. Never in 
history has a regime-type led to non-aggressive interstate 
relations. For this reason, as I have stated above, Michael 
Doyle believes that liberalism is the only international 
theory that can be truly called paradigmatic. Realism does 
not account for this unusual relationship between states. 
Balance of power theory makes little sense when applied to 
relationships between liberal states; and, as Doyle shows, 
even when applied to relations between all states, it must be 
converted, instead, into a balance of threats argument.-^ 
Regime type, not geography, determines the existence of 
threats.
The realist belief that war is a perennial quality of 
international life (short of the world state), regardless of 
regime type, is not consistent with empirical evidence. The 
threats to peace in the world currently come from the clash 
between hierarchical liberal and illiberal states, as well as 
violence between illiberal states of various kinds. Should 
all states become covenantal— dispersing power domestically, 
incorporating ethical and structural limits on the use of 
power into both domestic and foreign policy, recognizing 
limits on the efficacy of violence— there is a possibility
25 Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, 172-193,
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that interstate war could become a thing of the past, while 
covenantal regimes cannot eradicate evil, their very 
structure, with its emphasis on consensus and democratizing 
the policy process, limits their ability to carry out 
aggressive wars. Conflict would undoubtedly continue, 
economically and politically, as state behavior began to take 
on the characteristics of competing regions and parties 
within nations. Yet, non-military conflict, of whatever kind, 
is surely preferable to the bloodletting of the past.
Despite Fukuyama's recent doubts about his original 
thesis,-® he was largely correct that the dissemination of a 
type of liberalism would bring about an end to interstate 
war. And he was wholly correct in saying that any viable 
theory of that process had to be rooted in a universal 
history. As he points out, all universal histories, secular 
or sacred, posit an end to history of some kind. The affinity 
of secular realists for cyclical cosmologies (particularly
Note, for example, the foreign policies of two nations that 
incorporate such institutional limits on power: the US and Switzerland. 
Switzerland has no tradition of international imperialism, a fact which 
could be attributed to a limitation on resources. However, Schumpeter 
predicted correctly that despite the resources of the US, it would be
the least imperialistic of the great powers. Although the US is
certainly not without sin in this regard (see chapter 3), it has been
less aggressive than other great powers, a fact which cannot be
attributed to a lack of resources.
I hold this to be true despite protests of some that the 
enslavement of workers by capitalists is every bit as barbarous and 
violent as anything perpetrated by the most martial of states.
2® Francis Fukuyama, "Second Thoughts," The National Interest 
(Summer 1999), 16-33. While Fukuyama remains certain that the 
dissemination of liberalism will lead to the end of Hegelian human 
history, he adds a new thesis that new biotechnologies may blur the line 
of the human and non-human, leading to a new phase of non-Hegelian 
history.
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Hellenic) is antithetical to direction in history, a point 
utterly consistent with the Kulturpessimismus of realist 
thought. What is less obvious, as I have tried to show in 
this paper, is the way much of liberal thought has been 
affected by this pessimism as well.
Zacher and Matthew are certainly correct in their 
assessment that many liberals do not posit any kind of 
teleological notion. Nor should they, if by teleology we mean 
a state in which individuals realize perfect freedom and 
perfect harmony. Yet those constraints ought not prevent 
liberals from asserting that there is progress and 
directionality in history, implying direction towards 
something. The commonwealth or covenantal community, for 
example, is an ideal that has been and can be achieved in 
human history. Yet too many liberals, who claim to be 
ateleological, assert their own teleology of perfection as 
perfect autonomy; the end of history somehow combines 
personal sovereignty and autonony with liberal goals of 
justice and equality. Given its uniqueness in history, and 
the acute sense of limits that would have to exist to bring 
about the late liberal state, this seems to be a highly 
teleological assertion.
If the commonwealth or covenantal paradigm balances 
interests and moral goods, it makes sense to inquire about 
the substantive elements of those goods. In the international 
sphere, we do not have to look far, in as much as there are a 
plethora of documents that outline the basis for the global
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moral order. With Aristotle, I would argue that one need not 
reconstruct ethics from the ground up but rather examine the 
ideals expressed by extant ethical formulations.
The four documents that make up the International Bill 
of Human Rights show how this is so. Though I have shown in 
Chapter 3 how these documents are inconsistent with late 
liberalism, all four can be reinterpreted and made consistent 
with two of the three elements of covenantal thought. They 
are primarily about limiting the power of states to engage in 
aggression towards their own citizens and towards other 
states. Second, they require a commitment to federal, rather 
than natural, liberty. Where these documents fail to be 
covenantal is in their unrealistic expectations of non- 
covenantal, illiberal states, a point that causes a great 
deal of trouble in practice, undermining their viability as 
real law.
The four documents that make up the International Bill 
of Human Rights cover a whole host of moral demands placed 
upon all nations. The UN Charter (1948), the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (1966), all contain essential moral principles that 
serve as the underlying basis for a substantive political 
ethic.29 The Universal Declaration, for example, speaks of the
29 For an excellent compilation of these documents that places them 
in historical perspective, see Micheline R. Ishay ed., The Human Rights 
Reader: Major Political Writings, Essays, Speeches, and Documents from 
the Bible to the Present (New York: Rout ledge, 1997) . These documents
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dignity of human beings, the right to life, freedom, and 
equity. It prohibits arbitrary interference with one's 
privacy, family, home, correspondence, freedom of movement, 
emigration, rights to property, freedom of thought, religion, 
conscience, assembly, association, education, and adequate 
living standards.
The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is more 
expansive. Stating that rights derive from the inherent 
dignity of the human person, the Covenant prohibits slavery, 
arbitrary arrest and detention, imprisonment for debt, and ex 
post facto applications of law. It also guarantees many of 
the same rights as the Universal Declaration.
The Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is 
more controversial because it includes the provision of 
positive rights, goods not considered rights by many liberal 
states. It protects equal rights of both genders to the 
enjoyment of all "economic, social and cultural rights. It 
guarantees the right of everyone to choose their means of 
subsistence, fair and healthy working conditions, the right 
to join unions, social insurance, and special protections for 
the family which is defined as "the natural and fundamental 
group unit of society.
are also available online at the United Nations' web site, un.org, or at 
the University of Minnesota's Human Rights Library at 
wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/auob.htm.
30 Ishay, 424-432.
31 Ibid,. 433-440.
32 Ibid., Article 10:1.
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It is not possible or necessary to list here all of the 
provisions of these documents, what is clear is that they 
reflect certain assumptions about limits on state power and 
about public goods as political and ethical goals, a fact 
revealed by the moral tone of their provisions. As this work 
has shown, the ideal of human dignity is not obvious to pure 
rationality in the Kantian sense. There is a wide chasm 
between the procedural requirements of categorical logic and 
the substantive imperative of treating people as ends. In 
reality, this substantive imperative is founded upon a moral 
perspective closely tied to consequential goods. Apart from 
this perspective, these rights make little sense. Nor are 
they consistent with the idea of absolute autonomy, either of 
individuals or states, as they require commitment to a 
particular moral order. They require nations, and the 
individuals within them, to adhere to federal liberty, not 
natural liberty. The fundamental maxim of international law 
is, appropriately, pacta sunt servanda. Nations ought to keep 
their covenants. To do so requires a covenantal perspective.
Charles Kegley and Gregory Raymond make this point in 
their empirical investigation into the role of trust in 
international peace. Their particular focus, alliance norms, 
is salient to this work because it highlights the role of 
social capital in keeping the peace. Note the covenantal 
quality of their language.
Commitment is the adhesive o£ human interaction. Vows 
between husband and wife;contracts between buyer and seller; 
covenants between a deity and its people; pledges of 
allegiance between citizens and the state; and alliance
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treaties between nations exemplify this bond. The degree of 
obligation one feels toward the commitments made to others 
influences all social relationships.^^
Kegley and Raymond argue that there is a correlation between
the expectation of trustworthy behavior in alliances and
international peace. Strong and credible alliances will be
able to constrain state behavior in the international realm.
A lack of credibility, on the other hand, can lead to a
destabilization of state relations.
Peace, we conclude, is best preserved when there is a 
moderate amount of flexibility in alliance initiations and 
partner choices, when commitments are made judiciously and 
not left open-ended, and when promissory obligations are 
considered binding by prevailing international norms.^ ^
The lesson to be learned here is that trust, as social
capital, is as important for international relations as for
domestic political economy. Prudent and reliable behavior
leads to the development of informal norms of credibility
between states, a form of international social capital.
Collective action taken on the basis of that trust leads to
the ability to solve other collective action problems, just
as is the case in domestic social capital relations.
As I showed in Chapter 3, there are serious problems
with making late liberal premises connect with a relativistic
moral perspective. The unity of deontic ethics with
relativistic epistemic assumptions wreaks havoc in thinking
Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond, When Trust Breaks 
Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics (Columbia, South Carolina: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1990), 1.
Ibid.
35 Ibid., 232.
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about what constitutes a moral foreign policy. Expecting 
illiberal states to live up to their covenants may be 
unrealistic; expecting the same from liberal states relying 
on this dubious synthesis is just as unrealistic. The 
crusading spirit, the denial of normative and empirical 
limits, has always been dangerous. The loss of a rationale, 
of guiding theory, blinds those who hold power and causes 
them to respond to the exigencies of the moment with little 
thought of why they act or whether they should act. Again, at 
the domestic level, the value of limits on state violence and 
coercion are written into liberal law and are derived from 
the traditions that gave birth to liberal thought. The idea 
that preventing undue harm to the innocent should prevail in 
circumstances of uncertainty is a cherished principle that 
requires a belief, ironically, in both the capacity of humans 
to know the good and, concurrently, the limits of that 
knowledge. At the international level, however, few 
restrictions exist in reality. If international law is to 
develop similar protections to those found at the domestic 
level, a similar epistemic foundation is needed.
Premise 4; Prudence requires that even though a
position may be rational, the means of carrying it out
must be rational as well.
The third characteristic of covenantal thought, its 
pervasive realism, is not evident in much of the theory and 
practice of contemporary liberalism, a point made abundantly
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clear in an earlier chapter. The liberal belief that evil is 
a result of evil systems, and that it can be eradicated by 
eradicating global anarchy, only leads one back to the 
problem of liberalism's moral blindness, whether we call it 
the propensity to err, evil, or the animus dominandi, the 
tendency toward the will to power, toward the desire of 
humans to remake the world in their own image, is a common 
characteristic of persons in all social orders. Many 
communitarians share this problem in that they emphasize 
civic virtue and do not question closely how, and by whom, 
values are to be allocated. Successful liberal polities have 
assumed that no one can be trusted with an overabundance of 
power, not even the most rational of liberal leaders.
The federal solution to political ethics is intimately 
caught up with this belief in the plenary quality of evil. It 
is because of evil and error that power must be limited. Only 
by doing so can the Weberian nightmare of rule by experts, of 
political management, even in liberal polities, be avoided. 
This is no less true at the international level.
In his Perpetual Peace, Kant makes this point very 
plain. The world government must be federal, he states. His 
term for this society of states is the foedus pacificum, 
which can be translated as a pacific covenant. Kant makes two 
important points here about this federation of states. First, 
he explains under what conditions it will be successful.
For if fortune directs that a powerful and enlightened 
people can make itself a republic, which by its nature 
must be inclined to perpetual peace, this gives a 
fulcrum to the federation with other states so that
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they may adhere to it and thus secure freedom under 
the law of nations. By more and more such 
associations, the federation may be gradually 
extended.36
Kant'S logic here is somewhat Madisonian. That republic which 
has found the means to govern its people, as well as itself, 
may be trusted to limit its power in its relations with other 
states. It is not its inherent rationality (in some moral 
Newtonian sense) that makes it pacific; it is its ability to 
limit its own power through careful construction of 
institutional practices. In words that sounds much like an 
exhortation to federal liberty, Kant writes:
For states in their relations to each other, there cannot be 
any reasonable way out of the lawless condition which 
entails only war except that they, like individual men, 
should give up their savage (lawless) freedom, adjust 
themselves to the constraints of public law, and thus 
establish a continuously growing state consisting of various 
nations [civitas gentium) .3"^
Second, in contrast to many international thinkers, Kant
does not believe in the construction of a supranational
world-state. Though this position seems inconsistent with the
parameters of Kantian rationality, Kant uses language that
could just as easily have come from the pen of Tocqueville:
The idea of international law presupposes the separate 
existence of many independent but neighboring states.
Although this condition is itself a state of war (unless a 
federative union prevents the outbreak of hostilities), this 
is rationally preferable to the amalgamation of states under 
one superior power, as this would end in one universal 
monarchy and laws always lose in vigor what government gains 
in extent; hence a soulless despotism falls into anarchy 
after stifling the seeds of good.3®
36 Kant, Perpetual Peace, 101.
37 Ibid., 101.
38 Ibid., 113.
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In this age, a world-state would no doubt fall not into a 
soulless universal monarchy but rather a soulless and high­
handed bureaucracy. There are already intimations of this in 
the structure of the UN. Prudence dictates that to entrust a 
solitary figure or organization with absolute power, even to 
do good, is not just imprudent but immoral.
The. European Union and Liberal Hierarchv
Because of the difficulty of integrating relations 
between liberal and illiberal states on anything but a 
foundation of interests, successful liberal institutions will 
probably be transnational rather than international. The EU 
is a good example of this. Even given the fact that all EU 
members are liberal states, there have been a number of 
problems bringing about integration. Nevertheless, the future 
direction of the EU may be a harbinger of whether liberal 
institutions will evolve in a covenantal or hierarchical 
direction.
The EU marginally and imperfectly fulfills two of the 
three requirements for the covenantal order. Elazar calls the 
EU a "confederal system. The liberty of nations and 
individuals within them is federal, oriented toward human 
rights and material justice under the guidance of the 
European Court of Justice and the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Yet, it is not at all clear that the rights 
approach taken by the EU will not run into the same
Elazar, Covenant and Civil Society, 298.
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difficulties experienced by American courts in balancing 
individual and communal goods. Second, power is shared among 
the member states and the European Parliament is relatively 
representative. However, the European Commission, the 
bureaucratic arm of the EU, seems to be fulfilling Weber's 
vision of bureaucratic rational decision-making. This appears 
to fall in line with Tocqueville's France rather than the 
innovative energy of Modelski's global leaders. As George 
Soros puts it, "Brussels has become a bureaucrat's dream; its 
legalistic, ever more complicated structure is foreign to the 
spirit of an open society.Like Tocqueville's France, there 
are too many bureaucrats. At a stage when duties are limited- 
-but expanding--there are 20 commissioners, some of whom have 
very little to do. For example, the External Affairs division 
of the Commission is run by four different commissioners and 
four "directorates-general-units of the commission" who often 
collide with one a n o t h e r T h e  budget commissioner, Erkki 
Liikanen, stated that the organizational culture of the 
Commission combined "French hierarchy, German Mitbestimmung, 
and Italian trade u n i o n s . as integration continues and the 
responsibilities and staff of the Commission increase, one 
wonders, along with Soros, how open European society will be. 
Indeed, Robert Dahl, addressing the future of transnational
George Soros, "Can Europe Work? A Plan to Rescue the Union, 
Foreign Affairs 7 5(Sep.-Oct. 1996), 9.
"The Big Squeeze: European Commission," The Economist 
342(February 8, 1997), 55.
42 Ibid., 56.
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democracy, voices similar concerns for the quality and 
quantity of representative government in Europe.'*^  Dahl 
believes that initial widespread opposition to the Maastricht 
treaty actually served a positive role in reminding EU 
leaders about the need for representativeness in 
transnational institutions.
As to the third element of covenant, realism, that 
appears to be lacking in both domestic and foreign policy. 
Domestically (from a "European" context) critics from the 
left have already objected to the heavy-handedness of some 
ECJ and Commission decisions that have altered or ignored 
national environmental, labor, and benefit standards. Local 
and regional power has diminished in ways that are in 
conflict with the covenantal model in which consent and 
participatory decision-making is a must. On the right, there 
have been critiques of centralized economic regulation from 
Brussels. This is occurring in a region which has seen no net 
job growth over the last three decades and which has chronic 
unemployment rates three times that of the US. If the right 
and left are to find ways to achieve their respective goals 
while accommodating one another, those solutions are not 
likely to come from Brussels or Strasbourg. On this point, 
Europe's future, as envisioned fcy Jacques Delors, is Weberian 
rather than Tocquevillean. Delors was president of the 
Commission in 1990 when the provisions for what would become
Robert Dahl, "A Democratic Dilemma: System Effectiveness versus 
Citizen Participation," 109, No.1(1994), 23-34. See especially pages 32- 
34.
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the Maastricht Treaty were being negotiated. Delors predicted 
that someday 80% of EU social and economic legislation would 
come from Brussels rather than being made in member states.'*^ 
This is a recipe for hierarchical rather than the covenantal 
variety of liberalism.
With regard to foreign policy, I have already discussed 
the Kosovo campaign in a previous chapter. That is not an 
auspicious beginning for EU foreign affairs. In the long run, 
however, passivity rather than imprudent vehemence may be the 
primary problem Europe faces. Federal liberty involves the 
willingness to secure the blessing of liberty with sacrifice 
if necessary. Should hostilities between Russia and the West 
revive, Europe must be willing to overcome its fractious past 
and present a united front. They must not allow the expansion 
of illiberalism into Europe again. Here the interests of the 
EU and NATO intersect. But Europe must take the lead in its 
own region, something that, up until now, it has not been 
willing to do. The grand experiment of European unity may 
change direction for the better and serve as an example of 
how liberal states can deemphasize short-term interests in 
exchange for long-term goods.
From Federal to Hierarchical Liberal Foreign Policv: The Case
Qt America
Kant's inability to integrate interests and consequentialism 
into a larger ethical theory distinguishes him from the
44 "The Big Squeeze,* 55.
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moralistic synthesis we see in covenantal thought. As I 
showed earlier, it ironically leads towards the kind of 
unitary rationality so typical of the bureaucratic iron cage. 
Yet classical liberals who preceded Kant, namely the American 
Founders, had no trouble integrating interests and ethics.
The political culture of the northern American colonies had 
prepared them to think precisely in this way. The covenantal 
elements of this culture, in fact, require this synthesis.
One might reasonably inquire as to why it is that if 
democratic republics are at peace with one another, they are 
so violent in their relations with everyone else. There are 
two answers to this question. First, as liberals from Locke 
and Kant to Fukuyama have understood, the clash between 
nations mired in "history" and those who have reached its end 
is an ongoing process. This is perfectly consistent with 
covenantal theory. Those who do not bind their own power 
internally may not do so externally either. Illiberal states 
suffer from the political pathologies described by Elazar in 
his discussion of traditionalistic political cultures. 
Illiberal nations internally favor the interests of those in 
control of their hierarchies; there may be few, if any, 
ethical circumscriptions surrounding interest-seeking. Though 
they govern their people, they have not met the Madisonian 
requirement of governing themselves. For that reason, 
covenantal nations must deal with illiberal states in terms 
of interests without violating basic moral principle. This 
task is a matter for prudential action and not subject to
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predetermined rule-application. The legal relationship 
between covenantal and non-covenantal states is tenuous at 
best when dealing with matters of public international law. 
Covenantal states ought not to enter into legal arrangements 
lightly with states who have no accountability to their own 
people to live up to their agreements.
The need to survive in a hostile environment may explain 
some liberal aggression. It does not explain imprudent 
vehemence, the second reason for liberal aggression. I have 
already explored the theoretical and psychological roots of 
this liberal characteristic. But there are other reasons as 
well that have their origins in institutional changes that 
have occurred in liberal states. Nowhere is this more obvious 
than in the evolution of US foreign policy, a fact succinctly 
documented by Morgenthau.
Morgenthau divides American foreign policy into three 
periods: the realistic, the utopian, and the moralistic. In 
the first phase, the same sensibilities that contributed to 
the establishment of federal constitutional government also 
contributed to a foreign policy that understood the demands 
of both justice and power. American policy-makers maintained 
a sense of proportion with regards to foreign conflicts, 
realizing the benefits of remaining neutral and the hazards 
of being drawn into conflicts that did not threaten its 
survival. Morgenthau looks with special favor on John Quincy 
Adams' tenure as Secretary of State. On the question of human 
rights, Morgenthau writes:
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John Quincy Adams argued that it was not for the United 
States to impose its own principles of government upon the 
rest of mankind, but, rather, to attract the rest of mankind 
through the example of the United States. Indeed this has 
been the principle the United States has usually followed.
The American Revolution, to quote Thomas Paine, "was not 
made for America alone, but for mankind"; nevertheless,
American policy has been that those universal principles the 
United States had put into practice were not to be exported 
by fire and sword, but presented to the rest of the world 
through successful example.'*^
No better statement of the underlying principle of a
covenantal foreign policy could be made than this.
Covenantal political organization, with its emphasis on
power-limitation, severely limits states' ability to engage
in vast foreign adventures. A federal conception of liberty
ought to make them morally unwilling to do so in all but the
most exigent of circumstances. This was true of the earliest
biblical Jewish polity which was designed to be a
confederation of tribal entities connected only by Torah
obligations. Even provisions for monarchy limited kings to
constitutional powers and prohibited standing armies, a
serious check on foreign war.^® The elimination of standing
armies was also a tenet of Kant's own design for securing the
Morgenthau, Policies Among Nations, 247.
See monarchical provisions in Deukeronony 17. Prohibitions on 
standing armies are related to the provision in this passage on 
"increasing horses," as well as being behind the narrative of judgment 
by YHWH on the Davidic kingdom. In I Chronicles 21 of the Tanach, YHWH 
brings plague upon Israel in response to a government census clearly 
taken to assess the military capabilities of Israel. This was a 
violation of the spirit if not the letter of the prohibition on 
administrative centralization in the Torah. See also Walzer's comments 
on the decentralized nature of both the Jewish republic and the monarchy 
that followed it, and on the relationship between horses, chariots (that 
is to say, standing armies) and tyrannical government in Jewish thought. 
See Walzer, Exodus and Revolution, 127-129. In addition to the
prohibition on multiplying horses, one finds a prohibition on
multiplying wives (Deut. 17) . This law was not simply designed to curb
excessive polygamy but rather to avoid entangling alliances which were
often secured by marriage.
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perpetual p e a c e . O n e  might also note the importance of 
citizen militias in the history of the US and their current 
importance in Switzerland and Israel.
In the foreign policy of the early republic, the US 
incorporated what Alexander Bickel (in the field of 
jurisprudence) called the virtues of passivity, into its 
foreign policy. As Morgenthau and other realists have noted, 
there is a danger to matching great resources to utopian 
projects. This unhappy combination can all too quickly result 
in a loss of what Morgenthau refers to as "cosmic humility." 
He states: "To know that states are subject to the moral law 
is one thing; to pretend to know what is morally required of 
states in a particular situation is quite another.
Morgenthau's second period of US diplomacy is 
characterized by more ideological concerns. Beginning with 
the Jefferson Administration, American policy began to be 
oriented toward moral principle that, as it happened, seemed 
to coincide with national interest. Jefferson believed that 
moral duty should prevail at the international level as it 
did at the domestic. Even so, as president, he continued to 
focus on balancing power until the end of the Napoleonic 
Wars. Morgenthau writes:
Thus during the concluding decade of the Napoleanic Wars
Jefferson's thought on international affairs was a
Kant, Perpetual Peace, 87. Kant distinguishes armies from 
citizen militias. "But the periodic and voluntary military exercises of 
citizens who thereby secure themselves and their country against foreign 
aggression are entirely different."
48 Quoted in Russell, 161.
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reflection of the ever changing distribution of power in the 
world rather than of immutable principles. In 1806, he 
favored "an English ascendancy on the ocean* as being "safer 
for us than that of France". . . . However, in 1812, when 
Napolean was at the pinnacle of his power, Jefferson hoped 
for the restoration of the balance. . . .  In 1814, again 
compelled by the logic of events, he came clearly out 
against Napolean and in favor of a balance of power which 
would leave the power of Napolean and of England limited, 
but intact.49
After this period, however, he returned to his abstract 
moralizing about moral principle.9° However, should he have 
desired to engage in war to enforce principle, limits on 
American power projection prevented it. Federal institutions 
originally could not provide Washington with the power it 
currently possesses to carry out grand foreign policy 
adventures. The level of organizational centralization 
necessary to allow the US to mimic the policies of European 
states was conspicuously absent during this period.
with the McKinley Administration and the Spanish- 
American War, the US entered a third policy phase in which 
moralism and power were combined. By now, the shift of power 
to Washington has been enhanced by the mobilization of 
resources during the Civil War and the Progressive's 
political response to the rise of US commercial power. This 
accretion of power to the political center allowed American 
leaders to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy. The 
annexation of Spanish colonies was due not to concern for 
national interests, but to the moralistic imperialism to
49 Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest, with an 
Introduction by Kenneth W. Thompson, Reprint Edition (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1982), 19f.
50 Ibid,, 22.
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which great powers were so susceptible during the imperial 
period. It was Woodrow Wilson, however, that combined 
moralism, par excellence, with war aims.
The present period of history in which generally and, as it 
seems, permanently universal moral rules of conduct are 
replaced by particular ones claiming universality was 
ushered in by Woodrow Wilson's war "to make the world safe 
for democracy." It is not by accident and it has deep 
significance that those who shared Wilson's philosophy 
thought of that war as a "crusade" for democracy. The First 
World War, as seen from Wilson's perspective, has indeed 
this in common with the crusades of the Middle Ages--it was 
waged for the purpose of making one moral system, held by 
one group, prevail in the rest of the world.
The Wilsonian approach is antithetical to covenantal politics
that adheres to consensual foundations.52 it is one thing to
alter practices and institutions in conquered nations in
order to bring those practices more into line with
international legal and ethical principles. Again, that is a
matter for prudence, depending largely on the ability to
match means and ends. It is another thing entirely to wage
war specifically to bring about such changes, a sure recipe
for imprudent vehemence.
Covenantal political theory holds that creating a
centralized administrative hierarchy (to use Tocquevilie's
term) to carry out the noblest of acts worldwide will result
in the use of that power for less noble purposes. To repeat
the words of John Cotton:
51 Morgenthau, Politics Among Mations, 243.
52 Elazar's position on Wilson is consistent with that of 
Morgenthau' s. Whereas Morgenthau is concerned with the effects 
Wilsonianism had on foreign policy, Elazar is concerned with the way 
Wilson undermined federalism, stating that he "did more to undermine the 
principles of federal democracy than any other single person." See 
Elazar, Covenant and Constitutionalism, 134.
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Let all the world learn to give mortall [sic] men no greater 
power than they are content they shall use, for use it they 
will: and unless they be better taught of God, they will use 
it ever and anon. . . .  It is necessary therefore, that all 
power that is on earth be limited. . . .^ 3
Whether they are taught of God or not, it seems reasonable to
limit power for precisely this reason. The creation of a
national hierarchy to accomplish good ends led to the
national security state so abhorrent initially to those on
the left and, more recently, on the right. To repeat Rummel's
dictum, "Power kills; absolute power kills absolutely."^* No
regime, liberal or otherwise, given centralized power, can
resist the temptation to use it. Only institutional obstacles
to the use of power will prevent its devastating
consequences.
John Cotton, "Limitation of Government,'; quoted in Perry 
Miller and Thomas Johnson, The Puritans (New York: American Book 
Company, 1938), 212f.
5^  Rummel, Death by Government, 1.
55 Paul Kennedy's work The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers speaks 
brilliantly to this issue. He documents the tendency among global 
leaders to centralize power and, then, to use that power to engage in 
dubious foreign military adventures. These foreign commitments, far from 
being economically beneficial, as Lenin thought, drained the treasuries 
of nations and reduced their power in the long run. The book provided, 
and continues to provide, a powerful argument for creating institutional 
obstacles to the centralization of administrations in regimes of any 
type.
Kennedy argues that the US must face the same decision that 
confronted other great powers. The US must solve global collective 
action problems while refraining from commitments that will create 
unsustainable burdens on its economy. The implication of the book was 
that the US ought not allow the Cold War and the national security state 
required to maintain US security to send the US to the ashbin of 
history. The ability of the US to reengineer itself, something that 
required decentralized decision-making, was critical to sustainability. 
See Kennedy, The Rise and Pall of the Great Powers, 539.
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Abraham Lincoln; the Synthesis of Covenantal Theory and
Practice
The covenantal model is entirely consistent with the 
first phase Morgenthau described. In the modern period, 
however, its virtues are not obvious to those whose policy- 
concerns are media-driven. Nor are they obvious to those 
solely concerned with rights seen apart from specific 
contexts rather than as arising out of the network of mutual 
obligations that make them possible. There is something 
agonizing about watching men commit evil deeds and continuing 
to limit one's response. No president has had to deal with 
this issue more than Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln's approach to 
dealing with evil and aggression reveals some important 
principles of how covenantal thought integrates right and 
prudence.
The New England contingent of the American Founders, the 
inheritors of the covenantal tradition, had to deal with just 
such a problem: slavery. Making a place for this abhorrent 
practice in the new nation was premised, however, on the 
belief that the institution would eventually disappear if the 
trade in slaves was limited. This assumption would 
undoubtedly have proven accurate if not for the invention of 
the cotton gin which made slavery extremely profitable 
again.
Covenantal thought and hierarchy cannot coexist for long 
periods of time, and US political development was no
56 Elazar, Covenant and Constitutionalism, 125.
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exception. North and South divided more and more over moral 
and political philosophy. One aspect of that divide 
culminated in the argument over the nature of the original 
agreement to build a nation. John Calhoun was the best known 
among those arguing for a radical revision of the covenantal 
basis of the founding.
Calhoun believed that organic societies had primacy over 
all others. The states were organic and, therefore, preceded 
the Union in importance and in jurisdiction over matters like 
slavery. Northern attempts to rid the nation of the 
institution were egregious violations of the autonomy, both 
moral and political, of Southern states.
Abolitionists in early nineteenth century New England 
agonized for decades over the practice of slavery. Some, like 
John Brown, were determined to end it immediately by force. 
Others, though just as passionate about its elimination, had 
a more prudent response. Abraham Lincoln spent much of his 
early political career making his abhorrence for slavery 
known through public debates on the subject. Yet he also 
understood the limits on the efficacy of power in dealing 
with a moral problem.
There is, in fact, no greater model of the self-limiting 
moral perspective of covenantal theory than Abraham Lincoln. 
This is true for two reasons. First, Lincoln rejected the 
contractual theory of American politics in favor of a 
covenantal model rooted in the Declaration as America's
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defining covenantal document. Second, he understood the 
terrible price to pay for empowering and unleashing the 
military to respond to the brewing crisis in America. He did 
not use power lightly. He was prudent about what it would 
require to accomplish the task of maintaining the Union while 
not ruining, and therefore alienating, the South forever.
There can be no question that Lincoln saw the Union in 
covenantal terms. Lincoln referred to the Union as a "regular 
marriage," placing it within the context of that other most 
covenantal of institutions: matrimony.Though the 
Constitution had been compromised by necessity, the 
Declaration, signed by representatives of the original 
colonies, had not. Lincoln referred to it again and again as 
the foundational moral document of the nation. The 
Declaration required a federal, not a natural, concept of 
liberty. Freedom, in this view, is the freedom to determine a 
rational means to a valid objective (to use the Supreme 
Court's terms), not to engage in inherently immoral 
practices.
Slavery, in covenantal theory, is like adultery in 
marriage: a material breach of covenant that violates its 
essential nature and purpose.Separation cannot be legally 
justified on the basis of material breach by the offending
cited in Elazar, Covenant and Civil Society, 252.
On the antithetical relationship between slavery and coveneint 
eind covenant as a response to slavery, see Wildavsky, "Slavery: Passive 
People: Passive Leader." Chapter 1 in The Nursing Father, 27-61.
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party, only by the injured p a r t y . F o r  Lincoln, the highest
moral purpose was achieved in the preservation of federal
liberty within the framework of the Union. Yet that did not
justify conquest of the South in order to achieve the end of
slavery; in other words, in order to bring Southern political
culture into accord with that of the North. Lincoln
understood that this could not be done by coercion. Only in
the process of saving the Union, necessitated by Southern
military aggression, did he free the slaves.
Elazar describes Lincoln as a moralist in the midst of
the individualist political culture of Illinois. His Whiggish
background was part of the larger pattern of American
covenantal thought.
In all of this Lincoln was a Whig, not only in his original 
political party and fundamental political leanings, but in 
the larger sense of Whiggism as this had developed in Anglo- 
American civilization since the seventeenth century. Like 
all Whigs, prudence was not relativism but movement toward 
moral goals by carefully weighing the opportunities, limits, 
and possibilities, by keeping one's eye on the main chance—  
those things which were critical to the success of the 
movement— and adjusting the pace of change so as to avoid 
threatening the political-social order beyond what it could 
bear. Whiggism in this sense was the amtithesis of 
aggressive self-righteousness linked to some immediate cause 
which, no matter how legitimate, threatened the whole fabric 
of the enterprise.^^
When one reads Morgenthau's statements on political morality, 
there is a sense that he is trying to communicate the same 
principle of prudence tied to transcendence. I have shown
This was the case under common law until the development of no­
fault divorce which altered the legal grounds of divorce by removing the 
requirement that material breach be shown. This had the effect of 
replacing a covenantal rationale with a contractual one.
Elazar, Covenant and Constitutionalism, 131.
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why, ultimately, his ethic and epistemology cannot meet.
Nevertheless, Morgenthau's vision of ethics seems to be
substantively guided more by Lincoln than by N i e t z s c h e . h q
wrote a great deal on Lincoln and looked at him as a model of
tragic accomplishment, as have many before him.
In Politics Among Nations, Morgenthau summed up his
theory of international morality by looking to Lincoln's
statement to a delegation of Presbyterian ministers who had
asked him to emancipate the slaves immediately.
I am approached with the most opposite opinions and advice, 
and that by religious men, who are equally certain that they 
represent the Divine will. I am sure that either the one or 
the other class is mistaken in that belief, and perhaps in 
some respects both. I hope it will not be irreverent for me 
to say that if it is probable that God would reveal his will 
to others, on a point so connected with ray duty, it might be 
supposed that he would reveal it directly to me; for, unless 
I am more deceived in ityself than I often am, it is my 
earnest desire to know the will of Providence in this 
matter. And if I can learn what it is I will do it! These 
are not, however, the days of miracles, and I suppose it 
will be granted that I am not to expect a direct revelation.
I must study the plain physical facts of the case, ascertain 
what is possible and learn what appears to be wise and 
right.
Lincoln had no doubts about the wrongness of slavery, only 
about the consequences of immediate emancipation. Eventually, 
emancipation became official federal policy. What mattered 
was considering the best means and timing available for 
achieving the good in human affairs. This is an important
One has trouble, for example, imagining Lincoln, who agonized so 
much over the cost of procuring the good, pushing the Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution through Congress and involving America in Vietnam.
Morgenthau's opposition to Vietnam is perfectly consistent with his 
doubts about the cost of such a venture, doubts Lincoln would have 
certainly shared.
Quoted in Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 249.
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lesson for contemporary liberals. The agony over human 
tragedy, particularly that caused by other humans, should not 
cause us to make decisions that only exacerbate evil.
The covenantal ideal in international relations has 
always been synonymous with the idea of creating a beacon, a 
city on a hill, a model towards which others are drawn by 
choice. To repeat a point made in an earlier chapter, there 
is no word in ancient Hebrew for "obey. Covenantal 
political theory turns not to coercion but to "hearkening, " 
recognizing that lasting political traditions are based on 
consent. John Quincy Adams, who believed America’s basic 
covenantal document to be the Mayflower Compact, provided the 
basis for a covenantal foreign policy when he stated:
Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been 
or shall be unfurled, there will be America's heart, her 
benedictions, and her prayers. But she goes not abroad in 
search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the 
freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and 
vindicator only of her own. She will recommend the general 
cause by the countenance of her voice, and by the benignant 
sympathy of her example. She well knows that by . . . 
enlisting under other banners than her own, were they even 
the banners of foreign independence, she would involve 
herself beyond the power of extrication, in all the wars of 
interest and intrigue, of individual avarice, envy, and 
ambition, which assume the colors and usurp the standards of 
freedom. . . . She might become the dictatress of the world.
She would no longer be the ruler of her own spirit
Given Che power and scope of the current national security
state, Adams' view seems prophetic.
The consequences of state centralization to achieve even
beneficent political goals may have dangerous consequences
Elazar, Covenant & Polity in Biblical Israel, 70f, 
Quoted in Russell, 240f.
350
for internal domestic politics. The use of state power to 
exercise dominion is habit-forming. Over time, the accretions 
of power can remove the influence of civil society to the 
margins of political existence. Just as a vibrant civil 
society is necessary to preserve a commitment of citizens to 
interests beyond their own, so too is it necessary to prevent 
them from turning their backs on global problems.
Isolationism is always a nefarious possibility at both levels 
of political life.
The Role of Civil Society in Covenantal Politics
Tocqueville's admonishments for democratic states 
resonate as deeply at the international level as they do for 
domestic politics. A vicious cycle exists between increasing 
isolationist individualism and enervating bureaucratic 
centralization. Individualism is not just a pathology of 
individuals. Isolationism is the international equivalent of 
domestic self-absorption and can lead to similar consequences 
for international politics. Civic engagement by international 
actors of all kinds, liberal states, NGO's, and IGO's, is 
absolutely necessary. Without it, the temptation to solve 
crises--which always occur in the vacuum left by a lack of 
leadership and sacrifice— with administratively centralized 
institutions like a world-state will be enormous. The one 
variable, however, that crosses through both levels of 
analysis is civil society.
That great "discovery" of liberalism, civil society.
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plays a central role in the covenantal society. If we recall 
that spheres of activity (political, social, familial, etc.) 
are sovereign within the confines of federal liberty, the 
importance of non-govemmental associations becomes 
immediately apparent. This is no less true at the 
international level for two reasons. First, it is civil 
society that prevents the occurrence of the Weberian 
nightmare in liberal societies. Second, associations can play 
a critical role in world politics by exposing and critiquing 
illicit state practices of all kinds. Martin Shaw, for 
example, believes that civil society played a central role in 
bringing about the demise of the Soviet bloc.
Indeed one of the most fundamental reasons for the crisis of 
the Soviet system and the "triumph" of the West was clearly 
the much greater impact of society on western states, 
compared to the apparent insulation of the Stalinist regime 
from societal influences. Equally important was the impact 
which society's influence on western states had on 
international relations. . . . [T]he example of the peace 
movements in the West helped stimulate small, more 
courageous unofficial peace and human rights movements in 
eastern Europe, many of whose activists were to play a part 
in the East German and Czechoslovak revolutions of 1989.®°
Indeed, international institutions like the Catholic Church
served as a means of organizing social forces that peacefully
(or violently in the case of Romania) overthrew eastern
European regimes and are, in the post-Cold war period,
centers for organizing civil society.
Weber believed that only a fresh infusion of the non-
rational charismatic could prevent the total hegemony of
bureaucratic-rationality. Because of the nature of his
®® Martin Shaw, “State Theory and the post-Cold War World* in State 
and Society in International Relations, eds. Michael Banks and Martin 
Shaw (New York; St. Mairtin's Press, 1991), 8.
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beliefs about rationality, he could not envision how the 
charismatic and the rational could be synthesized. Weber 
tried to integrate charisma into political institutions 
through powerful and popularly-elected political leadership. 
This paper has reformulated Weber's position to show why this 
approach is incorrect. If social capital theory and other 
research on the role of civil society have shown anything, it 
is the need to secure a place for the charismatic (to use 
Weber's terms) in the non-governmental realm.
Yet such charisma does not only appear within 
entrepreneurial capitalism. Those who are "gifted* (the Greek 
meaning of charisma) are found everywhere in all aspects of 
social endeavor. Organizations that can take advantage of 
these gifts, as they are turned towards the international 
sphere, serve as powerful means of undermining hierarchy in 
liberal and illiberal states. They can provide the "voice* of 
democracy and human rights of which Adams spoke. The 
accountability provided by their observations contributes to 
the sustainability of liberal states and a movement toward 
liberalism by those that are illiberal.
In some sense, all of the research on social capital and 
the cultural underpinnings of successful democratic practice 
is premised upon a belief in the importance of a vibrant 
civil society. Liberal international theory has placed a 
great deal of hope in the emergence of a global civil society 
that can increase the networks between non-govemmental 
organizations. Organizations like Freedom House, Voice of the
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Martyrs, Amnesty International, and Greenpeace, exeimine state 
practices in liberal and illiberal states and point out acts 
that violate human decency. Because they have no coercive 
power, their legitimacy resides in the degree to which their 
moral perspectives are shared by others. Yet they have had 
great success in embarrassing states year after year through 
public dissemination of information. Their messages cross 
state lines and cannot be silenced because of their 
transnational character.
Just as states ought to do everything possible to 
encourage the propensity to associate within their own 
borders, liberal states ought to act in cooperation to 
encourage the development of NGO's that can function as a 
moral check on the power of all states. This, of course, 
means being willing to subject oneself to moral scrutiny by 
NGO's, something hierarchical organizations of any kind find 
difficult.
Elazar is sanguine about the role of civil society and 
its role in reviving covenantal politics. The demise of 
hierarchy after the disastrous political experiments with 
centralized administration has led to a new possibility for 
reorganizing domestic and global politics in covenantal 
terms. The shift from the state as patriarch to the state as
The idea espoused by some IR liberals that the nation-state is 
no longer the central actor in international arena is premature.
However, one of the central tenets of international liberalism and 
covenantal thought is that the state is not the only important actor on 
the world-stage, nor should it be. Dahl mentions that one way 
transnational organizations like the EU might deal with the 
representation problem is by bypassing the nation-state and dealing 
directly with local authorities. See Dahl, "A Democratic Dilemma: System
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partner he daims is part of the overall move from statism to
federalism. This is only consistent with the covenantal view
of the state as one association among many.
The implications of this paradigm shift are enormous.
Whereas before, every state strove for self-sufficiency, 
homogeneity, and, with a few exceptions, concentration of 
authority and power in a single center, under the new 
paradigm all states have had to recognize their 
interdependence, heterogeneity, and the fact that their 
centers, if they ever existed, are no longer single centers 
but parts of a multicentered network that is becoming 
increasingly noncentralized, and that all of this is 
necessary in order to survive in the new world.®®
As Elazar points out, there has been the increasing
recognition that solutions to what seem to be insoluble
problems--Northern Ireland, the Palestinian/Israeli Accords—
will have to be, or have already been, federal in nature.
Statist hierarchy is not a solution. Only in a federal system
can the "constituting elements . . . share in the processes
of common policymaking and administration by right, while the
activities of the common government are conducted in such a
way as to maintain their respective integrities. Yet
Effectiveness versus Citizen Participation,' 33. Kegley cites the demise 
of the hard-shell notion of the nation-state as evidence for the 
normative and empirical superiority of liberalism. See Kegley, "The 
Neoliberal Challenge to Realist Theories," in Controversies in 
International Relations Theory, 11 of 1-24. James Rosenau believes that 
while many scholars have addressed the increase in the mobility of 
technology, information, and economic interdependence, few scholars have 
considered the political implications of these changes. See Rosenau, 
"Turbulent Change, " in International Relations Theory. 447. Elazar, one 
could argue, is attempting to do just that, address the possibilities 
present in a period in which the nation-state finds itself limited ky 
factors not under its complete control. On the difficulty of 
conceptualizing the role of the nation-state in the post-Cold War 
period, see Cox, "Demystifying the Nation-State, * in Nation or 
Integration, 27-41.
®® Elazar, Covenant and Civil Society, 293 
Ibid., 291.
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federal structuration is not enough. There can be no brit 
Shalom (covenant of peace) without hesed (covenantal 
obligations rooted in love). As critical legal theorists 
point out, liberalism without a material base of justice is 
empty and self-contradictory. Covenant obligations imply 
concern over both material conditions and due process.
Nations and peoples must leam, over time, to adhere to a 
federal conception of liberty in conjunction with federally- 
constructed institutions. This requires an enlightened view 
of self-interest or national interest. Civil society has an 
increasingly important role in defining those interests.
Should international society take a more covenantal 
turn, what would it look like? How can the interests of civil 
society, the need for governance and the problem of combating 
evil be reconciled at the international level? If covenant 
can provide some direction for the evolving shifts in 
international relations, it makes sense to examine these 
questions further.
Covenant as the End of History
At the close of this investigation, one might
justifiably ask: What is the ultimate vision of the good
world order? Elazar's vision is much more compelling on this
issue than Fukuyama's. Elazar lists four aspects of the
covenantal vision:
1. A society of individuals (people, families and 
communities) who are freely bound to each other and to the 
moral order by covenant; a covenant based on federal liberty 
that encourages them to maintain their diverse integrities
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but does not confuse the legitimate search for individuality 
with the idea that they can follow their own stars without 
limit. Covenant implies law and law sets forth guidelines 
and limits.
2. A world community of substantially self-governing nations 
composed of substantially self-governing communities bound 
by interlocking covenants. Political covenants that 
encourage partnership, cooperation, and forbearance among 
nations and communities to allow each to act correctly by 
its own choice and will.
3. A constant search for individual and social integrities 
in each nation and a constant striving for hesed.
4. Ultimately a world-wide covenant society of individuals, 
communities, and nations but not a world-state based on a 
single universal society.^®
Unquestionably this vision is a distant one and will not be
completed in the near future. It shares a great similarity to
Kant's vision without all the problems of Kantian philosophy
impeding its theoretical integrity. Covenantal thought does
not require the separation between ethics and epistemology we
find in Kant's thought. Another important distinction is
that, while Kant believed nature would bring about a
federated world through interest, the covenant paradigm
recognizes that belief as a false hope. Interests narrowly
defined do not automatically lead to solutions to collective
action problems. Shared values upon which any good society is
constructed, must be carefully cultivated. Nature does not
guarantee federal liberty; it guarantees natural liberty that
is a poor substitute.Institutional improvements founded
upon shared values, even by those who seek to constitute the
good civil order in good faith, are not automatic either.
Elazar, Covenant and Civil Society, 313.
This is all the more true in the post-Darwinian period in which 
"nature* has taken on a whole new meaning.
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Kissinger's abhorrence of Kant's determinism in history is 
well-founded. The struggle toward sustainable moral polities 
has been tremendous, woefully incomplete, and not at all 
assured by elusive historical forces. The first step towards 
the covenantal polity is humility, the willingness to limit 
one's own power. In that sense, the very foundation of good 
politics, domestic or international, and, ironically, of good 
science, rests upon a habituated moral choice. Habituation is 
necessary because humility towards the "other," ethereal or 
ephemeral, must be a way of life in order for the search to 
begin and to become self-sustaining. Again, this brings us 
back to the important role of civil society in a covenantal 
polity. Nations have no moral traits; only people do. 
Diplomats, then, must be chosen and trained within a moral 
environment that causes them to understand their 
responsibilities from a properly moral perspective. There can 
be no existential or private morality among statesmen in the 
covenantal polity.
Neither politics nor law can ever be a value-free 
pursuit. They both contain ethical dimensions, and it is 
doubtful whether any of these pursuits can survive without 
some kind of belief in the transcendent. Fukuyama, like most 
modernization theorists and most liberals, takes the 
continuance of science, technology, law, and other aspects of 
modernity, for granted. He believes, for example, that 
science as a ongoing project can never d i s a p p e a r . His
Fukuyama, The End of History, 82-88.
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argument is countered by the evidence that science has risen 
and fallen before when its metaphysical and epistemic 
foundations were insecure. In the same way, justice must be 
cultivated and maintained. Its survival is not automatic. 
Harold Berman has argued persuasively that the permanence of 
law, domestic or international, is impossible to secure 
without transcendent moorings.The current direction of 
jurisprudence into epistemic chaos suggests he is correct.
The future without transcendence is not a utopia of rational 
beings living the good life; it is the dystopia of H.G.
Well's Time Machine, with its dark Nietzschean undertones. It 
is Weber's nightmare of the iron cage in which we imprison 
ourselves.
The Sources of the Transcendent
This project has not dealt in any length with the 
sources of ethical transcendence. My intention is not to 
develop a wholly new ethical philosophy but, rather, to deal 
with the implications of theories already in existence. This 
led to a discussion of what a viable political ethic must 
look like but not to the details or the sources of 
transcendence in that ethic. Yet, one can still examine this 
question of political ethics empirically, as Morgenthau did, 
and recognize the existence of a moral impulse that is 
universal. One can go beyond this recognition to Strauss' 
contention that natural right is ubiquitous, intelligible.
Berman, 39.
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permanent, and that despite ethical variation, there is a 
fundamental unity that allows us to make sense of those 
variations. One can turn to contemporary sociobiologists and 
comparative ethologists, as Fukuyama has recently done, to 
claim that moral sensibilities are part of our genetic 
m a k e u p . T h e y  point to the historical evidence that humans 
adapt to particular circumstances of survival and that 
societies, like individuals, devise, or return to, rules that 
will allow them to flourish. Additionally, religion is a 
source of transcendence, historically understood as the most 
important source of specific mores and practices.
This paper has shown that previous approaches to 
constructing a rational ethic have continued to draw, 
consciously or unconsciously, from religious sources, whether 
we examine the pietism of Kant and Weber, or the curiously 
consistent tendency of existentialists and poststructuralists 
to end up espousing a Marxian vision of the good, Nietzsche's 
interpretation of the m o d e m  humanistic ethic of rights and 
equality seems to be correct. They do have religious origins. 
But this does not explain whether religion is necessary to 
sustain the good society. Covenantal theory clearly arises 
from religious roots as does liberalism in general; yet this 
does not answer the question.
The analytic objective herein is not to answer this 
question definitively. Rather it is to propose that the
Fukuyama, The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the 
Reconstitution of Social Order (New York; The Free Press, 1999) . See 
especially Chapters 10 and 11.
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covenantal vision is the proper guide for constructing the
good society that can, in turn, serve as a model for peoples
in illiberal states who are burdened by hierarchy and
oppression. Yet, to some degree, the question of
transcendence is answered by examining the structure of the
covenantal polity and the place it makes for transcendent
aspirations of every kind.
The charismatic social element is found not in the
state, as Weber had hoped, but in civil society. It is within
the sovereign spheres themselves that we find creativity, and
it is their relative autonomy that guarantees its
continuance. This is no less true of religion. Both
Tocqueville and Elazar see religion as a primary means of
encouraging enlightened self-interest, civil associations,
and the mores of a free people. Yet they both recognize the
limits of religious institutions in a free society.
Tocqueville points out that in the US, unlike Europe, there
is no state church. The church is one association among many.
This echoes Putnam's point about the role of the Catholic
Church in northern Italy as opposed to the South. Because the
church lacked political institutional power, its legitimacy
came from moral suasion. It could not coerce; it could only
reason, debate, and persuade. Tocqueville points out that the
Catholic priests he spoke to in the US all agreed on one
thing; the value of the separation of church and state.
I know that, apart from influence proper to itself, religion 
can at times rely on the artificial strength of laws and the 
support of the material powers that direct society. There 
have been religions intimately linked to earthly
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governments, dominating men's souls both by terror and by 
faith; but when a religion makes such an alliance, I am not 
afraid to say that it makes the same mistake as any man 
might; it sacrifices the future for the present, and by 
gaining a power to which it has no claim, it risks its 
legitimate authority.7%
This was precisely the truth that Jefferson had in mind when
he penned his response to a query by the Danbury
(Connecticut) Baptist Association. They had written the
President a letter asking him to address the rumor that
Congregationalism was to be made the national church. It was
in this letter that he replied with his famous dictum
concerning the importance of the "wall of separation" between
church and state.
One need only look at the state of churches in Europe to
see the consequences of having a state church. Again,
Cotton's words reinforce the covenantal maxim concerning
power. Churches are led by fallible men who will use whatever
power they are given. Give them the power of the state
apparatus and they will use it. Nor are the people likely to
conceim themselves with the maintenance of piety when it
becomes the duty of the state to do so.
Tocqueville believes that states ought not err in the
opposite direction, however, and attempt to eradicate or
hinder the influence of religion. Indeed, the congruence
between religion in America and liberty was one of the
primary themes of his book. And herein lies a partial answer
to the general question of transcendence. Just as the state
■^5 Tocqueville, 297.
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cannot generate social capital, neither can it generate 
piety. In the covenantal society, the state can, on the other 
hand, act in partnership with associations in civil society 
to facilitate both. At a minimum, it should do harm to 
neither, for they are the lifeblood of the successful and 
responsive polity. It is not the function of the state to 
seek for transcendence; however, the state desperately needs 
support and guidance from, and accountability to, those for 
whom transcendence is critical.
In addition, statesmen will be guided by their own moral 
visions. The state is not an autonomic organization but one 
made up of men and women who themselves have an understanding 
of the good. In an open society, it is necessary to know what 
those values are and how they will function in application. 
This is the primary purpose of the electoral process. But 
once again, as Elazar's (and Putnam's) research on political 
culture shows, the state will only be as moral and responsive 
as the people who make it up. If voters are without a sense 
of the immutable and the eternal, they ought not to expect 
statesmen to have a vision greater than their own.
Conclusion: Covsnantal Ethics and Eorsiqn.Policy 
when traveling in the Israeli desert many years ago, I 
saw in the distance a number of pits dug into the sand, each 
with a small shoot planted in the middle. guide explained 
that it only rains once or twice a year in the Negev. The 
pits allowed enough water to collect for one tree to survive
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one year. There were thousands of these trees planted on the 
road outside of Beersheba. I have not been back since then, 
but I can only imagine how the deserts must have been 
transformed by this project, and how they will continue to be 
changed in the years to come. For fifty years, in this 
restoration of the first covenanted nation, the Israelis have 
been creating an oasis in the desert, agriculturally, 
economically, and politically. Despite its mistakes, and 
there have been many, it remains the only democratic nation 
in the region, and the only one concerned to any degree with 
the rights of its citizens. Its openness allows the world to 
see its errors, something not as visible in the surrounding 
nations with their organic and hierarchical state structures.
Elazar describes the covenantal polity as an oasis as 
well. Throughout the millennia, civilization has been 
inconstant and violence ubiquitous. Yet covenantal peoples 
have survived in pockets to help rebuild after catastrophes 
made by human hands. They have flourished by eschewing 
conquest, comparatively speaking, in opposition to the 
conventional wisdom throughout history that placed a premium 
on power and the ability to project it at will and for one's 
own gain. These commonwealths were not blind to the existence 
of evil. Because of its presence, they understood, at least 
in their origins, that power had to be limited domestically 
and internationally. Nor have they been blind to the 
existence of tragedy in history; but it is not the tragedy of 
Sisyphus. It is redemptive tragedy, suffering that leads to
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the possibility within history of the transcendence of evil.
The covenantal polity, by necessity and by principle, 
cannot create the good world order by force. It must persuade 
other nations and peoples that it is a model to be followed 
and it can only do that if its own house is in order. This 
means that its people must be committed to federal liberty 
which involves respect for the lives and dignity of human 
beings not because it is rational in some a priori sense, but 
because it is the best way to live consequentially.
Liberalism strayed from its origins at a very early 
point, leaving behind the assumptions of transcendence that 
allowed it to integrate interests and the good. The split 
between utility and right was fatal to this integration, when 
contemporary neo-Kantian liberals have attempted to revive 
the synthesis, it has been on the basis of natural liberty 
that cannot secure the place of a humanistic ethic or the 
rights with which it is concerned. Realists, ironically, 
began with some of the same Kantian assumptions which made 
politics and right incommensurable. As a result, political 
goods could only be achieved by contracting with the 
diabolical, hardly a promising commencement for securing 
ethics. Morgenthau's belief, for example, that evil was 
sometimes required to achieve good and that all political 
action inherently entailed entering the realm of evil, 
highlights this problem. Because liberals and realists share 
common epistemic assumptions concerning the unknowability of 
the good, their ethical positions often are founded upon
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existential assertion, coercion, or both.
The commonwealth described by Elazar is founded upon 
vastly different premises. Whatever its intellectual origins, 
its social origins are found in Jerusalem rather than Athens. 
Unlike other classical cultures--Greek, Hindu, and Roman-- 
Jewish culture never disdained commerce or labor of any kind. 
There has never been a strong Jewish monastic movement.
Unlike many Athenian intellectuals, Hindu Brahmans, or 
monastic priests, rabbis taught and labored simultaneously.
In addition, the Tanach is rife with consequentialist 
prescriptions. Yet they can hardly be described as lacking in 
transcendence. The fundamental premise of the Sinai covenant 
was "walk in goodness and you will be blessed spiritually and 
materially." Individual interests were strongly 
circumscribed, however, by prohibitions on inappropriate 
desire and by equating the good with seeking justice for "the 
widow and the orphan." The revival of Tanach theology in the 
15th century meant that the Church could again prescribe an 
ideal social order that combined the sacred and the mundane. 
On this point, Weber was absolutely correct. Early classical 
liberal theorists, drawing on these lessons and the culture 
they had produced, recognized the need for limits on 
interests, turning to natural law as a means of securing 
these limits. Late liberals and international realists have 
not managed to retain this synthesis, however, focusing on 
one side or the other, and losing both in the process.
Should liberal states seek to return to the commonwealth
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ideal, they would consider their interests in terms as 
generous as prudence would allow. As in the early period of 
American history, they would recognize the benefits of being 
slow to anger and of remaining militarily uninvolved in 
matters that do not affect their direct interests. There is a 
great deal to be said ethically for minding one's own 
business when it is at all possible to do so. However, with 
regards to doing good, to being concerned with human rights, 
with material provision, with all the goods that 
international covenants seek to ensure, and never can in a 
world mired in "history," they should consider interests in 
the broadest terms. Liberal societies are at an advantage 
over illiberal ones because freedom allows for the harnessing 
of the resources of civil society. Weber's charismatic 
element is necessary to prevent the iron cage from 
triumphing. Charisma, however, as its Greek origin connotes, 
is about the gifts of individuals who come together to use 
them for a greater good, a good defined within the bounds of 
charis or hesed, charity that reaches beyond self-interest.”^® 
Liberal states can only use moral persuasion if they 
keep their own covenants and if they are not engaged in 
inappropriate violence. The real power of liberal states, 
particularly those committed to covenantal principles, can 
never be military. Their power lies in the ability to 
persuade peoples in hierarchical states, peacefully but
Wolfe, for example, sees civil society as the basis for a 
successful econony and polity and, interestingly, refers to the role of 
civil society as a "gift." Whose Keeper, 261.
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adamantly, that there is a better way of life that they ought 
to acquire as soon as it is feasible to do so. That 
acquisition, however, ought to be a matter of choice. Should 
violence for the purpose of preservation become necessary, 
liberal states ought to be circumspect as to how they treat 
their enemies. As Kegley and Raymond point out, the ethical 
dimensions of forgiveness as policy are profound and become 
the basis for future conflict or future peace. In a 
remarkable prescriptive statement more appropriate to a 
covenantal than a late liberal perspective, they write:
In sum, victors in search of a durable peace settlement 
should apply the Golden Rule to diplomacy, treating the 
vanquished the way they would wish themselves to be treated 
were they in the same position. So long as one is not 
dealing with an utterly ruthless, depraved opponent, 
restraint and a readiness for conciliation can evoke 
gratitude and set in motion a positive spiral of tension- 
reducing reciprocation. Victors who couple firmness 
regarding their own interests with fairness towards the 
interests of others encourage defeated powers to work within 
the postwar system.
Even this may be a little pessimistic. It is difficult to
imagine more ruthless enemies than war-time Germany and
Japan, yet Allied policy (save that of the Soviets) followed
this moral prescription quite well. The rebuilding of Germany
and Japan by the US after the war, and the use of American
resources to provide democratic institutions where possible,
is an example of self-interest rightly understood in
international politics. Both America's interests (broadly
conceived) as well as a public international good were served
by these acts. By contrast, trying to win over the hearts and
77 Kegley and Raymond, How Nations Make Peace, 239.
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minds of Vietnamese citizens, as American soldiers burned 
their villages in a war that was not in American interests, 
brought ignominy, debt, shame, and corruption back, upon our 
own heads. Trade embargoes or military action against nations 
that are actively engaged in expansionism, or who threaten 
the open flow of goods and information, may make sense. 
Embargoes upon nations like Cuba, who, in the post-Cold War 
period, cannot possibly threaten the US and whose hierarchy 
could only be undermined by infusions of capital, do not.
The Future of Covenant in the New World Order
what is the likelihood of nations moving in a covenantal 
direction? It is not inevitable that the emerging world 
order will evolve towards covenantal federalism. The 
temptation of social engineering and hierarchical domination 
is powerful; covenantalism is the exception and not the rule 
in history. As Tocqueville understood, the temptation to 
rationalize domination for an ostensible good in liberal 
states is also powerful. The prudence required to maintain 
the precarious balance between shared values and 
decentralized administrative power must be carefully 
cultivated. There is little likelihood that the current 
liberal philosophical synthesis, described so aptly by 
Spragens, can continue to provide the pedagogical environment 
necessary to ensure that balance in the future. Neither 
"history," Kantian interests, economic forces, nor science 
and technology, stand as guarantors of the covenantal world
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community.
Yet, we need not believe with Weber or Schumpeter that 
the future will be characterized by enervating bureaucratic 
instrumental rationality. The iron cage is possible (and 
given the organizational culture of the UN at present, 
perhaps probable) but not inevitable. Unlike other regime 
types, people in liberal states do have a greater capacity to 
examine their practices in order to improve them. This is the 
rationale behind Modelski's observation that party systems 
and openness are key characteristics of all leading global 
powers. Both facilitate the self-examination critical to 
leadership. Current theories of management and 
organizational behavior confirm this.^s systems that cannot 
correct flawed practices, or deal with changing environments, 
wither and die. As social science research begins to focus 
more and more on the relationships between ethical practice, 
economic success, and social pathologies, it is possible that 
our views of the morally autonomous individual will change. 
Just as the hard shell conceptualization of the state in much 
of realist theory is countered by the emphasis on non-state 
actors in liberal theory, the hard shell concept of the 
liberal individual must be replaced with an understanding 
more amenable to both the empirical and normative conceptions 
that account for the increasingly decentered character of 
international relations.
On a range of recent organizational theories that have stressed 
the need for openness and critical self-examination of practices, see 
Jay M. Shafritz and J. Steven Ott eds.. Classics of Organization Theory 
(Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace, 1996), 485-493.
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As Che world becomes smaller and events become more 
visible globally, the inherent desire to construct 
institutions that can unite us will become more powerful. As 
Dostoyevsky showed through "The Grand Inquisitor,' the 
temptation to choose security over freedom in the face of 
uncertainty is sometimes overwhelming. Federal liberty, with 
its restrictions on absolute autonomy, requires more of us 
than is at times comfortable. The decision to provide for the 
widow and the orphan, or for that matter, the scholar and the 
artist, is not obvious to those concerned only with 
"preferences." Isolationism is not just a hazard of foreign 
policy; it can enervate individuals as well and prepare them 
for despotism, one of Tocqueville's central concerns. The 
shift from federal to natural liberty helps make the iron 
cage possible. Whether or not liberalism evolves in a 
covenantal direction is largely a function of whether or not 
citizens in liberal states are persuaded that this is the 
case.
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